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Abstract 
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) dominate the Single Market 
contributing to local employment generation and innovative supplies and 
services development. Yet, SMEs are continuously disproportionately 
underrepresented in public markets. On average EU member states spend 
approximately 14% of their gross domestic product (GDP) concluding 
public supplies, services and works contracts. EU rules aim to promote 
cross-border trade in the Single Market by removing the barriers faced by 
suppliers when tendering for public contracts. This research questions 
whether the inclusion of social criteria and innovative procedures 
facilitates SME participation in public contracts. The research questions 
what impact “the division of large contracts into small ‘lots’; the use of 
community benefit clauses; the use of subcontractor considerations; and 
the use of pre-commercial procurement (PCP) procedures” has on SME 
participation. A cross-border comparative case-study approach is adopted 
to examine the inclusion of social criteria and innovative procedures in 
four case studies. The case studies scrutinise the inclusion of social criteria 
in; a €1.7 billion works contract for the construction of a New Children’s 
Hospital in Ireland, a £27 million catering, cleaning and ancillary services 
contract conducted by Northern Ireland’s Central Procurement 
Directorate, and two PCP competitions conducted by Smart Dublin and 
Smart Belfast. The findings show how; the use of community benefit 
clauses and the use of lots facilitated a social enterprise in winning a 
proportion of a £27 million services and supplies contract; the use of 
subcontractor considerations resulted in the awarding of €500,000 of 
subcontracts to SMEs on a €1.7 billion contract within six months of 
contract commencement, and the use of PCP facilitated the participation 
of nine SMEs in public contracts. The thesis argues that public procurers 
should not to treat SMEs as a homogenised group and should design 
appropriate and proportionate policies for different forms of businesses, 
including social enterprises and innovative start-ups.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Public procurement is fast becoming a key instrument used to achieve 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the European Single Market.1 
The EU public procurement market accounts for approximately € 2 trillion 
per annum, representing 14% of EU gross domestic product (GDP).2 
Public procurement should be used to secure high-quality public services 
and goods while ensuring the efficient use of public finances.3 It may be 
used to drive innovative, energy-efficient, and socially-inclusive 
economies.4 This research is interested in the latter objective, the pursuit 
of socially-driven public procurement practices. One way this is achieved 
is through the facilitation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
participation in public contracts. SMEs account for two-thirds of overall 
employment in the EU and are the primary generators of innovative 
supplies and services.5 Facilitating SME participation in public 
procurement would yield a positive impact on employment creation, 
innovation generation and economic growth.6 The research questions to 
what extent the inclusion of social criteria and innovative procedures in 
public procurement facilitates SME participation. The EU Directives on 
                                                                                      
1 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (2014) OJ L 94/65 (Public Sector 
Directive), recital 2. 
2 See Commission, ‘Making Public Procurement work in and for Europe.’ 
(Communication) COM (2017) 572 final. 
3 See Commission, ‘Single Market Act II Together for new growth.’ (Communication) 
COM (2012) 0573 final. 
4 See COM (2017) 572 final. 
5 See Commission, ‘Annual Report on European SMEs 2017/2018. SMEs Growing 
beyond borders.’ (2017) 031. The definition of an SME covers all enterprises with less 
than 250 employees and equal to or less than either €50million turnover or €43million 
balance sheet total. Micro-enterprises are the smallest category of SME, with less than 
ten employees and a turnover or balance sheet total equal to or less than €2million. See 
Commission ‘Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises (notified under document number C(2003) 1422)’ (2003) 
OJ L 124/36, annex 2. 
6 See SIGMA, ‘Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Public Procurement.’ (2017) 
Brief 33, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
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Public Procurement and supporting policies include provisions to support 
SME participation; including the division of large contracts into smaller 
lots, use of proportionate financial and selection criteria, and the use of 
open, straightforward and electronic procedures.7 A cross-border 
comparative case study approach is adopted to analyse what impact the 
inclusion of social criteria has on SME participation in public contracts, 
either as a main contractor or as a subcontractor. The research will support 
current literature by demonstrating that the use of social criteria, namely 
“the division of large contracts into smaller ‘lots’; the use of community 
benefit clauses; the use of subcontractor considerations; and the use of 
pre-commercial procurement procedures” facilitated SME participation in 
each of the case studies. The thesis contributes to existing research by 
emphasising the importance of not treating SMEs as a homogenised 
group, and by exploring what impact the inclusion of social criteria has on 
sub-forms of SMEs, such as social enterprises and innovative start-ups. 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a context for the research topic, 
research question and research objectives.  
 
1.2 Introduction 
Public bodies spend billions of Euro annually purchasing works, goods 
and services, thus making procurement an important lever for achieving 
societal goals and fostering competitive markets.8 Public procurement is 
defined as an activity which involves the disbursement of public money 
aimed at the acquisition of works, supplies and services for consideration.9 
The definition extends to acquisitions, whether under formal contract or 
not, of goods, services and construction contracts concluded by public 
bodies.10 Public procurement operates at centralised or decentralised 
levels, with a wide variety of central government bodies, regional and 
                                                                                      
7 Public Sector Directive, recital 78. 
8 Public Sector Directive, recital 2. 
9 Public Sector Directive, art 1(2). 
10 S. Arrowsmith, ‘The law of public and utilities procurement.’ (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London) 388. 
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local authorities and semi-state bodies procuring various public 
contracts.11 It is an operational task that ensures the efficient management 
of the state; for example, ensuring hospitals have medical equipment, local 
authorities have access to water treatment services, and central 
government departments have adequate ICT services.12  Public procurers 
are expected to behave in a manner that is honest, fair and achieves value 
for taxpayers’ money, with all spending activities subject to audit and 
scrutiny.13  
Public procurement is regulated to prevent public procurers purchasing in 
a reckless or discriminatory manner. It was not until the early 1970s that 
regional regulation of government purchasing was adopted, with the EU 
creating a series of rules governing public purchasing to integrate and 
promote regional trade.14 The US adopted similar practices in the 1980s15 
and plurilateral world trade agreements were adopted globally in the early 
1990s.16 The public procurement rules have been revised to ensure the 
efficiency of public spending and to facilitate smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth, which includes the facilitation of SME participation.17 
The Directives are ultimately underwritten by a series of fundamental 
freedoms and principles derived from the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).18  Even though the TFEU does not explicitly 
refer to procurement, all Member States’ contracting authorities must 
comply with the internal market’s fundamental freedoms, namely the free 
                                                                                      
11 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Public Procurement.’ (2011) COD 0438. 
12 While there is a consensus on what procurement entails, debate remains as to whether 
‘public procurement’ is defined as a profession. See R.E. Lloyd, and C. P. McCue, ‘What 
is public procurement? Definitional problems and implications.’ (2004) 3 International 
Public Procurement Conference Proceedings 2. See also K.V. Thai, ‘Public procurement 
re-examined.’ (2001) 1(1) Journal of Public Procurement 9. 
13 Public sector employees responsible for procuring public contracts will be subject to 
various public and administrative requirements under domestic law. 
14  Commission Directive 70/32/EEC of 17 December 1969 on provision of goods to the 
State, to local authorities and other official bodies [1970] O.J. L13/1. 
15 Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulation. Parts 1 through 53 (1984). 
16 See the WTO plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (1994) art I – XII. 
17 Public Sector Directive, recital 2. 
18 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2016] OJ C202/1. 
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movement of goods,19 persons,20 services,21 and capital22 and the 
prohibition of anti-competitive measures.23 Member States’ public bodies 
must conform to the principles derived from the fundamental freedoms, 
including the principles of transparency,24 mutual recognition,25 
proportionality,26 non-discrimination,27 and equal treatment.28 
The research questions to what extent the inclusion of social criteria and 
innovative procedures in public procurement facilitates SME 
participation. While SMEs represent 99% of all businesses in the EU, 
SMEs are disproportionately underrepresented in public markets.29 SMEs 
are faced with administrative and financial barriers when competing for 
public contracts.30 The Public Sector Directive includes several provisions 
which encourage small business participation, such as the permissible 
division of large contracts into smaller lots, use of proportionate non-
economic criteria and use of open and electronic procedures.31 The 
                                                                                      
19 See TFEU, art 34.  
20 See TFEU, art 45. 
21 See TFEU, art 56. 
22 See TFEU, art 63. 
23 See TFEU, arts 101 – 109. 
24 Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria 
AG [2000] ECR I-10745. 
25 Case T-258/06 Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission [2010] ECR-
2027. 
26 Case C-376/08 Serrantoni Srl i Consorzio stabile edili Scrl v. Comune di 
Milano [2009] ECR I-12169. 
27 Case C-225/98, Commission v France (“Nord-pas-de-Calais”) [2000] ECR I-7445. 
28 Case C-13/63, Italy v Commission [1963] ECR 165 at paragraph III, (4)(a); Case C-
306/93, SMW Winzersekt v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1994] ECR I-5555 at paragraph 30. 
29 See Commission, ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ access to Public Procurement Markets in the 
EU.’ (2010) Final Report. 
30 See Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
31 In particular the research is interested in the study of the following articles of the Public 
Sector Directive; 
Art. 18(2) Mandatory social clause; 
Art. 20 Reserved contract; 
Art. 40 Preliminary market consultations; 
Art. 42(1) Technical specifications and accessibility requirements; 
Art. 43 Labels; 
Art. 46 Division of contracts into lots; 
Art. 56 Choice of participants and award of contracts; 
Art. 57 Exclusion grounds; 
Art. 67 Contract award criteria; 
Art. 69 Abnormally low tenders; 
Art. 70 Conditions for performance of contracts; 
Art. 71 Subcontracting. 
17 
 
research investigates the extent to which the inclusion of social criteria in 
public contracts facilitates SME participation.  Improving the relationship 
between SMEs and public procurement is intended to bring about 
increased value to the European economy, stimulate higher growth and 
increase job opportunities.32 
One aim of the research is to address the problems faced by public bodies 
in facilitating SME friendly policies in their tendering practices. 
Additionally, the research aims to contribute to the level of understanding 
of the strategic role of European procurement to both academics and 
practitioners. Public procurement is one of the key market instruments of 
the Europe 2020 Strategy which supports smart, sustainable and inclusive 
economic growth.33 EU Public Procurement Directives were revised and 
adopted in 2014 in response to the adoption of the Single Market Act.34 
The updated Directives encourage the use of environmental and social 
purchasing and have simplified procurement procedures for contracting 
authorities, thus providing easier access for SMEs.35 Public procurement 
law is a form of economic law, and as some of the revisions made to the 
rules were of a socially-centred nature, it is crucial that the research 
questions what are the objectives of the legislation?36 Are the rules 
economically or socially driven, and how can these two often 
contradictory objectives be harmoniously achieved? 
                                                                                      
32 G. de Wit and J. de Kok, 'Do Small Businesses Create More Jobs? New Evidence for 
Europe' (2014) 42(2) Small Business Economics 283; P. McCann and R. Ortega 
Argiles,’Smart Specialisation, Entrepreneurship and SMEs: Issues and Challenges for a 
Results-Oriented EU Regional Policy’ (2016) 4(4) Small Business Economics 537. 
33 See Commission, ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth.’ (2010) COM 2020 final. 
34 Public procurement was identified as one of the twelve levers to boost growth. See 
Commission, ‘Single Market Act Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen 
confidence "Working together to create new growth"’ (Communication) COM (2011) 
0206 final. 
35 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Public Procurement.’ (2011) COD 0438. 
36 Trepte contends that it is difficult to understand what the true objectives of the 2014 
Directives are and questions the purpose of including secondary social objectives. See P. 
Trepte, ‘Forward to the Second Edition in A. Sánchez Graells Public procurement and 
the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) xii. 
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On the one hand, the government is participating in the market as a 
purchaser with a tight budget, and on the other hand, the government must 
regulate the market with its purchasing power to advance conceptions of 
social justice.37 Literature differs on what the purpose of procurement 
legislation should be, with some contending the correct application of the 
rules should foster competition to secure economic efficiencies and should 
not incorporate any non-economic criteria which would distort the market 
place.38 A competing argument asserts that the rules are indeed concerned 
with promoting competitive cross-border trade, but additionally 
acknowledge that public procurement can contribute to the development 
of a smart, inclusive and innovative Single Market.39 The research works 
towards defining a middle ground between the two opposing arguments 
by investigating the extent to which the inclusion of social criteria in 
public contracts facilitates SME participation. 
SMEs play a fundamental role in the European Single Market, SMEs are 
the primary drivers for generating local employment, sustaining local 
economies and promoting entrepreneurship and business risk-taking in all 
areas of society.40 The research aims to identify the barriers facing SMEs 
selling into the public market and questions whether the use of social 
criteria and innovative procedures would improve participation in the 
marketplace. The thesis will identify the extent to which the use of social 
criteria helped to address market gaps in SMEs’ access. Current literature, 
as we will see in ‘Chapter 3 SMEs and Public Procurement’, 
acknowledges that there are a number of hurdles which SMEs must 
overcome to enter the public market. SMEs struggle to find and effectively 
compete for relevant sized-contracts. Onerous bidding documents which 
                                                                                      
37 C. McCrudden, ‘Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement and Legal 
Change.’ (2007) Oxford University Press. 
38 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Public procurement and the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn, 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) 121. 
39 G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon;New 
York, NY, 2015) 11. 
40 D. Floyd and J. McManus, ‘The role of SMEs in improving the competitive position of 
the European Union.’ (2005) 17(2) European Business Review 144; See also See 
Commission, ‘Annual Report on European SMEs 2017/2018. SMEs Growing beyond 
borders.’ (2017) 031. 
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set high selection and qualification criteria limit SME participation as the 
criteria can only be met by large organisations. Public procurement 
policies tend to offer supports to SMEs, which have the ability to compete 
for advertised contracts and offers assistance on how to ease the tender 
requirements and experience for SMEs. Procurement dedicated policies 
encourage public procurers to conduct open, electronic and proportionate 
tender competitions. Procurers are encouraged to include relevant and fair 
selection and award criteria and to offer unsuccessful tenderers sufficient 
information to help the SMEs to understand why their bids were rejected. 
This research offers a broader perspective; it assesses how different 
criteria assists SMEs entering contracts which they are normally excluded 
from, such as large contracts and assists SMEs in entering the public 
market for the first time. The research does not focus primarily on 
improving SMEs’ tendering skills and abilities and focuses on how public 
procurers can design more inclusive and socially conscious procurement 
practices to facilitate SME participation. This research contributes to the 
current literature by assessing how the inclusion of community benefit 
clauses, subcontractor considerations, PCP practices and the division of 
larger contracts into smaller lots assists all forms of SME participation in 
public procurement.  
The research adopts a socio-legal approach, relying on cross-national 
comparative case studies. The mixed-method triangulation approach 
allows for the research to examine the impact of including social criteria 
in public contracts.41 A primarily qualitative approach is adopted, 
interviews with key public procurers and small businesses were conducted 
to gain a practical understanding of the issues facing the inclusion of social 
criteria in public contracts. The research explores four comparative case 
studies, two from Ireland and two from Northern Ireland. Two of the case 
studies analyse the use of social criteria in high-value contracts, the other 
set of comparative studies explore the procurement processes for low-
                                                                                      
41Multiple research methods were employed to deepen the researcher’s knowledge of the 
topic. See D. Watkins and M. Burton eds., ‘Research methods in law’ (2nd edt., 
Routledge, 2017) 5; The research methodology is discussed in Chapter 4.  
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value public contracts.42 Each case study examines whether the inclusion 
or use of the following social criteria and procedures facilitates SME 
participation in public procurement;43  
• Division of large contracts into smaller “lots.” 
• The inclusion of Community Benefit Clauses - For example, encouraging 
winning contractors to employ long-term unemployed people through the 
use of targeted recruitment and training clauses (TR&T)44 
• Use of Subcontractor Considerations - Allowing SMEs to gain a 
proportion of a large contract 
• Use of Pre-commercial Procurement (PCP) - Allowing SMEs to prepare 
for tender competitions and to inform public buyers of any new innovative 
good or service 
For the high-value case studies, a €1.7 billion construction contract for the 
New Children’s Hospital in Dublin 8 is reviewed. This contract is 
compared to £27mn ‘Cleaning, Catering and Ancillary Services’ contract 
procured by Northern Ireland’s Central Procurement Directorate and the 
Buy Social Unit. For the low-value case studies, pre-commercial 
tendering practices of Dublin City Council and Belfast City Council are 
reviewed. These case studies review a contract procured by Dublin City 
Council’s ‘Smart Cities’ initiative and a contract procured by the Belfast 
City Council’s ‘Smart Belfast’ counterpart. The value of the contracts 
ranged from €12,500 to €50,000. 
                                                                                      
42 When referring to ‘high-value’ and ‘low-value’ sized contracts, the research is referring 
to contracts which fall above or below the financial thresholds. See Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2365 of 18 December 2017 amending Directive 
2014/24/EU in respect of the application thresholds for the procedures for the award of 
contracts. 
43 These criteria where identified during the literature review, Chapter Two and Three 
explore the reasons for choosing these criteria in detail. 
44 This form of social criteria is particularly suitable for facilitating social enterprise 
participation. The research does not treat SMEs as a homogenised group, and studies 
what impact the inclusion of social criteria has on different types of SMEs. Community 
benefit clauses are discussed in detail in Chapter Two and Three. 
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Ireland and Northern Ireland have similar public procurement regulations 
and expenditure and have adopted resembling SME friendly policy 
goals.45 Both states have adopted policies which aim to improve suppliers’ 
access to public contracts, deliver financial savings and promote the use 
of environmental purchasing.46 SMEs are the backbone of both the Irish 
and Northern Irish economies,47 and efforts have been made by both states 
to ease the financial and administrative burdens associated with tendering 
for public contracts.48 Recently, Northern Ireland introduced socially-
centred policies, encouraging contracting authorities to include 
community benefit clauses in certain high-value public works and services 
contracts.49 Cross-border procurement is of significant importance to the 
two countries, SMEs based on the island of Ireland tender easily and freely 
for public contracts. This research aims to further support the facilitation 
of SME participation in both public markets to support the sustainable and 
competitive development of the all-island procurement market.  
The case study findings allow for the research to establish a framework 
for analysing the impact of the inclusion of social criteria in public 
contracts on SME participation. The research will improve understanding 
of public procurement and public administrative management. It assesses 
the impact the Public Sector Directive has on national strategic 
procurement policies. This is of crucial importance to Ireland as national 
public procurement regulations and policies are heavily influenced by the 
Public Sector Directive and tend to favour rule-based decision-making, 
                                                                                      
45 The European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016 (SI No. 
284 of 2016) implements Directive 2014/24/EU into Irish law. The Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 (SI No 205 of 2015) implement in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland Directive 2014/24/EU. 
46 See Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’. 
(2017) Ireland; Department of Finance and Personnel and the Central Procurement 
Directorate ‘Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy’ (2014) Version 11. 
47 British Irish Governmental Strategy Study on All Island Economy ‘Comprehensive 
study on the All-Island economy’ (Intertrade Ireland, 2018) 45. 
48 Including the promotion of e-procurement using the centralised advertising platforms; 
eTenders.gov.ie and eTendersni.gov.uk. 
49 Procurement Guidance Note (PGN) 01/13 Integrating Social Considerations into 
Contracts is applicable to all Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (NIPPP) users. 
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and do not adhere to using procurement as a strategic tool to achieve socio-
economic improvements.50  
The research understands the need for businesses and society to engage 
together to foster feasible and practical solutions to global sustainable and 
financial challenges.51 The challenges need to be addressed in a 
multidisciplinary manner, recognising the economic, legal and political 
components of smart, inclusive and sustainable public procurement 
markets.52 The research findings are used to draft a policy blueprint for 
public bodies. The blueprint offers public procurers advice on how to 
promote the participation of all forms of SME participation in both high 
and low-value contracts.  
1.3 Terminology 
While the next chapter discusses the objectives of public procurement law, 
it is timely to offer a brief definition of the commonly used terms in the 
research. Since the definitions of contracting authorities, contracting 
entities, public procurers and public bodies often overlap and refer to the 
same government-controlled or funded entities, it is important to state 
when they will be used or referred to in this thesis. Several definitions of 
socially-driven public procurement practices are used in the literature, EU 
policy and in national policy. This section signposts when each term will 
be used throughout the thesis.  
                                                                                      
50 However, it should be noted that in December 2018 the Office of Government 
Procurement published an information note on ‘Social Considerations in Public 
Procurement.’ The note is not a policy document and does not direct contracting 
authorities to purchase in a socially-centred manner, however, it offers advice to 
contracting authorities on how to incorporate social considerations in procurement 
competitions. 
51 United Nations ‘Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development’ A/RES/70/1 (2015). 
52 This involves viewing procurement beyond just a tendering task. For a more detailed 
discussion on the use of strategic procurement see H. Good, ‘Making public procurement 
strategic’ (2015) 44(2) The Public Manager 9. 
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1.3.1 Contracting authorities, contracting entities, public bodies, public 
procurers 
When referring to the general functions and capacity of a public unit, the 
research will refer to the unit as a ‘public body’ and will refer to the unit 
as a ‘contracting authority’ when discussing its procurement functions 
and responsibilities.53 The term ‘public procurer’ is used when referring 
to contracting authorities and entities.54 However, the research focuses on 
contracting authorities and not on contracting entities.55 This research 
does not focus on the Utilities,56 Concessions57 or Defence Directives58 on 
public procurement. The primary changes introduced to the 2014 
Directives supporting SME participation were introduced to the Public 
Sector Directive, hereinafter, it will be referred to as ‘the Directive.’ 
Irish and Northern Irish policies on SME participation are generally only 
applicable to public works, supplies and services contracts conducted by 
contracting authorities.59 The research does not review the Concessions 
Directive as there is limited information available in Ireland to review and 
compare with other jurisdictions.60 Additionally, SME friendly public 
                                                                                      
53 Public Sector Directive art 2(1) defines ‘contracting authorities’ as State, regional or 
local authorities, bodies governed by public law or associations formed by one or more 
such authorities or one or more such bodies governed by public law. 
54 While the term is used interchangeably in literature and policy, the term is not used in 
the Public Sector Directive nor is it used in the implementing Regulations in Ireland and 
in the UK. 
55 Directive 2014/25/EU art 4(1) defines ‘contracting entities’ as entities which are 
contracting authorities or public undertakings, and which pursue one of the utilities 
activities referred to in Articles 8 to 14. 
56 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal 
services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (2014) OJ L 94/243 (Utilities 
Directive). 
57 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on the award of concession contracts (2014) OJ L 94/1 (Concessions Directive). 
58 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply 
contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of 
defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (2014) OJ 
L 216/76. 
59 See Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’. 
(2017) Ireland; Department of Finance and Personnel and the Central Procurement 
Directorate ‘Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy’ (2014) Version 11. 
60 Directive 2014/23/EU was transposed late by the European Union (Award of 
Concession Contracts) Regulations 2017 (SI No. 203 of 2017) (the Concessions 
Regulations) in Ireland. The majority of the research for this thesis was being gathered 
at the time the Concession Regulations were being implemented into Irish law. Future 
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procurement policies focus on the impact SMEs can have in contracts 
conducted by central government departments, local and regional 
authorities and other bodies procuring public supplies, services and works 
contracts. Additionally, the research does not analyse contracts which fall 
within the light regime,61 services of general interest62 or state aid.63  
1.3.2 Social criteria, social considerations and social clauses 
This thesis is concerned with the use and impact of socially-driven public 
procurement practices. Chapter Two: Public Procurement Law and 
Objectives analyses the debate surrounding the use of social objectives, 
questioning the permissible use and remit of social goals. However, it is 
useful at this stage to offer a definition of socially responsible public 
procurement (SRPP).64 SRPP refers to public procurement activities 
which incorporate a social objective.65 Social objectives may refer to 
sustainable environmental goals, living standard targets, facilitating SME 
participation and promoting innovative public services.66 There is no 
unified definition of what comprises a ‘social objective.’67 It is an 
evolving term, which allows public bodies to use public procurement to 
help address existing or emerging societal challenges. There are individual 
                                                                                      
work may assess what impact the Concession Regulations have on SME engagement in 
the market. 
61 Public Sector Directive, annex XIV. 
62 See Commission, ‘A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2011) 0900 final.  
63 See TFEU, arts 107 – 109. 
64 This is also referred to as ‘socially sustainable procurement.’ However, this term in 
mainly used in private procurement literature, and ‘socially responsible procurement’ is 
used in public procurement literature. See T.N. Gladwin, T.S. Krause, and J.J. Kennelly, 
‘Beyond eco‐efficiency: Towards socially sustainable business’ (1995) 3(1) Sustainable 
Development 35; A. Semple Socially Responsible Public Procurement (SRPP) under EU 
Law and International Agreements (2017) 12 European Procurement and Public Private 
Partnership Law Review 293. 
65 H. Walker and S. Brammer, ‘Sustainable procurement in the United Kingdom public 
sector’ (2009) 14(2) Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 128; V. K. 
Malolitneva, and Institute of Economic and Legal Researches of the NAS of Ukraine, 
‘Horizontal objectives in Public Procurement’ (2018) 1 Economics and Law 15.  
66 See Commission, ‘Buying Social A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations 
in Public Procurement’ (Guide) SEC (2010) 1258, final. 
67 For a wider discussion on the design of social policy objectives see; S.L. Wartick, and 
P.L. Cochran, P.L., ‘The evolution of the corporate social performance model’ (1985) 
10(4) Academy of management review 758; S. Hilgartner and C.L. Bosk, ‘The rise and 
fall of social problems: A public arenas model.’ (1988) 94(1) American Journal of 
Sociology 53; P.J. May, ‘Policy learning and failure’ (1992) 12(4) Journal of Public 
Policy 331. 
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streams of SRPP studies, including the study of sustainable public 
procurement (SPP),68 green public procurement (GPP)69 and public 
procurement of innovation.70 This thesis adopts the broadest definition of 
SRPP used in the European Buying Social guide. 
Furthermore, the term ‘social criteria’ is used throughout this thesis to 
describe the inclusion of a social objective in public procurement. The 
term is used to encompass the terms ‘social considerations’ and ‘social 
clauses’. It is essentially an umbrella term which is used when referring 
to both mandatory social clauses and voluntary social considerations. In 
the literature, the term ‘social clauses’ generally refers to contractual 
social benefit clauses.71 Commonly used social clauses in the UK and 
Ireland, tend to be ‘community benefit clauses’.72 Such clauses impose 
mandatory socially-focused obligations onto contractors; such as 
‘targeted recruitment and training requirements.’ These clauses are used 
                                                                                      
68 ‘Sustainable Procurement’ has been defined by the UK Sustainable Procurement 
Taskforce as a ‘process whereby organisations meet their needs for goods, services, 
works and utilities in a way that achieves value for money on a whole life basis in terms 
of generating benefits not only to the organisation, but also to society and the economy, 
whilst minimising damage to the environment.’ Procuring the Future – The Sustainable 
Procurement Task Force National Action Plan (DEFRA, London, 2006). 
69 Green public procurement often overlaps with sustainable procurement. While 
sustainable procurement is concerned with social, environmental and economic aspects 
of procurement decisions, green public procurement is generally associated with 
environmental aspects. Fisher comments that green public procurement is more widely 
accepted than other socially-responsible public procurement practices. See E. Fisher, 
‘The Power of Purchase: Addressing Sustainability through Public 
Procurement’ (2013) 8 Eur Procurement & Pub Private Partnership L Rev 2. 
70 The different forms of innovative public procurement are discussed in Chapter Two 
and Chapter Three. Innovative public procurement refers to the use of innovative 
procurement procedures or the use of public expenditure to purchase innovative 
solutions. See L. Hommen and M. Rolfstam, ‘Public procurement and innovation: 
towards a taxonomy’ (2009) 9(1) Journal of Public Procurement 17. 
71 See T. Schulten, K. Alsos, P. Burgess and K. Pedersen, ‘Pay and other social clauses 
in European public procurement. An overview on regulation and practices with a focus 
on Denmark, Germany, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.’ Study on behalf 
of the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) (EPSU, Düsseldorf, 2012); 
J. Bernete Garcia, ‘Social Clauses in Public Procurement: New Tools to Promote Local 
Employment’ (2013) 26(1) Cuadernos De Trabajo Social 85; C. Barnard, ‘To boldly go: 
social clauses in public procurement’ (2017) 46(2) Industrial Law Journal 208.  
72 Two of the research case studies assess the impact of the inclusion of community 
benefit clauses on SME participation in the Irish and Northern Irish public markets. 
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to promote the employment of disadvantaged people or people with 
disabilities.73  
This research will use the term ‘social clauses’ when discussing socially 
driven mandatory clauses. These types of clauses are generally included 
as weighted award criteria in a procurement competition and subsequently 
included as contractual performance clauses during the contract execution 
stage.74 Non-compliance with contractual performance clauses can be 
subject to contractual enforcement or penalties.75 This research will refer 
to the term ‘social considerations’ when discussing socially driven 
voluntary objectives. Contracting authorities may ask contractors to take 
into account the contracting authority’s environmental or socially 
sustainable policies and objectives when compiling their tender 
submission or performing their awarded contractual duties.76 Contracting 
authorities may ask tenderers to consider developing a sustainable supply 
chain by subcontracting with SMEs.77 In general, non-compliance with 
social considerations cannot be subject to contractual enforcement or 
penalties.  
The next chapter spends more time discussing the remit of the social 
objectives of public procurement. It reviews definitions set out in the 
                                                                                      
73 See; Social Value Act (UK), 2012; Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act, 2014; 
Northern Ireland’s CPD Policy Government Note, ‘Integrating Social Considerations 
into Contracts’ (2016) PGN 01/13. Also note that a draft proposal for a Northern Irish 
Buy Social Value Act has been put on hold since the collapse of the government in 2017. 
74 Social clauses may be included as contractual performance clauses once they are 
proportionately linked to the subject matter of the public contract. The clauses must 
comply with the TFEU principles and must not confer unrestricted freedom on the 
contracting authority. Public Sector Directive, arts 67 and 70. 
75 However, as we will see in the case study chapters, contracting authorities are not 
applying penalties for non-compliance with the community benefit clauses and instead, 
are focussing on building close relationships with the contractors to encourage and 
monitor compliance with the social targets.   
76 See Commission, ‘Buying Social A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations 
in Public Procurement’ (Guide) SEC (2010) 1258, final; Commission, ‘Buying Green! 
A handbook on green public procurement. Third Edition (Guidance)’ (2016) COM 179 
77 See Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy 
(2014); Version 11. Available at; https://www.finance-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/dfp/ni-public-procurement-policy-version-11-
august-2014.pdf Last accessed 25/04/2019; Office of Government Procurement, 
‘National Public Procurement Framework’ Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods 
and Services.’ (2019). Version 2.1 Accessible at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/national-
public-procurement-policy-framework/ Last accessed 2nd June 2019. 
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Directive, regional and national policy documents, decided judgments and 
peer-reviewed literature.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The research is divided into nine chapters. Chapter Two and Chapter 
Three offer an analysis of current legislation and academic literature. 
Chapter Four sets out the research methodology. Chapters Five to Eight 
review the selected case studies, and Chapter Nine concludes the thesis by 
offering a summary of the research findings. 
1.4.1 Chapter Two 
Chapter Two offers an analysis of the European rules governing public 
procurement.78 The chapter concentrates on analysing the two 
fundamental and often competing objectives of the rules; the economic 
objectives and the social objectives. The underpinning objective of the EU 
public procurement rules is to curb protectionist purchasing and to foster 
competitive cross-border trade. The economic objective of the rules is to 
achieve cost-savings through competitive cross-border tendering and 
price convergence.79 While some academics maintain that the economic 
objectives of the rules are the sole goal of the market-based instruments,80 
an alternative more dominant argument accepts that the economic 
objectives of the rules have been developed since the 1970s to include 
social objectives.81 The 2014 Directives were modernised to ensure the 
efficiency of public spending, the facilitation of SMEs and to support 
common societal goals.82 The research accepts that the pursuit of both 
social and economic objectives is permissible under the Directives. The 
                                                                                      
78 The research focuses on the Public Sector Directive. 
79 C. Bovis, ‘Research handbook on EU public procurement law’ (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2016) ix. 
80 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Public procurement and the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) 9. 
81 S. Arrowsmith and P.F. Kunzlik, ‘Social and environmental policies in EC 
procurement law: new directives and new directions’ (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; New York, 2009) 100. 
82 See Commission, ‘Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement 
policy: Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market’ COM (2011) 15/47. 
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chapter identifies social and innovative criteria which have the potential 
to encourage SME participation in public markets, such as the division of 
large contracts into smaller lots, procedure and award criteria choice, the 
use of community benefit clauses, the use of subcontractor considerations, 
and the use of innovative processes.83 The chapter concludes by 
summarising how the Directives are implemented in the case study 
countries, Ireland and Northern Ireland.84 
 
1.4.2 Chapter Three 
Chapter Three offers a discussion on the relationship between SMEs and 
public procurement. The prime purpose of this chapter is to identify the 
key factors which impact SME participation in EU public markets. Firstly, 
the chapter reviews the significance of the role SMEs play in the Single 
Market, highlighting their importance in driving employment and 
generating innovative supplies and services.85 Attention is then placed on 
the reasons as to why SMEs are hindered from successfully bidding for 
public contracts and continues to identify which factors are conducive to 
supporting SME participation. Factors which both hinder and support 
SME participation include; type of procuring body, size and value of the 
                                                                                      
83 Public Sector Directive; 
Art. 18(2) Mandatory social clause; 
Art. 20 Reserved contract; 
Art. 40 Preliminary market consultations; 
Art. 42(1) Technical specifications and accessibility requirements; 
Art. 46 Division of contracts into lots; 
Art. 56 Choice of participants and award of contracts; 
Art. 57 Exclusion grounds; 
Art. 67 Contract award criteria; 
Art. 70 Conditions for performance of contracts; 
Art. 71 Subcontracting; 
84 The European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016 (SI No. 
284 of 2016) implements Directive 2014/24/EU into Irish law. The Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 implement in England, Wales and Northern Ireland Directive 
2014/24/EU. 
85 See J. de Kok, P. Vroonhof. W. Verhoeven, N. Timmermans T. Kwaak, J. Snijders F. 
Westhof, ‘Do SMEs create more and better jobs?’ (2011) EIM Report 6. Available at; 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-
review/files/supporting-documents/2012/do-smes-create-more-and-better-jobs_en.pdf  
Last accessed 2nd June 2019. 
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public contract, type of procurement procedure and award criteria used in 
tender competitions.86  
 
1.4.3 Chapter Four  
The research methodology is discussed in detail in Chapter Four. A cross-
border comparative case study is adopted. Four comparable case studies 
were identified in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The two countries were 
selected for many reasons; for example, their public market size and 
structure is comparable, SMEs are dominant in both markets and face 
similar hurdles in participating in public procurement.87 Both countries 
have recently adopted ‘Smart Cities’ initiatives, using PCP practices to 
drive social goals and improve urban living standards in cities.88 Similarly, 
both states have recently incorporated community benefit clauses into 
large public contracts. An overview of how the case studies were selected, 
conducted and analysed is additionally offered.  
 
1.4.4 Chapter Five  
Chapter Five offers an analysis of a €1.7 billion works contract for the 
construction of the New Children’s Hospital in Dublin. The central aim of 
this chapter is to scrutinise what impact the inclusion of social criteria had 
on SME engagement.89 Three measures were assessed, the division of the 
contract into smaller lots, the use of community benefit clauses and 
                                                                                      
86 See Commission ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
87 See R. Fee, A. Erridge and S. Hennigan, ‘SMEs and government purchasing in 
Northern Ireland: problems and opportunities’ (2002) 14(5) European Business Review 
326; A. Flynn, and P. Davis, ‘The policy–practice divide and SME-friendly public 
procurement’ (2016) 34(3) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 559. 
88 Smart Cities initiatives are being implemented globally, public authorities are forming 
partnerships with citizens, academia and private sector bodies to develop internet data 
infrastructures to improve urban living. See D. McLaren and J. Agyeman, ‘Sharing 
cities: a case for truly smart and sustainable cities’ (MIT Press, 2015). 
89 SMEs are normally ‘locked out’ of large contracts, this case study assesses if the use 
of social criteria facilitates SME participation in the contract as a main contractor or as a 
subcontractor. See Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and 
aggregation of demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
30 
 
subcontractor considerations.90 The chapter opens with a review of the 
development of the socially conscious procurement procedure, reviewing 
the design of the individual clauses and considerations included in the 
request for tender and contractual performance clauses. Research was 
gathered for this case study by reviewing the request for tender (RFT) 
documentation and conducting interviews with key members of the 
procurement team.91 The findings offer convincing evidence that the 
inclusion of the social criteria resulted in the facilitation of SMEs in the 
supply chain. The use of voluntary subcontractor considerations resulted 
in the awarding of subcontracts to local SMEs within six months of 
contract commencement. The estimated value of the subcontracts is 
€500,000. In contrast to this finding, the community benefit clauses have 
not yet created an entry route for SMEs to enter the market.92 The 
concluding section of the chapter offers an analysis of the verifiable 
research findings.  
 
1.4.5 Chapter Six 
Chapter Six analyses the first comparative Northern Irish case study. The 
case study involves the study of a £27 million public supplies and services 
contract conducted by Northern Ireland’s Central Procurement 
Directorate (CPD) and the Buy Social Unit.93 While the contract 
conducted was for the supply and operations of a cleaning, catering and 
ancillary services, it included comparable social criteria with the National 
Children’s Hospital works contract. The contract included mandatory 
community benefit clauses, voluntary subcontractor considerations and 
the contract was divided into smaller lots. The core objective of this 
chapter is to assess the extent to which the inclusion of the comparable 
                                                                                      
90 Similar social criteria were included in the Northern Irish case study example.  
91 Research for this case study was gathered from 2016 – 2018.  
92 These findings are also discussed in Chapter Nine; Conclusions and Discussion 
93 While the Central Procurement Directorate (CPD) is now known as the ‘Construction 
and Procurement Delivery’ (CPD), the case study chapters will continue to refer to the 
CPD as the Central Procurement Directorate. This is the title used in all of the call for 
competition and contracts notices reviewed for this thesis.   
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social criteria in the public services contract facilitated SME participation. 
This contract was the first large scale services contract to incorporate 
social criteria in Northern Ireland.94 The social criteria used in this 
contract resulted in the awarding of one of the contractual lots to a 
consortium partnership comprising of one large organisation95 and one 
social enterprise.96 A subcontract was also awarded to a B-corporation.97 
In a similar fashion to the National Children’s Hospital case study, the 
request for tender (RFT) document was reviewed, and interviews were 
conducted with the public officials and awardee companies.  
There are several similarities between this case study’s findings and the 
National Children’s Hospital case study’s findings. Firstly, the findings 
indicate that subcontractor protection considerations encourage SME 
participation. Secondly, the findings indicate that the successful 
implementation of socially responsible public procurement practices is 
driven by dedicated and trained public officials, who maintain a 
connection between the tendering and contract performance stages. 
Thirdly, the findings commonly suggest that there is a need for public 
authorities to refrain from treating SMEs as a homogenised group.98 
Public authorities are encouraged to introduce additional measures to 
encourage social enterprise participation in the public market, particularly 
                                                                                      
94 In particular, this contract is noted as the first services contract to include targeted 
recruitment and training clauses. Community benefit clauses are routinely included in 
works contracts. See CPD and Department of Finance Sustainable Procurement in 
Construction; Sustainability Requirements; Model Contract Clauses and Guidance 
(2019). 
95 The contract was awarded to G4S and Loaf Catering, operating under the Now Group. 
G4S is a large organisation that employs over 34,000 people in the UK and Ireland. See; 
www.g4s.ie Last accessed 30th April 2019. 
96 Loaf Catering is a small social enterprise employing 14 people. See more about the 
company at; https://www.loafcatering.com/our-team Last accessed 30th April 2019. 
Kerlin defines a social enterprise as a company operating with a goal to generate profits, 
and a second goal to use the profits generated to address societal challenges, such as the 
employment of disadvantaged groups or environmentally sustainable goals. See; J.A. 
Kerlin, ‘Social enterprise in the United States and Europe: Understanding and learning 
from the differences’ (2006) 17(3) Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and 
Nonprofit Organizations 246. 
97 Ingeus, a B-corporation was awarded a subcontract. B-corporations are generally a 
registered company, not a charity, which have formally registered a social target in their 
articles of association. B-corporations require independent certification and annual 
audits. See B. Cummings, ‘Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote 
the Public Interest’ (2012) 112 Columbia Law Review 578. 
98 These findings are discussed in detail in Chapter 9 Conclusions and Discussion. 
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in contracts which include community benefit requirements. However, 
this case study differs from the National Children’s Hospital case study as 
the inclusion of mandatory community benefit clauses facilitated social 
enterprise participation in the main contract. The community benefit 
clause included in the National Children’s Hospital contract did not 
facilitate any form of SME participation.  
1.4.6 Chapter Seven 
The purpose of Chapter Seven is to review the impact the use of a low-
value PCP had on SME engagement. This chapter reviews a ‘Small 
Business Innovation Research’ (SBIR)99 PCP competition conducted by 
the Smart Dublin programme.100 There was an overriding social objective 
of the contract. The competition sought to increase the number of cyclists 
in Dublin city by 25%.101 The chapter reviews the procurement documents 
used in carrying out the competition. Interviews were conducted with the 
procuring officer and awardee companies to assess the impact of the use 
of the procedure. The results of this case study show that socially 
responsible procurement practices can encourage start-up growth. Five 
companies were awarded a contract with Dublin City Council through the 
Smart Dublin programme, four of which were successful in bidding for a 
second contract with the public body. Post completion of the public 
contract, two of the four companies were successfully awarded contracts 
with other public bodies nationally and internationally.  
                                                                                      
99 SBIR is defined as a partnership between a public body and a private entity or 
entrepreneur, where the public body funds the private sector R&D projects. See A. Link 
and J. Scott, ‘Government as entrepreneur: Evaluating the commercialization success of 
SBIR projects’ (2010) 39(5) Research Policy 589. 
100 Smart Dublin was established in 2016 and aims to develop partnerships with industry, 
academic and the community to develop innovative solutions to solve societal 
challenges. 
101 See http://smartdublin.ie/challenges/ For an overview of the recent challenges 
conducted by the programme. Last accessed 7th June 2019. 
33 
 
1.4.7 Chapter Eight 
Chapter Eight compares a similar PCP activity conducted by the Smart 
Belfast programme.102 Similarly, to the other case studies, this research 
was conducted over three years, the request for tender and sample 
contracts were reviewed, and interviews were conducted with the lead 
project manager and with an awardee company. The case study findings 
show that small businesses are at the forefront of developing innovative 
solutions to public challenges. Four small companies were awarded  
£5,000 at phase one of the competition, and two companies were awarded 
£50,000 at phase two to prototype and test the proposed solutions. One of 
the awardee companies identified approximately £0.5million of unpaid 
business revenue rates for the Council, and subsequently used the 
experience gained from the contract to win a further six PCP contracts. 
One of which was awarded by Smart Dublin. The initial results indicate 
that the use of PCP procedures by smart cities initiatives encourage SME 
participation in the public market. 
1.4.8 Chapter Nine 
Chapter Nine summarises and discusses the case studies findings. The 
findings indicate that the use of lots, community benefit clauses, 
subcontractor considerations and use of PCP facilitate SME participation 
in public procurement. These measures facilitated SME engagement when 
they were supported and driven by motivated public-sector officials, who 
were committed to implementing effective change in the organisation.103 
National and internal public body policies supported the successful 
                                                                                      
102 The Belfast Smart City objectives were formalised in the Belfast City Council 
‘Supporting Urban Innovation - The Smart Belfast Framework 2017 to 2021.’ The 
framework was adopted to support the implementation of the Belfast Agenda. The Belfast 
Agenda is the city’s first community plan, developed by city partners, residents and 
community organisations. It sets out long-term priority goals for the city. See The Belfast 
Agenda; 
https://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/council/Communityplanning/BelfastAgenda.aspx Last 
accessed 16th May 2019. 
103 The findings support arguments raised that the implementation of public sector change 
is dependent on the commitment of motivated champions. See; S. Fernandez and H.G. 
Rainey, ‘Managing successful organizational change in the public sector.’ In Debating 
Public Administration (Routledge, 2017) 7. 
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implementation of the socially driven practices in the case studies.104 
However, the research concludes that while the inclusion of the social 
criteria supported SME engagement in public procurement, treating SMEs 
as a homogenised group limits the prospects of different forms of 
businesses such as social enterprises and start-ups in bidding for public 
contracts.105 The thesis concludes by suggesting that public bodies should 
adopt specific policies to promote the facilitation of all forms of SMEs 
into the market place. The research also recognises that the success of 
socially responsible public procurement practices is dependent on the 
establishment of a working relationship between the public body and the 
contractor.  
1.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to offer an introduction to the research 
topic and question. Public procurement is an important market tool which 
can be used to promote cross-border trade in the Single Market and to 
support the Europe 2020 goals at a local and national level. SMEs play an 
essential role in supporting a more inclusive, innovative and sustainable 
Europe. SMEs dominate the Single Market and are the key market players 
in developing innovative supplies and services and are essential 
generators of local employment. However, SMEs are disproportionately 
underrepresented in public markets. This chapter explored the 
fundamental objective of this thesis to question whether the inclusion of 
social criteria in public procurement facilitates SME participation. In 
answering this question, a cross-border comparative case study approach 
is adopted to analyse what impact the inclusion of social criteria has on 
SME participation in public contracts, either as a main contractor or as a 
subcontractor. The thesis now continues by identifying and investigating 
                                                                                      
104 See Northern Ireland’s CPD Policy Government Note, ‘Integrating Social 
Considerations into Contracts’ (2016) PGN 01/13; The Irish Office of Government 
Procurement, ‘Social Considerations in Public Procurement.’ OGP. (2018). Accessible 
at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/information-notes/ Last accessed 16th May 2019. 
105 The barriers faced by innovative start-ups and small social enterprises will differ 
greatly from a medium-sized enterprise. 
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the applicable rules on public procurement, analysing how provisions set 
out in the rules and policies support SME engagement in public contracts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Chapter Two Public Procurement Law and Objectives 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Single Market Strategy supports the free movement of people, 
services, goods and capital, and creates competitive business opportunities 
for European companies.1 Public procurement is identified as an important 
market-based instrument to drive cross-border trade in the European 
‘Single Market.’2 The Single Market refers to the single market where the 
European Member States, citizens, and economic operators can trade 
goods and services and move freely without any internal borders or other 
regulatory obstacles.  Public procurement directives were introduced to 
support the harmonisation of procurement procedures and redress 
opportunities between the Member States.3 The 2014 Directives mark a 
significant change in the underpinning objectives, diluting the dominant 
economic goals and introducing socially focussed economic targets.4 
The specific objective of this chapter is to examine the changing 
objectives of public procurement legislation, questioning the permissible 
use of SME friendly provisions. The academic literature on public 
procurement has revealed the emergence of two contrasting themes. The 
first theme accepts and supports the use of socially responsible public 
procurement practices (SRPP) while the second theme dismisses the 
adoption of any objectives which diminish the core economic functions of 
the rules.5 The research traces how the original economic objectives have 
been extended to include socially driven criteria. An analysis of the 
                                                                                      
1 See Commission, ‘A Single Market Strategy for Europe - Analysis and Evidence. 
Accompanying the document Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for 
people and business’ SWD (2015) 202 final. 
2 See Commission, ‘White Paper for the completion of the Internal Market’ COM (1985) 
final, 85-310. 
3 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Public Procurement’ COD (2011) 1585 final. 
4 C. Barnard, ‘To boldly go: social clauses in public procurement’ (2017) 46(2) Industrial 
Law Journal 208. 
5 O. Martin-Ortega., O. Outhwaite., and W. Rook, ‘Buying power and human rights in 
the supply chain: legal options for socially responsible public procurement of electronic 
goods’ (2015) 19(3) The International Journal of Human Rights 341. 
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different stages of public procurement legislation is offered, summarising 
the main changes and developments introduced in each revision of the 
rules. 
Upon analysing the two contrasting themes, the research accepts that 
public procurement not only allows for the use of non-economic criteria 
but also encourages contracting authorities to use public procurement to 
develop smart, sustainable and inclusive economies. The research 
concentrates on assessing the use of socially responsible practices which 
have the potential to encourage SME participation in public procurement. 
Chapter Three continues this discussion by determining whether the social 
criteria included in the Directive and the implementing statutory 
instruments in Ireland and the UK address the constraints faced by SMEs 
when bidding for public contracts.  
 
2.2 Economic and Social Objectives 
Public procurers purchase works, goods and services within a set budget. 
Like their private-sector procuring counter-parts, public procurers must 
engage with the market to secure high-quality products and services at a 
reasonable cost.6  Procurers should have a working knowledge of the 
target market.7 If procurers have a good understanding of the market-
place, they will adopt procurement procedures which are best suited to 
fostering competition amongst the suppliers.8 Unlike, their private-sector 
counterparts, public procurers are not driven by the need to secure 
financial profits for shareholders. Public procurers are driven by the need 
                                                                                      
6 A. Erridge, and J. McIlroy, ‘Public Procurement and Supply Management 
Strategies’ (2002) 17(1) Public Policy and Administration 52. 
7 O. Mamavi, H. Nagati, F. Wehrle, and G. Pache, ‘Out of sight, out of mind? Supplier 
spatial proximity in French public procurement’ (2014) 27(6) International Journal of 
Public Sector Management 486. 
8 If a contracting authority seeks to purchase a generic product from a market dominated 
by suppliers, such as the supply of dry food products, the contracting authority would be 
best suited to conducting an open or restricted procurement procedure. However, if a 
contracting authority seeks to purchase a complex integrated ICT service from a market 
dominated by few suppliers, the authority should consider adopting a competitive 
dialogue or competitive procedure with negotiation. See Case C-84/03 Commission v 
Spain [2005] ECR I-00139. 
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to secure ‘value for taxpayers’ money.9 The term ‘value for money’ (VfM) 
has many definitions, to some VfM means purchasing on the basis of 
lowest cost, and to others, VfM means securing the optimum combination 
of whole life costs and quality.10 Public procurement legislation prevents 
public purchasers from purchasing in a preferential manner, requiring 
purchasers to conduct competitive procedures to secure their perceived 
conception of VfM.11 To secure the optimum combination of whole life 
costs and quality, procurers may consider the environmental or innovative 
characteristics linked to the product or service. Furthermore, public 
procurers may consider the wider societal impact of the procurement 
activity.12  
Facilitating SME participation in public procurement assists public bodies 
in achieving VfM. Increasing SME participation increases the number of 
bidders which in turn improves the quality of the services and goods 
offered and enhanced competition results in reduced tendered prices.13 
Additionally, improving SMEs access to finance supports SME growth 
which in turn leads to the creation of new jobs.14 Contracting authorities 
can encourage SME participation in procurement competitions by using 
proportionate procedures, appropriate selection and award criteria and by 
dividing large contracts into smaller lots.15 
                                                                                      
9 N. Dimitri., ‘“Best value for money” in procurement.’ (2013) 13(2) Journal of Public 
Procurement 149. 
10 This phrase has been adopted from the archived UK National Audit Office’s ‘Setting 
Value for Money from Procurement – How auditors can help guide?.’’. 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130802191146/http://www.nao.org.uk/w
p-content/uploads/2013/02/vfmprocurementguide.pdf Accessed 20th April 2019. 
11 This thesis is primarily concerned with EU public procurement law and pays particular 
attention to the application of the Public Sector Directive. 
12 Public Sector Directive, recital 93. 
13 L. Preuss, ‘On the contribution of public procurement to entrepreneurship and small 
business policy’ (2011) 23(9-10) Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 787. 
14 C. Deijl, J. de Kok, and V. V. Essen., ‘Is small still beautiful? Literature review of 
recent empirical evidence on the contribution of SMEs to employment creation.’ 
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 2013) 29. 
15 See Commission Implementing Decision C(2016) 63 final of 18.01.16 on the adoption 
of the work programme for 2016 and the financing for the implementation of the 
Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
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A large and growing body of literature differs on how public bodies should 
achieve VfM. Debate centres on whether the rules prioritise economic 
objectives over social objectives. One interpretation suggests that the 
central aim of the rules is to promote cross-border trade using transparent, 
fair, non-discriminatory, proportionate and competitive procedures.16 This 
approach argues that the fundamental purpose of the rules is to prevent 
preferential treatment, to remove barriers to trade for suppliers and to 
support the sustainability of competitive public markets. 17  This view is 
supported by the judgment of the Gemeente case, where the Court 
concluded that; 
The purpose of coordinating at Community level the procedures for 
the award of public service contracts is to eliminate barriers to the 
freedom to provide services and therefore to protect the interests of 
economic operators established in a Member State who wish to offer 
goods or services to contracting authorities in another Member 
State.18 
A contrasting interpretation of what the ‘economic objectives’ of the rules 
entail is put forward by Sánchez Graells, who argues that the ‘ultimate’ 
purpose of the rules is to secure ‘economic efficiency from undistorted 
competition’.19 This interpretation argues that competition orientated 
public markets result in the minimum distortion of private sector activities, 
which allows for tenderers to submit competitive costs.20 This approach 
rejects the inclusion of non-economic selection or award criteria in 
procurement competitions. Instead, VfM is achieved when fair, 
                                                                                      
16 S. Arrowsmith and P.F. Kunzlik, ‘Social and environmental policies in EC 
procurement law: new directives and new directions’ (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; New York, 2009) 100. 
17 A. Cox. and P. Furlong, ‘Cross-border trade and contract awards. The intellectual 
myopia at the heart of the EU procurement rules’ (1997) 3(1) European Journal of 
Purchasing & Supply Management 9. 
18 Case C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem v BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821, para 41. 
19 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Public procurement and the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) 9. 
20 Case C-240/83 Waste oils [1985] ECR 531 9; Case C-55/06 Arcor v Germany [2008] 
ECR I-2931 Opinion of Adovate General Poires Maduro, para 49. 
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competitive tendering results in reduced costs and maximises public 
procurer operating efficiencies.21  
However, the difference between the two approaches is the emphasis 
Sánchez Graells, in particular, places on obtaining economic efficiency 
through the promotion of competition. Sánchez Graells disputes a claim 
made by Arrowsmith that his argument is attempting to rely ‘on 
competition’ as a tool for replicating the private sector market in the public 
procurement setting. Support for Sánchez Graells’s argument can be 
found in the ruling of Bundesdruckerei, where the CJEU concluded that   
the ultimate objective of the internal market rules and the EU public 
procurement directives is to allow all the economic operators 
involved to achieve economic efficiency derived from competition 
strategies unaffected by restrictive procurement decisions.22  
It should be noted that this judgment was an interpretation of the 2004 
Directives, and the recent RegioPost judgment has somewhat diminished 
its relevance.23 Sánchez Graells argues that Article 18(1) of Directive 
2014/24/EU consolidates the principle of competition as an additional 
fundamental principle of the rules.24 The article requires contracting 
authorities to treat economic operators ‘equally and without 
discrimination’ and to act in a ‘transparent and proportionate’ manner.25 
If this article is to be interpreted to have introduced a new fundamental 
principle of competition, the economic objective of the rules could be 
                                                                                      
21 J.M Fernandez Martin, ‘The EC Public Procurement Rules: A Critical Analysis’ 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996) 33; S. Domberger and P. Jensen, ‘Contracting out by 
the public sector: theory, evidence and prospects’ (1997) 13(4) Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 67. 
22 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei [2014] pub. electr. EU:C:2014:2235. 
23 Case C‑115/14 RegioPost v Stadt Landau [2015] pub. electr. EU:C:2015:566. 
24 The importance of ‘competition’ above other procurement objectives is evident in; 
Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Impresa Lombardini v AMAS [2001] ECR I-09233; 
Case C-247/02 Sintesi [2004] ECR I-9215. These judgments adopted a stricter view of 
the earlier rulings of Mannesmann, BHI Holding and Cambridge, which emphasised the 
importance of opening up competition in the marketplace. C-44/96 Mannesmann 
Anlagenbau Austria AG v Strohal Rotationsdruck GesmbH [1998] ECR I-00073; Case 
C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem v BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821; Case C-380/98 R v 
HM Treasury ex parte University of Cambridge [2000] ECR I-08035. 
25 Public Sector Directive, art 18(1). 
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interpreted as the promotion of cross-border trade to achieve economic 
efficiency. Arrowsmith criticises the approach and counter-argues that 
Article 18(1) does not elevate ‘competition’ to a fundamental principle of 
the rules, that the article should be interpreted as a manifestation of the 
equal treatment principles, preventing contracting authorities from 
favouring one economic operator over another.26 
Sánchez Graells argument further calls for the Directive to align with 
competition law to strengthen the operation of the Single Market.27 
Competition law and public procurement law are traditionally separate 
doctrines. Competition law is more concerned with economic efficiency 
than public procurement law. To fully achieve economic efficiency in 
public markets, his argument calls for competition law to be widened 
beyond the rules set out in Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU. This would 
mean extending out the rules beyond mergers control or antitrust to 
include the operation of public sector purchases further.28 The promotion 
of competition within the Single Market is embedded in the TFEU, which 
prohibits anti-competitive agreements, cartels, and outlines permissible 
use of mergers and state aid provisions and sets rules for the purchases of 
public services of general interest.29 While the doctrines may sit 
separately, private and public markets have standard features including 
                                                                                      
26 S. Arrowsmith, ‘The purpose of the EU procurement directives: ends, means and the 
implications for national regulatory space for commercial and horizontal procurement 
policies’ (2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1. 
27 Sánchez Graells (n 19) 223. 
28 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Competition and Public Procurement’ (2018) 9(8) Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 551. 
29 Art 101- 109 TFEU. For a summary of the meaning and interpretation of the articles 
see L. Peeperkorn and V. Verouden in editor, J. Faull, A. Nikpay and D. Taylor, ‘The 
EU law of competition’ (Third edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom 
2014) I. General Principles; A. Jones and B. Sufrin, ‘EU competition law: text, cases, 
and materials.’ (Oxford University Press 2016) 91. 
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demand and supply conditions.30 The primary difference between the two 
markets is the pursuit of public interests versus the pursuit of profits.31  
Bovis makes the central distinction between competition and public 
procurement regulation, summarising that competition regulations are 
underpinned by a principle of uniformity and possess a corrective 
characteristic whereas public procurement regulations allow for Member 
State discretions and have an underlying convergence character.32 The 
convergence nature of public procurement seeks to harmonise 
‘behavioural norms’ including legal efficiency, simplification, cross-
border trade through the use of harmonised procedures and rules.33 Bovis 
additionally notes that public procurement ‘serves as negation agent to 
state aid and competition regulation.’ which is firstly concerned with the 
promotion of a cross-border competition by respecting the fundamental 
freedoms and principles.34 Therefore, it is difficult to review public 
procurement through the lens of competition regulations alone.  
There is an underlying socio-economic basis to the 2014 Directives. This 
research adopts the approach put forward by Arrowsmith, accepting that 
economic objectives aim to promote cross-border trade in an open, non-
discriminatory manner, as is stated several times through the Directive,35 
                                                                                      
30 C. Bovis, ‘The social dimension of EU public procurement and the ‘social market 
economy’ in D. Ferri and F. Cortese, ‘The EU social market economy and the law: 
theoretical perspectives and practical challenges for the EU’ (Routledge, Abingdon, 
Oxon [UK], New York, 2018) 105; A. Heinemann, ‘Social Considerations in EU 
competition law: the protection of competition as a cornerstone of the social market 
economy’ in  D. Ferri and F. Cortese, ‘The EU social market economy and the law: 
theoretical perspectives and practical challenges for the EU’ (Routledge, Abingdon, 
Oxon [UK], New York, 2018) 129. 
31 J. Stentoft Arlbjørn and P. Vagn Freytag, ‘Public procurement vs private purchasing: 
is there any foundation for comparing and learning across the sectors?’ (2012) 25(3) 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 203. 
32 C Bovis (n 30), A. Heinemann (n 30). 
33 C Bovis (n 30). See also; P. Trepte, ‘Regulating procurement: Understanding the ends 
and means of public procurement regulation’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 
123. 
34 C Bovis (n 30) 106. 
35 Public Sector Directive, recital 1, arts 18(1), 43, 46, 56, 58, 68. 
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CJEU rulings36 and in supporting European policy documents.37 The 
Directive sets out rules on how contracting authorities should conduct 
competitive procedures. Importantly, the rules do not dictate ‘what’ 
contracting authorities should purchase. Member States enjoy the 
discretion to pursue their perceived conception of VfM.38 Additionally, 
the research adopts arguments made by Heinemann and Bovis, outlining 
the differences between competition law and public procurement law; the 
principle of uniformity underpins competition regulations whereas public 
procurement regulations include Member State discretions such as the 
promotion of SME friendly criteria.39 Article 18(2) does not create a new 
principle of competition. The provision is concerned with socio-economic 
objectives which is achieved through the promotion of competitive cross-
trade created by respecting the fundamental TFEU freedoms and 
principles.40 The purpose of this research is to assess what impact the rules 
and similar policies on public procurement have on SME engagement in 
public markets. This research relies on the case studies’ findings to 
demonstrate the ability of public procurement to achieve socially driven 
objectives competitively at a national level, particularly the promotion of 
SME participation. However, in answering this question, the research 
must ask what effect the varying definitions of economic objectives have 
on daily procurement procedures.  
At an operational level, economic objectives may be interpreted in several 
ways. By following the rules laid out in the Directive and upholding the 
fundamental principles, contracting authorities support the economic 
                                                                                      
36 Case C-31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v State of the Netherlands, [1988] ECR 4635; 
Case C-243/89 Commission v Denmark ("Storebaelt") [1993] ECR I-3353, para 33; Case 
C-87/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, para 54; Case C-225/98 
Commission v France (“Nord-pas-de-Calais”) [2000] ECR I-7445; Case C-513/99, 
Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsinki Kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne (“Concordia 
Buses”) [2002] ECR I-7213; Case C-448/01, EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v Austria 
(“EVN”) [2003] ECR I-14527. 
37 Commission, ‘Single Market Act II Together for new growth’ (Communication) COM 
(2012) 0573 final; See Commission, ‘Making Public Procurement work in and for 
Europe’ (Communication) COM (2017) 572 final. 
38 While upholding the fundamental principles and not distorting market competition. 
See Case C-448/01 EVN [2003].  
39 C Bovis (n 30), A. Heinemann (n 30). 
40 S. Arrowsmith, ‘The law of public and utilities procurement’ (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell London 2012) 631. 
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objective of allowing for and encouraging cross-border trade. Contracting 
authorities may consider the economic efficiency argument by adopting a 
price-dominant competition to prevent market distortions and secure best 
value for taxpayers’ money.41 Generally, there are three permissible award 
criteria which contracting authorities can rely on; lowest cost, best price-
quality ratio and a life-cycle costing approach. When transposing the 
Directive, Member States had the choice to restrict contracting authorities’ 
discretion to use the lowest cost approach. However, the lowest cost 
approach does not necessarily mean that contracting authorities are 
adopting the economic efficiency approach as set out by Sánchez Graells. 
The lowest cost approach may be adopted in repeat purchases procured 
using a framework agreement,42 a dynamic purchasing system43 or 
through the use of electronic auctions or electronic reverse auctions44 at 
the end of a competitive procedure. For each of these circumstances, the 
contracting authority may have assessed non-economic criteria such as 
quality, environmental characteristics or delivery services during the 
earlier tender selection and award stages.45 
Contracts awarded on the basis of lowest costs may be suitable in cases 
where contracting authorities are purchasing routine, low-value supplies 
or services. An argument can be made suggesting that contracting 
authorities who purchase on the lowest cost award basis alone are trading 
                                                                                      
41 It is estimated that 55% of all above threshold contracts concluded by European 
contracting authorities are evaluated using a lowest-cost price criterion. See Commission, 
‘Making Public Procurement work in and for Europe.’ (Communication) COM (2017) 
572 final. 
42 Public Sector Directive, article 33(1) defines a framework agreement as an 
arrangement between one or more contracting authorities and one or more economic 
operators, ‘the purpose of which is to establish the terms governing contracts to be 
awarded during a given period, in particular with regard to price and, where 
appropriate, the quantity envisaged.’ 
43 Public Sector Directive, article 34(1) requires dynamic purchasing systems to be 
conducted electronically and openly, allowing any economic operator that satisfies the 
selection criteria to join the system at any time. A dynamic purchasing system is a 
procurement tool which allows for contracting authorities to continuously purchase from 
the selected economic operators over the duration of the public contract.  
44 Public Sector Directive, article 35(1) defines an electronic auction as a repetitive 
electronic process, which occurs after an initial full evaluation of the tenders, enabling 
tenderers to be ranked using automatic evaluation methods. 
45 McLaughlin and Harvey Ltd v Department of Finance and Personnel (No.2) [2008] 
NIQB 91 and [2011] NICA 59. 
45 
 
long-term socially sustainable markets for short-term economic gains.46 
Economic gains can still be achieved alongside the assessment of non-
economic award criteria.47 The most economically advantageous tender 
approach set out under the new best price: quality ratio still allows for 
contracting authorities to set weightings disproportionally in favour of 
costs.48  Again, this does not necessarily mean that heavily weighted costs 
restrict the achievement of non-economic objectives; for example, in one 
of the case studies reviewed for this research, a £27 million catering, 
cleaning and ancillary services contract had a cost weighting of 70% and 
was still able to incorporate social criteria into the contract. The contract 
was awarded to a consortium comprising of one large organisation and 
one small social enterprise.49 However, contracting authorities should be 
cautious on when they use price dominant competitions, as such 
approaches can result in ‘race to bottom’ tendencies by interested 
economic operators.50 This occurs in circumstances where tenderers 
reduce their tendering costs significantly to win the advertised contract.51 
                                                                                      
46 H. Boes and A. Dorée, ‘Public procurement of local authorities in the Netherlands: a 
case of breaking tradition for a more strategic approach’ (2009) 10 Proceedings of RICS 
COBRA Research Conference, University of Cape Town; J Yeow and J. Edler, 
‘Innovation procurement as Projects.’ (2012) 12(4) Journal of Public Procurement 472; 
R. Eadie, M. Browne, H. Odeyinka, C. McKeown and S. McNiff, ‘BIM implementation 
throughout the UK construction project lifecycle: An analysis’ (2013) 36 Automation in 
construction 145; N. Obwegeser and S.D. Müller, ‘Innovation and public procurement: 
Terminology, concepts, and applications.’ (2018) 74 Technovation 1. 
47 Trepte, P., ‘Regulating procurement: understanding the ends and means of public 
procurement regulation’ (Oxford University Press, New York 2004) Ch 2. 
48 Public Sector Directive, art 67. 
49 This is discussed later in Chapter Six Buy Social Case Study. 
50 Case C‑377/17 European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2017] pub. 
electr. EU:C:2019:163 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, paras 76 and 96. See also; 
J. Howe and I. Landau, ‘Using public procurement to promote better labour standards 
in Australia: a case study of responsive regulatory design.’ (2009) 51(4) Journal of 
Industrial Relations 575; Harrison, K. ed., ‘Racing to the bottom?: provincial 
interdependence in the Canadian federation’ (UBC press 2011) 8; E. Overbye, 
‘Globalisation and the design of the welfare state’ in D. Pieters, ‘European Social 
Security and Global Politics’ (London: Kluwer Academic Press, 2013) 145;  G. 
Czerniawski, ‘A race to the bottom–prison education and the English and Welsh policy 
context’ (2016) 31(2) Journal of Education Policy 198. 
51 Contracting authorities are required to investigate tenders which they deem to be 
‘abnormally low’. If the economic operator cannot provide evidence of the company’s 
ability to submit the low price, the contracting authority should reject the tenderer’s bid. 
Public Sector Directive, art 69. See also; Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 
Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233, para 51; Case T-495/04 Belfass [2008] 
ECR II-781, para 100; Case C-292/07 Commission v Belgium [2009] I-59, para 159;  
Case T-638/11 European Dynamics Belgium and Others v EMA [2013] ECR 530; Case 
C-599/10 Slovensko [2011] ECR I-10873 paras 30 and 34. See also; NATS (Services) Ltd 
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In certain circumstances, tenderers cannot complete the contract within 
the submitted costs, which results in cost over-runs and operational 
inefficiencies.52  
The Directive strongly encourages contracting authorities to consider 
using the Best price: quality ratio or a life-cycle approach.53 These 
approaches do not restrict contracting authorities’ abilities to achieve 
economic gains from limiting the inclusion of non-economic criteria. The 
research acknowledges that the economic objectives of the rules are 
concerned with promoting cross-border competition by requiring tender 
procedures to be conducted in open, non-discriminatory and proportionate 
manners which may consider non-economic award criteria.54 While the 
economic efficiency objectives remain stagnant for competition law, 
public procurement law has developed to reflect the overall movement of 
the EU. Article 9 of the TFEU requires the Union in carrying out policies; 
[shall] take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high 
level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the 
fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training 
and protection of human health.  
Article 9 does not provide a legal base for social policy, but it attests that 
‘social objectives are equivalent to economic objectives within EU 
primary law.’55  This interpretation is in stark contrast with Sánchez 
                                                                                      
v Gatwick Airport Ltd [2014] EWHC 3728 (TCC); SRCL v NHSE [2018] EWHC 1985 
(TCC). 
52 While, contracting authorities are required to investigate any tender which they 
consider to be abnormally low, it is difficult to identify abnormally low tenders if all 
tenderers are caught in a race to the bottom. Not only do abnormally low tenders increase 
the risk of default and costs, there is additional risks of avoidance of environmental, 
social and labour requirements and risks of reduced quality supplies or services. See; A. 
Calveras, J.J. Ganuza and E. Hauk, ‘Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement 
contracts’ (2004) 26(1) Journal of Regulatory Economics 41. 
53 Public Sector Directive, art 67. For a discussion on the development of the award 
criteria see; E. Van den Abeele, ‘Integrating Social and Environmental Dimensions in 
Public Procurement: One Small Step for the Internal Market, One Giant Leap for the 
EU?’ (2014) ETUI Working Paper 2014.08.  
54 C-324/14 Partner Apelski Dariusz [2016] pub. electr. EU:C:2016:214, para 60; C-
387/14 Esaprojekt [2017] pub. electr. EU:C:2017:338, para 35. 
55 TFEU, art 9. See also, B. De Witte,‘Forward’ in D. Ferri and F. Cortese, ‘The EU 
social market economy and the law: theoretical perspectives and practical challenges 
for the EU’ (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon [UK], New York, 2018) xi. 
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Graells’s lack of acceptance of any non-economic objective in public 
procurement regulations. The need to support a competitive Single Market 
remains a steadfast fundamental objective of the EU. But it is clear that 
this is no longer an isolated goal. In the current ‘Future of Europe’ 
debates, the EU is pushing for the commitment of the Member States to 
avoid harmful tax evasion, government subsidiaries and social dumping 
activities.56 The EU calls for further investment in sustainable, inclusive 
and innovative economic growth.57  
In light of the development of the EU’s commitment to upholding these 
goals, it is becoming more difficult to assess the economic objectives in 
isolation. A significant proportion of the current literature is dedicated to 
analysing the role public procurement plays in achieving socio-economic 
objectives.58  Such socio-economic objectives range from the promotion 
of employment opportunities, decent work opportunities, compliance with 
social labour rights, promotion of social enterprises and SMEs, and the 
inclusion of accessibility criteria, corporate social responsibility, fair trade 
and the protection of human rights.59 
2.3 Use of Social Public Procurement  
The primary EU guidance document on socially conscious public 
procurement, the ‘Buying Social’ document offers a non-exhaustive list of 
examples of social criteria, including the use of labour standards, 
                                                                                      
56 See Commission, ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe - Reflections and scenarios 
for the EU27 by 2025’ (White Paper) COM (2017) 2025. 
57 Promoting a balance between free trade and the pursuit of social goals is a contested 
topic. For a broader discussion on the topic see; R. Claassen, R. Gerbrandy, A. Princen, 
and M. Segers, ‘Rethinking the European Social Market Economy: Introduction to the 
Special Issue’ (2019) 57(1) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 3. 
58 For example, see C. McCrudden, ‘Buying social justice: equality, government 
procurement, and legal change’ (Oxford University Press, New York; Oxford 2007); G. 
Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon;New York, 
NY, 2015); B. Sjåfjell and A. Wiesbrock, eds., ‘Sustainable public procurement under 
EU law: new perspectives on the state as stakeholder’ (Cambridge University Press, 
2015). 
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proportionately linked to the subject matter of the public contract. The criteria must 
comply with the TFEU principles and must not confer unrestricted freedom onto the 
contracting authority. Public Sector Directive, arts 67 and 70. 
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sustainable practices, innovative and inclusive requirements.60 The 
promotion of employment opportunities extends to the inclusion of 
‘employment opportunities for the long-term unemployed’, including 
policies and employment opportunities ‘for persons from disadvantaged 
groups’, ‘youth unemployment’ and for ‘people with disabilities’.61 In 
relation to the promotion of decent work, procurers are required to comply 
with core labour standards and are encouraged to promote ‘decent pay’,62 
‘access to training’ and ‘gender equality and non-discrimination’.63 
Promotion of compliance with social and labour rights requires 
contracting authorities to ensure that contractors comply with national 
laws including occupational health and safety laws. Public procurers are 
encouraged to include mandatory ‘accessibility and design for all’ 
technical specifications to ensure persons with disabilities have access to 
the goods and services been provided.64 Furthermore, the guide requests 
procurers to consider including ‘ethical trade’ considerations into the 
technical specifications and to encourage contractors to voluntarily adopt 
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260/17 Anodiki Services EPE [2018] pub. electr. EU:C:2018:864. 
62 The CJEU is reluctant to accept any mandatory requirements which go beyond 
statutory labour standards. See, Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei [2014] pub. electr. 
EU:C:2014:2235. See also; M. Doherty, ‘W(h)ither social Europe? Labour rights in a 
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(2010) 10(4) Journal of Public Procurement 541; K. Jaehrling, ‘The state as a ‘socially 
responsible customer’?’ Public procurement between market-making and market-
embedding (2011) 21(2) European Journal of Industrial Relations 14. 
64 Contracting authorities are required to comply with the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. See also; C. Easton, ‘Website accessibility and 
the European Union: citizenship, procurement and the proposed Accessibility Act’ 
(2013) 27(1-2) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 187. 
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‘Corporate Social Responsibilities’ (CSR) measures.65 Finally, the 
guidance encourages procurers to level the playing field for SMEs.66  
While governments are free to adopt these social criteria, national 
governments face many issues when implementing socially-driven 
practices. Arrowsmith elaborates a detailed taxonomy of how social 
policies can be incorporated into public procurement activities.67 The 
taxonomy is based on three key distinctions. The first distinction identifies 
policies that ‘are limited to securing compliance with a legal requirement 
and those that go beyond such requirements’.68 For the first distinction, 
Arrowsmith notes that certain policies are only concerned with ensuring 
compliance with legislation; for example, minimum wage legislation, 
whilst others go beyond such requirements and in this example would 
request the supplier to provide employees with a ‘fair wage’. The fair 
wage may be higher than the national minimum wage and may include 
additional employment benefits.69  
The second distinction identifies policies applied only to contract award 
and those that go beyond it. The policies identified in this category are 
                                                                                      
65 Furthermore contracting authorities are required to comply with Vienna Convention 
for the protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete 
the Ozone Layer; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention); Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm POPs Convention); Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade (UNEP/FAO) (The PIC Convention) Rotterdam, 10 September 1998, 
and its 3 regional Protocols. For a discussion on CSR in the public sector see; L. 
Albareda, J.M. Lozano, and T. Ysa, ‘Public policies on corporate social responsibility: 
The role of governments in Europe’ (2007) 74(4) Journal of Business Ethics 391; R. 
Steurer, ‘The role of governments in corporate social responsibility: Characterising 
public policies on CSR in Europe’ (2010) 43(1) Policy sciences 49. 
66 L. Preuss, ‘On the contribution of public procurement to entrepreneurship and small 
business policy’ (2011) 23(9-10) Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 787; M.V. 
Kidalov and K.F. Snider, ‘US and European public procurement policies for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME): a comparative perspective’ (2011) 13(4) Business and 
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practice divide and SME-friendly public procurement’ (2016) 34(3) Environment and 
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67 S. Arrowsmith, ‘Horizontal policies in public procurement: a taxonomy’ (2010) 10(2) 
Journal of Public Procurement 149. 
68 See Arrowsmith (n 67). 
69 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei [2014] pub. electr. EU:C:2014:2235; Case C‑115/14 
RegioPost v Stadt Landau [2015] pub. electr. EU:C:2015:566. 
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only concerned with the performance of the contractual requirements. 
This model is used successfully in the private sector, particularly in the 
purchase of sustainable raw products; for example, FSC certified timber. 
The third distinction identifies nine different mechanisms by which 
strategic policies are implemented in public procurement operations. The 
different mechanisms look at contracts which are reserved solely for 
certain groups of companies including sheltered workshops or social 
enterprises, contracts which give credit or merit to tenderers for the 
environmental or social benefit aspects of their tenders.70 SME friendly 
criteria can be applied at all stages of a procurement competition; pre-
tender stage, tender stage and contract performance stage. At the pre-
tender stage, contracting authorities should conduct market research 
activities to gain an understanding of what services or goods are available 
on the market, to gauge the level of current competition and to identify the 
market value of the products and services.71 Upon completion of the 
market research, contracting authorities should select an appropriate 
electronic competitive procedure which would encourage competition 
amongst all forms of companies in the market place.72 Contracting 
authorities should consider splitting large contracts into smaller lots. 
Selection and award criteria should be set proportionately.73 Once the 
submitted tenders have been evaluated, feedback should be offered to 
unsuccessful tenderers outlining the reasons as to why the tenders what 
were not selected.74 Providing information to unsuccessful SMEs will 
assist the companies in reviewing and improving their tendering skills and 
abilities.75 The contracting authority can further promote SME 
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EU:T:2015:774. 
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engagement during the contract performance stage by requesting the main 
contractor to consider subcontracting to SMEs.76  
A European Commission Report on the strategic use of public 
procurement assessed the use of socially-driven public procurement. The 
report provides a comprehensive overview of Member States’ experiences 
of integrating social criteria into procurement policy. The report examined 
the extent of the use of Green Public Procurement (GPP), SRPP and the 
promotion of innovative goods, services or works.77 The Report found that 
GPP is gaining momentum, with 20 Member States adopting specific non-
binding National Action Plans (NAP). However, Member States are 
reluctant to introduce SRPP specific action plans, favouring to adopt 
socially-conscious policies into the GPP national plans or existing 
procurement policies.78 The most commonly adopted SRPP criteria 
include ILO core labour standards, reservations for SMEs, social 
enterprises and sheltered workshops and reservations for social inclusion 
and equal opportunity. 79  
Some Member States are becoming pro-active in regulating social criteria. 
The UK is a prime example of this.80 The UK Government passed the 
Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 into law on March 8, 2012.81 The 
Act requires UK procurers to consider the socio-economic impact of their 
procurement activities in their local vicinity. Henty recognises that the Act 
essentially applies in pre-procurement situations of services contracts and 
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requires public procurers and suppliers to re-consider the social, 
environmental and economic outcomes of their actions.82 The Scottish 
government are also active in this area, allowing for the inclusion of 
specific community benefit clauses in public contracts.83 The clauses 
include targeted recruitment and training requirements, small business and 
social enterprise provisions and community engagement considerations. 
A government Guidance note was originally published in 2008 following 
the successful completion of a pilot programme that examined these issues 
in a practical context.84 Building on the success of the Guidance Note, a 
more comprehensive plan on the strategic use of social procurement was 
adopted in 2016.85 
One of the greatest criticisms of the inclusion of social criteria in public 
procurement is the associated risk of increased costs.86 Tenderers will 
include the costs of complying with the social criteria in the submitted 
tender price.87 Contracting authorities may incur administrative costs 
through the incorporation of additional criteria in the competition.88 
However, regular inclusion of social criteria will reduce the administrative 
and operational costs incurred by both public bodies and suppliers.89 
Suppliers will overtime view social criteria as ‘commercial’ costs, 
knowing that the company could be locked out of public markets if it 
refuses to comply with the social objectives.90 Original costs associated 
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with the introduction of social criteria should be offset against the long-
term socio-economic benefits, such as the facilitation of SME growth, 
compliance with social and labour rights and the protection of human 
rights. Although, it should be recognised that contracting authorities do 
not have unrestricted freedom on what social targets they can pass onto 
tenderers. The Directive and CJEU case law set parameters on how social 
criteria can be incorporated into public procurement competitions.  
The objectives of the acquis of the Procurement Directives have 
developed over time to include socially-driven goals. The original 1970s 
Directives focused on achieving economic efficiencies by preventing 
preferential treatment and opening cross-border trade. It was not until the 
2004 Directives that these objectives were widened. The 2004 Directives, 
for the first time, explicitly permitted the use of social and environmental 
considerations in procurement practices. The Directives offered scope for 
taking account of social considerations provided they are linked to the 
subject matter of the contract and are proportionate to its requirements.91  
This research is concerned with how contracting authorities can include 
non-discriminatory, proportionate and relevant criteria into their 
procurement procedures which will encourage SME participation. This 
thesis examines the development of European public procurement 
legislation and identifies four stages of growth. There has been a gradual 
development of the legislation over the last five decades, with each 
revision and modification of the legislation reflecting the political and 
economic landscape of the time. The first set of Directives were born in 
the era of early European integration. The primary objective of the rules 
was to encourage cross-border trade in the Community.92 Throughout the 
1980s a period of consolidation occurred, expanding the coverage and 
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applicability of the rules.93 The Single Market was created in 1993, 
transforming the way suppliers could trade goods between the Member 
States.94 The procurement rules were eventually overhauled in 2004 to 
reflect the changing socio-economic European developments.95  
The comprehensive set of rules introduced modernised public 
procurement procedures allowing contracting authorities to award 
contracts using social and environmental award criteria.96 Cross-border 
trade remained at the heart of the 2004 Directives. Contracting authorities 
were required to publish notices adequately, and the rules included 
measures preventing contracting authorities from discriminating in favour 
of domestic suppliers.97 Within a couple of years of the introduction of the 
rules, Europe was faced with a financial crisis. Public funds were limited, 
and there was a growing need to foster innovative and sustainable growth 
in the Single Market.98 In responding to the political and economic needs 
of the Member States, the Commission conducted a review of the public 
procurement rules.99 In 2014, the rules were revised, allowing contracting 
authorities to conduct more straightforward and electronically driven 
procedures.100 In contrast to the earlier sets of  Directives, the Commission 
promoted the use of public procurement expenditure to achieve social and 
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environmental policy goals whilst achieving financial savings by 
encouraging competitive cross-border trade.101 
 
2.4 Stages of Social Development 
 
2.4.1 Stage One – Introduction 
Prior to the 1970s, European Member States were responsible for the 
regulation of domestic public procurement expenditure. Member States 
enjoyed a wide degree of discretion in regulating public procurement 
practices through administrative-legal mechanisms.102 States had the 
freedom to utilise procurement expenditure to purchase from domestic 
suppliers.103 During this period, the EEC introduced regulations and 
directives to abolish trade barriers within the regional market. The EEC 
developed two underlying strategic plans to facilitate economic 
integration. The first plan sought to adopt measures aiming at the abolition 
of all tariff and non-tariff barriers to cross-border trade and the second 
plan established an undistorted regime of competition within the common 
market.104 Public procurement was identified as a barrier to cross-border 
trade as preferential purchasing was the norm in most Member States. In 
1962, the Council of Ministers adopted the General Programmes which 
envisaged the abolition of national quotas and restrictions in public 
procurement. A Directive was adopted in 1966, preventing contracting 
authorities from prohibiting foreign companies tendering for public works 
contracts.105 The founding public procurement Directive 70/32 was 
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102 D.G. Morgan and G.W. Hogan, ‘Administrative law in Ireland’ (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, Dublin, 1998). 
103 S. Martin, K. Hartley and A. Cox, ‘Public procurement directives in the European 
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published in 1969, incorporating the rules outlined in the General 
Programmes and Directive 66/683.106  This initial Directive 70/32 sought 
to encourage trade by imposing obligations on the Member States to 
publicise invitations to tender regionally.107  
The main purpose of the secondary sources of procurement legislation was 
to apply the Treaty principles in the internal market and to facilitate cross 
border trade.108 The original Works Directive in applying the Treaty 
principles sought to prohibit national discrimination by introducing 
measures that promoted the free movement of goods. Rules relating to the 
procurement of supplies played a subordinate role until the late 1970s. The 
original Works Directive sought to open trade within the European market 
place, to increase import penetration of goods into the public sector, thus 
resulting in significant savings and price convergence.109 However, the 
rules failed to achieve their economic objectives as the rules did not 
address disparities in national legislation, and an updated co-ordination 
Works Directive was adopted in 1971.110 The updated Works Directive 
further outlined the circumstances where a contracting authority was 
required to apply the rules. The Works Directive required contracting 
authorities to adequately advertise public contracts and prohibited the use 
of technical specifications that had a discriminatory effect on economic 
operators from the other Member States.111 
The updated rules imposed further obligations on contracting authorities 
to publish contract notices in the Official Journal. Contracting authorities 
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were required to publish any technical specifications of the contract in the 
supplementary documentation to allow interested economic operators to 
assess whether or not to submit a tender response.112 The consolidated 
rules made specific reference to the permissible use of European 
Standards in the technical specifications of the contract, further applying 
the Treaty principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.113 This 
provision would be further expanded in the coming years to comply with 
the new WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).114 
A further consolidative Directive was adopted in 1976 to cover public 
supplies contracts.115 The Supplies Directive was comprised of provisions 
similar to that of the Works Directive. The two Directives placed similar 
procedural obligations on contracting authorities; the only substantive 
difference was the use of a higher financial threshold for advertising works 
contracts.116 A European assessment report was conducted in 1985, 
examining the impact of the two Directives.117 The Report concluded that 
the rules failed to achieve the two main legislative objectives of opening 
trade in the common market and allowing contracting authorities to 
achieve value for money in public supplies and works contracts. The 
report identified three distinct causes for the ineffectiveness of the rules. 
The first issue identified that the application of excessively high 
advertising thresholds aided protectionist purchasing. Contracting 
authorities easily ignored the requirement to advertise contracts 
regionally, by under-evaluating contract costs and dividing contracts into 
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smaller lots. Short submission time-frames limited non-national economic 
operators’ ability to submit a completed bidding document.118  
The second major error identified a substantive problem with the scope of 
the rules. The Directive only covered goods and limited services contracts. 
The rules did not apply to defence contracts, public utility contracts and 
the vast majority of service contracts.119 Procedural weaknesses were 
present, the rules did not require contracting authorities to account fully 
for their actions, and there were no obligations placed on contracting 
authorities to offer reasons or explanations of their choice to unsuccessful 
aggrieved tenderers. The third error referred to the lack of substantive 
appeal provisions, and redress rules differed significantly between the 
Member States increasing the difficulty for non-national tenderers to 
understand the redress rights available under each national system.120  
 
2.4.2 Stage Two - Consolidation 
The rules were updated a series of times over the late 1980s and early 
1990s to correct failings of the previous texts.121 Two Directives were 
introduced to cover additional public services contracts and the previously 
excluded public utilities sector. Directive 89/665 of 21 December 1989 
and Directive 92/13 of 25 February 1992 were introduced to harmonise 
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18 July 1989 amended Directive 71/305 on the procurement of public works contracts.  
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and improve procurement redress rights for unsuccessful tenderers. Three 
further consolidating texts were adopted in 1993 to enhance 
harmonisation of public procurement for supplies contracts, for works 
contracts and the formally excluded utilities sector.122 Each of the 
Directives further clarified the use of permissible procedures for awarding 
contracts, including the use of prior information measures,  quality criteria 
and outlined the availability of redress processes. Economically driven 
principles motivated the implementation of the consolidation Directives, 
the rules sought to increase cross-border procurement by removing 
discriminatory barriers to trade. The removal of trade barriers yielded 
trade benefits for purchasers; in this case, procurers benefitted from the 
use of economies of scale and increased competition.123  
A number of transformative European Treaties were adopted in rapid 
succession over the next two decades accumulating in the creation of the 
European Union.124 The adoption of the Treaties and the creation of the 
Single European Market had a significant impact on the purpose and role 
of public procurement rules. Public procurement operations were the 
focus in two historically important documents, in the 1985 White Paper 
document on the creation of the Single Market and in the 1986 
Commission Communication.125 It was hoped that the creation of the 
Single European Market (SEM) would combat the economic threat to 
Europe posed by the high technology developments in the US and Japan 
and newly industrialising states in assembly industries.126 The SEM 
focused on removing the formal and informal barriers to cross-border 
trade in the region, including the removal of physical barriers associated 
                                                                                      
122 Directive 93/36/EEC [1993] OJ L 199/1 Covering Supplies Contracts 
     Directive 93/37/EEC [1993] OJ L 199/54 Covering Works Contracts 
     Directive 93/38/EEC [1993] OJ L 199/84 Covering Utilities Contracts 
123 See Commission, ‘White Paper for the completion of the Internal Market’ (White 
Paper) COM (1985) 85-310 final. 
124  Treaty on European Union (1992) (Maastricht Treaty); EU Treaty (2001); Accession 
Treaty (2003); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2008) (TFEU) 
(formerly the EC Treaty); Treaty of Lisbon (2009). 
125 See COM (1985) 85-310 final. 
126 See Commission, ‘Removing the Legal Obstacles to the Use of the ECU. Commission 
White Paper for the Council.’ (White Paper) SEC (1992) 2472. 
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with state frontier inspections and the removal of technical barriers to ease 
the harmonisation of legal and regulatory measures.127  
One of the subsidiary goals of the SEM was to create an active single 
European public procurement market. In 1988 an official report was 
commissioned to investigate the economic justification for completing the 
internal market. The significant ‘Cecchini Report’ described the regional 
public market during this period as ‘closed’ and ‘generally 
uncompetitive’. Attention was paid to the failings of the public market 
with the report concluding that governments were distorting the market 
place through the overuse of government subsidiaries and the use of 
multiple national standards for the ICT and utilities sector. The report 
found that most states were effectively excluding all non-domestic 
suppliers from public procurement competitions by dividing contracts into 
smaller lots to avoid the publication thresholds and by incorrectly 
classifying contracts as ‘continuations’ or ‘emergencies’ to avoid the full 
application of the rules regardless of the purpose of the contract.  
The SEM introduced a climate of openness and fairness by encouraging 
contracting authorities to advertise contract notices and specify objective 
award criteria which do not discriminate in favour of domestic 
suppliers.128 The harmonisation of design standards in high technology 
sectors resulted in improved efficiencies in the utilities sector.129 The SEM 
successfully paved the way for the creation of strong European companies. 
The EU experienced enhanced cross-border trade and witnessed the 
reorganisation of high technology industries capable of competing with 
their US and Japanese counterparts.130 An SEM evaluation report 
congratulated public procurement legislation for facilitating and levelling 
the playing field for high technology industries whilst also recognising 
                                                                                      
127 See Commission ‘The Single Market Review Dismantling of Barriers Public 
Procurement.’ (1997) 3(2) Kogan Space Earth Scan 44. 
128 See C. Bovis (n 107) 4. 
129 K.A. Armstrong, S.J. Bulmer, ‘The governance of the single European market’ 
(Manchester University Press, 1998). 
130 For a wider discussion on the improvement of the utilities sector see; T. Jamasb, and 
M. Pollitt, ‘Electricity market reform in the European Union: review of progress toward 
liberalization & integration’ (2005) The Energy Journal 11. 
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that the legislation should be further expanded to support the innovative 
ICT sector.131  
The later adoption of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) further 
recognised the importance of promoting trade in the Single Market, while 
additionally emphasising the need to develop sustainable growth in the 
market.132 The Treaty of Amsterdam significantly extended the scope of 
the social dimension of the Union, insisting on future policies to take into 
account social objectives that promote employment, living and working 
conditions. These developments cemented the Union’s move away from 
introducing regional regulation based on purely economic objectives. 
Against the backdrop of a modernising Union, the primarily economically 
driven public procurement Directives appeared outdated. A series of 
evaluating reports were commissioned to assess the use of public 
procurement to promote economic and social growth in the Member 
States.133 
 
2.4.3 Stage Three Modernisation 
The Directives were once more amended in 2004 to address the changes 
made by the Treaties, to codify Court of Justice case law and to modernise 
and simplify the existing rules. The amendments resulted in the 
consolidation of one single directive for the procurement of works, 
supplies and services contracts.134 The changes introduced aimed to 
enhance contracting authority’s flexibility by providing new provisions on 
framework agreements, the introduction of a new competitive dialogue 
procedure and facilitating the use of electronic procurement. The rules 
codified CJEU case law, by requiring the disclosure of weightings for 
                                                                                      
131 See Commission, ‘The Single Market Review Dismantling of Barriers Public 
Procurement.’ (1997) 3(2) Kogan Space Earth Scan 44. 
132 B. Sjåfjell and A. Wiesbrock, eds., ‘Sustainable public procurement under EU law: 
new perspectives on the state as stakeholder’ (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 10. 
133 C. McCrudden, ‘Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement and Legal 
Change’ (Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford 2007). 
134 Directive 2004/17/EC (Utilities Directive) [2004] OJ L 358/35; Directive 2004/18/EC 
(Public Sector Directive) [2004] OJ L 134/1. 
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award criteria, by making substantial changes to the scope of 
specifications and allowing for the use of particular environmental 
criteria.135  
Additionally, Directive 2007/66/EC was introduced on the 11th December 
2007 to improve the efficiency of the redress procedures for aggrieved 
unsuccessful tenderers.136 The Remedies Directives aim to protect 
tenderers’ redress rights by imposing a ‘standstill period’ and stringent 
rules against illegal direct awards. The standstill period refrains 
contracting authorities from concluding the contract for a period of 
fourteen to sixteen days after the selection of the preferred tenderer.137 The 
standstill period should give unsuccessful tenderers sufficient time to 
assess whether it is appropriate to initiate a review procedure.138 In the 
case where a review proceeding is initiated, the procurement process 
becomes automatically suspended and cannot be completed until the 
review has been addressed and completed.139 The Remedies Directives 
aim to maintain integral and ethical procedures by imposing strict rules 
against illegal direct awards and providing for national courts to hold such 
awards as ‘ineffective’.140 The revision of the redress rules represents the 
completion of the harmonisation of procurement procedures, which is 
thought to make cross-border tendering more accessible for SMEs. 141 
 
                                                                                      
135Codified cases included; Case C-380/09, paragraph 34., Case C-237/99 1 February 
2001., Case C-300/07 11 July 2009. and Case C-44/96 15 January 1998. 
136 The Directive replaces and makes substantial changes to the previous Remedies 
Directives, Remedies Directive for Utilities Sector (Directive 92/13/EEC) and the 
Remedies Directive for the Public Sector (Directive 89/665/EEC). 
137 The standstill period should last at least 15 days if the notification letter is posted and 
at least 10 days if the letter is delivered by electronic means. Remedies Directive, art 
2(a). 
138 Unsuccessful tenderers must also receive sufficient information regarding the reasons 
as to why their tender was rejected. See Case T 667/11 Veloss International SA and 
Attimedia SA v European Commission [2015] pub. electr. EU:T:2015:5. 
139 Remedies Directive, art 2(d). See; American Cyanamid Co (No 1) v Ethicon Limited 
[1975] UKHL 1. 
140 Remedies Directive, art 2(d). This is the first Directive to impose the remedy of 
ineffectiveness; previously the highest remedy available was the declaration of voidness 
of contracts found to be illegally awarded. 
141 This comment refers to procedural harmonisation only and does not extend to use of 
the SRPP or compliance with the Directives. 
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2.4.4 Stage Four Maturity  
The changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty had a significant impact 
on public procurement, further supporting the use of social and 
environmental criteria in the awarding public contracts.142 The Lisbon 
Treaty introduced Article 3 to the TEU, clearly stating that the internal 
market policies and regulations shall promote the attainment of 
sustainable economic growth.143 Internal market policies should assist in 
the creation of a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. This interpretation of the 
social economy is in stark contrast to the former Article 4(1) in the TEC.144 
The former article sets out the basis for a free market economy, implying 
a strict focus on the matter of competition only with minimum influence 
and control by public regulatory authorities.145 The principles of a free 
market economy do not promote the achievement of social or 
environmental goals outside the economic scale.146 The original public 
procurement rules were based on free-market goals. However, the 
emphasis on designing rules around purely economic objectives has been 
diminished dramatically in recent years. 
Public procurement procedures may focus on achieving non-economic 
objectives, while also adhering to Article 119 paragraph 1 of the TFEU, 
which prohibits the distortion of competition in the internal market.147 
                                                                                      
142 For a wider debate on the development of a socio-sustainable Europe see; L.F. 
Besselink, ‘National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon’ (2010) 6 Utrecht 
L. Rev 36;  S. Gstöhl and D. Hanf, ‘The EU's Post‐Lisbon Free Trade Agreements: 
Commercial Interests in a Changing Constitutional Context’ (2014) 20(6) European Law 
Journal 733. 
143 TEU, art 3. See also; A. Dimopoulos, ‘The effects of the Lisbon treaty on the principles 
and objectives of the common commercial policy.’ (2010) 15(2) European Foreign 
Affairs Review 153; AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:245, para 51. 
144 Former TEC, art 4(1). 
145 D. Ferri and F. Cortese, ‘The EU social market economy and the law: theoretical 
perspectives and practical challenges for the EU’ (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon [UK], 
New York, 2018) 129. 
146 O. Odudu, ‘The Boundaries of EC Competition Law; The Scope of Article 81’ (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 9. 
147 TFEU, art 119(1).  
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This is evident in the Directives, which allow for the use of sustainable 
environmental award criteria that are relative to the subject matter of the 
contract and do not distort competition. In particular, contracting 
authorities are required to follow the test for the use of non-economic 
criteria set out in ‘Concordia Bus’ and ‘Wienstrom’ judgments.148 The 
cases established four separate criteria which must be present for 
environmental award criteria to be declared compatible with European 
law. For environmental and social award criteria to be deemed compatible, 
the criteria must be linked to the subject matter of the contract, it may not 
confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority, it 
must be expressly mentioned in the tender notice and must comply with 
all the fundamental principles of Community law.149 
The transformation of the Union from an economic trading block to a 
Union which supports the development of innovative, digitalised and 
sustainable economies, is evident by the adoption of the Single Market 
Act in 2011.150 The Act set out twelve levers to boost growth and 
strengthen confidence in economies, ranging from access to finance for 
SMEs, development of a digital Single Market, supporting social 
entrepreneurship, business environments and social cohesion.151 One of 
the twelve levers directly refers to the operation of public procurement 
markets. The lever proposed to revise the 2004 Directives to make 
procurement ‘more efficient, flexible and user-friendly’, by reducing the 
administrative burden on suppliers, supporting the use of e-procurement 
and allowing for greater use of environmental, innovative and social 
considerations.152 Specifically, the lever outlined an objective to improve 
                                                                                      
148 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus, [2002] ECR I-7213, para 81; Case C-4481/01 EVN 
[2003] ECR I-14527. 
149 Case C‑368/10 Commission v Netherlands [2012] pub. electr. EU:C:2012:284. 
150 See Commission, ‘Single Market Act II Together for new growth.’ (Communication) 
COM (2012) 0573 final. 
151 See Commission, ‘Single Market Act Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen 
confidence "Working together to create new growth"’ (Communication) COM (2011) 
0206 final. 
152 COM (2011) 0206 final. 
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SMEs access to public procurement by prohibiting disproportionate 
financial specifications in tender competitions.153  
Whilst researchers disagree on the effectiveness and implementation of 
the European social economy goals, public procurement is recognised as 
a practical tool for delivering the regional socio-economic aims at a local 
level.154 In supporting the public procurement lever of the Single Market 
Act, the 2004 Public Procurement Directives were overhauled to allow 
contracting authorities to support the development of inclusive, innovative 
and sustainable public markets.155 Bovis concludes that the 2011 Single 
Market Act established and directly promoted a ‘liberalised and 
integrated’ public procurement region.156 The Directives do not impose 
specific policies on the Member States and instead focus on eliminating 
barriers to participation and extending contracting authorities’ freedom to 
include social, environmental and innovative purchasing criteria. Thus, 
achieving the wider harmonised goals of the Single Market Act. 
 
2.5 2014 Directives 
The new rules were initially proposed in early 2011 and agreed with the 
Council in June 2013.157 The European Parliament voted to accept three 
new EU Directives; Public Sector Procurement Directive,158 Utilities 
Sector Procurement Directive159 and a Procurement of Works and 
Services Concessions Directive.160 The new Directives replaced Directive 
2004/17/EC co-ordination of Utilities sector procurement and Directive 
                                                                                      
153 COM (2011) 0206 final. 
154 For a debate on the development of the social economy market see  F.W. Scharpf, 
‘The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a ‘social market 
economy’ (2010) 8(2) Socio-Economic Review 211. 
155 See Commission, ‘Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement 
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2004/18/EC. Overall, the Directive clarifies when contracting authorities 
can include economic, innovation-related, environmental, social or 
employment-related considerations and contractual performance clauses 
in tender competitions.161  
The updated rules allow public bodies to best use their limited resources 
without being unduly burdensome. Public bodies can include economic, 
innovation-related, environmental, social or employment-related 
contractual performance conditions, provided that they are linked to the 
subject-matter of the contract and indicated in the call for competition 
documents.162 Revised rules on tender submissions are thought to make it 
less administratively difficult and easier for SMEs to compete for public 
contracts. A new Regulation on the access of third-country suppliers and 
service providers to EU Member States’ public markets was also adopted. 
The Directive for the first time makes numerous references to the 
importance of supporting SME participation in public contracts. 
Contracting authorities are encouraged to divide large contracts into lots 
and to use proportionate, inclusive and innovative criteria and procedures.  
2.6 Main Changes  
 
2.6.1 Division of contracts into lots  
SMEs generally do not have the financial or operational capability to carry 
out large contracts.163 SMEs are thereby locked out of large contracts 
which are often conducted at a centralised level and are awarded to a sole 
supplier or a number of large economic operators.164 Sub-dividing large 
                                                                                      
161 Public Sector Directive, art 70. 
162 Public Sector Directive, art 70. 
163 A company’s survival, growth and profitability prospects are intrinsically linked to 
the size of the company. See T. Beck, Demirgüç, A. Kunt, and V. Maksimovic, 
‘Financial and legal constraints to growth: does firm size matter?’ (2005) 60(1) The 
Journal of Finance 137. 
164 H. Walker and L. Preuss, ‘Fostering sustainability through sourcing from small 
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1600; D. Pickernell, A. Kay, G. Packham and C. Miller, ‘Competing agendas in public 
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(2011) 29(4) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 641; K. Loader, 
‘SME suppliers and the challenge of public procurement: Evidence revealed by a UK 
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contracts into manageable sections offer SMEs the opportunities to bid for 
a lot of the overall contract. Recital 78 the Directive specifically requests 
contracting authorities to ‘make use’ of the ‘European Code of Best 
Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts’, 
by dividing large contracts into smaller lots on a quantitative or qualitative 
basis to facilitate SME participation. When splitting contracts on a 
quantitative basis, contracting authorities should ensure that SMEs would 
have the capability to bid for appropriately sized lots.165 When dividing 
the contracts on qualitative basis procurers are encouraged to consider the 
specific sectors in which SMEs operate, to assist SMEs in competing for 
the specialised lots or project phases.166 Public procurers retain the 
freedom to define the size and subject matter of the contract and maintain 
the discretion to use lots in contracts which fall outside the remit of the 
Directives.167 
Furthermore, contracting authorities have the discretion to limit the 
number of lots that may be awarded to one tenderer.168 Equally, tenderers 
should enjoy the freedom to bid for each of the advertised lots.169 
Contracting authorities considering limiting the number of lots tenderers 
may bid for and win should firstly conduct market analysis to ensure that 
there is sufficient competition in the market to secure value for money by 
adopting this approach.170 Spagnolo and Yukins declare that the use of lots 
                                                                                      
Management 103; A. Flynn and P. Davis, ‘The policy–practice divide and SME-friendly 
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559. 
165 Public Sector Directive, art. 46(1). 
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is a key determinable in opening competition in public procurement.171 
SMEs will benefit from the use of lots when the divisions are 
proportionate in number, size, geographical dispersion and specialisms, 
allowing for SMEs to bid for manageable contracts in relative proximity 
to their place of business.172 Limiting the number of lots tenderers can bid 
for may unintentionally curb competition for the contracting authority.173 
Suppliers should be given the opportunity to bid for each lot which the 
supplier believes it can effectively compete. This places the responsibility 
onto public procurers to base their decisions on a detailed understanding 
of the current marketplace and knowledge of economic operators. 
Contracting authorities should consider limiting the number of lots that 
can be awarded to one tenderer in circumstances where the contracting 
authority has a need to ‘re-buy’ a standard good or service on a continuous 
basis.174 By limiting the number of lots, one tenderer may be awarded 
increases the number of suppliers engaged in the public market, which in 
turns contributes to competition in the private market. When the 
contracting authority tenders for the contract again, the authority should 
reap the benefits of a competitive market. 
One of the more progressive provisions of the rules is the requirement for 
contracting authorities to outline their reasons for not dividing above-
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threshold contracts into proportionate lots.175 This requirement may cause 
legal uncertainty for the Member States which have chosen not to 
transpose the mandatory requirement to sub-divide large contracts into 
smaller lots. There is confusion over the judicial remit of this provision, 
concerns have been expressed regarding to whom the contracting 
authority is responsible and what form of penalties can be applied for non-
compliance with the requirement. Sánchez Graells goes as far as 
suggesting that the ‘divide or explain’ requirement should be subject to 
judicial review.176 Trybus contends this interpretation, concluding that 
procurers are required to offer an ‘explanation’ not a ‘justification’ of their 
decision not to use lots, and as such ‘explanations’ are not subject to 
judicial review.177 Despite the lack of regulatory certainty, contracting 
authorities are required to consider their decisions to divide large contracts 
into smaller lots. 
Furthermore, recent research completed by Trybus indicates that this 
provision will not improve SME participation as it does not differ 
substantially from the provision contained in the 2004 Directive.178 The 
new explanation requirement is the core difference between the 2004 
Directive provisions and the 2014 Directive provisions. This is 
particularly relevant for the Member States which have not implemented 
the mandatory division requirements. Trybus argues that this new 
requirement for public procurers to note their decisions not to divide large 
contracts will not by itself increase SME participation. However, it is clear 
that the 2014 Directive has promoted the use of lots as a useful mechanism 
to facilitate SME participation. Trybus further notes that the use of lots 
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has the potential to increase micro-enterprises participation in low-value 
contracts which fall outside the remit of the Directive.179 
2.6.2 Considerations for Persons with Disabilities, Unemployed Persons 
and Disadvantaged Persons 
Member States were required when implementing the Directive to take 
into account the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.180 The Directive requires contracting authorities to ensure 
that they consider the Convention when selecting the means of 
communications, technical specifications, award criteria and contract 
performance conditions.181 Technical specifications must refer to any 
mandatory accessibility requirements which have been adopted by a legal 
act of the EU.182  
The revised rules aim to contribute to the integration of disabled183 and 
disadvantaged persons ‘such as the unemployed members of 
disadvantaged minorities or otherwise socially marginalised groups’ into 
the workplace.184 One of the provisions contained in the rules allows for 
contracting authorities to set-aside certain contracts for sheltered 
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workshops or economic operators which aim to promote the long-term 
employment of disabled and disadvantaged persons.185 This can be 
achieved through the use of sheltered workshops.186 While the 
terminology is outdated and fails to reflect the diverse development of the 
social enterprise sector, this clause will benefit many social enterprises.187 
Social enterprises are companies which pursue both social and economic 
goals with an entrepreneurial spirit.188 The enterprise is required to 
demonstrate that at least 30% of its employees are disadvantaged workers 
or people with disabilities.189  
Furthermore, Article 20 provides for contracting authority to reserve 
contracts or certain ‘lots’ of contracts for sheltered employment 
programmes. Current literature is quiet on this aspect of the rules. 
However, this provision has the potential to support the inclusion of 
community benefit clauses into public works and supplies contracts 
without distorting market competition; for example, if a contracting 
authority plans to include a ‘targeted recruitment and training clause’ in 
a public contract, the authority can choose to set the clause aside in a 
separate lot of the contract. This might be an appealing approach for both 
for-profit SMEs and social enterprises.190 SMEs are generally driven by 
profit and may not have the capability or interest in the community benefit 
clause.191 If the community benefit clauses were isolated in a separate lot 
of the contract, this would not hinder SME participation as SMEs could 
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a social objective. 
191 This is not always the case as noted in; L. Spence and R. Rutherfoord, ‘Social 
responsibility, profit maximisation and the small firm owner-manager’ (2001) 8(2) 
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 126. 
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bid for the operational element of the contract. Likewise, social enterprises 
which focus on promoting employment of people with disabilities and 
disadvantaged people can bid for the element of the contract which is of 
most interest to the enterprises, i.e. the social clauses lot.  
This approach may only be suitable for certain types of public works and 
services contracts,192 and the lot should include elements of the subject 
matter of the contract; for example, if a contracting authority sought to 
tender for a catering and ancillary services contract, the contract could be 
divided into heterogenous sub-lots. One hypothetical lot may require ad-
hoc catering services for events and a second lot may require the operation 
of a small office café. If the contracting authority wishes to include 
targeted recruitment and training requirements in a contract, the authority 
could isolate this community benefit clause to the small café lot.193 The 
ad-hoc catering services lot would not include the community benefit 
requirements.  
In this scenario, the contracting authority could rely on Article 20 to set-
aside the lot for a sheltered workshop or economic operators which aim to 
promote the long-term employment of disabled or disadvantaged people. 
Interested economic operators would need to demonstrate that 30% of 
their employees are disadvantaged or unemployed persons. Contracting 
authorities may isolate the social clause to the individual lot, which has 
the greatest potential to generate jobs and will not distort market 
competition. Two different arguments may refute this approach. One 
argument might suggest the inclusion of the social clause alone distorts 
competition and a second opposing argument might suggest that this 
approach limits the effectiveness of the social clause by only applying the 
clause to one lot of the contract.194  
                                                                                      
192 This approach is generally suitable for contracts which are large enough to generate 
employment growth.  
193 The contracting authority may follow this approach if it supports local government or 
national employment and inclusivity policies. 
194 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Truly competitive public procurement as a Europe 2020 lever: 
what role for the principle of competition in moderating horizontal policies?’ (2016) 
22(2) European Public Law 377. 
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The isolation of social benefits in a single lot will not maximise 
employment opportunities nor will it promote pure economic efficiency, 
however, it creates an opportunity for contracting authorities to pursue 
social objectives in a manner which will facilitate SMEs and social 
enterprises, and, in a manner, which would not significantly distort 
competition. While this approach is set out in the Recitals of the Directive, 
it is rarely used in the two case studies countries. Irish and Northern Irish 
public bodies, as we will see, are extremely reluctant to rely on the 
provision to set aside contracts for sheltered workshops.  
 
2.6.3 Innovation 
The socio-economic dimension of the rules is further evident in the 
promotion of innovative public procurement practices. Recital 47 calls for 
public procurers to ‘make the best strategic use of public procurement to 
spur innovation’ to secure the key Europe 2020 objectives of promoting 
smart, sustainable and inclusive economic growth.195 Contracting 
authorities are encouraged to purchase innovative supplies and services to 
achieve eco-growth and social innovation.196 The recitals encourage the 
use of innovative procurement to address ‘major societal challenges’, 
whilst simultaneously securing value for taxpayers’ money and supporting 
innovative business growth. The rules suggest that this can be achieved 
through the use of PCP and by the use of the ‘innovation partnership.’ 
The recital makes specific reference to the PCP model established and set 
out in the Commission Communication ‘Pre-commercial Procurement’ 
which may be used by procurers in the procurement of research and 
development (R&D) services.197 R&D activities refer to any actions taken 
                                                                                      
195 See Commission, ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth.’ (2010) COM 2020 final. 
196 This viewpoint has been previously encouraged by J. Edler and L. Georghiou, ‘Public 
procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research 
Policy 949; L. Hommen and M. Rolfstam, ‘Public procurement and innovation: towards 
a taxonomy’ (2009) 9(1) Journal of Public Procurement 17; V. Lember, T. Kalvet and R. 
Kattel, ‘Urban competitiveness and public procurement for innovation’ (2011) 
48(7) Urban Studies 1373. 
197 See Commission, ‘Pre-commercial Procurement: driving innovation to ensure 
sustainable high-quality public services in Europe’ (Communication) COM (2007) 0799 
final.  
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normally by companies to develop new supplies or services. The 
Communication is applicable for contracts which fall outside the remit of 
the Directive. PCP involves the successive development of innovative 
solutions with risks and benefits shared between economic operators and 
a public body under market conditions.198  
Full tender competitions for the purchase of the commercialised solutions 
can follow the completion of the pre-commercial stage.199 This demand 
led activity offers procurers greater choice to define and design required 
solutions by interacting closely with a range of tenderers. Contracting 
authorities do not enjoy the freedom to interact with interested economic 
operators when the tender competition is ongoing.200 This process 
provides start-ups and innovative companies an opportunity to work with 
public bodies. PCP involves procuring activities which fall for the most 
part outside of the Directive and require low sums of investment from 
public procurers.201  
For innovative R&D contracts falling within the remit of the Directive, 
contracting authorities are encouraged to use the new ‘innovation 
partnership’ procedure. This procedure assists procurers in purchasing 
innovative solutions which require significant sums of public 
investment.202 The innovation partnership procedure is suitable for 
contracting authorities which require the design and development of an 
innovative product or service which is not commercially available on the 
market.203 The procedure allows contracting authorities to establish a 
long-term partnership with economic operators for the development and 
subsequent purchase of the commercialised products or services. The 
                                                                                      
198 J. Edler and L Georghiou, ‘Public procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the 
demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research Policy 949. 
199 See COM (2007) 0799 final. This process is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three 
SMEs and Public Procurement.  
200 Joined Cases C-21/03 and C-34/03 Fabricom SA v Belgian State [2005] ECR I-1559. 
201 Public Sector Directive, recital 47. 
202 M. Andhov, ‘Innovation Partnership in the New Public Procurement Regime – A Shift 
of Focus from Procedural to Contractual Issues?’ (2015) 2 Public Procurement Law 
Review 18. 
203 E. Iossa, F. Biagi and P. Valbonesi, ‘Pre-commercial procurement, procurement of 
innovative solutions and innovation partnerships in the EU: rationale and strategy’ 
(2018) 27(8) Economics of Innovation and New Technology 730. 
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innovation partnership is based on the procedural rules that apply to the 
competitive process with negotiation.204 Contracts awarded under this 
procedure must be evaluated on the basis on Best Price: Quality Ratio.205 
The new procedure encourages contracting authorities to make purchases 
that improve the efficiency and quality of public services while addressing 
major societal challenges.206   
Questions have been raised by Arrowsmith around the risk of preferential 
treatment associated with PCP procedures.207 Companies which have 
completed the development and prototyping stages may have an unfair 
competitive advantage at the full tender stage. Perceived favouritism 
between the contracting authority and contracted companies may deter 
additional suppliers from bidding for the contract, believing that they do 
not have the same knowledge or experience that the other companies may 
have gained from the earlier development stage.208 The new innovation 
partnership aims to reduce these concerns, as it combines the R&D and 
commercial purchase stage in one overall procedure.209 However, a full 
tender process, as required, for an innovation partnership encompasses the 
traditional tendering and legislative barriers for SMEs.210  
While there are some concerns around the risk of preferential treatment 
with PCP procedures, Edler and Georghiou suggest that procurers can 
prevent monopolistic structures in later procurement contracts by 
involving more than two competitors in the process.211 Procurers may 
conduct initial solution design contracts with multiple suppliers which 
they can remove from the competition at different stages of the procedure.  
                                                                                      
204 The procedure for conducting a Competitive procedure with Negotiation is set out in 
art 29 of the Public Sector Directive. 
205 Public Sector Directive, art 67. 
206 As most Member States transposed the Directive into national law in or after 2016, 
there are limited resources available assessing the use and effectiveness of the new 
procedure. 
207 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London) 1054. 
208 S. Arrowsmith (n 207) 1047. 
209 This process may take place over successive stages. Public Sector Directive, art 31(2). 
210 Including problems finding and accessing tenders and meeting the financial and 
professional criteria. 
211 J. Edler and L Georghiou (n 198). 
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By working with several companies may reduce the risk of preferential 
treatment. This approach also encourages competition amongst all forms 
of small companies. PCP offers an easier route for start-ups, academics, 
non-profits, entrepreneurs to work with the public sector.212 It is not clear 
at this stage if the same can be said about innovative partnerships. Limited 
research is available assessing the impact of the innovation partnership on 
SME participation. 
The Directive includes additional measures for contracting authorities to 
incorporate innovative criteria in traditional procurement procedures, such 
as the use of variants.213 Contracting authorities are encouraged to carry 
out pre-market consultations to make themselves aware of relevant 
technological advances or innovative changes in the market place. Pre-
market consultations will aid procurers in designing appropriate and 
relevant innovative selection and award criteria.214 Contracting authorities 
are required to disclose the process and content of the consultations.215 
2.6.4 Subcontracting 
Another aspect of the rules encourages contracting authorities to take 
subcontractor considerations into account.216 Large contracts are 
dominantly awarded to large enterprises.217 SMEs can access large 
                                                                                      
212 Y. Myoken, ‘Demand-orientated policy on leading-edge industry and technology: 
public procurement for innovation’ (2010) 43(1-3) International Journal of Technology 
Management 196; A. Apostol, ‘Pre-commercial procurement in support of innovation: 
regulatory effectiveness’ (2012) 21(6) Public Procurement Law Review 213; J. Rigby, 
‘Review of pre-commercial procurement approaches and effects on 
innovation’ (Manchester Institute of Innovation Research: Manchester, 2013); V. 
Lember, R. Kattel and T. Kalvet, ‘Public procurement and innovation: Theory and 
practice’ (2014) Public Procurement, Innovation and Policy 13; C. Edquist and J.Zabala‐
Iturriagagoitia, ‘Pre‐commercial procurement: a demand or supply policy instrument in 
relation to innovation?’ (2015) 45(2) R&D Management. 
213 Public Sector Directive, recital 48. 
214 D. McKevitt and P. Davis, ‘How to interact, when and with whom? SMEs and public 
procurement’ (2015) 35(1) Public Money & Management 79. 
215 Public Sector Directive, arts 40-42. 
216 Public Sector Directive, art 71. See Case C-176/98 Host Italia [1999] ECR I-8607 
paras 26 and 27; Case C-126/03 Commission v Germany [2004] judgment of 18 
November 2004. 
217 This is mainly due to the large companies’ capacity, resources and market dominance. 
See R. Berrios, ‘Government contracts and contractor behaviour’ (2006) 63(2) Journal 
of Business Ethics 119. 
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contracts through the supply chain as subcontractors.218 In general, SMEs 
do not have the financial requirements and operational capability to carry 
out large contracts, and subcontracts offer SMEs a share of the public 
contract. The Directive includes several subcontractor provisions. 
Contracting authorities may ask tenderers in their submissions to indicate 
any plan it may have to subcontract to third parties.219 Contracting 
authorities may make direct payments to subcontractors for works 
completed on awarded public works, supplies or services contracts.220 In 
these circumstances, contracting authorities may allow the main 
contractor to object to the direct payments.221 
In public works and related services contracts, contractors are required to 
provide the contracting authority with information on all subcontractors 
used throughout the contract. Contractors are required to provide the 
name, contact details and legal representatives of its subcontractors.222 
Contracting authorities may require subcontractors to submit certificates 
and supporting documents to declare their suitability and capability to 
carry out the proportion of the public contract.223 Additionally, the 
contracting authority may restrict the main contractor from subcontracting 
vital elements of the contract, requiring the contractor to perform the 
specified works, supplies or services.224 Although, this approach may 
hinder SMEs from bidding for contracts as SMEs may rely on 
                                                                                      
218 A. Berry, ‘SME competitiveness: The power of networking and subcontracting’ (Inter-
American Development Bank 1997); L. Preuss, ‘Buying into our future: sustainability 
initiatives in local government procurement’ (2007) 16(5) Business Strategy and the 
Environment 354; K. Loader, ‘The challenge of competitive procurement: value for 
money versus small business support’ (2007) 27(5) Public Money and Management 307; 
K. Loader, ‘Is public procurement a successful small business support policy? A review 
of the evidence’ (2013) 31(1) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 39. 
219 Public Sector Directive, art 71(2) See Case C-314/01 Siemens AG Osterreich, ARGE 
Telekom & Partner and Hauptverband der osterreichischen Sozialversicherungstrager, 
judgment of 18 March 2004. 
220 Public Sector Directive, art 71(7) This provision was at the discretion of Member 
States. 
221 Public Sector Directive, art 71(3). 
222 Public Sector Directive, art 71(5). 
223 Contracting authorities should in particular assess whether there are any grounds for 
the exclusion of subcontractors pursuant to Article 57. 
224 Public Sector Directive, art 63(2). 
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subcontractors’ qualifications, experience, financial capabilities to meet 
the minimum selection criteria set out in the tender document.225  
Alternatively, interested economic operators can form a consortium to 
pool their resources to meet the minimum selection, and qualification 
criteria set out in the contract. There is no requirement for the consortium 
to establish a separate legal entity.226 However, Trybus raises an argument 
that SMEs do not wish to enter the public market as subcontractors or as 
part of a consortium as they do not want another enterprise controlling and 
managing their operational choices.227 Whilst this is a valid concern, this 
research accepts that SMEs can enter public markets via subcontracts. 
2.6.5 Conditions for the performance of the contract 
The rules expressly allow for the inclusion of economic, environmental, 
social, innovative or employment-related contractual performance 
conditions. This extends to measures which relate to the production 
process, such as the use of targeted recruitment and training of 
disadvantaged or unemployed persons.228 This form of community benefit 
clause is a permissible form of award criteria, once the clause is directly 
related to the works, supplies or services contract. Thus, the social 
requirements must be directly related to the subject matter of the contract 
and can be fulfilled during the production process.229 The use of targeted 
recruitment and training clauses have become popular with Irish and 
Northern Irish public bodies, particularly in the use of large works 
                                                                                      
225 See Case C-389/92 Ballast Neddam Groep which concerned the reliance on third-
party resources within a group company structure and Case C-176/98 Holst Italia which 
concerned the reliance on third-party resources in the context of joint venture 
arrangements. 
226 Case C-94/12 Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino [2013] pub. electr. 
EU:C:2013:646 Opinion of Advocate General Jaaskinen, para 33 paras 29 and 33; Case 
C‑324/14 Partner Apelski Dariusz [2016]  pub. electr. EU:C:2016:214. 
227 M. Trybus, ‘The Promotion of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Public 
Procurement: a Strategic Objective of the New Public Sector Directive?’ in F. Lichère, 
R. Caranta and S. Treumer (eds.) ‘Modernising Public Procurement: The New Directive; 
(Djøf: Copenhagen, 2014) 255. 
228 Contracting authorities may additionally request tenderers to show compliance or 
equivalent compliance with specific environmental or social ‘labels.’ These requirements 
may be included in the technical specifications, the award criteria or the contract 
performance conditions, once they are proportionate and relevant to the subject-matter 
of the contract. See Public Sector Directive, art 43. 
229 Public Sector Directive, recital 99. 
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contracts.230 This is a contentious area of public procurement law with 
multiple layers of arguments supporting and criticising the use of socially-
related contractual performance conditions.  
Firstly, as mentioned already, theoretical arguments question the legality 
and purpose of pursuing social objectives. Sánchez-Graells and Telles 
contest the legality of such objectives, claiming that such measures distort 
market competition.231 While McCrudden argues that public procurement 
should be used by public procurers to pursue their perceived conceptions 
of social justice.232 Secondly, arguments have been raised around the 
actual benefits achieved from the use of social criteria.233 Baden et al.’s 
empirical evidence finds that SMEs are not in favour of community 
benefit clauses, as the clauses lead to increased operational costs and 
inefficiencies. The research further argues that the use of targeted 
recruitment and training clauses can demotivate contractors’ permanent 
employees due to the constant rotation of new staff employed to meet the 
targets set out by the social clause.234 Although Tátrai argues that when 
social clauses become embedded in procurement practice, they will not 
lead to increase tendering or operational costs.235  
Loosemore adds another layer to this argument, suggesting that the 
inclusion of targeted recruitment and training clauses encourages social 
                                                                                      
230 The legislative developments in Ireland and in Northern Ireland will be discussed in 
further detail later in this chapter, in Chapter Three SMEs and Public Procurement and 
in Chapter Five the National Children’s Hospital Case Study and in Chapter Six the Buy 
Social Case Study. 
231 A. Sánchez-Graells, ‘Distortions of Competition Generated by the Public (Power) 
Buyer: A Perceived Gap in EC Competition Law and Proposals to Bridge It’ (2009) 
University of Oxford, Center for Competition Law and Policy, CCLP (L) 23; P. Telles, 
‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The EU's Internal Market, Public Procurement 
Thresholds, and Cross-Border Interest’ (2013) 43 Pub. Cont. LJ 3. 
232 C. McCrudden, ‘Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement and Legal 
Change’ (Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford 2007). 
233 R. Eadie and S. Rafferty, ‘Do corporate social responsibility clauses work? A 
contractor perspective’ (2014) 7(1) International Journal of Procurement Management 
19. 
234 D. Baden, I. Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The effects of procurement policies on 
‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: Content-analytic insights into the 
views and actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 29(3) International Small Business 
259. 
235 The costs will be viewed as operational costs by the interested economic operators. 
See; G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, Abingdon, 
Oxon;New York, NY, 2015) 18. 
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enterprise participation in public procurement.236 Social enterprises which 
prioritise the employment and training of people with disabilities and for 
people at risk of gaining long-term employment can act as useful partners 
or subcontractors on large works or services contracts that incorporate 
social clauses. Social enterprises are in a prime position to carry out the 
social requirements which a partnering or main contractor may find 
unappealing.237 
2.6.6 Compliance with Social and Labour Laws 
Arguably, one of the most progressive social provisions of the Directive 
is the requirement to ensure that contractors are compliant with applicable 
obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law. Article 
18(2) requires contracting authorities to take relevant measures to ensure 
the procured service provider or contractor complies with the social and 
labour laws that apply in the Member State where the services are 
provided or where the works are conducted.238 Contracting authorities are 
specifically required to ensure that the procurement requirements are 
conducted in accordance with Directive 2018/957 concerning the posting 
of workers.239 Non-compliance with social and labour requirements is 
                                                                                      
236 A social enterprise is defined as an enterprise whose ownership structure reflects the 
enterprise’s mission to promote social justice. See Commission, ‘Social Business 
Initiative Creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the 
social economy and innovation’ (Communication) COM (2011) 0682 final. See also; M. 
Loosemore, ‘Building a new third construction sector through social enterprise’ (2015) 
33(9) Construction Management and Economics 724. 
237 Loosemore (n 236) See also; S. Munoz, ‘Social enterprise and public sector voices 
on procurement’ (2009) 5(1) Social Enterprise Journal 69; A. Erridge and S. Hennigan, 
‘Sustainable procurement in health and social care in Northern Ireland’ (2012) 32(5) 
Public Money and Management 363; A. Argyrou, ‘Providing Social Enterprises with 
Better Access to Public Procurement: The Development of Supportive Legal 
Frameworks’ (2017) 12 Eur. Procurement & Pub. Private Partnership Law Rev 310. 
238 Contracting authorities are not permitted to rely on this provision to violate Art 56 
TFEU.  Contracting authorities can rely on Art 18(2) to assess economic operators’ 
compliance with applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour 
law established by Union law, national law, collective agreements or by the international 
environmental, social and labour law provisions listed in Annex X. Art 18(2) is supported 
by recital 37, 38 and 39; art 56(1) on awards of contracts; art 57(4) on exclusion criteria 
and art 69(3) on abnormally low tenders.  
239 Directive (EU) 2018/957 OJ L 173 amends Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision. See also; Public Sector Directive, recital 
98. 
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considered a grave form of misconduct and may result in the economic 
operator being excluded from the procurement process.240  
In relation to discretionary exclusions contracting authorities may exclude 
economic operators from participation in a procurement procedure;241  
• where the contracting authority can demonstrate that an economic 
operator violates any obligations in the fields of social, labour and 
environment law referred to in Annex X; 
• where the operator is bankrupt or is in the process of winding-up 
proceedings, or is the subject of insolvency;  
• where the economic operator is guilty of grave professional 
misconduct;  
• where the economic operator has engaged in activities aimed at 
distorting competition;  
• where a conflict of interest exists;242  
• where an economic operator has participated in market 
consultations, and participation in the tender would distort 
competition;243  
• where the economic operator has performed poorly in previous 
public contracts which led to the early termination of the contract 
or the application of sanctions or other comparable sanctions;  
• where the economic operator has made serious misrepresentations 
in relation to the selection criteria; 
• and where the economic operator has unduly influenced the 
awarding process or has received confidential information about 
the bidding process. 
                                                                                      
240 However, the grounds for misconduct must be proportionate to the overall nature of 
the contract. See Case C-171/15 Connexxion Taxi Services BV v Staat der Nederlanden, 
Transvision BV and others [2016] pub. electr. EU:C:2016:948, para 44. 
241 As listed in the Public Sector Directive, art 57(4). 
242 As laid out in Public Sector Directive, art 24. 
243 This should only be used as a last resort and in circumstances where the inclusion of 
the economic operator would result in a breach of the fundamental principles. 
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Contracting authorities may exclude economic operators at any stage of 
the competition for engaging in any of these activities before or during the 
competition.244 
Although, a contracting authority shall not exclude such economic 
operators if the economic operator has fulfilled its payments or has entered 
into an arrangement to pay any outstanding tax or social contributions.245 
In exceptional circumstances, contracting authorities are not required to 
exclude economic operators for violations of environmental, social and 
labour law, if there any overriding public policy considerations.246 
Similarly, contracting authorities are not required to exclude such 
economic operators if the violations against social, labour or 
environmental law are minor and disproportionate to the size of the 
contract.247 
Contracting authorities retain the discretion not to exclude any economic 
operator for engaging in these activities in circumstances where; the 
economic operator provides evidence showing that it has paid or has 
undertaken to pay compensation in respect of any damage caused by the 
criminal offence or misconduct concerned or has offered a valid 
explanation for its actions or has introduced technical, organisational and 
personnel measures to prevent further offences.248 If the contracting 
authority considers the steps taken to be insufficient, they must offer the 
economic operator a statement summarising the rationale of their reasons 
for rejecting the bidder.249 
Contracting authorities are required to exclude economic operators from 
competitions if the authority is aware that the economic operator has been 
convicted of any the offences listed below or if the authority has verified 
the information in accordance with Articles 59, 60 and 61 of the Directive. 
                                                                                      
244 Public Sector Directive, art 57(5). 
245 Public Sector Directive, art 57(3). 
246 Public Sector Directive art 57(2). 
247 Public Sector Directive arts 57(2) and 57(3). 
248 Public Sector Directive, art 57(6). 
249 See Case C-391/15 Marina del Mediterraneo and Others [2017] pub.electr. EU: 
C:2017:268; Varney v Hertfordshire County Council [2010] EWHC 1404. 
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Offences include; participation in a criminal organisation,  engaging in 
corrupt or fraudulent activities, engaging in terrorist offences or offences 
linked to terrorist activities, engaging in money laundering or terrorist 
financing, or participation in child labour or other forms of trafficking of 
human beings.250 The provision relies on definitions established for each 
of these activities in Council Framework Decisions,251 the Convention on 
the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests252 and 
definitions set out in Directives.253 If the contracting authority is aware 
that a person convicted of any of these offences is a member of the 
administrative, management or supervisory body of the economic 
operator or maintains a decision making, representative or controlling 
position within the company, the contracting authority shall exclude that 
economic operator from the competition.254 Economic operators found 
guilty of any of the mandatory exclusion offences and have not engaged 
in any self-cleaning measures shall be excluded from procurement 
competitions for five years from the date of conviction.255  
Van den Abeele notably comments that these provisions, and in particular 
Article 18(2) ‘introduces a minimum core of social and environmental’ 
requirements in public contracts. 256  Not only does the Directive promote 
compliance with applicable social, labour and environmental law, the 
Directive additionally aims to prevent social dumping in the Single 
                                                                                      
250 Public Sector Directive, art 57(1). 
251 Including; Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ 
L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3; Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on 
combating corruption in the private sector, OJ L 192 p. 54; Council Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, OJ L 300, 
11.11.2008, p. 42. 
252 Including; the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial 
interests OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 48; Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system 
for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 
15. 
253 Including; Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its 
victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 
15.4.2011, p. 1. 
254 Public Sector Directive, art 57(2). 
255 Public Sector Directive, art 57(7). 
256 E. Van den Abeele, ‘Integrating social and environmental dimensions in public 
procurement: one small step for the internal market, one giant leap for the EU?’ (2014) 
ETUI Working Paper. 
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Market.257 Social dumping in public procurement can occur in situations 
where economic operators tendering for a public contract in another 
Member State submit low tender costs by relying on lower wages and 
working conditions, relative to the levels set out by the Member State 
where the public work is to be carried out.258 The economic operator can 
reduce its overall tender cost as its labour-costs will be lower than those 
economic operators who are complying with the relevant labour laws 
where the public work will be conducted.259 There are a number of reasons 
why social dumping practices should be discouraged, such practices erode 
workers’ rights and result in tenderers submitting abnormally low tenders, 
which leads to cost overruns and in some cases non-completion of public 
contracts or non-completion of elements of the public contract.260  
An alternative argument disputes these claims, arguing that economic 
operators’ ability to rely on lower labour costs in its base Member State is 
advantageous to the business and increases its competitiveness when 
bidding for public or private contracts.261 Recent CJEU judgments differ 
on the permissible use of public procurement to advance contracting 
authorities’ perceptions of labour equality.262 This is discussed in the next 
section of the chapter. The labour-law related provisions reduce the 
incentives for tenderers to submit abnormally low tenders, which may 
                                                                                      
257 This provision supports the often-contentious Posted Workers Directive. See J. 
Cremers, J. Dølvik and G. Bosch, ‘Posting of workers in the single market: attempts to 
prevent social dumping and regime competition in the EU’ (2007) 38(6) Industrial 
Relations Journal 524. 
258 J. Alber and G. Standing, ‘Social dumping, catch-up or convergence? Europe in a 
comparative global context’ (2000) 10(2) Journal of European Social Policy 99. 
259 M Bernaciak, ‘Social Dumping: Political Catchphrase or Threat to Labour 
Standards?’ ETUI Working Paper 2012/06. (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute 
2012); E. Bengtsson, ‘Social dumping cases in the Swedish Labour Court in the wake of 
Laval, 2004–2010’ (2016) 37(1) Economic and Industrial Democracy 23. 
260 M. Gunduz and H. Karacan, ‘Assessment of abnormally low tenders: a multinomial 
logistic regression approach’ (2017) 23(6) Technological and Economic Development 
of Economy 848; T. Hanak, I. Marovic and N. Jajac, ‘Effect of Electronic Reverse 
Auctions on Competition and Abnormally Low Bids in Public Construction Procurement’ 
(2018) 25(1) Tehnicki vjesnik - Technical Gazette 144. 
261 C. Thörnqvist and C Woolfson, ‘When tender turns tough: posted workers and the 
tendering regime in the Swedish construction industry’ (2012) 30(7) Construction 
Management and Economics 525. 
262 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei; Case C‑115/14 RegioPost [2015].  
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level the playing field for SMEs and reduce incidents of cost over-runs 
associated with abnormally low tenders.263 
2.6.7 Procedural 
There are several procedural provisions included in the Directive which 
make it easier for procurers to promote competition by upholding the 
fundamental principles. The rules require contracting authorities to 
include financial and professional selection criteria which are 
proportionate to the subject matter of the contract.264 In particular, the 
minimum turnover required should not exceed twice the estimated 
contract value.265 The Directive encourages the use of a ‘European Single 
Procurement Document’ (ESPD) which allows suppliers to upload 
certificates and financial documents to an online procurement account. 
This eases SMEs burden in producing this documentation every time they 
submit a tender response.266 Reducing the administrative burden 
associated with tendering makes it easier for SMEs to bid for public 
contracts.  
Member States are encouraged to increase the use of electronic 
procurement strategies to increase efficiency and transparency.267 
Electronic procurement (e-procurement) refers to any procurement 
process which is completed through the use of electronic means by the 
contracting authority.268 The European Commission has called on the 
Member States to increase their use of e-procurement to generate 
significant savings for European taxpayers and to encourage SME 
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participation.269 The Commission reports that public entities that have 
implemented e-procurement report savings of between 5% and 20% of 
their procurement expenditure.270 The current EU public procurement 
market is estimated to be more than €2 trillion and a 5% reduction in the 
budget would result in about €100 billion of savings per year.271 The 
promotion of e-procurement is a prime feature in the Digital Agenda for 
Europe, and the rules included an ambitious transition towards e-
procurement in the EU.272 However, this is not a new development; similar 
targets were set by the Manchester Ministerial Declaration of 24 
November 2005, requiring for at least 50% of above-threshold public 
procurement procedures to be carried out electronically by 2010.273 The 
use of e-procurement has clear and tangible benefits for SMEs, by 
increasing transparency and access to tender competitions and by reducing 
administrative costs.274  
 
2.7 Public Procurement activities outside the remit of the rules 
SMEs are more successful in winning public contracts which fall below 
the Directive’s thresholds.275 The research must now question if the social 
and economic objectives are still applicable to below-threshold contracts. 
The Directive is only applicable to high-value contracts. The rules were 
put in place to promote cross-border trade by harmonising open and fair 
procedures across Member States. To achieve these goals, the Directive is 
                                                                                      
269 Directive 2014/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
on electronic invoicing in public procurement Text with EEA relevance OJ L 133/1. 
270 See Commission, ‘A strategy for e-procurement’ (Communication) COM (2012) 0179 
final.  
271 The French central purchasing body, UGAP (Union des Groupements d’achats 
publics) estimated that the switch to e-procurement practices reduced the administrative 
burden for buyers by 10%. The Welsh e-procurement programme ‘XchangeWales’ 
delivered benefits of £58million within three years of its implementation. See 
Commission, ‘A Strategy for e-Procurement’ (Memo) 20 April 2012 . 
272 See Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (Communication) 
COM (2015) 0192 final.  
273 See Manchester Ministerial Declaration 2005. 
274 COM (2012) 0179 final. See also; H. Walker and S. Brammer, ‘The relationship 
between sustainable procurement and e-procurement in the public sector’ (2012) 140(1) 
International Journal of Production Economics 256. 
275 See Commission, ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ access to Public Procurement Markets in the 
EU.’ (2010) Final Report.   
87 
 
only applicable to public contracts which have the potential to create 
cross-border trade. The European Commission calculates the value of 
public contracts which generate cross-border trade, this value is set as the 
monetary ‘threshold’ for the rules.276 Public works, supplies and services 
contracts whose estimated value meets or exceeds this threshold must 
adhere to the procedures set out in the Directive.277 The financial 
thresholds are revised every two years to reflect market conditions.278 
Different thresholds are set for central government departments, local and 
regional authorities and the utilities sector, to reflect the differences in 
market competition. Similarly, a higher threshold is set for social, health 
and education services contracts.279 
Member States retain the discretion to regulate below threshold contracts. 
However, contracting authorities must comply with the fundamental 
principles in circumstances where the public contract has the potential to 
generate cross-border trade regardless of the value of the contract.280 
Contracting authorities are required to adhere to the principles of 
transparency, equal treatment, non-discrimination and proportionality 
whenever they conclude public procurement contracts that fall outside the 
remit of the Directives.281 The principle of transparency imposes an 
obligation on the contracting authority to conduct procurement procedures 
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openly.282 The principle requires the contracting authority to publish or 
advertise a notice of a proposed contract; 
…for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising 
sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up to competition 
and the impartiality of the procedures to be reviewed.283 
Contracting authorities are at a minimum required to advertise notice of a 
proposed contract, for all contracts that may be of commercial interest to 
suppliers operating in any other Member State. Although, contracting 
authorities will not need to advertise the contract where there is only a 
very modest economic interest at stake. It is best practice for contracting 
authorities to publish contract award notices post completion of the tender 
stage. Commonly used means of publication include; online notices on the 
contracting authorities’ own website and on tender specific portal 
websites; National Official Advertising journals; local means of 
publication such as advertisements in newspapers or noticeboards; and 
voluntary advertising on the OJEU.284  
The advertisement should provide enough information to allow for a 
reasonable economic operator to decide whether to express its interest in 
obtaining the contract.285 A contracting authority may conclude a tender 
competition without publishing an advertisement notice in cases 
concerning situations of extreme urgency due to unforeseeable events and 
for contracts connected with the protection of exclusive rights.286 The call 
for competition should clearly outline the selection and award criteria. 
Contracting authorities are required to apply the stated criteria at the 
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evaluation stage.287 As with above-threshold contracts, contracting 
authorities enjoy the freedom to include social criteria in the selection and 
award criteria, once the criteria do not purposely distort competition. 
Contracting authorities are not prohibited from dividing contracts into 
smaller lots, using community benefit clauses, subcontractor 
considerations and innovative criteria. Importantly, the contracting 
authorities must ensure that these clauses are outlined in the call for 
competition notices and are designed in a non-discriminatory manner.288 
The principle of non-discrimination prohibits contracting authorities from 
rejecting tenders on the basis of nationality.289 Furthermore, contracting 
authorities must accept equivalent technical specifications, checks, 
diplomas, certificates and qualifications requirements.290 The principle of 
proportionality requires contracting authorities to use relevant and 
appropriate selection and award criteria. Contracting authorities should 
not impose technical, professional or financial conditions that are 
excessive and disproportionate to the overall procuring goal.291 This 
means that contracting authority may request tenderers to demonstrate 
compliance with EU eco-labels or equivalent certifications or 
qualifications.292  
There are no set procedures which should be followed for below-threshold 
contracts. Financial and selection criteria should be set proportionately 
and should be conducted electronically, where possible to facilitate SME 
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participation.293 Contracting authorities enjoy a high degree of flexibility 
in managing procedures at this level and can take measures to limit the 
number of applicants participating in a competition.294 The authorities can 
consider using qualification systems where a list of qualified operators is 
compiled using an advertised, transparent, competitive procedure.295 
Contracting authorities can request future tender bids from the list of 
registered operators on a rotational basis. The principles must be fully 
observed at the contract award stage, particularly in circumstances where 
negotiation is permitted with shortlisted tenderers.296 
If a contracting authority believes that the contract award would not create 
a cross-border economic-interest, the principles do not apply. The CJEU 
concluded that in such cases;  
…the effects on the fundamental freedoms are… to be regarded as 
too uncertain and indirect” to warrant the application of standards 
derived from primary Community law.297 
Contracting authorities should assess whether a cross-border interest 
exists by reviewing the subject matter of the contracts, its estimated value, 
the structure of the market and geographic location of the place of contract 
performance.298 Technically, in these exceptional circumstances, 
contracting authorities may directly award contracts to SMEs. However, 
this will only occur in limited circumstances, and Member States generally 
regulate below-threshold contracts in some manner.299 
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The Commission can initiate infringement proceedings under Article 258 
TFEU against contracting authorities which fail to comply with the 
fundamental freedoms and principles in circumstances where a genuine 
cross-border interest in the contract award existed.300 Contracting 
authorities are therefore required to comply with the fundamental 
principles and freedoms for certain below threshold contracts and enjoy 
the freedom to pursue economic and social objectives once they do not 
favour economic operators or distort competition.301 If contracting 
authorities choose to implement social criteria in their below threshold 
contracts, they must clearly refer to the selection and award criteria in the 
call for competition notices. Overall, as with the above threshold 
procurement, contracting authorities retain the freedom of choice to 
pursue economic and non-economic criteria. The principles are concerned 
with levelling the playing field for all economic operators and opening 
cross-border trade. Member States retain the discretion to use below-value 
procurement purchases to achieve their individual perceived conceptions 
of VfM. 
This research examines four individual case studies, two of which fall 
above the thresholds and two of which are contracts which fall below the 
advertising thresholds. The case studies examine how the use of social 
criteria or the use of innovative processes facilitate SME participation in 
public contracts of all sizes. The contracts examined were concluded by 
city-county councils and central government departments in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland.  
The legislation is no longer focused on securing economic objectives 
alone and contains provisions which promote the use of environmental, 
social and innovative related provisions. The promotion of cross-border 
trade in the Single Market still lies at the heart of the rules. However, the 
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rules now aim to promote sustainable economic growth. The Directive 
reflects the current economic and political landscape of the EU.302 Since 
the rules were revised in 2011, there have been a number of important 
communications adopted by the EU, which further demonstrate the 
commitment to the development of an inclusive, innovative and 
sustainable Single Market.  In particular, the adoption of the ‘Single 
Market Act II — Together for new growth’ promotes the inclusion of 
social entrepreneurship and the development of a Digital Single Market 
(DSM).303 The DSM Strategy aims to improve public services and 
business operations through the use of e-government and supporting 
innovative business growth.304 Further European support for the pursuit of 
socio-economic goals in public policy is evident in the adoption of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights in 2017.305 The adoption of the Pillar 
demonstrates the commitment of the Union to move away from austere 
financial measures to support a socially conscious and sustainable Single 
Market.306 
This section offered an overview of the context of the European public 
procurement rules, and it identified what rules exist and when they need 
to be applied. While this research claims the public procurement 
legislation has ‘matured’ to include non-economic objectives, this term 
would not be universally accepted by other researchers. Trepte concludes 
that ‘there is confusion over the purpose of the directives and what they 
can be used to achieved.’307 Trepte argues that there are two core reasons 
for this confusion, the first reason he argues is due to the lack of clarity in 
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the drafting of the Directives and the second reason relates to the 
‘incrementalism of regulatory intervention’.308 He argues that the 
Directives are ‘appearing more like Regulations’ with each review.309   
However, Trepte amongst others accepts that there are two broad sets of 
objectives that European regulations can be seen as serving, a set of social 
objectives and a set of economic objectives.310 Social objectives can range 
from utilising procurement to promote VfM targets, including using it as 
a tool to encourage labour equality, environmentally friendly purchases 
and the facilitation of SMEs in public contracts.311 The second set of 
economic goals see governments using procurement to achieve 
competitive markets, economies of scale and financial savings.312 Key 
CJEU judgments offer further guidance on the parameters of the use of 
social criteria in public procurement.   
2.8 CJEU Jurisprudence 
The overhaul of the complete suite of the Directives reflected the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU up until 2011. The CJEU has adopted both a 
flexible and restrictive view in public procurement rulings.313 In older 
cases, the Court took a more restrictive approach, consistently maintaining 
the importance of the economic approach to the regulation of public 
contracts, while more recent judgments have adopted a flexible approach 
in allowing contracting authorities to include non-economic objectives in 
their award criteria.314 The exception to this is the judgments assessing the 
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permissible use of labour-related conditions in public contracts. One of 
the earliest and most prominent cases that adopted a flexible approach to 
public procurement is the Beentjes315 case, where the Court held that the 
inclusion of a specific award condition relating to the employment of long-
term unemployed was permissible, provided that the condition was 
notified to potential tenderers in the tender notice.  
…in order to meet the directive’s aim of ensuring development of 
effective competition in the award of public works contracts, the 
criteria and conditions which govern each contract must be given 
sufficient publicity by the authorities awarding contracts. …the 
condition relating to the employment of long-term unemployed 
persons is compatible with the directive if it has no direct or indirect 
discriminatory effect on tenders from other Member States of the 
Community. An additional specific condition of this kind must be 
mentioned in the contract notice. 316 
While the Beentjes judgment acknowledged the role of social 
procurement, it did not greatly extend the contracting authority’s 
flexibility in designing contract award criteria. The ruling at its core re-
emphasised the economic objectives of the legislation, paying attention to 
the importance of complying with the principles of transparency and non-
discrimination.317 
Over 30 years ago, the Beentjes case clarified that public procurers 
maintain the authority to include non-economic criteria in tender 
documents, such as social or environmental criteria, once the published 
criteria are related to the subject matter of the contract and are consistent 
with all the fundamental principles of Community law and the Treaty 
provisions. Shortly after the Beentjes ruling, the ECJ took a primarily 
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of Cambridge [2000] ECR 8035 para 17. 
315 Case C-31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4929. 
316 Beentjes, para 21. 
317 J. Chave, ‘EU public procurement takes on a greener hue: Developments in the 
application of social and environmental factors in public procurement’ (2003) 24(1) 
Business Law Review 2. 
95 
 
flexible legal approach on the permissible use of environmental award 
criteria. In the Concordia Bus Finland case,318 the Court considered the 
legitimacy of the use of environmental award criteria in a tender 
competition for the outsourcing of an urban transport bus network of the 
Municipality of Helsinki. The tender was evaluated using the most 
economically advantageous tender award criteria. The contracting 
authority awarded marks for the overall price of the operation, the quality 
of vehicles and the supplier’s quality and environmental policies.319 
Concordia Bus, similar to the applicants in the Beentjes case, submitted 
the lowest-cost bid. The contract was awarded to another supplier who 
submitted a higher price but was received higher marks on the two 
environmental criterions.320  
Concordia Bus contended that the contracting authority had acted in a 
discriminatory manner by including restrictive environmental criteria. The 
company argued that the minimum criteria set to evaluate the quality of 
vehicles could realistically only be met by one sole supplier, the supplier 
who was subsequently awarded the contract.321 The ECJ did not accept 
Concordia Bus’s argument, concluding that public procurement 
legislation did not preclude contracting authorities from including 
environmental award criteria when assessing most economically 
advantageous tender322. The contracting authority in this case, by allowing 
suppliers to submit a range of environmental certifications had observed 
the Treaty principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment.323 The 
Court once more reiterated the test established by Beentjes, that any 
environmental considerations included must be directly connected to the 
subject matter of the contract. This is the first case where you can see the 
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depreciation of the importance of cost-driven award criteria. The 
judgment, contrasting to the Beentjes judgment offers greater flexibility 
to contracting authorities to utilise award criteria for the benefit of public 
interest.324 
The rule arising from the case law indicates that social criteria may be 
inserted in public procurement contracts as far as they do not hamper 
competition rules and are relevant to the subject matter of the contract. 
The difficulty for contracting authorities lies in defining the subject matter 
of a public contract. A public contract is defined as a; 
contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or 
more economic operators and one or more contracting authorities 
and having as their object the execution of works, the supply of 
products or the provision of services.325 
This definition implies that strictly speaking everything that is not 
necessary for the execution of works, the supply of products or provision 
of services is a secondary consideration.326 Contracting authorities must 
decide whether sustainable requirements are considered a primary 
consideration required for the execution of the public contract; for 
example, a contracting authority may need to purchase timber. If the 
contracting authority states that it needs to purchase Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) approved timber, then the subject matter of the contract is 
to purchase FSC timber.327 The sustainability clause in this instance is a 
primary consideration, and there is no need for secondary considerations.  
However, if the contracting authority adopts a formalistic approach, it 
would assess if it is necessary to request FSC approved timber. If a strict 
approach is adopted, the contracting authority would assess whether it is 
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relevant to have FSC approved timber to fulfil the objective of the public 
contract, non-FSC timber could technically fulfil the purpose of the 
contract. In this situation, the subject matter of the contract is the purchase 
of timber and the requirement to ensure that the timber is FSC approved 
is a secondary consideration.  McCrudden recognises the internal conflict 
a government must face in adopting secondary considerations. On the one 
hand, the government is participating in the market as a purchaser with a 
tight budget, and on the other hand, the government must regulate the 
market with its purchasing power to advance social justice.328  
The Directives offer detailed guidance on the inclusion of both primary 
and secondary non-economic criteria in daily procurement practices.329 
Contracting authorities cannot include secondary considerations which 
require contractors to subcontract to local SMEs as this would be a serious 
violation of the underpinning freedoms and principles of the TFEU. 
Similarly, contracting authorities cannot require economic operators to 
have local market knowledge or require the operators to source materials 
locally.330 Secondary considerations must be linked to the subject matter 
of the contract, including production methods and must be conducted in 
compliance with other laws.331 Non-economic criteria used must be 
specific and objectively quantifiable and must be explicitly set out in the 
call for competition documents.332 Contracting authorities, when 
                                                                                      
328 C. McCrudden (n 326). 
329 In particular the following articles of the Public Sector Directive; 
Art. 18(2) Mandatory social clause; 
Art. 20 Reserved contract; 
Art. 40 Preliminary market consultations; 
Art. 42(1) Technical specifications and accessibility requirements; 
Art. 43 Labels; 
Art. 46 Division of contracts into lots; 
Art. 56 Choice of participants and award of contracts; 
Art. 57 Exclusion grounds; 
Art. 67 Contract award criteria; 
Art. 69 Abnormally low tenders; 
Art. 70 Conditions for performance of contracts; 
Art. 71 Subcontracting. 
330 See Laboratori Bruneau Srl v Unità Sanitaria Locale RM/24 De Monterotondo [1994] 
1 CMLR 707 (‘Laboratori Bruneau’); See also Case C- 243/89 Storebaelt [1993] ECR I-
3353. 
331 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus, para 26.  
332 Joined Cases C-448/01 EVN AG and Another v Austria (Stadtwerke Klagenfurt AG 
and Another [2004].  
98 
 
evaluating the submitted tenders, must follow the award criteria set out in 
the call for competition notices.  
Once contracting authorities comply with these tests, they have the 
freedom to pursue social objectives in their public procurement 
operations. Contracting authorities can freely design their perceived VfM 
objectives; such objective may include the use of targeted recruitment and 
training clauses333; the use of fair-trade criteria334; or the use of renewable 
energy sources335. Contracting authorities are not required to demonstrate 
an economic benefit of including the social objectives in the procurement 
competition.336 However, this freedom of choice to pursue social 
objectives is not limitless. The CJEU has generally adopted a strict 
approach to the use of labour law requirements, which has prevented the 
extension of socially responsible public procurement parameters.  
There are three core cases, Ruffert,337 Bundesdruckerei,338 and 
RegioPost339 , which have assessed the inclusion of minimum wage and 
employment requirements in public contracts. Each of the procurement 
competitions was challenged on the basis of Directive 96/71340 and Article 
56 TFEU. The Rüffert case found that the inclusion of a minimum-wage 
requirement was in breach of EU law.341 The judgment found that Article 
3 of Directive 96/71 did not apply to the public contract as the wage 
requirement was not universally applicable and only applied to public 
contracts.342 The Rüffert judgment confirmed the earlier Viking343 and 
                                                                                      
333 Case C-31-87 Beentjes [1990].  
334 Case C-368/1 European Commission v Netherlands [2013] All ER (EC) 804 (the 
Dutch Coffee Case). 
335 Case C-448/01 EVN of 4 December 2003. 
336 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus; Case C-296/15 Medisanus d.o.o. v Splosna Bolnisnica 
Murska Sobota [2016] pub. electr. EU:C:2016:922 Opinion of 
the Advocate General Saugmandsgarrd Øe. 
337 Case C-346/06 Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] pub, electr. EU:C:2008:189. 
338 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei.  
339 Case C‑115/14 RegioPost.  
340 Directive 96/71 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision 
of services OJ L 18/1. 
341 Case C-346/06 Rüffert. 
342 This related to payments which were not laid down in Article 3(1) and (8) of the 
Directive 96/71. Case C-346/06 Rüffert, paras 31 – 34. 
343 Case C-438/05 Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779. 
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Laval344 decisions, concluding that Member States do not enjoy the 
freedom to require contractors to comply with domestic collective 
agreements rates. The court found that this type of requirement constituted 
as a barrier to cross-border trade, by imposing additional economic 
burdens on contractors and subcontractors established in the other 
Member States where minimum rates of pay are lower.345 For economic 
operators based in Member States with lower minimum rates of pay, this 
requirement would have ‘prohibited, impeded, or render the tender less 
attractive’, therefore conferring a restriction on cross-border trade.346  
In the Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Case C-319/06, the 
court further held that the Member States could not implement public 
policy provisions which are not equally applicable to national and foreign 
economic operators.347 The 2014 Bundesdruckerei judgment again 
assessed the compatibility of the Posted Workers Directive with the Public 
Procurement Directives.348 In this case, a German contracting authority 
requested all tenderers to comply with federal minimum wage law. The 
Court held that the requirement restricted subcontractors’ competitive 
advantage, limiting the fundamental freedom to provide services.349   
However, the 2014 Regiopost ruling quickly diluted the restrictive 
approach.350 This case involved a challenge to another minimum wage 
requirement inserted by German federal law. The regional minimum wage 
was only applicable to the public sector, and it did not extend to the private 
sector.351 The Regiopost judgment differs to that of Bundesdruckerei by 
concluding that clauses requiring tenderers to pay regulated or collectively 
agreed minimum rates of pay is compatible with Article 26 of Directive 
                                                                                      
344 Case C‑341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 70 and 71. 
345 C. Barnard Viking and Laval: an introduction (2008) (10) Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 463. 
346 Case C-346/06 at para 37. For a similar agreement see C-298/15 UAB Borta [2016] 
pub. electr. EU:C:2016:921 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston para 38. 
347 Case C-319/06 Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg paras 85 and 97. 
348 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei. 
349  Case C-549/13 at paras 35 and 36. See also F. Costamagna Minimum Wage between 
Public Procurement and Posted Workers: Anything New after the Regio Post Case? 
(2017) 1 European Law Review 101. 
350 Case C‑115/14 RegioPost. 
351 Case C-115/14 at para 33. 
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2004/18/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of the Posted Workers 
Directive and with Article 56 of the TFEU.352  
While the Regiopost judgment appears to extend the permissible use of 
social criteria in public contracts, doubt still exists on the extent to which 
public procurers can incorporate employment considerations into their 
tendering practices.353 There has been a noticeable increase in the 
inclusion of pay-related clauses in public sector contracts.354 There are 
some examples of successful incorporation of living wage requirements 
in public contracts. Scotland has successfully incorporated living wage 
considerations into public contract competitions.355 Scotland sought 
advice from the European Commission on two separate occasions, the 
advice received indicated that such an inclusion would be incompatible 
with EU law. Scotland proceeded with the implementation of the 
Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014.356 The Act itself does not state 
that compliance with the ‘Living Wage’ is a mandatory requirement for 
public contracts. However, interested bidders are required to adopt ‘fair 
work practices and conditions’ for all employees working on public 
contracts.357 Fair work practices extend to paying the living wage and 
avoiding the use of unnecessary zero-hour contracts. Technically, Scottish 
procurers do not include mandatory living wage specifications in their 
contract agreements. 
London actively promotes the inclusion of living wage requirements in 
public contracts. The City Corporation is committed to gradually, 
                                                                                      
352 Case C-115/14 at paras 66, 73 and 74. 
353 C. Kaupa, ‘Public Procurement, Social Policy and Minimum Wage Regulation for 
Posted Workers: Towards a More Balanced Socio-Economic Integration Process?’ 
(2016) 1(1) European Papers: a Journal on Law and Integration 127. 
354 Academic opinion is divided on the use of public procurement to promote 
employment standards. See A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Regulatory substitution between labour 
and public procurement law: The EU’s shifting approach to enforcing labour standards 
in public contracts’ (2018) 24(2) European Public Law 229. 
355 See Scottish Government, ‘Statutory Guidance on the Selection of Tenderers and 
Award of Contracts Addressing Fair Work Practices, including the Living Wage, in 
Procurement.’ (2015). 
356 Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. 
357 Scottish Government, ‘Statutory Guidance on the Selection of Tenderers and Award 
of Contracts Addressing Fair Work Practices, including the Living Wage, in 
Procurement.’ (2015). 
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including living wage requirements in services contracts.358 This is 
achieved through voluntary mechanisms. The City Corporation does not 
appear to include living wage requirements in their weighted award 
criteria.359 An Irish Public Services and Procurement (Workers’ Rights) 
Bill 2017 was proposed last year and is currently at the second stage of 
review.360 While it is unlikely that the Bill will be enacted, it is interesting 
to note that there is some level of support for the inclusion of mandatory 
‘Living Wage’ requirements in public contracts.361 The Bill proposes to 
extend the definition of ‘Most Economically Advantageous Award 
Criteria’ to include the following considerations; trade union recognition, 
contractor commitments to pay their employees the living wage or above, 
to comply with collective bargaining agreements and a commitment not 
to engage with zero-hour contracts.362  
Overall, the CJEU jurisprudence supports the inclusion of non-economic 
objectives and criteria in public procurement. The CJEU explicitly 
recognises contracting authorities’ freedom to facilitate SME participation 
in public procurement. In Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino,363 
the Court remarked that; 
An objective of the public procurement rules is to open up 
the public procurement market for all economic operators, 
regardless of their size. The inclusion of small and medium-sized 
                                                                                      
358 See the City of London Procurement Strategy 2015-2018 p.11 The City plans to 
eventually require services contractors and subcontractors to pay the London Living 
Wage to those employees based in Greater London and pay the UK Living Wage to those 
employees based outside Greater London. This is restricted to employees working on the 
public contracts. 
359 See the City’s Standard Conditions April 2018.  
360 The private member’s bill Public Services and Procurement (Workers’ Rights) Bill 
2017 is one of several procurement bills proposed in recent years. The Bill is currently 
under review. 
361 The majority of private members bills are not enacted. See B. Farrell The political 
role of cabinet ministers in Ireland. Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994) 73. 
362 Proposed Art. 9(3). See the full Bill at this link; 
https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/bill/2017/83/eng/initiated/b8317d.pdf Last 
accessed 10th June 2019. 
363 Case C-94/12 Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino [2013] pub. electr. 
EU:C:2013:646 Opinion of Advocate General Jaaskinen, para 33 para 33; Joined Cases 
C‑523/16 MA.T.I. SUD [2018] pub. electr. EU:C:2018:135, para 58. 
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enterprises (SMEs) is especially to be encouraged as SMEs are 
considered to form the backbone of European Union economy.364 
In this case, the Court considered if economic operators can rely on 
consortium partners qualifications and capabilities to meet the 
specifications required to bid for a public contract. The Court reiterated 
that the main purpose of the Directive is to promote trade and competition 
amongst all suppliers in the public markets.365 Restricting economic 
operators’ choice to partner with other operators would restrict them from 
bidding for public contracts which they could not compete for on their 
own. Advocate General Jaaskinen had previously noted that; 
The chances of SMEs to participate in tendering procedures and to 
be awarded public works contracts are hindered, among other 
factors, by the size of the contracts. Because of this, the possibility 
for bidders to participate in groups relying on the capacities of 
auxiliary undertakings is particularly important in facilitating the 
access to markets of SMEs.366 
Contracting authorities may not restrict SMEs bidding for a public 
contract as part of a consortium.367 SMEs wishing to form a consortium 
are not required to establish a separate legal form for the partnership.368 
This is particularly important for SMEs wishing to bid for large, 
centralised contracts. SMEs are generally locked out of large contracts as 
they do not have the ability to carry out the contract on their own and need 
to rely on the capabilities of others to fulfil the contract requirements.369 
                                                                                      
364 Case C-94/12 Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino para 33. 
365 See Case C-94/12 para 34 which concludes that the promotion of competition has a 
positive impact on both the economic operators and the contracting authorities. See also 
Case C‑305/08 CoNISMa [2009] ECR I‑12129 para 37.  
366 Case C-94/12 para 33. 
367 See Case C-223/16 Casertana Costruzioni v  Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei 
Trasporti [2017] pub. electr. EU:C:2017:685. 
368 Case C‑324/14 JuPartner Apelski Dariusz [2017] pub. electr. EU:C:2016:214. 
369 See Commission, ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ access to Public Procurement Markets in the 
EU.’ (2010) Final Report. See also Commission, ‘Making Public Procurement work in 
and for Europe.’ (Communication) COM (2017) 572 final. 
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Furthermore, the Courts have also instructed contracting authorities to 
include fair and proportionate subcontracting considerations.370  
Contracting authorities are not permitted to limit a contractors’ discretion 
to subcontract elements of the contract to third parties.371 Contractors do 
not have complete discretion in this area, and the contracting authority 
may restrict the contractor from subcontracting certain components of the 
public contract.372 The contracting authority may also prohibit the use of 
subcontractors whose capacities cannot be verified or do not meet the 
selection criteria required for the public contract.373 Subcontracting is an 
entry route to public procurement for suitable and capable SMEs.  
Overall, the CJEU rulings adopt a positive approach when considering the 
inclusion of non-economic objectives in tender competitions, providing 
contracting authorities with the discretion and flexibility to incorporate 
policy-led concerns once the non-economic criteria do not violate the 
principles of transparency, mutual recognition, equal treatment and 
proportionality. Thus, non-economic objectives are permissible once they 
are not used in a manner which tilts the playing field in favour of certain 
economic operators. Although, this is not always the case as demonstrated 
in Ruffert and Bundesdruckerei.374 In these cases, the CJEU adopted a 
restrictive approach, limiting contracting authorities’ discretion to 
incorporate labour related contractual performance clauses. This research 
accepts that contracting authorities can pursue social objectives. The 
CJEU jurisprudence and the updated rules have set the parameters on how 
contracting authorities may compliantly incorporate social criteria in 
public procurement. European Commission policy documents offer 
                                                                                      
370 Case C-298/15 Borta [2017] pub. electr. EU:C:2017:266. 
371 Public Sector Directive, art 63(2) See also; Case C-176/98 Host Italia [1999] ECR I-
8607 paras 26 and 27; Case C-126/03 Commission v Germany [2004] judgment of 18 
November 2004. 
372 See Case C-389/92 Ballast Neddam Groep  which concerned the reliance on third-
party resources within a group company structure and Case C-176/98 Holst Italia which 
concerned the reliance on third-party resources in a joint venture arrangement. 
373 Case C-314/01 Siemens and ARGE Telekom [2004] pub. electr. EU:C:2004:159, 
para 45; See also; C-324/14 Partner Apelski Dariusz [2016] pub. electr.  EU:C:2016:214 
374 Case C-346/06 Rüffert; Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei. 
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further guidance on how contracting authorities can incorporate social 
criteria into public procurement. 
2.9 Policy Support  
The European Commission’s ‘Public Procurement Strategy’ calls for 
central and local public bodies to use procurement to respond to societal, 
environmental and economic challenges.375 It is a difficult task to ask 
procurers to use procurement to promote more sustainable, inclusive and 
innovative economies. Local and national public procurers generally tend 
to be concerned with the buying activity and their buying and financial 
needs.376 Procurers are concerned with the competitiveness of local 
economies and the quality, costs and services of the goods or supplies 
procured.377 There is a tendency for procurers to avoid the inclusion of 
social criteria in procurement competitions to avoid the risk of legal 
uncertainty and legal challenges from aggrieved unsuccessful tenderers.378 
The provisions of the Directive and the CJEU jurisprudence set out the 
boundaries for the inclusion of social criteria, and the Commission has 
further published guidance documents and policy offering public bodies 
advice on how to practically design and use social criteria.379 The 
Commission recognises the importance of supporting procurers in 
introducing strategic public procurement operations; 
…mainstreaming innovative, green, and social criteria… as well as 
procurement of innovative solutions at the pre-commercial stage 
                                                                                      
375 See Commission, ‘Making Public Procurement work in and for Europe.’ 
(Communication) COM (2017) 572 final. 
376 K. Loader, ‘Is public procurement a successful small business support policy? A 
review of the evidence’ (2013) 31(1) Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy 39. 
377 Contracting authorities are required to pursue their perceived ‘value for money’ 
objectives within limited budgets. See L. Preuss and H. Walker, ‘Psychological barriers 
in the road to sustainable development: evidence from public sector procurement’ (2011) 
89(2) Public Administration 493. 
378 L. Georghiou, Y. Li, E, Uyarra and J. Edler, ‘Public procurement for innovation in 
small European countries.’ A Report from the ERA-PRISM: Policies for Research and 
Innovation in Small Member States to Advance the European Research Area  (OMC-Net 
Project, Brussels 2010); C.P. McCue, E. Prier, and D. Swanson, ‘Five dilemmas in public 
procurement’ (2015) 15(2) Journal of Public Procurement 177. 
379 See Commission, ‘Buying Social A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations 
in Public Procurement’ (Guide) SEC (2010) 1258, final. 
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requires not only a highly competent pool of public procurers but 
above all policy vision and political ownership.380 
The Commission is currently developing and updating voluntary common 
green criteria, and the criteria will be based on Eco-label criteria and 
available scientific data.381 Contracting authorities may reduce the 
administrative burden and ease their concerns regarding legal uncertainty 
by using the voluntary criteria set by the Commission. The ‘Buying Green! 
A handbook on green public procurement’ is also available to support 
public bodies in adopting environmental considerations.382  
The Commission’s ‘Buying Social – A guide to taking account of social 
considerations in public procurement’ offers legal and practical advice on 
the incorporation of social criteria.383 The guidance document offers 
practical guidance on how to incorporate social criteria at the pre-
tendering stages, in selection and award criteria and contractual 
performance clauses. While this document is expansive and offers advice 
on a wide range of social criteria, such as the design of inclusive criteria, 
SME friendly criteria and labour related criteria, the guide is outdated and 
is reflective of the 2004 Directives. It is currently being revised, and an 
updated version is due to be published in 2020. 
SME participation in public procurement is supported by the Small 
Business Act.384 The Act acknowledges that SMEs miss out on securing 
public contracts as procurers may ‘find it more comfortable to award 
certain contracts to large enterprises with a track record rather than to 
young innovative companies.’385 This is one of a number of reasons why 
                                                                                      
380 COM (2017) 572 final 3. 
381 This will also support the effective use of the Clean Vehicles Directive (2010/21/EU); 
the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) and the Energy Performance of Buildings 
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382 See Commission, ‘Buying Green! A handbook on green public procurement. Third 
Edition (Guidance)’ COM 179. See also; Further support; Commission, ‘Guidance for 
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383 See Commission, ‘Buying Social A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations 
in Public Procurement’ (Guide) SEC (2010) 1258, final. 
384 See Commission, ‘Think Small First” - A “Small Business Act” for Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2008) 0394. 
385 COM (2008) 0394, section V. 
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SMEs fail to bid for public contracts successfully; other concerns arise 
around SMEs’ lack of awareness of advertised contracts; lack of ability to 
complete the tender form; and a lack of financial and professional 
capabilities to meet the contractual requirements set.386 To alleviate these 
concerns and to level the playing field for SMEs, the ‘European Code of 
Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement 
Contracts’ was adopted in 2008.387  The ‘Code’ outlines measure for 
public procurers to adopt to make tender competitions more conducive to 
SME participation.  
Notably, the Code stresses that SMEs access to public contracts is not 
driven solely by legislative provisions but is primarily driven by a 
contracting authority’s procurement culture.388 The Code sets out a series 
of measures for public procurers to adopt to ease the barriers faced by 
SMEs. These include; 
• Setting appropriately sized contracts 
• Ease of access to relevant information 
• Setting proportionate qualification and financial criteria 
• Reducing administrative burden 
• Reducing the use of cost-driven competitions 
• Ensuring payments on time. 
The Code suggests that if a public body is committed to supporting SME 
participation in public contracts, the contracting authority should follow 
these measures by; dividing larger contracts into smaller lots, using e-
procurement tools fully, setting appropriate qualification levels and 
                                                                                      
386 COM (2008) 0394, section V. 
387 See Commission ‘European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to 
Public Procurement Contracts’ (SWP) COM (2008) 2193. 
388 The importance of staff training and the need for co-operation across departments is 
emphasised in; J. Thomson and T. Jackson, ‘Sustainable procurement in practice: 
lessons from local government’ (2007) 50(3) Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 421. 
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financial requirements, awarding the tender on the basis of Best Price: 
Quality,389 and by paying contractors promptly.390  
Concerns have been raised that the pursuit of non-economic criteria 
distorts market competition and has the potential to reduce economic 
efficiencies.391 This research does not dismiss these critical and 
worthwhile arguments. However, the research accepts that the Directive 
has an economic purpose and socially-sustainable purpose. This has been 
set out in the Directive, the CJEU jurisprudence and by the supporting 
guidance and policy documents. There is a tendency by the Directive, in 
particular, to classify social, environmental and innovation goals in one 
category.392  While legislative supports for the use of ecological, green 
and sustainable criteria further demonstrate that the use of non-economic 
criteria is permissible and welcomed at an EU level, this research does not 
plan on reviewing these practices further. This research is tasked with 
assessing to what extent the measures included in the Directive and policy 
facilitate SME participation in public procurement. 
The research accepts that the facilitation of SME participation in public 
contracts will not distort market competition as the purpose of SME 
friendly policies is to open-up and increase competition amongst all types 
and sizes of companies.393 The research fundamentally argues that the 
inclusion of SMEs in public procurement has a positive impact on 
employment and innovation generation. This is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Three ‘SMEs and Public Procurement’. Overall, SMEs are a 
primary source of employment in Member States and are key generators 
in the design and development of innovative services and supplies.394 This 
                                                                                      
389 These measures are discussed in more detail in Chapter Three SMEs and Public 
Procurement. 
390 See also Directive 2011/7/EU of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in 
commercial transactions OJ L 48/1. 
391 M. Porter and M. Kramer, ‘The link between competitive advantage and corporate 
social responsibility’ (2006) 84(12) Harvard Business Review 78. 
392 Public Sector Directive recital 37 and art 67(2). However, it should be noted that 
environmental considerations are dealt with in more detail, see art 62. 
393 Case C-94/12 Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino para 33. 
394 Not all SMEs are drivers of innovation, start-ups are the key drivers of innovation as 
we will see in the next chapter.  
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chapter concludes by examining the public procurement regulatory 
landscapes in the two case study countries, Ireland and Northern Ireland.  
The European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 
2016 (SI No. 284 of 2016) implement Directive 2014/24/EU into Irish 
law.395 Public procurement is considered a transferred matter under the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 as the UK Public Contracts and Utilities 
Contracts Regulations were adopted prior to the restoration of a Devolved 
Administration in Northern Ireland.396 Therefore, public procurement law 
in Northern Ireland falls within the scope of the UK Procurement 
Regulations. The Public Contracts Regulations 2015 implement in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland Directive 2014/24/EU.397  
Both sets of Regulations closely transpose the provisions contained in the 
Directive. However, the rules did not include the provisions to mandate 
the division of contracts into lots398 and did not provide for contracting 
authorities to make direct payment to subcontractors.399 When 
implementing the rules, the states chose to implement mandatory 
electronic communication rather than deferring that requirement until 
April 2017.400 
2.10 Public Procurement Law in Ireland 
On average, the state spends approximately €8.5 billion annually 
concluding public supplies and services contracts.401 In recent years, 
                                                                                      
395 European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016 (SI No. 284 
of 2016) (Public Authority Regulations). 
396 Northern Ireland Act 1998 Section 6(A). S. 6A inserted (26.6.2018 for specified 
purposes) by European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (c. 16), ss. 12(6), 25(2)(c) (with s. 
19, Sch. 2 paras. 3(5), 14(5), Sch. 8 paras. 37, 41. 
397 (UK) Public Contracts Regulations 2015. 
398 Public Authority Regulations reg 46; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 46. 
399 Public Authority Regulations reg 71; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 71. 
400 Both states actively promote the use of e-procurement for both above and below 
threshold contracts. Irish contracting authorities are encouraged to utilise the ‘eTenders’ 
national advertisement platform and Northern Irish contracting authorities are 
encouraged to utilise the ‘eSourcingNI’ and ‘eTendersNI’ online support platforms.  
401 Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’ 
Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services. (2019) Version 2.1. Accessible 
at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/national-public-procurement-policy-framework/ Last 
accessed 2nd May 2019. 
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Ireland has moved towards a centralised system of public procurement. 
The Office of Government Procurement (OGP) commenced operations in 
2014, and together with four key sectors (Health, Defence, Education and 
Local Government), takes responsibility for sourcing all goods and 
services on behalf of the public service.402 The three overriding goals of 
the office are to integrate procurement policy, strategy and operations in 
one office, to improve spend analytics and data management, and to secure 
significant savings.403 National, regional and local bodies retain 
responsibility for sector-specific procurement operations in health, 
defence, education and local government. While the key four sectors 
retain ownership of specialised procurement, there is an overriding 
national public service objective to speak with ‘one voice’ to the market 
when procuring set categories of goods and services.404 Coordinating the 
market in a centralised manner is designed to eliminate duplication of 
tasks and to secure the scale of ‘public procurement to best effect.’405  
The European Union (Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 
2016 (SI No. 284 of 2016) transposed Directive 2014/24/EU into Irish 
law. This is the central piece of regulation governing the awards of public 
contracts by central government departments, regional and local 
authorities in Ireland.406 The rules on redress procedures have recently 
                                                                                      
402 Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’ 
Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services. (2017) Version 1. 
403 Office of Government Procurement, ‘Communications Strategy 2018 – 2020’.  p.2. 
404 Office of Government Procurement (n 402). 
405 Office of Government Procurement (n 403) 2. While centralisation can generate 
savings, research is divided on what impact the use of centralised procurement has on 
SME participation in public contracts. See D. Pickernell, A. Kay, G. Packham and C. 
Miller, ‘Competing agendas in public procurement: an empirical analysis of 
opportunities and limits in the UK for SMEs.’ (2011) 29(4) Environment and Planning 
C: Government and Policy 641. 
406 Additional public procurement rules include; The European Union (Award of 
Contracts by Utility Undertakings) Regulations 2016 (SI No. 286 of 2016) (the Utilities 
Regulations) transposed Directive 2014/25/EU into Irish law, this regulation governs 
procurement in water, energy, transport and postal services sectors. This Regulation is 
not discussed, this research focusses on the rules governing public authority contracts. 
Equally, this thesis does not offer an analysis of Directive 2014/23/EU which was 
transposed by the European Union (Award of Concession Contracts) Regulations 2017 
(SI No. 203  of 2017) (the Concessions Regulations. The European Union (Award of 
Contracts Relating to Defence and Security) Regulations 2012 (SI No. 62 of 2012) 
implements the Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service 
contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security. 
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been updated to reflect the changes introduced by updated statutory 
instruments. Harmonised redress rules assist aggrieved unsuccessful 
bidders in accessing proportionate remedies for uncompetitive or flawed 
procurement procedures.407 The EU Directives and implementing 
instruments do not extend to below threshold value contracts in Ireland. 
Domestic guidance documents govern such contracts.408 Contracting 
authorities should always follow a competitive process, save in justifiably 
exceptional circumstances. The process should always take into account 
the general Treaty principles of transparency, equal treatment, 
proportionality and non-discrimination.409  
At a national level, the OGP conducts procurement competitions for 
standardised services and supplies. Framework agreements are generally 
attached to the concluded contracts, allowing national, regional and local 
contracting authorities to purchase from the framework agreements using 
the stated and agreed upon form of mini-competition or purchasing 
method.410 To date, the OGP has established 16 categories of expenditure, 
the OGP procures eight of these, the remaining categories are controlled 
by the four key sectors of health, education, defense and local government. 
Sourcing categories controlled at a national level include; Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT); Facilities Management; Utilities, 
Fleet and Plant, Marketing, Print and Stationery; Travel, HR and Managed 
Services; Professional Services; and Spot Buying.411  
                                                                                      
Similarly, to the Utilities, Concessions and Remedies Regulations, these rules are not 
analysed in this research as they have limited impact on the facilitation of SME 
participation in public markets. 
407 In relation to remedies, the European Communities (Public Authorities’ Contracts) 
(Review Procedures) Regulations 2010 (SI No. 130 of 2010) gives effect to Directive 
89/665/EEC as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC (the Remedies Directives). The 
2010 Regulations were amended in July 2017 by the European Communities (Public 
Authorities’ Contracts) (Review Procedures) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI No. 
327 of 2017) to align the 2010 Regulations with the Public Sector Regulations of 2016. 
408 Namely by Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement 
Framework Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services.’ (2019) Version 
2.1. 
409 Below threshold public contracts may be subjected to judicial review under ‘S.I. No. 
234 of 2018 Review of the award of public contracts Order 84(a). 
410 Framework agreements are commonly used by the OGP. The use of frameworks 
agreements is reviewed briefly in Chapter Three SMEs and Public Procurement. 
411 Office of Government Procurement, ‘Communications Strategy 2018 – 2020’. 
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National, regional and local bodies are responsible for procuring public 
works, supplies and services contracts which fall outside of these 
categories; for example, the Health Service Executive (HSE) manages and 
governs the procurement operations of the health system.412 There are 31 
local authorities in Ireland, 26 of which are county councils responsible 
for local government in 24 geographical counties. There are two city and 
county councils and three city councils.413 Each council has jurisdiction 
for its administrative area.414 
Semi-state bodies which are owned by some level by the state and are 
technically commercially-run, take ownership of their procurement 
practices and policies.415 The Public Contracts Regulations or the Utilities 
Regulations may apply to some of their procurement practices, depending 
on the value and subject matter of the contract, however, for the most part, 
semi-state bodies are not required to purchase from OGP concluded 
contracts or adhere to government policy on public procurement.416 The 
National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) advises contracting 
authority on how to secure VfM in setting up public-private partnerships 
(PPPs).417 All projects involving the use of private finance must be 
referred to the NDFA for advice.418  
Public procurement guidance and training material are offered through 
various means. The ‘National Procurement Policy Framework’ consists 
of five streams; 
• Legislation (Regulations implementing the Directives)  
                                                                                      
412 As set out in the Health Act 2004. 
413 As set out under the Local Government Reform Act 2004. 
414 The Local Government Act 2001 sets out the functions and powers entrusted to local 
bodies. Furthermore, Art 28(a) of the Constitution (Bunreacht na hEireann) formalises 
the role of local government in providing democratic representation of local 
communities. 
415 Semi-state bodies are governed by Department of Public Expenditure and Reform 
‘The Code of Practice for the Governance of State Bodies.’ (2006). 
416 Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’. 
(2019). Version 2.1. 
417 The National Treasury Management Agency (Amendment) Act (2014) sec 55. 
418 This role is provided for in the National Development Finance (Amendment) Agency 
Act 2007 sec 3. 
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• Policy (Soft Law measures, i.e. government circulars)  
• Capital Works Management Framework (Specifically designed for 
construction contracts) 
• General Procurement Guidelines  
• Detailed technical guidelines, template documents and notes 
published by the OGP 
The most comprehensive guidance and training material on the new 
Directive has been published centrally by the OGP. In 2017, the OGP 
published a comprehensive ‘Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods 
and Services.’ document, which is subject to amendment and review 
periodically.419 These guidelines aim to ‘promote best practice and 
consistency of application of the public procurement rules in relation to 
the purchase of goods and services.’420 Furthermore, the OGP has recently 
published an information note on the incorporation of ‘Social 
Considerations in Public Procurement.’421 This document offers practical 
advice on the inclusion of relevant and appropriate social considerations 
in the purchase of goods and services. Additionally, guidance and training 
materials have been published by national, local and regional authorities.  
Achieving VfM is a key procurement principle. Individual contracting 
authorities are responsible for ensuring VfM outcomes.422 The Irish 
‘Public Spending Code’ requires contracting authorities to achieve VfM 
by ‘doing the right thing’ that is, spending money to achieve the right 
objectives, and ‘doing it right’, that is, spending money as efficiently as 
possible, avoiding waste.’423The Irish National Public Procurement 
                                                                                      
419 Office of Government Procurement, National Public Procurement Framework Public 
Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services.’ (2019) Version 2.1. 
420 Office of Government Procurement (n 419) 13. 
421 Office of Government Procurement Social Considerations in Public Procurement. 
OGP. (2018). Accessible at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/information-notes/ Last accessed 
16th May 2019. 
422 Public bodies are required to provide ‘cost-effective’ public services under section 
4(f) and (g) of the Public Service Management Act (PSMA), 1997. 
423 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform Public Spending Code - Expenditure 
Planning, Appraisal & Evaluation in the Irish Public Service: Standard Rules & 
Procedures (2012) A-00. 
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Guidelines document sets out three forms of structured steps for 
conducting below-threshold public procurement processes. The guidance 
documents set out general guidance for contracts valued below €5,000,424 
contracts valued between €5,000 to €25,000425 and contracts valued from 
€25,000 to EU thresholds.426 
The national guidelines encourage the contracts to be evaluated using the 
‘most economically advantageous tender’ (MEAT) award criteria and to 
be carried out by a team with requisite experience. The ‘MEAT’ award 
approach allows the contracting authority to evaluate costs alongside other 
characteristics of the supplies or services. Such criteria may include; 
quality, technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, 
environmental characteristics, running costs, after-sales services and 
technical assistance, delivery dates and period of completion.427 
Contracting authority’s choice to use lowest price award criteria has been 
removed in most cases. Contracting authorities must award contracts on 
the basis of MEAT. This shall be identified on the basis of cost, using a 
cost-effectiveness approach, such as life-cycle costing, and may include 
the best price-quality ratio.428 The introduction of MEAT as a sole award 
criterion will encourage the evaluation of bids on the basis of the best 
price-quality ratio. 429 It would also allow an authority to award to the 
                                                                                      
424 Contracts valued less than €5,000 should be purchased on the basis of verbal quotes 
from one to five competitive suppliers. Contracting authorities can evaluate the tenders 
on the basis of lowest price or most economically advantageous tender, assessing the 
tenders’ experience, technical competence, capability, financial standing. 
425 Supplies or services contracts valued between €5,000 and €25,000 are to be purchased 
on the basis of a minimum of three written quotes. The quotations received are evaluated 
on a lowest price or most economically advantageous tender basis. See Office of 
Government Procurement (n 419). 
426 There is no requirement to advertise contracts valued below €25,000 on the e-tenders 
website. Supplies and services contracts with an estimated value of and above €25,000 
and works contracts with an estimated value of and above €50,000 should normally be 
advertised on the e-tenders site. A formal tendering process is required for such contracts. 
See Office of Government Procurement (n 419). 
427 Public Authority Regulations reg 67. 
428 Public Authority Regulations regs 67 and 68. 
429 All criteria used and relied on in the evaluation stage must be clearly stated in the call 
for competition notices. See Clare Civil Engineering v Mayo County Council [2004] 
IEHC; Word Perfect Translation Services Limited v The Minister for Public Expenditure 
and Reform (No.3) [2018] IECA 15.   
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bidder submitting the lowest priced bid provided that that bidder meets 
minimum quality standards established by the authority.  
The new rules promote a life-cycle costing approach. The notion of life-
cycle costing includes all costs over the life cycle of a works, supplies or 
services contract. This means internal costs as well as costs related to 
environmental factors; internal costs include costs for research and 
development, production, transport, consumption of energy, maintenance 
and end-of-life disposal; external costs include the emission of greenhouse 
gases, pollution caused by the extraction of raw materials used in the 
product or caused by the product itself or its manufacturing.430 
The contracting authority should consider additionally advertising the 
contract notice on the OJEU site.431 The contracting authorities may 
follow any of the procurement procedures and can ask tenderers to present 
or elaborate on proposals for technical or consultancy projects.432 Once 
the preferred tenderer has been selected, the contracting authority should 
inform all other tenderers of their decision without delay. The guidelines 
do not prevent contracting authorities from including environmental or 
social criteria into their procurement practices.433 Contracting authorities 
enjoy a wide discretion to include socially conscious clauses in both below 
and above threshold contracts.434 
                                                                                      
430 Public Authority Regulations regs 68. See also D. Dragos and B.Neamtu, ‘Sustainable 
public procurement: life-cycle costing in the new EU directive proposal’ (2013) 8 Eur. 
Procurement & Pub. Private Partnership L. Rev. 19. 
431 This is particularly suitable in circumstances where competition is limited and there 
is a need to foster competitive bids. See B. Jan Drijber and H. Stergiou, ‘Public 
procurement law and internal market law’ (2009) 46(3) Common Market Law Review 
805. 
432 However, contracting authorities must ensure that the requests for further information 
cannot be construed as post tender negotiations or used to provide tenderers with 
competitive information. See Case C-337/98 Commission v France; Case C-454/06 
Pressetext; Gottlieb, R (On the Application Of) v Winchester City Council [2015] 
EWHC 231 (Admin).  
433 Procurement practices are subject to audit and scrutiny under the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (Amendment) Act 1993 and the Local Government Reform Act 2014. 
434 Complying with the VfM directions set out in Public Spending Code - Expenditure 
Planning, Appraisal & Evaluation in the Irish Public Service: Standard Rules & 
Procedures (2012) A-00. 
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2.11 Public Procurement Law in Northern Ireland 
On average £3 million is spent annually procuring public supplies and 
services contracts in Northern Ireland.435 A semi-centralised system of 
procurement operators in Northern Ireland. There are five elements to the 
centralised governance structure; the Construction and Procurement 
Delivery (CPD)436; the Procurement Board; Centres of Procurement 
Expertise (CoPEs) and a Procurement Practitioners’ Group (PPG).437 The 
CPD in Northern Ireland differs to the OGP, as it plays a stronger role in 
assisting public sector bodies in concluding public contracts. The CPD 
assists public bodies in defining what they need, offers advice on the best 
method of identifying economic operators, secures the best value for 
money when conducting procurement competitions and assists the 
management of concluded contracts.438 Public procures are encouraged to 
achieve VfM by considering ‘the most advantageous combination of cost, 
quality and sustainability to meet customer requirements.’439 Public 
procurers are encouraged to use public procurement in a strategic manner.  
To ease the administrative burden, the CPD conduct collaborative 
framework agreements which can be availed of by the 158 government 
bodies, government agencies, and non-departmental government 
bodies.440 The Procurement Board is responsible for the development and 
coordination of public procurement policy. The CoPEs are responsible for 
procurement in the areas of Roads Service, NI Water, Translink, Health 
Estates, Procurement and Logistics Service, the Education and Library 
                                                                                      
435 Federation of Small Business Northern Ireland The realities of public procurement 
for SMEs in Northern Ireland (2014). Available at; https://www.fsb.org.uk/docs/default-
source/fsb-org-uk/the-realities-of-public-procurement.pdf?sfvrsn=1 Last accessed 25th 
April 2019. 
436 Known as the ‘Central Procurement Directorate’ until 2018. 
437 Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (2014) 
Version 11. Available at; https://www.finance-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/dfp/ni-public-procurement-policy-version-11-
august-2014.pdf Last accessed 25th April 2019. 
438 The CPD operates within the remit of the Department of Finance. 
439 Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (n 437) 
3. 
440 A list of the participating bodies is available at this link; https://www.finance-
ni.gov.uk/publications/list-public-bodies-which-can-participate-cpd-collaborative-
frameworks. Last accessed 29th January 2019. 
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Boards and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. Representatives 
from both the CPD and the CoPEs make up the PPG which support the 
development of policy.441  
A significant number of Procurement Guidance Notes (PGNs) have been 
designed in partnership with each of these bodies, publishing guidance for 
contracting authorities in supporting the promotion of human rights in 
procurement, use of SME and social enterprise friendly criteria, the 
integration of the social considerations, environmental criteria and 
guidelines on how to manage abnormally low tenders.442 Furthermore, 
contracting authorities are required to comply with twelve underpinning 
guiding principles when carrying out the procurement of contracts of all 
sizes. The principles reflect the statutory obligations, and overall 
governance objectives set out by the Programme for Government.443 
Contracting authorities are required to behave in an accountable, 
consistent, integral, informed and compliant manner to support 
competition in the market.  The states willingness to promote socio-
economic public procurement is demonstrated in the adoption of the three 
principles of ‘effectiveness, efficiency and integration.’444 The principle of 
integration encourages contracting authorities to comply with statutory 
duties, but to also take into account additional requirements set out in other 
economic, social and environmental policies; 
                                                                                      
441 Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (n 437) 
3. 
442 See CPD Policy Government Notes;  
A Guide for Social Economy Enterprises (2011) PGN 01/11;  
Helping Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Social Economy Enterprises 
(SEEs) access Public Sector contracting opportunities (2011) PGN 02/11; 
Public Procurement: A Guide for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) (2012) 
PGN 02/12; 
Helping SMEs Benefit from Subcontracting Opportunities (2012) PGN 06/12; 
Abnormally Low Tenders (2013) PGN 03/13; 
Integrating Social Considerations into Contracts (2016) PGN 01/13; 
Innovation in Public Procurement (2017) PGN 02/17; 
Human Rights in Public Procurement (2018) PGN 03/18. 
443Northern Ireland Executive Programme for Government 2011-2015. (2012) 27; Please 
note that a draft Programme for Government 2016-2021 has yet to be adopted since the 
collapse of the government in 2017.  
444 Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (n 437) 
10. 
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 duties on equality of opportunity and sustainable development and the 
Executive’s policy on joined-up government, procurement policy 
should pay due regard to the Executive’s other economic, social and 
environmental policies, rather than cut across them.445 
Although the principles of effectiveness and efficiency require contracting 
authorities to carry out procedures ‘as cost-effectively as possible’ 
adopting socio-economic objectives in a ‘balanced manner.’446This 
research suggests that non-economic objectives are encouraged in both 
jurisdictions, on the proviso that such objectives do not distort competition 
or violate the fundamental principles of the rules.  
Unlike the CJEU cases, there are a limited number of cases in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland instructing contracting authorities on how they should 
incorporate social criteria in public procurement. Public procurement 
challenges tend to focus on tendering activities, such as the use of suitable 
procedures,447 acceptance of late tenders,448 and errors in evaluation 
methods.449 However, government policies set out the permissible use of 
socially-driven practices. Both States require contracting authorities to use 
public procurement spend strategically, achieving VfM in all purchases. 
                                                                                      
445 Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (n 437) 
5. 
446 Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (n 437) 
4. 
447 See QDM Capital Ltd. v Athlone Institute of Technology (unreported judgment of 
Birmingham J, 3 June 2011) See also; Case C-226/09 Commission v Ireland, judgment 
of 18 November 2010. 
448 See BAM PPP v National Treasury Management Agency & Minister for Education 
and Skills [2015] No 176 JR. 
449 These cases largely relate to application of selection and award criteria at the 
evaluation stage. See Scott and Others v. Belfast Education and Library Board NICh D, 
Weatherup J, (2007);  
McLaughlin & Harvey Ltd. v Department of Finance and Personnel (No 2) [2008] NIQB 
91 (QBD, Deeny J, 11 September 2008) (Affirmed by NI Court of Appeal, 26 September 
2011 [2011] NICA 60);  
Resource (NI) Limited v Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunal Service [2011] NIQB 
121; 
 Easycoach Limited v Department of Regional Development (Northern Irish High Court, 
McCloskey J, 28 February 2012);  
RPS Consulting Engineers Limited v Kildare County Council [2016] IEHC 113; 
Sanofi Pasteur v Health Service Executive [2018] IEHC 566;  
Word Perfect Translation Services Limited v The Minister for Public Expenditure and 
Reform (No.3) [2018] IECA 156. 
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Contracting authorities retain the freedom to pursue social objectives in 
public procurement, including the facilitation of SME participation. 
2.12 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to provide an analysis of the Public Procurement 
Directives and examine the developing objectives of the Directive. The 
chapter has shown that the original economic objectives of the rules have 
gradually been supplemented with social, environmental and innovation 
goals. While some commentators question the legality, purpose and 
benefit of such developments, the research accepts that the Directive has 
both economic and social characteristics. Several measures have been set 
out in the Directives to assist SMEs in entering the public markets as main 
contractors or subcontractors. The main measures include the division of 
large contracts into smaller lots, the use of subcontractor protection 
conditions, the use of social, environmental and innovative award criteria 
and complementing contractual performance conditions, the use of 
proportionate financial criteria and the requirement to adopt electronic 
practices.  
Member States are free to use public procurement strategically to achieve 
their individually perceived conceptions of social justice, once any social 
objectives do not distort market competition. Northern Ireland and Ireland 
transposed the Directives closely, providing public bodies with the 
opportunities to level the bidding playing field for SMEs. Irish and 
Northern Irish public bodies enjoy a wide discretion to include social 
criteria to achieve value for taxpayers’ money. The next chapter assesses 
what factors hinder SMEs from successfully gaining access to public 
markets, relying on survey findings, academic literature and assessment 
reports to investigate if the measures outlined in the Directives can 
facilitate SME participation.  
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Chapter Three SMEs and Public Procurement  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapters One and Two describe how European derived public 
procurement law is an important market-based tool used to foster 
competition in public markets and to deliver the overriding socio-
economic goals of the EU. Chapter Two outlines how contracting 
authorities may compliantly incorporate non-economic criteria into their 
procurement procedures. The purpose of this chapter is to review the 
relationship between SMEs and public procurement, identifying what 
barriers SME face when competing for public contracts and identifying 
what SME friendly measures contracting authorities may take account of 
when designing procurement competitions. This chapter relies on survey 
findings, academic literature and assessment reports to investigate if the 
SME friendly provisions outlined in the Directive can facilitate SME 
participation. 
SMEs play a critical and fundamental role in the Single Market.1 SMEs 
account for 99% of enterprises operating in the Single Market, of which 
92% are micro-enterprises.2 SMEs are key drivers of employment 
generation and sources of innovation in the Single Market.3 SMEs are the 
key drivers for generating local employment, sustaining local economies 
                                                                                      
1 The definition of an SME covers all enterprises with less than 250 employees and equal 
to or less than either €50million turnover or €43million balance sheet total. Micro-
enterprises are the smallest category of SME, with less than ten employees and a turnover 
or balance sheet total equal to or less than €2million. See Commission ‘Recommendation 
of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(notified under document number C(2003) 1422)’ (2003) OJ L 124/36, annex 2. 
2 European Parliament, ‘Small and Medium Sized Enterprises’ (2019) Factsheet of the 
European Union. N54602. 
3 SMEs from the period of 2002 – 2010 were responsible for creating over 85% of all 
new jobs in Europe, with micro-enterprises alone responsible for 58% of total net 
employment growth. Innovation is driven primarily by start-ups. See J. de Kok, P. 
Vroonhof. W. Verhoeven, N. Timmermans T. Kwaak, J. Snijders F. Westhof, ‘Do SMEs 
create more and better jobs?’ (2011) EIM Report 6. Available at; 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-
review/files/supporting-documents/2012/do-smes-create-more-and-better-jobs_en.pdf  
Last accessed 2nd May 2019. 
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and promoting entrepreneurship and business risk-taking in all areas of 
society.4 However, the Commission recognises that SME participation in 
the European public procurements markets is disproportionately low to 
the number of SMEs operating in Member States. On average, the overall 
contract value secured by SMEs ranges from 31 – 38% of all contracts 
advertised in the OJEU.5 This presents significant challenges in both 
preparing and informing SMEs of tendering opportunities and promoting 
more SME-friendly procurement techniques among public buyers.   
SMEs play an important role in public contracts, they offer high-quality 
supplies and services, and they tend to be flexible, particularly in reactions 
to urgent problems.6 SMEs normally have a simple organisational 
structure, allowing procurers to have accessibility to senior management.7 
SMEs have instinctive local knowledge and contribute to local 
employment generation.8 While there are potential weaknesses associated 
with SMEs, such as lack of technical capabilities and financial guarantees, 
the benefits may outweigh the concerns in a large majority of cases.9 
SMEs benefit greatly from selling into the public market; public procurers 
are important customers offering real scale opportunities both in terms of 
value and length of the contract.10 Public procurers are buyers with 
continuous demand. The public sector will continue to buy throughout any 
economic downturn.11 The public sector pay promptly, they are bound by 
                                                                                      
4 See J de. Kok et.al (n 3) However, it should be noted that not all SMEs offer innovative 
products and services. Certain categories of SMEs, namely, start-ups are responsible for 
driving innovative developments. 
5 Of which; Micro enterprises accounted for 6%, Small enterprises accounted for 11% 
and Medium Size enterprises accounted for 17%. See Commission, ‘SMEs' access to 
public procurement markets and aggregation of demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final 
Report. 
6 A. O'Donnell, A. Gilmore, D.Carson and D. Cummins, ‘Competitive advantage in small 
to medium-sized enterprises’ (2002) 10(3) Journal of Strategic Marketing 205. 
7 O.J. Borch and E.L. Madsen, ‘Dynamic capabilities facilitating innovative strategies in 
SMEs’ (2007) 1(1) International Journal of Technoentrepreneurship 109. 
8 A. Morrison, J. Breen and S. Ali, ‘Small business growth: intention, ability, and 
opportunity’ (2003) 41(4) Journal of Small Business Management 417. 
9 E. Uyarra, J. Edler, J. Garcia-Estevez, L. Georghiou, and J. Yeow, ‘Barriers to 
innovation through public procurement: A supplier perspective’ (2014) 34(10) 
Technovation 631. 
10 L. Preuss, ‘On the contribution of public procurement to entrepreneurship and small 
business policy’ (2011) 23(9-10) Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 787. 
11 Albeit, with reduced budgets. 
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legislative requirements and usually required to pay within 30 days of 
receiving an invoice.12  
3.2 Definitions, Benefits and Concerns with SMEs 
EU Recommendation 2003/361 provides the legal definition of the 
SMEs.13 Medium sized-enterprises are defined as any business entity 
which employs fewer than 250 employees and has an annual turnover not 
exceeding €50million. Small businesses are business entities which 
employ fewer than 50 employees and have an annual turnover not 
exceeding €10million. Micro-enterprises are business entities which 
employ fewer than ten employees and have an annual turnover not 
exceeding €2million.14 SMEs play a fundamental role in the Single 
Market, sustaining local economies and promoting entrepreneurship and 
business risk-taking in all areas of society. In 2017 SMEs contributed to 
67% of total employment in the Single Market, employing almost 90 
million people. SMEs account for 99.8% of all enterprises in the non-
financial sector. Over 92% of all SMEs operating in Europe are defined 
as micro-enterprises.15 SMEs predominantly operate in the following five 
key sectors; wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, construction, 
business services, accommodation and food services.16  
Similarly, to the European experience, SMEs are the backbone of the Irish 
and Northern Irish economies. Over 250,143 SMEs operate in Ireland 
employing almost 7 in every 10 employees in the business economy. In 
terms of the overall market share, SMEs account for 99.7% of all business 
                                                                                      
12 See Directive 2011/7/EU of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in 
commercial transactions OJ L 48/1 art 3(2). 
13 See Commission ‘Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (notified under document number C(2003) 1422)’ 
(2003) OJ L 124/36, annex 2. 
14 See Commission ‘Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises’ annex 2. 
15 See Commission, ‘Annual Report on European SMEs 2016/2017. Focus on self-
employment. SME Performance Review’ Report 0162. 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/single-market-integration-and-competitiveness-eu-
and-its-member-states-2016_en. Last accessed 2nd May 2019. 
16 See Commission ‘Annual Report on European SMEs’ 2016/2017 (n 15) . 
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entities, contributing to 36.6% of gross value added (“GVA”).17 GVA is 
defined as the gross income from operating activities and is the balance 
available to enterprises to pay employees and realise a return on 
investment.’18  It is important to note that micro-enterprises contributed 
19% of the GVA. In terms of enterprise size, over 90% of SMEs are 
defined as micro-enterprises, 8% are small businesses, and 2% are 
medium-sized enterprises.  
Micro-enterprises employ 26.5% of the working population, small 
businesses employ 22.5%, and medium-sized enterprises employ 18.9%.19 
Nearly half of the enterprises belong to the services sector, over a third 
operate in the construction and distribution sectors, and the remaining 
entities work in the industry, financial and insurance sectors. While only 
3% of the enterprises operate in the financial and insurance sectors, these 
sectors have the highest number of employees engaged per enterprise. On 
average enterprises operating in the financial and insurance sector 
employee 17 or more people.20 However, in terms of turnover, the industry 
sector had the largest turnover in the business economy of €384.4 billion 
in 2014. Turnover is defined as ‘the total invoiced by enterprises during 
the reference period’.21 The services and distribution sector closely 
followed the industry sector. The construction sector accounted for 2.3% 
of total turnover.  
                                                                                      
17 SMEs employ 927 759 people in Ireland. See Commission ‘2017 Small Business Act 
(SBA) Factsheet – Ireland.’ (2017). Available at 
https://dbei.gov.ie/en/Publications/Publication-files/2017-SBA-Fact-Sheet.pdf Last 
accessed; 15th April 2019. 
18 See the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO) ‘Business in Ireland 2012.’ (Stationery 
Office, Dublin. December 2014) 5. 
19 While large enterprises only account for 0.3% of all enterprises, they are responsible 
for employing 32% if the working population. See CSO (2014) (n121) 15. 
20 See CSO (2014) (n 18) 9. 
21 See CSO (2014) (n 18) 15. 
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Over 132,700 SMEs operate in Northern Ireland.22 Interestingly, the 
number of SMEs operating in the state has risen rapidly since 2015.23 
SMEs predominately operate in the services sectors contributing to 75% 
of employment, 75% of turnover and 81% of GVA in the private sector.24 
Micro-sized enterprises alone employ over 110,000 people, accounting 
towards 19% of the total workforce.25 In 2017, micro-enterprises 
generated sales of £10.4 billion.26 Across the whole UK, micro-enterprises 
are responsible for employing approximately 4.09 million people.27 
SMEs undoubtedly play a vital role in driving employment and 
developing new industries. de Wit and de Kok conducted a European wide 
study questioning whether small businesses create more jobs than larger 
enterprises. The research used a dynamic classification to analyse job 
creation within the different size classes across all Member States. Overall 
the research found that small firms create more jobs in all sectors than 
larger companies, bar the manufacturing and industry sectors.28 Birch’s 
seminal study on the ability of small businesses to create employment in 
the United States in 1979 remains valid today.29 More recent research 
conducted by Okolie and Butani et al. further supports Birch’s argument 
that small businesses are the primary generators of employment in a 
                                                                                      
22 See Statista Number of small and medium enterprises (SME) in the private sector in 
Northern Ireland from 2010 to 2018 (2018). Available at; 
 https://www.statista.com/statistics/668790/number-small-and-medium-businesses-
northern-ireland/ Last accessed 15th April 2019. 
23 Approximately 110,200 SMEs operated in the state in 2013, 118,500 in 2014, 116,700 
in 2015, 124,000 in 2016, 131,700 in 2017 and 132,700 in 2018. See Statista (2018) (n 
22). 
24 See Federation of Small Businesses and Ulster University, ‘The contribution of small 
businesses to Northern Ireland’ (2015). Available at; 
https://www.fsb.org.uk/docs/default-source/Publications/the-contribution-of-small-
businesses-to-northern-ireland.pdf?sfvrsn=1 Last accessed 15th April 2019. 
25 See N. Hewitt-Dundas and S. Roper, ‘Understanding micro-businesses in Northern 
Ireland’ (2018). Available at; https://www.economy-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/economy/NI-Macros-Report.pdf  Last accessed 
15th April 2019. 
26 See N. Hewitt-Dundas and S. Roper  (n 25). 
27 Over 1.11 million micro-enterprises are operational across the whole UK See N. 
Hewitt-Dundas and S. Roper (n 25) 8. 
28 G. de Wit and J. de Kok, ‘Do Small Businesses Create More Jobs? New Evidence for 
Europe’ (2014) 42(2) Small Business Economics 283. 
29 D.L. Birch, ‘The Job Generation Process: Final Report to Economic Development 
Administration’ (MIT Cambridge, MA Program on Neighborhood and Regional Change 
1979) Birch’s approach was equally challenged and supported in the 1990s. 
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business economy.30 However, Davis et al. questions small businesses true 
contribution to employment growth, arguing that Birch’s results were 
based on distorted data which overestimated SMEs ability to generate 
employment and which failed to take into account the issue of job 
quality.31 Neumark et al. revisited the theories put forward by Birch and 
Davis et al., questioning if small businesses in the US create more jobs 
than larger enterprises. Relying on data retrieved from a national 
longitudinal data file, the findings ‘robustly’ show that small businesses 
do create more jobs than large enterprises.32 
Alongside, job creation Roper argues that small businesses are important 
initiators and catalysts for the development of innovative goods and 
services for two distinct reasons.33 The first reason explains that small 
businesses proximity to the market assists them in developing 
technological solutions to address new market opportunities. Secondly, 
small businesses are more likely to be innovative due to their 
organisational and financial flexibility.34 Small companies tend to operate 
a simpler organisational structure and inhibit an entrepreneurial spirit 
which allows them to respond quickly to change.35 However, an SMEs 
ability to drive innovation or change in their organisation is dependent on 
the entrepreneurial nature of the company or need to develop highly-
technological products or services. Some SMEs will focus on survival and 
generating profits over-investing in innovation. While it is not accurate to 
say that all SMEs are capable of driving innovation, it is appropriate to 
say that SMEs, particularly small businesses, contribute significantly to 
                                                                                      
30 C. Okolie, ‘Why size class methodology matters in analyses of net and gross job flows’ 
(2004) 127(7) Monthly Labor Review 3; S.J. Butani, R.L. Clayton, V. Kapani, J.R. 
Spletzer, D.M. Talan and G.S. Jr., ‘Working Business employment dynamics: 
Tabulations by employer size’ (2006) 129 Monthly Labor Review 3. 
31 S. Davis, J. Haltiwanger and S. Schuh, ‘Small business and job creation: Dissecting 
the myth and reassessing the facts’ (1996) 8 Small Business Economics 297. 
32 D. Neumark, B. Wall and J. Zhang, ‘Do Small Businesses create more jobs? New 
evidence for the United States from the National Establishment Time Series’ (2011) 93(1) 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 16. 
33 S. Roper, ‘Product Innovation and Small Business Growth: A Comparison of the 
Strategies of German, U.K. and Irish Companies’ (1997) 9(6) Small Business Economics 
523. 
34 See S. Roper (1997) (n 33). 
35 G.T. Lumpkin and G.C. Dess Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and 
linking it to performance (1996) 21(1) Academy of management Review 135. 
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employment growth in the Single Market. It is for this reason that there 
are a plethora of EU policies aimed at supporting SME growth, assisting 
SME access markets and finance.36 However, there is a worrying tendency 
to treat all SMEs as one generic group of enterprises.  
The definition of SMEs offered by the EU is expansive, categorising 
entities by size, which results in policy treating SMEs as one homogenised 
group. Infelise and Diego argue that the inclusion of micro-businesses 
within the definition significantly distorts the analysis of SME 
participation in the Single Market, which results in the design of 
ineffective policy solutions aimed at addressing market failures in SMEs’ 
access to finance.37 The EU definition of SMEs focuses on enterprises 
sizes, and SME focussed policies are designed to reflect the general 
economic and operational concerns faced by micro, small or medium-
sized entities. By and large, this is an effective policy approach as it 
addresses the general concerns of the SME population, hence this form of 
generalisation will have the most impact on the majority of SMEs 
operating in the Single Market.38 However, this generalised approach is 
not always appropriate. SME friendly policies should also take into 
account the different forms of companies. In addition to ordinary for-profit 
SMEs, this research is also concerned with two types of generally micro-
enterprises falling within the EU definition of SME; social enterprises and 
start-ups. 
Social enterprises or social economy enterprises are rapidly becoming a 
popular form of enterprise in the Single Market. One in every three 
enterprises established in Finland, France and Belgium is a social 
                                                                                      
36 S. Panagopoulos, ‘Strategic EU public procurement and small and medium size 
enterprise’ in C. Bovis. ‘Research handbook on EU public procurement law’ (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2016) 270. See also; European Economic and Social Committee Study 
on the assessment of the effectiveness of the EU SME policies 2007-2015 (2017). 
Available at; https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/qe-02-17-762-en-n.pdf Last 
accessed 20th April 2019. 
37 F. Infelise and D. Valiante, ‘Why a more accurate EU definition of SMEs matters’ 
(2013) Centre for European Policy Studies. 
38 R. Mayntz, ‘The conditions of effective public policy: a new challenge for policy 
analysis’ (1983) 11(2) Policy & Politics 123. 
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enterprise.39 The common definition of social enterprise defines social 
enterprises as businesses established with a profit-making goal and 
established with a social impact objective.40 A social enterprise might 
establish itself as a café; the business objective of the enterprise is to sell 
food at profitable rates. An additional goal of the enterprise might be to 
use the profit generated to employ people with a disability.41 Local sports 
or community clubs might be considered a form of social enterprise, as 
they are established to meet a community need and any profits generated 
from the use of the buildings is generally used to maintain the sporting 
club or host community events. There are many varieties of social 
enterprises, such as social businesses, social cooperatives, certified 
corporate social responsibility programmes of private for-profit entities 
and inter-sector partnerships.42  
Kerlin identifies the differences between social enterprises operating in 
the United States compared to enterprises operating in the EU.43 Social 
enterprises based in the United States tend to be commercial ventures 
organised by not-for-profit entities, whereas in the EU, social enterprises 
generally tend to be co-operatives funded by government grants.44 The 
European Commission further supports this distinction by applying the 
term to any enterprise whose ownership structure reflects the enterprise’s 
                                                                                      
39 See Commission, ‘Social Business Initiative Creating a favourable climate for social 
enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation’ (Communication) 
COM (2011) 0682 final. 
40 J. Blount and P. Nunley, ‘Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the Corporate 
Governance Narrative’ (2015) 52(2) American Business Law Journal 201; R. Dart, ‘The 
legitimacy of social enterprise’ (2004) 14(4) Nonprofit management and leadership 411; 
R. Harding, ‘Social enterprise: the new economic engine?’ (2004) 15(4) Business 
strategy review 39; J. Defourny, C. Borzaga and J. Defourny, ‘From third sector to social 
enterprise’ (London: Routledge, 2001) 1-28. 
41 R. Dart, ‘The legitimacy of social enterprise’ (2004) 14(4) Nonprofit management and 
leadership 411. One examples of social enterprises operating in Ireland include; 
Speedpak, Jobcare, Fledglings, Hand on Heart Enterprises, MyMind and 
RehabEnterprises. 
42 D.R. Young and J.D. Lecy, ‘Defining the Universe of Social Enterprise: Competing 
Metaphors’ (2014) 25(5) Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations 1307. 
43 J.A. Kerlin, ‘Social enterprise in the United States and Europe: Understanding and 
learning from the differences’ (2006) 17(3) Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary 
and Nonprofit Organizations 246. 
44 See J.A. Kerlin (n 43). 
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mission to promote social justice.45 European social enterprises are 
predominantly concerned with creating employment opportunities for 
marginalised groups and delivering local community services.46 Young 
and Lecy offer an alternative definition of social enterprise, arguing that 
the meaning cannot be reduced to one single concept and a fluid approach 
should be adopted to reflect the diverse and complex needs of social 
enterprises.47 
 As with most of the Member States, there is no legal definition for ‘social 
enterprise’ in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The sole Irish government 
report, the ‘2013 Forfás Report - Social Enterprise in Ireland Report: 
Sectoral Opportunities and Policy Issues’ defines social enterprises as  
an enterprise that trades for a social/societal purpose, where at 
least part of its income is earned from its trading activity, is separate 
from government and where the surplus is primarily reinvested in 
the social objective.48  
There is no specific legal form for social economy enterprises. The most 
suitable type is a ‘Company Limited by Guarantee’ (CLG); this form of 
company is limited by guarantee and does not raise money through share 
capital.49 Members’ liability is limited to the amount of the guarantee. This 
form of company is suitable for social enterprises as members are not 
required to buy shares in the company, and the company enjoys the 
benefits of separate legal personality and limited liability.50 In Northern 
Ireland, social enterprises tend to establish themselves as unincorporated 
associations, trusts, limited companies, industrial and provident societies 
                                                                                      
45 See Commission, ‘Social Business Initiative Creating a favourable climate for social 
enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation’ (Communication) 
COM (2011) 0682 final. 
46 COM (2011) 0682 final. 
47 D.R. Young and J.D. Lecy (2014) (n 42). 
48 Forfás, ‘Social Enterprise in Ireland. Sectoral Opportunities and Policy Issues.’ 
Government report (2013) 2. 
49 See the Irish Companies Act 2014, part 18. 
50 Companies Act 2014, part 18. 
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and community interest companies (CICs).51 Alternatively, many social 
enterprises establish themselves as registered charities. The primary 
benefit for a social enterprise to establish itself as a registered charity is 
the availability of tax exemptions.52 
Market-led reports and current peer-reviewed literature conclude that due 
a lack of clarity on a definition of social enterprises, there is a myriad of 
terms used interchangeably to describe ‘social economy’ and ‘social 
enterprise’.53 The most commonly used terms include; community and 
voluntary groups, community development, community enterprise, social 
enterprise, social innovation and social entrepreneurship, credit unions 
and housing and agricultural cooperatives. The common dominator is that 
each of these terms focuses on achieving a stated social goal, such as 
providing a community service, supporting the employment of 
disadvantaged people or people with disabilities or supporting the 
development of environmentally sustainable communities.54 The terms 
used are all-encompassing, focussing on a broad spectrum of objectives, 
primarily promoting the development of socially sustainable local 
economies and communities.  
O’Broin distinguishes the crucial differences between the key terms, of 
social economy, social enterprise, social entrepreneur and social 
innovation.55 O’Broin relies on Amin and Noya and Clarence’s definition 
of social economy, concluding that it is an economic activity which sits 
                                                                                      
51 One of the most suitable forms of companies for social enterprises operating in the UK 
is a ‘Community Interest Company’ (CIC). CICs resemble a CLG with the additional 
mechanism to safeguard the social objective of the company. See also; P. Teague, 
‘Developing the social economy in Ireland?’ (2007) 31(1) International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research 91. 
52 R. Spear, C. Cornforth and M. Aiken, ‘The governance challenges of social 
enterprises: evidence from a UK empirical study’ (2009) 80(2) Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics 247. 
53 J. Battilana and M. Lee, ‘Advancing research on hybrid organizing–Insights from the 
study of social enterprises’ (2004) 81(1) The Academy of Management Annals 397; F. 
Lyon and L. Sepulveda, ‘Mapping social enterprises: past approaches, challenges and 
future directions’ (2009) 5(1) Social Enterprise Journal 83. 
54 T.A. Wilson, ‘Supporting social enterprises to support vulnerable consumers: the 
example of community development finance institutions and financial exclusion’ (2012) 
35(2) Journal of Consumer Policy 197. 
55 R. Munck, D. O’Broin and C. Jordana, ‘Social Innovation in Ireland: Challenges and 
Prospects’ (Glasnevin Publishing, Dublin, 2017). 
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between the public sphere and private market and is orientated towards 
meeting social needs56. The term social enterprise refers to for-profit 
entities with a social purpose. When discussing the remit of social 
entrepreneurs, O’Broin relies on the comprehensive definition put forward 
by Social Entrepreneurs Ireland, distinguishing social entrepreneurs as 
those who ‘develop new, innovative solutions to address the entrenched 
social and environmental challenges we face.’57 Finally, social innovation 
is described as a process of solution-orientated social collaborations and 
networks.58 
As there is no uniformed definition of social enterprise, it is difficult to 
offer an accurate description of the size and market value of social 
enterprises based and operating in the Single Market. There are 
approximately 2 million social enterprises in Europe, representing 10% of 
all businesses in the EU.59  There are approximately 500 social enterprises 
operating in Northern Ireland, generating an annual turnover of 
approximately £600 million. Social enterprises employ over 12,000 
people in the region and a further 13,000 work with the enterprises on a 
voluntary basis.60 However, it should be noted that these figures are 
outdated, they are based on the number of enterprises operating in the state 
in 2013. 
Similarly, in Ireland, it is hard to estimate how many social enterprises are 
currently operating in the state. The most recent 2013 ‘Forfás Report’ 
estimated there are 1,400 social enterprises operating in the state, 
employing between 25,000 – 30,000 people, generating a total income of 
                                                                                      
56 A. Noya and E. Clarence, eds., ‘The social economy: building inclusive economies.’ 
(Publications de l'OCDE 2007); A. Amin, ‘Extraordinarily ordinary: working in the 
social economy’ (2009) 5(1) Social Enterprise Journal 30. 
57 As set out by Social Entrepreneurs Ireland, 2017.  
58 R. Munck, D. O’Broin and C. Jordana (2017) (n 55) 
59 As reported by the Commission, Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs. See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy_en. Last accessed 30th 
June 2019. 
60 See Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment (DETI) Social Enterprise NI 
Evaluation (2016). https://www.economy-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/deti/EVALUATION%20OF%20SOCIAL%20
ENTERPRISE%20NI.pdf Last accessed 1st April 2019. 
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approximately €1.4 billion.61 These figures were based on reports 
conducted by Clann Credo ‘The Economic and Social Contribution of 
Clann Credo – the Social Investment Fund and Irish Non-profits 
Knowledge Exchange (2012) Irish Non-profits: What do we know?’ in 
2011. These figures have been relied on in more recent reports published 
by Certified Public Accountants Ireland (CPA)62 and by the European 
Commission63.  This research assumes that these figures are at best a loose 
estimate, they are based on statistics gathered from 2009, a time of 
economic instability, where the state was entrenched in an economic 
recession. Earlier reports conducted by Clarke and Eustace64 and 
Prizeman and Crossman65 recognised the difficulties in mapping the 
diverse sector. However, each of the reports acknowledges that the sector 
is growing and has the potential to impact sustainable economic growth 
significantly. In 2017, the Department of Community and Rural Affairs 
and the Social Finance Foundation initiated plans to develop a ‘National 
Strategy to Social Enterprise in Ireland’.66 Research is ongoing, and it is 
hoped that the policy document will be published shortly. 
One of the main reasons for including social enterprises in the research is 
due to their growing importance. There is a shortage of research conducted 
on the number and value of public contracts gained by social enterprises 
across Europe. One of the principles of the SBA requires the EU and 
Member States to create an environment in which entrepreneurs and 
                                                                                      
61 Forfás Social Enterprise in Ireland. Sectoral Opportunities and Policy Issues. 
Government report (2013) 2 Please note that these figures were based on the number of 
enterprises operating in the state in 2009. 
62 The Institute of Chartered Public Accountants Ireland Social Enterprise. The Irish and 
International Landscape (2018). https://www.cpaireland.ie/CPAIreland/media/Business-
Development/CPA-Social-Enterprise_July2018.pdf Last accessed 1st April 2019. 
63 European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion ‘Mapping study on Social Enterprise Eco-systems – Updated Country report 
on Ireland’ (2016). 
64 A. Clarke, A. Eustace and C. Wexford, ‘Exploring Social Enterprise in nine areas in 
Ireland’ Dublin Employment Pact, Clann Credo (Ulster Investment Trust and PLANET: 
Enniscorthy 2009). 
65 G. Prizeman and D. Crossan, ‘Mapping social entrepreneurial enterprises in Ireland’ 
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Dublin 2011. 
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family businesses can thrive, and entrepreneurship is rewarded.67 Policy 
reports on the potential role social enterprises can play in the Single 
Market continuously call for the greater facilitation of social enterprise 
participation in public procurement.68 The research questions if the recent 
use of community benefit clauses can create an entry route to public 
contracts for social enterprises. 
Additionally, the broad definition of SMEs includes micro-sized 
innovative start-ups. Start-ups are defined as any business entity which is 
younger than ten years, have a focus on developing highly innovative 
technologies and strive for large-scale business and employment growth.69 
The definition of start-ups additionally includes ‘scale-up’ entities. Scale-
ups are a specific form of start-up that has already established significant 
growth.70 Start-ups form a share of high growth firms which are 
recognised for creating more new jobs compared with other forms of 
business entities.71 Start-ups contribute socially to the Single Market 
through the adoption of flexible working conditions and contribute to the 
Digital Agenda.72  Similarly to the situation with social enterprises, there 
is a lack of statistics and research available on the relationship between 
start-ups and public procurement. Fritsch and Noseleit acknowledge that 
start-ups contribution to employment growth is dependent on their ability 
to survive in the market and compete successfully with incumbents for a 
prolonged period.73 This suggests that employment generation is not 
                                                                                      
67 See Commission, ‘Think Small First” - A “Small Business Act” for Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2008) 0394. 
68 See Commission, ‘Social Business Initiative Creating a favourable climate for social 
enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation’ (Communication) 
COM (2011) 0682 final. 
69 Kollmann, T, Linsteadt J. Kensbock, ‘European Startup Monitor’ (2015). 
https://europeanstartupmonitor.com/fileadmin/presse/download/esm_2015.pdf Last 
accessed 20th May 2019. 
70 See Commission, ‘Europe’s next leaders: the Start-up and Scale-up Initiative’ 
(Communication) COM (2016) Strasbourg, 22 November. 
71 According to Henrekson and Johansson 4% of firms generate 70% of new jobs. See 
M. Henrekson and D. Johansson, ‘Gazelles as job creators: a survey and interpretation 
of the evidence’ (2010) 35(2) Small Business Economics 227. 
72 See Commission, ‘Single Market Act II Together for new growth.’ (Communication) 
COM (2012) 0573 final. 
73 M. Fritsch and F. Noseleit, ‘Start-ups, long- and short-term survivors, and their 
contribution to employment growth ‘(2013) 23(4) Journal of Evolutionary Economics 
719. 
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linked with the number of start-ups operating in the market but is linked 
to the quality and competitiveness of the enterprises.  
Not only are start-ups contributing to employment growth, but start-ups 
also contribute to developing a knowledge-based economy through the 
use of highly-technological products and services.74 Economic growth in 
a knowledge-based economy relies on knowledge creation and 
distribution and an interdependent relationship between society, 
businesses and governments.75  Similarly to social enterprises, start-ups 
may register the business as any form of permitted company. It is the 
character of the business which defines the company as a start-up. Start-
ups tend to offer highly technological services in the IT or software 
development sectors and in the green technologies sectors amongst other 
areas. The initial capital required to commence operations is generally 
higher than an average SMEs, as the start-ups need to invest in or develop 
new technologies. The distinctive characteristics of start-ups is their 
objective to develop an innovative service or product which can be scaled 
out once the product or service is commercially ready.76 This means that 
start-ups have the potential to create more jobs than other types of SMEs. 
Micro-businesses tend to employ 2-3 people, whereas start-ups tend to 
employ 12-13 people.77 However, one of the main concerns with start-ups 
is their risk of collapsing; most European start-ups do not survive beyond 
the critical phase of 2-3 years.78 Problems facing start-up growth include; 
concerns around profitability; cashflow; acquisition of new customers; 
product development, and raising capital.79 Facilitating start-up 
participation in public procurement may alleviate some of these concerns. 
                                                                                      
74 See Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (Communication) 
COM (2015) 0192 final. 
75 R.G. Harris, ‘The knowledge‐based economy: intellectual origins and new economic 
perspectives’ (2001) 3(1) International Journal of Management Reviews 21. 
76 E. Autio, ‘Entrepreneurship support in Europe: Trends and challenges for EU policy’ 
(London, England: Imperial College Business School 2016). 
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78 See Commission, ‘Europe’s next leaders: the Start-up and Scale-up Initiative’ (n 77). 
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Public bodies would also benefit from the innovative solutions offered by 
the start-ups.  
Improving SME access to public procurement is intended to improve 
employment generation. Additionally, improving social enterprise 
participation will support public bodies in achieving wider societal goals, 
such as generating employment opportunities for vulnerable groups or 
supporting environmental goals. Facilitating start-up participation in 
public contracts will additionally improve public services. Infelise and 
Diego argue for the adoption of a more accurate definition of SME, which 
reflects the different evolution stages of an enterprise and diverse financial 
needs of enterprises.80 By adopting policies that respond to the diverse 
financial and operational needs at the various stages of enterprise life 
would assist in policies effectively addressing market failures in SMEs’ 
access to finance.81  
Access to finance is a prevalent problem faced by all forms of SMEs.82 
Since the financial crisis, EU policies on SME growth are primarily 
concerned with improving SMEs access to finance. Public procurement is 
a valuable source of income for SMEs, the next section of the chapter 
investigates tendering barriers faced by both contracting authorities and 
enterprises and identifies measures set out in the Directive and policies to 
assist SME participation. While SME focussed policies and regional-level 
research treat SMEs as a homogenised group, the thesis case studies will 
assess what impact the provisions have on sub-forms of SMEs, including 
social enterprises and start-ups. SME friendly provisions set out in the 
Directive will have varying abilities to facilitate participation in public 
procurement. The use of social clauses such as community benefit clauses 
is shown to promote social enterprise participation in public contracts. 
                                                                                      
80 F. Infelise and D. Valiante, ‘Why a more accurate EU definition of SMEs matters’ 
(2013) Centre for European Policy Studies. 
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However, as we will see later, things are not so simple, the use of social 
clauses has the potential to assist and hinder for-profit SMEs from 
participation in public contracts. The use of PCP procedures will facilitate 
innovative SMEs, including start-ups and micro-enterprises participation 
in public contracts. It is for these purposes that the research relies on the 
definition offered by the EU and accepts that this definition includes all 
forms of businesses, including social enterprises and start-ups.  
3.3 SMEs and Public Procurement  
From the period of 2009-2012, Commission led research was conducted 
investigating the role SMEs play in European public procurement 
markets.83 The studies analysed trends and patterns of contract award 
notices published on the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 
during this period. A principal finding of the two published reports 
acknowledges that SME participation in public markets is 
disproportionately low to the number of SMEs operating in the Single 
Market. The figures indicate that SMEs secure 45% of the aggregate 
contract value as main contractors or as subcontractors.84 Considering 
SMEs significant contribution in the Single Market, the Commission 
suggests that SMEs should retain 58% of the aggregate contract value.85  
Loader identifies 23 distinct barriers which curb SME’s ability to bid for 
public contracts successfully.86 Loader divides the barriers into two 
categories. The first of which relates to the barriers set by public bodies, 
with this section divided into two sub-sections; public-sector environment 
and procedural issues. Public-sector environment barriers include the lack 
of targeted policies, cultures of risk-averse and pro-large enterprise 
                                                                                      
83 While this data is now old, it is the most recent large-scale data obtained from analysing 
OJEU notices available. 
84 See Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
85 See Commission, ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ access to Public Procurement Markets in the 
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attitudes and organisational complexity and inconsistency. Barriers 
relating to the procurement process, include finding contract opportunities 
of appropriate size and value, determining contractual requirements and 
difficulties faced competing and engaging with tender competitions. The 
second category of barriers identifies the problems and issues faced by 
SMEs, such as lack of appropriate resources and capacity to bid for and 
manage a contract, and a reluctance to engage with the public sector.87  
There are a number of measures which impact SME participation in the 
Irish and UK public markets. The measures range from the type of 
procurer, the tender procedure chosen, value and size of the contract and 
choice of evaluation procedure used.88   
1. Type of Procurer 
The procurement administrative processes in Ireland and the UK are 
complex and fragmented, and there is a vast variety of contracting 
authorities and entities with unique purchasing needs. The Commission 
research indicates that local and regional authorities award a higher 
proportion of public contracts to SMEs than the portion awarded by 
central authorities and other bodies governed by public law or utilities.89 
However, it should be noted that both states have moved towards 
centralised systems of procurement. The OGP and CPD are responsible 
for co-ordinating centralised contracts on behalf of the public sector. 
SMEs tend to be awarded fewer contracts from centralised procuring 
bodies, which normally conclude high-volume contracts.90 
 
 
                                                                                      
87 See K. Loader (2015) (n 86). 
88 See Commission ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
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90 G. Spagnolo and C. Yukins, ‘Lots – the Economic and Legal challenges of centralised 
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2. Size and Value of Contracts 
SMEs fare better at winning contracts with a value below the EU financial 
thresholds. SMEs are proportionately represented in below-threshold 
contracts. SMEs, in general, gain a lower proportion of above-threshold 
contracts.91 However, they benefit from the division of larger contracts 
into lots. SMEs generally bid for small to medium value contracts, as in 
general, they fail to meet the technical and financial capabilities required 
in large-scale contracts. The Commission’s research notes that 
approximately 65% of works contracts with a value of €300,000 or less 
are awarded to SMEs. This figure starts to decline for above-threshold 
value contracts, with SMEs winning between 21 – 29% of contracts with 
a value above €5mn. 92  Procurers can address this concern by breaking 
large contracts into lots. The division of lots can be based on distinct 
professional tasks or geographical service areas.93  
3. Type of Procedure 
The choice of procedure used has an impact on the number of contracts 
awarded to SMEs. The open procedure is the most accommodating 
procedure for SME participation.94 The open procedure is one of the 
fairest procedures, allowing all interested parties to submit tenders. The 
procedure is suitable for straightforward types of purchases; it involves a 
one-step process inviting all interested parties to tender.95 The contracting 
authority is required to publish the capacity and expertise sought for the 
contract. Tenders deemed to meet the minimum levels of technical and 
financial capacity and expertise are evaluated. The open procedure 
promotes competition, supports SME participation and is inherently 
transparent. However, the contracting authority cannot control the number 
                                                                                      
91 See Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
92 See Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
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of responses they receive, which can result in a costly and time-consuming 
process.96 
The restricted procedure also facilitates SME participation.97 The 
‘restricted procedure’ is a two-stage process.98 Any supplier can request 
to participate in a restricted procedure, however only those invited by the 
contracting authority may submit a tender.99 The contracting authority can 
request a minimum of five and a maximum of twenty suppliers to submit 
a tender. Only parties who meet the contracting authorities’ minimum 
requirements such as professional or technical ability, experience, 
expertise and financial capacity, are invited to tender.100 However, the 
competitive dialogue appears to disfavour and discourage SME 
participation.101 In general, the percentage of the contract valued gained 
by SMEs participating in an open procedure is 38%, this figure is reduced 
to 6% when a competitive dialogue procedure is followed.102 Competitive 
dialogue and competitive procedures with negotiations are suitable for 
circumstances where a contracting authority is purchasing a complex ICT 
contract or in circumstances where the authority is unable to define the 
specifications of the contract and need to engage and negotiate with 
suppliers to conclude their purchase.103 
4. Evaluation Methods 
SMEs tend to win more contracts which are evaluated on a Most 
Economically Advantageous Tender (‘MEAT’) assessing criteria, than 
                                                                                      
96 A.S. Soliño and P. Gago de Santos, ‘Transaction Costs in Transport Public-Private 
Partnerships: Comparing Procurement Procedures’ (2010) 30(3) Transport Reviews 
389. 
97 See Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
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demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
103 M. Burnett, ‘Using competitive dialogue in EU public procurement-Early trends and 
future developments’ (2009) 2 EIPAScope 17. 
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contracts awarded on the basis of the Lowest Price award criteria.104 A 
wide variety of criteria can be assessed under the MEAT approach, 
examples of permissible criteria include; pricing, quality, technical merit, 
environmental factors, cost-effectiveness and after-sales service.105 The 
use of the MEAT evaluation method encourages both SMEs and public 
procurers to take social and environmental considerations into account in 
their decision-making procedures.106 It is questionable what percentage 
should be assigned to the price criteria.107  
SMEs have expressed many difficulties in securing public contracts. They 
experience both internal and external restrictions including lack of 
technical qualifications and capabilities, lack of professional 
qualifications and capabilities, inadequate tendering skills and an inability 
to meet financial and insurance requirements.108 External restrictions 
range from lack of knowledge of tender opportunities, over-emphasis on 
price and inadequate feedback from procurers.109  
3.4 Survey Analysis 
In order to understand the relationship between SMEs and public 
procurement in Ireland, exploratory research for this thesis was conducted 
with the OGP and Dublin City University (DCU) Business School.110 
From 2011 – 2015, four large-scale surveys were conducted in partnership 
with DCU Business School and the National Procurement Service within 
                                                                                      
104 Stake’s empirical research on SME participation in Sweden contests these arguments, 
suggesting that the use of MEAT award criteria does not assist SMEs in winning 
government contracts. See J. Stake and Institutionen för samhällsvetenskaper, Södertörns 
högskola & Nationalekonomi, ‘Evaluating quality or lowest price: consequences for 
small and medium-sized enterprises in public procurement’ (2007) 42(5) The Journal of 
Technology Transfer 1143. 
105 Case C-601/13 Ambisig v Nersant [2015] pub. electr. EU:C:2015:204 para 30. 
106 Case C-368/10 Commission v Netherlands [2012] pub. electr. EU:C:2012:284, para 
86. 
107 P.S. Stilger, J. Siderius and E.M.V. Raaij, ‘A comparative study of formulas for 
choosing the economically most advantageous tender’ (2017) 17(1) Journal of Public 
Procurement 89. 
108 See K. Loader (2015) (n 86). 
109 A. Flynn and P. Davis, ‘Firms’ experience of SME-friendly policy and their 
participation and success in public procurement’ (2016) 23(3) Journal of Small Business 
and Enterprise Development 616. 
110 Two national surveys were conducted in 2014 and 2015, and the findings are shared 
openly between DCU Business School and the researcher. 
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the Office of Public Works and the OGP. The primary objectives of the 
surveys were to baseline current practices in public procurement from 
both a buyer and a supplier point of view. The surveys were conducted 
early in the research to help determine the research methodology by 
identifying which SME friendly measures are being used or neglected and 
to preliminary explore the effectiveness of the measures. Unfortunately, it 
was not possible to carry out a comparative survey in Northern Ireland.111 
The researcher participated in each of the four surveys, and the last two 
surveys were conducted during the Ph.D. programme. The findings from 
the 2014 and 2015 surveys are analysed as part of the thesis. The surveys 
were distributed in electronic format to approximately 70,000 suppliers 
and 4,000 public sector procurers registered on www.etenders.gov.ie. The 
surveys were collected using the online data collection and analysis tool 
‘Survey Monkey’. The 2014 survey was conducted over one month, from 
9th December 2013 to 7th January 2014. 5897 suppliers and 338 public 
purchasers responded to the survey. The 2015 survey was conducted over 
three months, from 1st December 2014 to 23rd February 2015. 4747 
suppliers and 552 public purchasers responded to the survey. The 2014 
supplier survey included 37 questions, and the procurer survey included 
35 questions.112 For this research, the 2014 survey is scrutinised in detail, 
and the 2015 survey is used as a controlling survey to identify any outliers 
and anomalies.  
 
 
                                                                                      
111 This research was conducted as part of a group of public procurement researchers.  
112 Some survey questions were common to both groups, and some survey questions were 
particular to either procurers or suppliers. The following key books and journal articles 
were consulted prior to the design of the survey method and questions. See; D.A. 
Dillman, ‘Mail and telephone surveys: The total design method’ (New York: Wiley. 
Volume 19, 1987); F.J. Fowler, ‘Improving survey questions: Design and evaluation’ 
(Sage, 1995) 38; S.E. Gaddis, ‘How to design online surveys’ (1998) 52(6) Training & 
Development 67; J.R. Evans and A. Mathur, ‘The value of online surveys’ (2005) 15(2) 
Internet Research 195; V.M. Sue and L.A. Ritter, ‘Conducting online surveys’ (Sage, 
2012). 
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3.4.1 2014 Supplier Survey  
5897 suppliers responded to the 2014 survey. Approximately 70% of the 
respondents identified the legal form of their organisation as a ‘Limited 
Company’. The majority of the respondents identified their organisations 
as micro-enterprises and small enterprises.  
 
Number of Companies Number of 
Respondents 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
(Rounded) 
Micro-sized enterprises 
(1-9 employees) 
 
3,185 55% 
Small-sized enterprises 
(10 – 49 employees) 
 
1,335 23% 
Medium-sized enterprises 
(50 – 249 employees) 
 
681 12% 
Large-sized enterprises 
(+250 employees) 
595 10% 
   
Table 1.0 
 
65% of the respondents have an annual turnover of less than €2million. 
8% of the respondents reported having an annual turnover of €50million 
or more. Over half of the companies surveyed belong to the services 
sector,113 the remainder of the companies predominantly belonging to the 
construction sector114 and the manufacturing sector.115 The majority of the 
respondents are based in Ireland,116 with less than a quarter of the 
                                                                                      
113 3175 (55%). 
114 959 (17%). 
115 582 (10%). 
116 4432 (76%). 
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respondents based in Northern Ireland117 the rest of the UK118 and the 
EU.119  
The survey findings show that suppliers have mixed tendering experience 
and success rates. When asked where their company ranked in winning 
public tenders, a significant proportion (38% of respondents) stated that 
they had ‘no success’ at all at winning bids, with only 6% agreeing that 
they were ‘very successful’ in gaining contracts.120 The remainder of the 
respondents admitted to having ‘some success’ in winning public 
contracts. The majority of participants bid for low-medium value 
contracts. Over half of the respondents typically bid for below threshold 
contracts.121  
Average size of tendered contracts 
 
 
Contracts with a value of; 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
(Rounded) 
€25,000 or less  35% 
€25,000 - €130,000 38% 
€130,000 - €250,000 10% 
€250,000 - €500,000 7% 
€500,000 - €1,00,000                5% 
€1,00,000 +                5% 
Table 2.0 
Surprisingly, these figures change slightly in the 2015 survey, only 26% 
of the firms surveyed in 2015 indicated that they tender for contracts with 
a value of below €25,000 and 40% reported that they tender for contracts 
with a value of €25,000 - €130,000.122 One possible reason for this could 
                                                                                      
117 216 (4%). 
118 760 (13%). 
119 229 (4%) are based in the EU, and the remainder are based worldwide. 
120 These figures are inclusive of the 10% of respondents which define their organisation 
as a ‘large company.’ Unfortunately, it was not possible to isolate these respondents from 
the overall findings. Therefore, it is not clear what forms of companies indicated that 
were ‘very successful’ in winning public contracts.  
121 The €25,000 band was selected as government guidance requests contracting 
authorities to advertise supplies and services contracts with a value of €25,000 and above 
on the national etenders platform. See Office of Government Procurement, ‘National 
Public Procurement Framework’ Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and 
Services.’ (2019) Version 2.1. Accessible at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/national-public-
procurement-policy-framework/ Last accessed 2nd June 2019. 
122 See (n 121) The EU advertising thresholds rates are listed in Appendix A.  
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be the centralisation of procurement activities by the OGP. Between 2014 
and 2015, the OGP concluded a number of significant national framework 
agreements and aggregated contracts on notebook and tablet computers, 
ICT services, personal computers, travel insurance, taxi services to the 
greater Dublin area, external workplace investigation services, multi-
language services, emergency ambulance services, legal services, 
electrical goods, accounting, audit, financial and economic services. 
Contracts were extended for personal protective equipment and bulk 
liquid fuels.123  
Central government departments, regional authorities, local authorities 
and county councils are strongly encouraged to procure from OGP 
centralised contracts to achieve cost and administrative savings from 
reduced duplication of tendering.124 If public procurers started purchasing 
from the central contracts and framework agreements in 2014, you would 
expect to see a decrease in the availability and quantity of low-value 
contracts. As the use of large centralised contracts is becoming the norm 
in the state, it is a crucial time to assist SMEs in successfully tendering for 
above-threshold contracts. Albano and Sparro recognise that SMEs will 
be ‘locked’ out of the centralised contracts in circumstances where the 
centralised procurement body does not divide the contract into several 
smaller lots.125 The prominent ruling in the Irish Copymoore case 
questioned the impact of the use of centralised contracts on the exclusion 
of SMEs from the public market for a prolonged period.126  
The Copymore case challenged the validity of the procurement procedure 
used to conclude seven ‘Managed Print Services’ framework 
agreements.127 The framework agreements were concluded by the 
National Procurement Service (NPS) in February 2012. The applicants 
                                                                                      
123 Office of Government Procurement, ‘Communications Strategy 2018 – 2020’. 
124 See Circular 16/13, ‘Revision of arrangements concerning the use of Central 
Contracts put in place by the National Procurement Service’ (2013) . 
125 G.L. Albano and M. Sparro, ‘Flexible Strategies for Centralized Public Procurement’ 
(2010) 1 Review of Economics and Institutions 2. 
126 Copymoore Limited & Ors -v- The Commissioner of Public Works in Ireland [2013] 
IEHC 230. Subsequent ruling; IECA 119 (11 June 2015). 
127 The framework agreements were used at the end of a competitive tender procedure. 
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secondly contended the validity of ‘Circular 06/12 Public Procurement 
(Framework Agreements).’128 The applicants comprised of eleven 
separate small limited liability companies which had previously supplied 
managed print services to local schools and other public bodies.129 Each 
of the companies had a direct or indirect interest in the supply of public 
print services contracts. It must be noted that none of the companies 
tendered for the framework agreements.130 None of the companies on their 
own would have met the €10 million insurance requirement.131 However, 
the request for tender encouraged the use of consortia bidding.132 The 
approximate value of the contract was €100 million over two years.133  
In relation to the first issue, the applicants contended that the framework 
agreements did not comply with Part 13 of Schedule 5 of Regulation 
2006.134 The contract notice did not expressly state the actual date the 
contract was awarded on, and it did not specify the contract prices and 
appeals period allowed. The High Court did not accept these challenges, 
concluding that the mistakes made were not manifest errors and did not 
prejudice the applicants.135 As the applicants did not submit a tender bid, 
they had no standing to make general complaints about the tender 
                                                                                      
128 Replaced with Circular 16/13, ‘Revision of arrangements concerning the use of 
Central Contracts put in place by the National Procurement Service’ (2013). 
129 The companies fell within the SME category. 
130 It is enough to show that they had an interest in the contract and were unfairly 
prevented from submitting a bid. See R. v. Avon C.C., ex p. Terry Adams Ltd. [1994] 
Env. L.R. 442; Case-C 230/02 Grossmann Air Services v Austria [2004] 2 CMLR 2; 
Ryanair v. Minister for Transport [2009] IEHC 171. 
131 One of the main problems associated with the use of centralised contracts is the 
potential restriction of competition. See D. Pickernell, A. Kay, G. Packham and C. Miller, 
‘Competing agendas in public procurement: an empirical analysis of opportunities and 
limits in the UK for SMEs.’ (2011) 29(4) Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy 641. 
132 ibid 126 (Hogan J at para 8) SMEs could have pooled their resources to meet the 
selection criteria. Contracting authorities may not restrict the submission of consortium 
bids. See Case C-94/12 Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino [2013] pub. electr. 
EU:C:2013:646 Opinion of Advocate General Jaaskinen, para 33 paras 29 and 33; Case 
C‑324/14 Partner Apelski Dariusz [2016]  pub. electr. EU:C:2016:214. 
133 The insurance requirements may therefore seem appropriate to the value of the 
contract. Public Sector Directive, art 58(3) prevents contracting authorities from setting 
financial criteria which exceeds two times the estimated contract value, except in duly 
justified cases. However, different financial criteria should be set to reflect the value of 
the individual lots.  
134 S.I. No. 329 of 2009, part 13.   
135 For a discussion on what consists a ‘manifest error’ see Case C-454/06 Pressetext. 
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documentation. However, the applicant’s second claim regarding the 
validity of the Circular was upheld.136  
Circular 06/12 was published by the Minister for Public Expenditure and 
Reform in July 2012. Clause Four of the Circular introduced a mandatory 
condition;  
In order to increase the usage of National Procurement Services 
framework agreements and thereby secure best value for money, the 
government has decided that it should be mandatory for public 
service bodies to use the specified framework agreements.137  
Appendix one of the Circular further observed that; ‘When opting for 
managed print service solutions it is mandatory to use this framework 
agreement.’ The applicants argued that the mandatory clause of the 
Circular would have ‘profound consequences’ for their firms.138 The firms 
contended that if they had of known that the framework agreements 
included a mandatory clause, then they would have submitted a tender. 
One of the applicants, Eurotech Office Equipment Ltd., received written 
correspondence from South Tipperary County Council thanking the 
company for the previous good service it provided and stated that due to 
the adoption of the Circular, it would ‘not be in a position to hold an open 
tender.’139 Hogan J found that the mandatory clauses effectively changed 
the original framework agreements and locked the applicants out of local 
public markets. As the Circular was published post completion of the 
procurement of the managed print services contracts, the Court found that 
the Circular was ultra vires as it required the mandatory use of these 
framework agreements.140 A different ruling would have been expected if 
the Circular was published before the commencement of the procurement 
                                                                                      
136 ibid 126 (Hogan J at paras 47and 48). 
137 Circular 06/12 Public Procurement (Framework Agreements), part 4.  
138 ibid 126 (Hogan J at para 13).  
139 ibid 126 (para 13). 
140 ibid 126 (Hogan J at para 63). 
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procedure. The Circular was subsequently updated to reflect the 
judgment.141  
To return to the survey findings, while the number of firms solely 
competing for below €25,000 valued contracts may have fallen, the 
average small business tends to bid for suitably sized contracts. Suppliers 
bid for contracts that they can effectively complete, and experience a 
mixed, leaning more towards a negative success rate.  Nevertheless, SMEs 
will need to consider ways to improve their chances of tendering for 
centralised contracts, especially considering that over 43% of companies 
indicated that they planned to increase their tendering activity.142   
An additional question was included in the 2015 survey, asking suppliers 
to indicate in their experience do public buyers ensure that framework 
agreements give small suppliers the opportunity to compete.  65% of the 
surveyed firms disagreed with this statement, and this may suggest that 
SMEs do not perceive framework agreements to be a viable entry route 
into the public market.  While it is unclear what impact centralisation is 
having on SME engagement, government circulars on the facilitation of 
SME friendly measures are making it easier for businesses to find and 
compete for advertised contracts. A positive finding from the report found 
that 91% of companies use the eTenders platform to find and bid for public 
tenders. SMEs find it easier to bid for national contracts.143 The majority 
of the companies tender solely in Ireland, with only 18% tendering for EU 
contracts. This figure does not apply to the UK, with over a quarter of the 
respondents indicating that they bid for public contracts regularly in the 
UK.144  
                                                                                      
141 See Circular 16/13, ‘Revision of arrangements concerning the use of Central 
Contracts put in place by the National Procurement Service’ (2013). 
142 SMEs should consider forming partnerships with other economic operators to bid for 
large contracts. We will see an example of this in Chapter Six Buy Social Case Study. 
143 Loader noted a similar finding amongst UK SMEs. See K. Loader, ‘SME suppliers 
and the challenge of public procurement: Evidence revealed by a UK government online 
feedback facility’ (2015) 21(2) Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 103. 
144 Post completion of the thesis, the researcher plans to assess what impact Brexit will 
have on cross-border public procurement between Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
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When asked about their tendering experience, most companies neither 
agreed nor disagreed that public contracts;  
• are divided into lots to facilitate SME access; 
•  joint bidding among SMEs is actively encouraged; 
•  or that contracting authorities are flexible in the proof of financial 
capacity that they accept.  
Less than a third of the companies agree that pre-qualification criteria are 
relevant and proportionate to the circumstances of the contract.145 
However, over half of the respondents agree that contracting authorities 
allow for self-declarations. Such self-declarations allow companies to 
declare that it meets the financial capacity criteria and relevant insurance 
criteria at the initial tendering stage.146 Tenderers are only required to 
produce evidential documents if they are selected as the preferred tenderer 
at the end of the competition.  
When asked what problems companies faced when tendering, over 65% 
of the respondents agreed that they met problems communicating with the 
public-sector bodies and with the costs associated with compiling a 
tender.147 The respondents indicated that they faced problems in 
understanding questions asked in the request for tender documentation, 
identifying available public-sector contracts and not being able to meet 
requirements for previous experience in supplying to the public sector. 
Less than 40% of the respondents indicated that they experience problems; 
• meeting financial capacity and insurance requirements; 
• finding partner firms in which to make a joint bid for a contract 
                                                                                      
145 It is important to note that the survey was completed before the Public Sector Directive 
was implemented in Ireland. Contracting authorities are now required to set proportionate 
financial selection criteria. See Public Authority Regulations, reg 58. 
146 To ease administrative burden on suppliers, contracting authorities are encouraged to 
use the ‘European Single Procurement Document’ and ‘eCertis’ platforms. See  also 
Commission, ‘Think Small First” - A “Small Business Act” for Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2008) 0394. 
147 These issues can be addressed through the use of prior information notices, e-
procurement and simple, straightforward tender competitions. See S. Panagopoulos, 
‘Strategic EU public procurement and small and medium size enterprise ‘in C. Bovis, 
‘Research handbook on EU public procurement law’ (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016). 
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•  and having the organisational capacity for managing a public 
contract.  
Lack of knowledge and understanding of procurement legislation and 
policy documents is another barrier to participation identified by the 
suppliers. Over half of the surveyed firms indicated that they have no 
knowledge whatsoever of the European Directives and Irish Regulations 
on public procurement.148 As such, the companies were unable to state 
whether they believe the procurement rules have an impact on; 
transparency and clarity in the procurement process, SME participation in 
the public market and competition between suppliers and costs in 
procurement procedures. The vast majority of the companies surveyed 
have no knowledge of government circulars on facilitating small business 
in public procurement and circulars on sustainable procurement. While it 
not necessary for SMEs to have a working knowledge of the rules to 
compete for public contracts effectively, a lack of understanding of the 
rules may limit unsuccessful aggrieved tenderers’ ability to seek 
appropriate redress for non-compliant competitions.149 
Of the 5897 companies surveyed, only 56 companies stated that they had 
previously initiated a legal challenge under the Remedies Regulations.150 
Of those 56 challenges, 19 were still in progress at the time of the survey, 
16 of the challenges were successful, and 21 were unsuccessful. Over half 
of the respondents indicated that the cost of legal representation, 
reputational risk, duration of legal proceedings and lack of knowledge of 
                                                                                      
148 Firms were asked to indicate their understanding of ; 
S.I. 329 of 2006 implementing EU Public Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC, S.I. 50 of 
2007 implementing EU Public Procurement Directive (Utilities Sector) 2004/17/EC,  
S.I. 130 of 2010 and S.I. 131 of 2010 implementing EU Public Procurement Remedies 
Directive,  
S.I. 339 of 2011 European Communities (Clean and Energy-efficient Road Transport 
Vehicles) Regulation 2011 and S.I. 62 of 2012 European Union (Award of Contracts 
Relating to Defence and Security) Regulations 2012. 
149 It is important that unsuccessful aggrieved bidders are aware of the available remedial 
rights set out in the European Communities (Public Authorities’ Contracts) (Review 
Procedures) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI No. 327 of 2017). 
150 S.I. 130 of 2010 implementing EU Public Procurement Remedies Directive. 
148 
 
the procurement and remedies legislation acts as barriers for unsuccessful 
tenderers to initiate a legal challenge under the Remedies legislation.151  
Overall, the supplier survey findings indicate that suppliers tend to bid for 
low-value contracts conducted by local and regional public bodies. Overly 
complex and large contracts hinder participation. It is not clear whether 
the use of lots, framework agreements and the promotion of consortia 
supports SME participation. Suppliers have little knowledge of the 
procurement rules and tend not to challenge procurement decisions. While 
suppliers are making the best use of the advertising platform to find and 
bid for public contracts, suppliers indicated that they would like more 
engagement and interaction with the public bodies. This can be done in a 
compliant manner, contracting authorities can conduct market 
engagement activities before the publication of a competition and should 
offer genuine feedback to unsuccessful tenderers post completion of the 
evaluation stage.152 
3.4.2 2014 Public Procurer Survey 
The public procurer survey also offered a useful insight into the Irish 
public procurement landscape. 338 public purchasers responded to the 
survey. The public procurers surveyed had varying degrees of experience; 
• 37% of respondents have less than five years of purchasing 
experience; 
• 23% have 6-10 years of purchasing experience; 
• with the remaining 11% having 21 years plus purchasing 
experience.  
Only 11% described their sole role in the organisation as buying goods 
and services, 34% described buying goods and services as a significant 
part of their role, but it is not their only role. 45% of the respondents 
                                                                                      
151 While the OGP operates a free ‘Tender Advisory Services’ for aggrieved SMEs, 
bidders are required to apply to the High Court to seek remedial actions. it should be 
noted that few cases are heard before the High Court each year. 
152 Approximately 80% of the companies believe that receiving feedback from public 
sector buyers would help them to improve their future tender submissions. 
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described purchasing as a minor part of their role, and the remainder 
indicated that purchasing does not form part of their formal role.153 Of the 
procurers surveyed, less than a fifth are employed by a central government 
department, such as Education, Finance or Defence departments. Even 
with the establishment of the NPS and the new OGP, the public 
procurement market is still extremely complex and fragmented in Ireland.  
Type of public sector organisation Total 
% 
Central Government Department (e.g. Education, Finance, Defence) 
 
18% 
Local Authority 
 
11% 
Educational Institution  
 
23% 
State Agency 
 
13% 
Semi-State Body 
 
9% 
Utility Body 
 
4% 
Another entity which funded in part by the public sector 22% 
  
Table 3.0 
 
Whilst the procedures used by public bodies differs greatly from each 
department or authority, procurers generally comply with best practice 
manuals published by the Department of Finance and Office of Public 
Works. A positive finding found that approximately 70% of the public 
buyers are familiar with the content of the now replaced ‘Circular 10/10 
Facilitating SME participation’154 and ‘Circular 01/11 Model Tender and 
                                                                                      
153 For the respondents that indicated that purchasing did not form part of their main role, 
they may have the occasional need to purchase ad-hoc goods and services. For example, 
a school principal’s main role is to manage the educational needs of the students. From 
time to time, the principal is required to purchase school supplies, cleaning and catering 
services. Arguments have been raised about the inefficiencies of this form of ad-hoc 
purchasing and call for governments to professional the procurement sector. See J.M 
Steinfeld, C. McCue and E. Prier, ‘Examining professionalisation in public procurement 
by ranking practitioner job positions according to job activities’ (2016) 9(3) 
International Journal of Procurement Management 328. 
154 Now incorporated into Circular 10/2014, ‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public 
Procurement’ 2014 and the Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public 
150 
 
Contract’ documents for the public service and supplies contracts.155 60% 
were aware of ‘Circular 16/13 Revision of arrangements concerning the 
use of central contracts’ put in place by the NPS and now the OGP.156 A 
more negative finding indicates that only 44% of the procurers are familiar 
with the ‘Green Tenders – An Action Plan for Public Procurement.’157  
More than half of the procurers indicated that they consider the importance 
of SME access, innovation, environmental sustainability and local 
economic sustainability when designing request for tender 
documentation.158 Only a third of procurers consider engaging with the 
not-for-profit sector or social enterprises when conducting procurement 
competitions.159 Procurers facilitate SME participation by using simple 
procedures and proportionate criteria. The open procedure is the most 
commonly used process for supplies and general services contracts valued 
between €25,000 - €125,000 and for works and related services contracts 
worth between €50,000 - €250,000.160 Most procurers consider 
themselves flexible in the type of proof of financial capacity they accept 
and ensure that pre-qualification criterion is relevant and proportionate to 
the circumstances of the contract. Over 80% allow suppliers at the time of 
tendering to declare that they have the appropriate and proportionate 
financial and insurance capacity, which is necessary to undertake the 
                                                                                      
Procurement Framework’ Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services. 
(2019) Version 2.1. 
155 Circular 01/11, ‘Model Tender and Contract’ sets out standard documentation for 
public procurers to use when conducting an open procedure to conclude a public supplies 
or services contract. 
156 Interestingly, McDermott J accepted that Circular soft-law requirements created 
enforceable obligations. See Copymoore Ltd & ors -v- Commissioners of Public Works 
of Ireland [2016] IEHC 709 para 28. 
157 Note this is a guidance document and is not a soft-law circular. 
158 It is timely to ask this question again, it has been three years since the rules were 
transposed in Ireland. It is interesting to ask if the new rules make it easier for procurers 
to consider SME participation when designing the request for tender documentation and 
contractual performance clauses. 
159 However, it appears that only NUI Galway, the National Children’s Hospital 
construction board and the Irish Prison Service are actively relying on Public Sector 
Authorities, reg 20 to support social enterprise participation in public contracts.   
160 This indicates that public procurers are largely complying with Circular 10/2014, 
‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement’ 2014 and the Office of Government 
Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’ Public Procurement 
Guidelines for Goods and Services. 
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contract. Over 70% of the procurers purchase from national framework 
agreements.161  
Some less positive findings indicate that less than a third break contracts 
into lots where possible to facilitate SME access and less than 40% 
encourage joint bidding among SMEs. The vast majority of procurers do 
not make full use of electronic procurement, such as e-auctions, e-
assessment, e-evaluation and e-contract management. Only 40% indicated 
that they regularly use electronic invoicing.162Additionally, the use of PCP 
is not widely used by public bodies. Over half of the procurers surveyed 
regularly research suppliers and markets, with a fifth of procurers engaged 
with designing, prototyping, or testing new products and services with 
suppliers.163 
Another adverse finding suggests that only 55% of the procurers provide 
feedback to unsuccessful firms after each contract has been awarded. Over 
a quarter of the procurers provide feedback most of the time. While these 
figures appear relatively low, nearly all of the procurers agree that 
providing feedback helps to improve the quality of suppliers’ future 
tenders.164 The sufficiency of reasons for rejecting a tender was recently 
assessed in RPS Consulting Engineers Limited v Kildare County 
Council.165 The Court found that alongside providing unsuccessful 
tenderers reasons as to why they were not selected, contracting authorities 
are additionally required to answer any follow-up questions a tenderer 
may have on the information offered.166 This triggers an additional 
obligation, contracting authorities when answering the follow-up 
questions are required to provide more extensive reasons explaining the 
                                                                                      
161 See (n 158). 
162 Again, the new Directive was not transposed when this data was gathered. The Public 
Authorities alongside S.I 258 of 2019 the European Union (Electronic Invoicing in 
Public Procurement) Regulations 2019 have since come into effect.  
163 Limited research is available on what impact these activities have on promoting the 
participation of small innovative companies in public contracts. 
164 See A. Glover, ‘Accelerating the SME Economic Engine: Through Transparent, 
Simple and Strategic Procurement’ (HM Treasury, London 2008). 
165 RPS Consulting Engineers Limited v Kildare County Council [2016] IEHC 113. 
166 In addition to the standstill notice requirements set out in the Remedies Directive, art 
2(a). 
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rationale of the decision-making process.167 Procurers need to keep 
updated with legislative developments; however the survey findings show 
that procurers understanding of public procurement legislation is 
relatively limited with less than a fifth indicating to have a good 
knowledge of the 2004 Public Sector Regulations and the 2010 Remedies 
Regulations. Procurers appear to have little knowledge of the Defence and 
Security Regulations,168 Utilities Procurement Regulations169 and the 
Clean Vehicles Regulations.170  
Further data collected by the OGP indicates that approximately 66% of 
the State’s expenditure is with SMEs based within the State.171 74% of the 
tender notices were considered ‘below OJEU threshold tenders’, with the 
median values range from €50,000 to €500,000 depending on the category 
of goods and services involved.172 These results show that public 
procurers are adhering to the soft-law document by publishing low-
medium value tender competitions on the central advertising facility, 
which has, in turn, resulted in the participation of SMEs in the market 
place. However, the limited amount of research available does not indicate 
what percentage or value of the contracts is obtained by the enterprises. 
The OGP updated procurement circulars in 2014 to strengthen the 
measures to encourage further SME participation.173  
Public procurers actively adhere to certain soft-law requirements, such as 
the advertising of below-threshold contract openly on the central 
                                                                                      
167 This case demonstrates that even if a compliant procedure has been followed, the 
Court will collapse the competition if the feedback provided in the standstill letter is 
generic and unhelpful. See also; T-638/11 European Dynamics Belgium and Others v 
EMA, para 68. 
168 SI 62 of 2012 European Union (Award of Contracts Relating to Defence and Security) 
2012. 
169 Now replaced with SI 286-2016 European Union (Award of Contracts by Utility 
Undertakings) Regulations 2016. 
170 SI 339-2011 European Communities (Clean and Energy-Efficient Road Transport 
Vehicles) Regulations 2011. 
171 This research is based on the analysis of 5,826 tender notices that were published on 
the eTenders site in 2013. See Office of Government Procurement, ‘Public Service Spend 
and Tendering Analysis’ (2013). Available at; 
http://www.procurement.ie/sites/default/files/ogp-public-service-spend-tendering-
analysis-2013-1.pdf Last accessed 1st June 2019. 
172 See Office of Government Procurement (n 171). 
173 See Circular 10/14; ‘Initiatives to assist SMEs in Public Procurement’. 
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advertising facility and allowing SMEs to use self-declarations.174 While 
policy is helping procurers adopt SME friendly measures, there appears to 
be a lack of co-ordinated support and training on the remit of procurement 
legislation.175 Procurers should be made aware of how the legislation 
allows for the strategic use of public procurement. Additionally, procurers 
should be made aware of their legal requirements, particularly in relation 
to the requirement to provide detailed notification letters to unsuccessful 
tenderers before the commencement of the standstill period.176 Overall, 
the survey findings suggest that Irish public procurers comply with the 
best guidance; they use open procedures, set relevant and proportionate 
financial and qualification requirements and use e-procurement tools. As 
government policy is moving towards centralisation and encouraging the 
use of standardised documents at a local level, procurement appears to 
focus on the tendering activity and lacks strategic focus. 
3.5 Key Factors Enabling SME Participation 
It is now well established from a variety of studies that SMEs face both 
internal and external barriers when competing for public contracts.177 At 
a European level there are a plethora of SME focussed policies set out in; 
the ‘European Charter for Small Enterprises’,178 the ‘Lisbon 
Programme’,179 the Communication on implementing a ‘Modern SME 
Policy for Growth and Employment’,180 the ‘European Small Business 
Act’ (SBA)181 and the European ‘Small Business Portal’.182 Each of the 
                                                                                      
174 However, as the European Single Procurement Document and the eCertis tools were 
not available at this time, the use of these tools was not assessed. 
175 Although, the OGP do offer tendering support to all central and local public bodies. 
See Office of Government Procurement ‘Communications Strategy 2018 – 2020’. 
176 Remedies Directive, art 2(a). 
177 See Bovis (1998); Morand (2003); L Carpineti, G Piga, M Zanza (2006); Erridge 
(2007); Preuss (2011); Kidalov and Snider (2011); Flynn and Davis (2016) Loader 
(2015) Pangaopoulos (2016).  
178 The European Charter for Small Enterprises was approved by EU leaders at the Feira 
European Council on 19-20 June 2000. 
179 See Commission ‘Working together for growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon 
strategy” (Act) COM (2005) 24 final. 
180 See Commission ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon programme - Modern SME 
policy for growth and employment’ (Act) COM (2005) 551 final. 
181 See Commission ‘Think Small First” - A “Small Business Act” for Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2008) 0394. 
182 See Commission, ‘Thinking Big for Small Businesses - What the EU does for SMEs’ 
(2011) 24 final. 
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policies recognise the important role SMEs play in supporting a 
sustainable and competitive Single Market. This research argues that the 
most influential policy in this area is the ‘European Code of Best Practices 
Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts’ as it has 
influenced the provisions relating to the division of large contracts into 
smaller lots in the Directives. 183  While the code remains a voluntary tool 
for procurers to use, elements of the code have been cemented as 
legislative provisions.184 Alongside the encouragement of the use of 
proportionate lots, the code offers advice for contracting authorities on 
how to; improve suppliers’ access to relevant information, setting 
proportionate selection and award criteria, and reducing the administrative 
burden for suppliers. Interestingly, the objective of the code is to assist 
contracting authorities in exploiting the SME friendly provisions of the 
2004 Directives to level the playing field for all enterprises. Although, 
now the code has been elevated from assisting with the implementation of 
provisions to influencing critical legislative measures of the 2014 
Directive.185 This is evident in the requirements to use e-procurement 
tools, self-declarations and proportionate financial selection criteria.186 
The European Commission is committed to sustaining and encouraging 
SME participation and growth across the single market and has integrated 
SME friendly initiatives into public procurement policy and procedures, 
including; the ‘Public Procurement for Better Environment’,187 the ‘Pre-
                                                                                      
183 See Commission, ‘European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to 
Public Procurement Contracts’ (SWP) COM (2008) 2193. 
184 Namely, the requirement to use proportionate financial criteria and to divide large 
contracts into smaller lots. See Public Sector Directive, arts 46 and 58. 
185 Public Sector Directive, recital 78 makes a direct reference to the Code. In particular, 
the recital encourages contracting authorities to promote competition by dividing large 
contracts into smaller lots. 
186 The Code is not solely responsible for the adoption of these measures. These measures 
were also promoted in European working papers. See Commission, ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ 
access to Public Procurement Markets in the EU.’ (2010) Final Report; Commission, 
‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of demand in the EU 
2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
187 See Commission, ‘Public procurement for a better environment’ (Communication) 
COM (2008) 400 final. 
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Commercial Procurement’188 and the ‘Integrating Social Considerations 
into Public Procurement’.189 The communications encourage contracting 
authorities to consider the facilitation of SME participation during the full 
procurement cycle rather than focusing primarily on the administrative 
tendering function.190 
Measures set out in the ‘European Code of Best Practices Facilitating 
Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contract’ mirror provisions 
included in policies, guidance documents and information notes adopted 
in Ireland and Northern Ireland over the last ten years. Two of the most 
relevant soft-law policies adopted in Ireland are the 2017 ‘Public 
Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services’191 and the ‘Social 
Considerations in Public Procurement.’192 The Procurement Guidelines 
aim to promote consistency of best practice procurements for supplies and 
services contracts. The ‘Social Considerations in Public Procurement’  
document does not prescribe what social criteria contracting authorities 
should incorporate into their procurement practices, and instead offers 
guidance on how to compliantly incorporate non-economic objectives into 
their procurement procedures.193 The guides assist contracting authorities 
in designing competitions which include SME and social enterprise 
                                                                                      
188 See Commission, ‘Pre-commercial Procurement: driving innovation to ensure 
sustainable high-quality public services in Europe’ (Communication) COM (2007) 0799 
final. 
189 See Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication of the Commission on the 
Community law applicable to public procurement and the possibilities for integrating 
social considerations into public procurement’ (Communication) COM (2001) 566 final. 
190 The process starts when the public procurer considers the public needs, completes the 
tender stage, manages the contract execution stage and ends with the removal of waste 
products or services. See; W. Holding, ‘Problems of State Procurement’ (1976) 8 Public 
Contract Law Journal 17; D.C. Dragos and B. Neamtu, ‘Sustainable Public 
Procurement: Life-Cycle Costing in the New EU Directive Proposal’ (2013) 
8 Eur Procurement & Pub Private Partnership Law Rev 19. 
191 Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’ 
Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services.’(2019) Version 2.1. Accessible 
at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/national-public-procurement-policy-framework/ Last 
accessed 2nd June 2019. 
192 Office of Government Procurement, ‘Social Considerations in Public Procurement. 
OGP.’ (2018). Accessible at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/information-notes/ Last 
accessed 2nd June 2019. 
193 Office of Government Procurement (2018) (n 192). 
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friendly provisions, community benefits clauses, and other innovative, 
environmental and social considerations.194 
Similarly, to the measures listed in the Directive and regional guidance 
documents, contracting authorities are encouraged to conduct electronic 
competitions, to avoid single-supplier large contracts, to use the open 
procedure and to set appropriate selection and award criteria.195 Again, 
policy and guidance documents in Northern Ireland rely on the same 
measures to facilitate competition amongst all forms of businesses.196 The 
most noteworthy soft-law measures include policies on the integration of 
social considerations in public contracts, helping SMEs benefit from 
subcontracting opportunities, and guides assisting both SMEs and social 
enterprises enter the public market.197 Importantly, the NI policies offer 
advice for both procurers and suppliers.198  
                                                                                      
194 Additional SRPP guidance is available, see; Circular 15/2011, ‘Mechanism to monitor 
compliance with employment law in outsourced operations under the Croke Park 
Agreement’; ‘Green Tenders: An Action Plan on Green Public Procurement’ 2012; EPA, 
‘Green Procurement Guidance for the Public Sector’ 2014; Circular 10/2014, ‘Initiatives 
to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement’ 2014. 
195 This is to encourage competitive cross-border trade amongst all suppliers. When 
designing the call for competition notices and carrying out the evaluations, contracting 
authorities must be mindful of the TFEU principles. Recently, Canadian courts have 
extended the scope of the ‘administrative law duty of procedural fairness’ to public 
procurement. Contracting authorities are now required to comply with an additional 
principle of fairness when setting criteria and rejecting tenderers for failing to meet the 
minimum standards set by public bodies. See; Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British 
Columbia (Transportation and Highways) [2010] 1 SCR 69; Mega Reporting Inc. v. 
Yukon (Government of), 2017 YKSC 69 (CanLII); Interpaving Limited v. City of Greater 
Sudbury, 2018 ONSC 3005 (CanLII); Aquatech Canadian Water Services Inc v 
H2OInnovation Inc, 2018 ABCA 140 (CanLII); CG Acquisition Inc. v. P1 Consulting 
Inc., 2018 ONSC 4089 (CanLII); Maglio Installations Ltd. v. Castlegar (City), 2018 
BCCA 80 (CanLII). 
196 Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (2014) 
Version 11. 
197 See CPD Policy Government Notes;  
A Guide for Social Economy Enterprises (2011) PGN 01/11;  
Helping Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Social Economy Enterprises 
(SEEs) access Public Sector contracting opportunities (2011) PGN 02/11; 
Public Procurement: A Guide for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) (2012) 
PGN 02/12; 
Helping SMEs Benefit from Subcontracting Opportunities (2012) PGN 06/12; 
Abnormally Low Tenders (2013) PGN 03/13; 
Integrating Social Considerations into Contracts (2016) PGN 01/13; 
Innovation in Public Procurement (2017) PGN 02/17; 
Human Rights in Public Procurement (2018) PGN 03/18. 
198 Whereas, recent Irish policies tend to focus on procurers’ activities. 
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While national reports in both states indicate that SME participation in 
public contracts has increased recently, SMEs are faced with internal and 
external barriers when competing for public contracts, particularly when 
competing for aggregated national contracts conducted by the OGP in 
Ireland and by the CPD in Northern Ireland.199 Limited research is 
available from either state on the inclusion of social enterprises and 
innovative start-ups in public contracts.200  
A large and growing body of literature reviews the relationship between 
SMEs and public procurement. There is no unified approach adopted to 
assess what is the optimal approach to facilitating SME participation in 
public markets. However, the main body of literature relies on the 
following criteria to assess SME participation;201  
• choice of procedure,  
• use of electronic procurement,  
• sub-dividing contracts,  
• size of the contract,  
• type of procurer,  
• subcontractor criteria,  
• consortia promotion,  
• selection and award criteria,  
• costs associated with SME friendly tendering,  
• tender feedback,  
                                                                                      
199 A. Erridge, and J. McIlroy, ‘Public Procurement and Supply Management Strategies’ 
(2002) 17(1) Public Policy and Administration 52; A. Flynn, and P. Davis, ‘The policy–
practice divide and SME-friendly public procurement.’ (2016) 34(3) Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy 559. 
200 Seminal research has been conducted by Erridge, Loader and Halloran. See A. Erridge 
and S. Hennigan, ‘Sustainable procurement in health and social care in Northern 
Ireland’ (2012) 32(5) Public Money and Management 363; K. Loader, ‘Is public 
procurement a successful small business support policy? A review of the evidence’ 
(2013) 31(1) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 39; D. Halloran, 
‘Local Government and Public Procurement: Legal and Policy Issues Related to Social 
Procurement and Community Benefit Clauses in Contracts in Ireland’ (2013) 3(29) 
King's Inns Student L. Rev. 
201 See Bovis (1998); Morand (2003); L Carpineti, G Piga, M Zanza (2006); Erridge 
(2007); Preuss (2011); Kidalov and Snider (2011); Flynn and Davis (2016) Loader 
(2015) Pangaopoulos (2016). 
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• public body payments, 
•  innovative procedures,  
• the availability of training and policy support for procurers and 
suppliers.  
This research intends to contribute to the body of literature and hopes to 
uniquely contribute to the area by using a case study approach to assess 
what impact the inclusion of specific social criteria has on SME 
participation. Research predominantly accepts that the use of 
proportionate criteria, open procedures, e-procurement and MEAT award 
criteria assists SMEs in tendering for public contracts.202 This research 
builds on previous studies by assessing whether; the use of lots; the use of 
community benefit clauses; the use of subcontractor considerations; and 
the use of PCP facilitates all forms of SMEs in both above and below-
threshold contracts. SMEs struggle to compete for large contracts, and as 
centralised contracts are being used more regularly by Irish and Northern 
Irish public bodies, SMEs will need to consider how they can best gain a 
proportion or lot of these contracts. There is also a growing trend to 
include community benefit clauses in works and services contracts, again 
SMEs will need to consider how they can comply with these requirements 
if they are going to bid for the public contracts successfully. Research on 
the use of pre-market engagement activities is limited in both 
jurisdictions,203 even though a fifth of the procurers surveyed for this 
research agree that they have engaged with designing, prototyping or 
                                                                                      
202 Additionally, noted in; Commission, ‘Single Market Act Twelve levers to boost growth 
and strengthen confidence "Working together to create new growth"’ (Communication) 
COM (2011) 0206 final; Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Public Procurement.’ (2011) COD 0438; See 
Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of demand 
in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
203 Research on this topic has predominantly conducted by J. Carlisle, R. Eadie, A. 
Erridge, R. Fee, G. Heaney, S. Hennigan and R. Perera, See R. Fee, A. Erridge, and S. 
Hennigan, ‘SMEs and government purchasing in Northern Ireland: problems and 
opportunities’ (2002) 14(5) European Business Review 326; A. Erridge, ‘Public 
procurement, public value and the Northern Ireland unemployment pilot project’ (2007) 
84(a) Public Administration 1023; R. Eadie, S. Perera, G. Heaney, and J. Carlisle, 
‘Drivers and barriers to public sector e-procurement within Northern Ireland’s 
construction industry’ (2007) 12 Journal of Information Technology in Construction 103. 
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testing new products and services with suppliers.204 This research assesses 
criteria which will assist all types of SMEs bid for current public contracts 
in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The next section of the chapter reviews 
why each of the four measures was chosen.  
3.5.1 Use of Lots 
One of the most prominent SME friendly provisions included in the 
Directive encourages the division of large contracts into lots to enhance 
competition.205 Chapter Two noted that the new Directive calls for 
extensive use of lots, going as far as requiring contracting authorities to 
justify their reasons for not using lots. There are some exceptions to this 
requirement; for example, where the division of the contracts into lots 
would restrict competition or would be unsuitable due to the excessive 
technical subject matter of the contract.206 The primary objective of the 
use of lots is to enhance competition, and contracting authorities are 
prohibited from using lots to avoid the full application of the rules.207 
When calculating the value of the contract, contracting authorities must 
combine the total estimated value of the individual lots. Contracting 
authorities can further promote competition by limiting the number of lots 
a supplier can win.208  
Spagnolo and Yukins declare that a public procurer’s decision to divide a 
contract into smaller lots ‘is the most important decision in procurement’ 
as it determines the ‘object procured’ and ‘defines the market.’209 A 
decision to use lots either encourages or restricts competition. Vesel notes 
the potential risks associated with procuring central or large contracts on 
                                                                                      
204 Public procurers survey, 2014. 
205 Public Sector Directive, recital 78 and art 46. 
206 Public Sector Directive, 46(1). See also J. Telgen, N. Uenk, W. Lohmann and E. 
Manunza, ‘Conditions on lot: practical desirability versus legal acceptability’ in G. Piga 
and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon;New York, NY, 
2015) 94. 
207 See Commission of the European Communities, ‘The Cost of Non-Europe, Basic 
Findings, Vol.5, Part A; The Cost of Non-Europe in Public Sector Procurement’ Official 
Publications of European Communities, Luxembourg 1988. 
208 Public Sector Directive, 46(2). 
209 G. Spagnolo and C. Yukins, ‘Lots – the Economic and Legal challenges of centralised 
procurement’. Colloqium in G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ 
(Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon;New York, NY, 2015) 61. 
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the basis of value alone.210 In such cases, large enterprises are incentivised 
to submit low bids which outbid SMEs from the competition. 211 If the 
contract is a large centralised contract, SMEs are technically locked out of 
the public market for the life-cycle of the contract, which may last four 
years.212 Within this time, SMEs may collapse, leaving a gap in the market 
place. When the procurer goes back to the market for a re-buy contract, 
they may be faced with an uncompetitive market. The incumbent will 
subsequently be able to increase prices and continue to lock out any new 
bidders from entering the public market.213  
Spagnolo and Yukin’s support of the use of lots does not extend to 
supporting the provision set out in the Directive. When discussing the new 
‘lots’ article, Spagnolo and Yukin argue that EU legislators and national 
legislation should not introduce prescriptive measures and should allow 
contracting authorities to continue to enjoy the freedom to use their 
procuring expertise and market knowledge to conduct tender competitions 
effectively.214 When limiting the number of lots a supplier can bid for, this 
potentially hinders competition by restricting potential tenderers choice to 
demonstrate their capabilities to carry out the contract. Interested 
economic operators should be allowed to bid for all lots, although, a limit 
set on how many lots one economic operator can win will promote 
competition.215 
                                                                                      
210 T. Vesel, ‘Addressing social considerations in PP: best practices for fighting social 
dumping in Slovenia’ in G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, 
Abingdon, Oxon;New York, NY, 2015) 39. 
211 This point is not referring to abnormally low tenders, however, it is referring to 
competitively priced bids. Vesel suggests that larger organisations can submit loss leader 
style pricing to win the contract by being able to cover operational costs through 
increased prices in private contracts. See Vesel (n 210). 
212 Particularly in cases where a framework agreement or dynamic purchasing system is 
used. Public Sector Directive arts 33 and 34. 
213 C. Webster, ‘Buyer involvement in purchasing success’ (1993) 22(3) Industrial 
Marketing Management 199.; E. Bakker, H. Walker and C. Harland, ‘Organising for 
collaborative procurement: an initial conceptual framework.’ Advancing Public 
Procurement: Practices, Innovation and Knowledge-Sharing. (Academic Press, Boca 
Raton, FL, 2006) 14. 
214 See G. Spagnolo and C. Yukins (n 209) 62. 
215 See G. Spagnolo and C. Yukins (n 209) 62. See also; Zimmermann M, ‘Economic 
Efficiency and the Division of Large Procurement Contracts Into Lots: An Analysis’ 
(2017) 12 Eur Procurement & Pub Private Partnership L Rev 422. 
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Chapter Two offered a discussion on the effectiveness of the use of lots. 
Trybus appropriately concluded that the effectiveness of the use of lots 
depends on the size, value and nature of the individual lots.216 The use of 
lots makes it easier for SMEs to bid for large contracts, however, this alone 
may not directly promote successful SME bidding. Alongside the use of 
lots, other SME friendly measures should be incorporated into the call for 
competition documents. This research aims to add clarity to this debate by 
assessing what impact the use of lots has on SME participation. 
3.5.2 Community Benefit Clauses 
This research is interested in the use of community benefit clauses, and 
questions if the inclusion of ‘targeted recruitment and training clauses’ 
facilitate SME participation in public procurement. Public sector interest 
in the use of community benefit clauses has increased rapidly over the last 
five years.217 Targeted recruitment and training clauses are routinely 
included in large works and services contracts in Northern Ireland and 
have been included in a number of key construction contracts in Ireland. 
Contractors are additionally required to include the targeted recruitment 
and training clauses in any subcontracts awarded to carry out key elements 
of the public contract. As community benefit clauses become more 
popular, SMEs will need to demonstrate their abilities and willingness to 
meet these criteria. SMEs which formalise existing practices, such as the 
employment and training of apprenticeships will improve their chances of 
being able to compete for large contracts or subcontracts.218  
                                                                                      
216 M. Trybus, ‘The Division of Public Contracts into Lots under Directive 2014/24: 
Minimum Harmonisation and Impact on SMEs in Public Procurement?’ (2018) 43(3) 
European Law Review 313. 
217 In the UK and Ireland. See The Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012; Integrating 
Social Considerations into Contracts (2016) PGN 01/13 (NI policy). 
218  If SMEs do not engage in any social activities, they may consider developing a new 
‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) programme. Brooks comments that SMEs already 
engage with socially responsible activities without naming or acknowledging the 
importance of the activities. See S. Brooks, ‘The practice and construction of corporate 
social responsibility among small to medium sized enterprises in South Wales’ (2004) 
17(1) Contemporary Wales 162. 
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As already discussed, community benefit clauses have the potential to 
facilitate social enterprise participation in public procurement.219 There 
are many issues facing social enterprises in entering the public market; 
they struggle internally to compete at a professional level, lacking the 
financial capacity and operational capabilities to carry out standard goods 
and services contracts.220 The use of community benefit clauses can 
encourage social enterprise participation in public contracts, as firstly the 
social enterprises are motivated by the social justice objectives and 
secondly, the enterprises have the experience in carrying out the 
community benefit requirements. To overcome the tendering barriers, 
social enterprises can partner with large companies to pool their resources 
to meet the social requirements and the financial and professional 
selection criteria.221 
The inclusion of community benefit clauses may be initially seen by for-
profit SMEs as a hindrance to participation, increasing operational and 
tender costs and forcing suppliers to carry out work which is outside their 
normal work practices.222 Baden et al. raise an important question 
regarding what effect social clauses have on SMEs. This research has 
focussed on what impact social criteria has on SME engagement, but it 
must also question what potential impact such procurement practices have 
on SME operations. Baden et al.’s research analysed 68 SME owner-
managers opinion on issues faced when tendering for public contracts, 
including their perceptions of imposed versus voluntary CSR related 
standards.223 The European Commission defines CSR as a ‘concept 
                                                                                      
219 Thus, responding to the wider objectives set by the Directive to develop a competitive, 
inclusive and innovative Single Market. See Public Sector Directive, art 2.  
220 S. Munoz, ‘Social enterprise and public sector voices on procurement’ (2009) 5(1) 
Social Enterprise Journal 69; A. Argyrou, ‘Providing Social Enterprises with Better 
Access to Public Procurement: The Development of Supportive Legal Frameworks’ 
(2017) 12 Eur. Procurement & Pub. Private Partnership Law Rev 310. 
221 M. Loosemore, ‘Building a new third construction sector through social enterprise’ 
(2015) 33(9) Construction Management and Economics 724. 
222 D. Baden, I.A. Harwood and D.G. Woodward, ‘The effect of buyer pressure on 
suppliers in SMEs to demonstrate CSR practices: An added incentive or counter 
productive?’ (2009) 27(6) European Management Journal 429. 
223 D. Baden, I.A. Harwood and D.G. Woodward, ‘The effects of procurement policies 
on ‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: Content-analytic insights into 
the views and actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 29(3) International Small 
Business 259. 
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whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis.’224 Baden et al.’s research found that imposed CSR 
measures increased costs for suppliers and demotivated the workforce by 
forcing them to carry out activities outside of their normal work duties.225 
Studer et al. further notes that SMEs in general, do not engage with CSR 
activities, due to a lack of policy support, insufficient resources and an 
overriding profit agenda.226 Lantos additionally argues that shareholders 
rights would be violated if companies pursue CSR obligations. This 
opinion assumes that shareholders are only concerned with dividends.227 
Sarbutts refutes these claims, contending that SMEs are in a favourable 
position to adopt social objectives or CSR goals, as in general SMEs are 
not pressurised by stakeholders need for profits and are generally 
connected to local communities.228   
Perrini, Russo and Tencati further dispute the above arguments and 
similarly agree with Sarbutts that SMEs can quickly and effectively adopt 
a social agenda.229 A continuous argument has been raised that SMEs 
engage in social activities without identifying and recording the long-term 
impact of these activities. Perrini et al. refer to this as ‘sunken CSR’ and 
Jenkins refers to it as ‘silent CSR’.230 SMEs are more connected to local 
                                                                                      
224 See Commission, ‘Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (Green Paper) COM (2001) 366. See also; Commission, ‘A renewed EU 
strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’(Communication) COM (2011) 
0681 final. 
225 D. Baden, I.A. Harwood and D.G. Woodward (2011) (n 223). 
226 S. Studer, R. Welford, P. Hills, ‘Drivers and barriers to engaging small and medium-
sized companies in voluntary environmental initiatives’ (2005) The University of Hong 
Kong Working Paper, November. 
227 This opinion assumes that shareholders are concerned with dividends not the 
promotion of the company’s social commitments or objectives. See G.P. Lantos, ‘The 
boundaries of strategic corporate social responsibility’ (2001) 18(7) Journal of 
Consumer Marketing 595. 
228 N. Sarbutts, ‘Can SMEs ‘do’ CSR? A practitioner’s view of the ways small and 
medium-sized enterprises are able to manage reputation through corporate social 
responsibility’ (2003) 7(4) Journal of Communication Management 340. 
229 F. Perrini, A. Russo and A. Tencati, ‘CSR strategies of SMEs and large firms. 
Evidence from Italy’ (2007) 74(3) Journal of Business Ethics 285. 
230 H. Jenkins, ‘A Critique of Conventional CSR Theory: An SME Perspective’ (2004) 
29(4) Journal of General Management 37; F. Perrini, S. Pogutz and A. Tencati, 
‘Corporate social responsibility in Italy: State of the art’ (2006) 23(1) Journal of 
Business Strategies 65. 
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communities than large organisations.  SMEs employ locally, offer local 
sponsorships and donations, accept volunteer workers and 
apprenticeships.231 In order to improve their chances of bidding for public 
contracts, SMEs should ‘control and report’ the impact of their 
activities.232  
Tátrai argues that SMEs need to view social criteria as essential 
operational functions.233 As more and more public bodies require 
contractors to comply with targeted recruitment and training clauses, 
SMEs will need to demonstrate their ability and willingness to meet the 
contractual performance clauses. Additionally, the adoption of socially 
related criteria and sustainability practices should assist SMEs in 
competing for private contracts with large organisations. Current literature 
indicates that large-sized enterprises are increasingly adopting sustainable 
procurement procedures akin to the approaches adopted by their public-
sector counterparts.234 This is evident in the adoption of the first 
international standard on sustainable procurement, ‘ISO 20400-2017’.235 
The progressive standard sets out guidance for all forms of organisations 
on integrating social sustainability requirements into procurement 
procedures. 
It is difficult to ignore the growing use of community benefit clauses in 
the EU countries. Northern Ireland has not yet adopted a legal act on the 
use of socially responsible public procurement. A Bill was proposed to 
introduce a socially responsible procurement act, similar, to the laws 
                                                                                      
231 F. Perrini, A. Russo and A. Tencati (2007) (n 229). 
232 Perrini et. al. suggest that SMEs must control and monitor their social activities to 
embed CSR into their operations. See F. Perrini, A. Russo and A. Tencati (2007) (n 229). 
233 G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon; New 
York, NY, 2015). See also; H. Walker and L. Preuss, ‘Fostering sustainability through 
sourcing from small businesses: public sector perspectives’ (2008) 16(15) Journal of 
Cleaner Production 1600. 
234 R. Sparkes and C.J. Cowton, ‘The maturing of socially responsible investment: A 
review of the developing link with corporate social responsibility’ (2004) 52(1) Journal 
of Business Ethics 45. 
235 The first international standard on sustainable procurement, ‘ISO 20400-2017’ was 
adopted in 2017. See ISO 20400:2017, Sustainable procurement — Guidance. The guide 
builds on 2010 ISO 20600 voluntary guidance on social responsibility.  
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enacted by Scotland,236 England and Wales237. However, the Bill has 
stalled since the collapse of the government in January 2017. Instead, 
there are several 'Buy Social' policies in place at the moment. Since Nov 
2015, contracting authorities are requested to incorporate social clauses 
into the following contracts; building contracts with a value of £2m and 
above and civil engineering contracts with a value of £4m and above.238 
Since February 2017, contracting authorities are requested to include 
social clauses in services contracts with a value of £500,000 per annum or 
more. A 'Buy Social' unit has been set up to draft standardised clauses and 
to assist contracting authorities in using social clauses. The Buy Social 
unit focuses on the promotion of 'targeted recruitment and training 
clauses.'239 
Before the establishment of the OGP in Ireland, public procurement policy 
did not encourage the inclusion of social clauses in public contracts. 
However, within six months of its establishment, the OGP created a 
‘Social Clauses Project Group.’240 The pilot project aims to identify 
public contracts where social clauses could be deployed to contribute to 
employment or training opportunities for long term unemployed. The 
project is concentrating on examining the use of social clauses in contracts 
where contractors are likely to employ additional workers to deliver the 
contract.241 The project is, in particular, reviewing the use of social clauses 
in two contracts; Grangegorman Development242 and Developed Schools 
Build Programme.  In the Developed Schools Build Programme, the social 
clauses included in the Public Works contracts require that; 
                                                                                      
236 Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act, 2014. 
237 Social Value Act (UK), 2012. 
238 Procurement Guidance Note (PGN) 01/13 Integrating Social Considerations into 
Contracts is applicable to all Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy (NIPPP) users. 
239 The Buy Social Unit was established and operates under the Strategic Investment 
Board. 
240 Dail Deb 25 February 2015 (8351/15) 87. 
241 However, there have been no assessment reports published by the project group to 
date. 
242 The Grangegorman Development Agency is a statutory agency established in 2006 
by the Irish Government under the Grangegorman Development Agency Act 2005 to 
redevelop the former St. Brendan’s Hospital grounds in Dublin City Centre. 
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 …10% of the aggregate time worked on site to have been 
undertaken by individuals who have been registered on a national 
unemployment register within the EU for a continuous period of at 
least 12 months immediately prior to their employment on the 
project, 2.5% of the aggregate time worked on site to have been 
undertaken by individuals who are employed under a registered 
scheme of apprenticeship or other similar national, accredited 
training or educational work placement arrangement.243 
The Department of Social Protection, through its Intreo offices, is 
providing support to the contractors in meeting their obligations under the 
contract by providing suitably trained candidates.244 Early results, 
indicated that approximately 48 long term unemployed people had been 
hired across fifteen sites out of a total workforce of 440. The pilot project 
has published no further results.245 While the OGP has not included any 
targeted recruitment and training clauses in their contracts, they have 
published guidance on the use of social considerations in public contracts.  
It is important to note that this is not a recent advancement of socially 
focused procurement, targeted recruitment and training requirements have 
been used for the last twenty years.246 Prior to the review and final 
adoption of the Directive, Member States had successfully demonstrated 
socially responsible practices through the use of policy-led initiatives. In 
2008, Amsterdam introduced a ‘Social Return’ initiative as part of a 
strategic public policy plan. The initiative required municipalities to 
include social conditions in public goods and services contracts, in view 
of promoting the employment of people at risk on the labour market.247. 
Similar ‘Social Return’ initiatives have been adopted in Maastricht and 
                                                                                      
243 Seanad Deb, 7 December 2016 (27). 
244 Intreo offers tailored employment services and supports for jobseekers and employers. 
245 Dail Deb, 25 February 2015 (8351/15) 87. 
246 Case C-31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4929. 
247 Amsterdam’s South East District successfully incorporated the clauses in a major 
construction contract for urban development work. Within the first year, the contractor 
had secured twelve traineeships and seven employment positions for people with a 
migrant background. See Commission, ‘Buying Social A Guide to Taking Account of 
Social Considerations in Public Procurement’ (Guide) COM (2010) 1258, final. 
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Gouda. Denmark is considered as one of the first Member States to 
proactively encourage the inclusion of social clauses in public contracts, 
by issuing an action for social considerations in 1995 and creating an 
internal portal on the use of such considerations in 2000.248  
In 2003, the Scottish government adopted the “Community Benefits in 
Procurement (CBIP) Pilot Programme.”249 Five public bodies 
participated in the pilot programme with the aim of maximising local 
employment to reduce social exclusion. The public bodies incorporated a 
variety of social clauses into their procurement practices, once the 
requirements were relevant to the subject matter of the contract and were 
consistent with government procurement policy.250 Each of the five 
participating public bodies incorporated the social provisions into their 
practices through a variety of ways and stages in the procedure. Some 
incorporated the labour conditions by setting minimum targets including; 
setting a percentage of the total labour time required to deliver the 
contract, setting a specified number of beneficiaries (e.g. employees, 
trainees, work placements); or setting a specified number of weeks of 
engagement for recipients in the contract. All of the participating 
contracting bodies found that the inclusion of employment clauses did not 
deter bidders and, found that in each case, the authorities were able to 
achieve their policy objectives without any additional cost to the 
contracts.251 Building on this success, the Scottish Government 
implemented a comprehensive strategic plan on the use of social 
procurement in 2016.252 
The use of such clauses is not isolated to the EU. Certain US states have 
adopted progressive social procurement practices, allowing for states and 
                                                                                      
248 COM (2010) 1258, final. 
249 See Scottish Government Community Benefits in Public Procurement (2008). 
Available at; http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/212427/0056513.pdf Last 
accessed 24th April 2019. 
250 Contracting authorities were also required to comply with the TFEU principles of 
transparency, equal treatment, non-discrimination and proportionality. See Case C-
513/99, Concordia Bus, [2002] ECR I-7213, para 81; Case C-4481/01 EVN [2003] ECR 
I-14527.  
251 See Scottish Government Community Benefits in Public Procurement (n 249). 
252 Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. 
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cities to include localised criteria in circumstances where geographic 
preference is permitted under federal funding legislation.253 The US State 
of Ohio is currently reviewing the legality of the mandatory inclusion of 
local employment clauses in public contracts concluded by Cleveland’s 
public procurers.254 In 2003, the city of Cleveland introduced a ‘Lewis 
Law’ which requires public bodies to include local labour clauses in all 
public improvement contracts. In an attempt to reduce poverty levels in 
the city, the law requires contractors to ensure that a minimum of ‘20% of 
the total work hours is performed by Cleveland residents, with at least 4% 
of those hours performed by low-income individuals.’255  
Ackerman notes that this practice is not the norm in the US. However, 
there are some federal laws which promote the use of local employment 
and local suppliers in limited circumstances; for example, in tackling the 
obesity epidemic, public bodies may purchase local food produce for 
federal food programs, such as school lunch programs.256 States may 
additionally introduce preferential laws in circumstances where they are 
acting as ‘market participants.’257 Ackerman notes that this reasoning was 
the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Massachusetts 
Council of Construction Employers in upholding Boston’s executive order 
requiring 50% of all construction projects employees to be residents of the 
city.258 
                                                                                      
253 For a discussion on US preference laws see; Y. Qiao, K.V. Thai and G. Cummings, 
‘State and local procurement preferences: a survey’ (2009) 9(3/4) Journal of Public 
Procurement 371. 
254 In 2016, the State of Ohio passed a revised code prohibiting the states’ public bodies 
from including local labour clauses in public contracts. The city of Cleveland challenged 
the constitutionality of the code on the grounds that it violated the City’s Home Rule 
authority. The Eight District Court of Appeals upheld this argument, concluding the 
state’s law infringed the city’s local governance powers. The court concluded that the 
Lewis Law was not a ‘residency’ law, nor a ‘police power’ law, it was a permissible law 
provided for under home rule authority. The State of Ohio has since requested a 
discretionary appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. See Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of 
Court - Filed January 22, 2018 - Case No. 2018-0097. 
255 Fannie M. Lewis Cleveland Resident Employment Law (Chapter 188). 
256 A.S. Ackerman, ‘Buy Healthy, Buy Local: An Analysis of Potential Legal Challenges 
to State and Local Government Local Purchase Preferences’ (2011) 43(4) Urban Lawyer 
1015. 
257 A.S. Ackerman (n 256). 
258 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983). See also; A.S. 
Ackerman (n 256). 
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Ackerman continued by recognising that such preferential laws will not 
be deemed constitutional in cases where the state is not acting as a market 
participant and relies on the preferential clauses as a policy or regulation 
tool. As found in the case of W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, where the 
Illinois state introduced a law which required all public bodies to include 
a local employment clause in all forms of public contracts.259 In this 
instance, the public bodies were not operating social clauses as market 
participants.260  
Such a direct approach cannot be adopted by the EU Member States, direct 
requirements to promote domestic employment would fundamentally 
breach the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment.261 
However, one could question whether the use of targeted recruitment and 
training clauses are in reality ‘ quasi-local employment’ clauses. The 
procurers may hope to encourage the inclusion of people from local 
unemployment lists. However, the contractor must be willing to accept at-
risk employees based in any of the Member States. While there are 
positive examples of how public procurement expenditure can have a 
positive impact on local economies, there is a shortage of evidence on the 
long term economic, social and legal impacts of the use of social criteria 
in Ireland and Northern Ireland.262 Although this is another reason why 
SMEs should formalise and record their social activities to demonstrate 
their ability to meet targeted recruitment and training clauses. SMEs are 
closely connected to local communities and are the key drivers of local 
employment.  
This thesis contributes to current research by questioning if the inclusion 
of community benefit clauses facilitates all forms of SME participation in 
                                                                                      
259 W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1984). 
260 A.S. Ackerman (n 256). 
261 Case C-249/81 Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982]; Case C-113/13 Spezzino 
[2014] pub. electr. EU:2014:2440. 
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public contracts. It is an important time to assess the use of such clauses, 
as the use of socially driven clauses are becoming ‘normal’ practice in 
large scale works and services contracts. Community benefit clauses have 
the potential to facilitate social enterprises in public contracts and 
additionally can encourage the participation of SMEs which have adopted 
social practices to improve their chances of winning public contracts.263  
 
3.5.3 Subcontractor considerations 
SMEs can gain access to large public contracts through the supply 
chain.264 SMEs may compete privately to work with organisations which 
have been awarded public contracts. As we have already discussed, the 
Directive includes some provisions to support subcontractors, including 
the contracting authorities’ ability to pay subcontractors directly or to 
request information on subcontractors throughout the life-cycle of the 
contract to ensure that they meet the minimum requirements to work on 
the public contract. The main contractor remains largely free to sub-
contract with any business of their choosing.265 Equally, a contracting 
authority can use subcontractor considerations to assess the sustainability 
of the supply chain. It is not uncommon for contracting authorities to ask 
suppliers to consider subcontracting with SMEs.266 Monitoring of the 
supply chain can assist contracting authorities in measuring competition 
and economic stability in the marketplace.267   
                                                                                      
263 Two of the studied contracts for this thesis included targeted recruitment and training 
clauses. We will discuss these in more detail in Chapter Four Methodology. 
264 L. Moretti and P. Valbonesi, ‘Firms’ qualifications and subcontracting in public 
procurement: an empirical investigation’ (2015) 31(3) The Journal of Law, Economics, 
and Organization 568. 
265 Once they meet the minimum selection and qualification criteria. Public Sector 
Directive art 71. See Case C-314/01 Siemens AG Osterreich, ARGE Telekom & Partner 
and Hauptverband der osterreichischen Sozialversicherungstrager, Judgment of 18 
March 2004. 
266 The OGP in Ireland and the CPD in Northern Ireland actively promote the use of 
SMEs in the supply chain. 
267 H. Walker and W. Phillips, ‘Sustainable procurement: emerging issues’ (2009) 2(1) 
International Journal of Procurement Management 41. 
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Subcontracting checks assist contracting authorities in identifying 
potential problems with the main contractor. This is particularly useful in 
certain circumstances where a large contract has been awarded on the 
basis of lowest cost. If a contractor submitted a low-cost bid to win the 
advertised contract, changes in economic conditions would have an 
impact on the ability of the contractor to carry out the contract for the 
agreed price. If it is not sustainable for the company to absorb the costs of 
the contract, it can lead to costs-over-runs or the eventual bankruptcy of 
the company.268 The latter situation has a direct impact on the completion 
of public contracts and the stability of unpaid subcontractors. The most 
prominent example of this occurring is seen in the unexpected collapse of 
the UK company Carillion plc. The quick demise of the large company 
had a direct and significant impact on the collapse of subcontractors and 
the non-completion of public works contracts in both the UK and 
Ireland.269  
At the time of the collapse, Carillion plc. was managing six Irish public 
works contracts for the construction and refurbishment of schools and 
colleges. Carillion plc. was awarded these contracts as part of the 
‘InspiredSpaces’ consortium with the ‘Dutch Infrastructure Fund 
Corporation’.270 InspiredSpaces subcontracted elements of the 
construction work to the Irish company ‘Sammon Contracting Ireland 
LTD. As a result of the Carillion plc. collapse and non-payment of 
invoices, Sammon subsequently entered into liquidation in June 2018, 
resulting in the loss of over 200 jobs.271 Sammon further subcontracted 
                                                                                      
268 M. Gunduz and H. Karacan, ‘Assessment of abnormally low tenders: a multinomial 
logistic regression approach’ (2017) 23(6) Technological and Economic Development 
of Economy 848. 
269 For a discussion on the Carillion plc. collapse see; D. Rogers, ‘Not-so-sudden death: 
How Carillion disguised its ailing finances just enough’ (2018) 9(2) Construction 
Research and Innovation 44; S. Wren-Lewis, ‘What Carillion's collapse tells us about 
public sector outsourcing’ (2018) British Politics and Policy at LSE. 
270 InspiredSpaces consortium were awarded a €100 million contract for the construction 
of six schools by September 2018. See Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure 
and Reform, and Taoiseach díospóireacht, Role and Operation of National Development 
Finance Agency: Discussion (3rd July 2018). 
271 Brennan, J. 2018, NTMA considers contractors risk list after Carillion collapse, The 
Irish Times Ltd, Dublin. Sammon Contracting Ireland LTD.’, hereinafter referred to as 
‘Sammon’ 
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with ‘G Morgan & Sons LTD.’ for the supply and delivery of furniture to 
five schools.272 G Morgan & Sons LTD. is a micro-enterprise with nine 
employees. The company claim that the failure to pay for contracts 
completed has caused cash flow difficulties for the company.273 
A High Court proceeding between G Morgan and Sons LTD. against 
Inspired Spaced Bundle 5(Ireland) for payment of supplied school 
furniture is ongoing.274 This case is directly connected to the collapse of 
Carillion.  The school bundle contract was suspended in January 2018 
with only three out of the five schools ready to open for the academic 
year.275  
The UK and Irish Regulations do not require contracting authorities to 
make direct payment to subcontractors.276 The UK and Irish contracting 
authorities are encouraged to include subcontractor considerations in their 
procurement procedures to prevent situations like this occurring again. 
Not only should contracting authorities assess subcontractors’ 
qualification and selection criteria when competing for a subcontract, but 
contracting authorities should also assess that contractors are upholding 
their contractual duties with the subcontractors throughout the 
performance of the contract.277 SMEs should not be discouraged by recent 
events from participating in large public contracts as subcontractors. 
SMEs engaged in large-scale public contracts have the potential to 
                                                                                      
272 Schools contracted included Loreto College in Wexford and Colaiste Raithin, Bray, 
Co. Wicklow. 
273 See Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach 
díospóireacht, Role and Operation of National Development Finance Agency: 
Discussion (3rd July 2018). 
274 G. Morgan & Sons Limited initiated a High Court proceeding against Inspired Spaces 
in August 2018 seeking several declarations and injunctions for the return and non-use 
of furniture supplied to two schools. See G Morgan & Sons Ltd v Inspired Spaces Bundle 
5 [Ireland] Ltd 7399. 
275 See Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach 
díospóireacht, Role and Operation of National Development Finance Agency: 
Discussion (3rd July 2018). 
276 Public Authority Regulations reg 71; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 71. For 
an overview of the Irish and Northern Irish Regulations, please refer back to Chapter 2 
Section 2.10 Public Procurement Law in Ireland and Section 2.11 Public Procurement 
Law in Northern Ireland.  
277 For example, checking compliance with Directive 2011/7/EU of 16 February 2011 on 
combating late payment in commercial transactions OJ L 48/1. 
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increase their growth rate, employment, technology investments and can 
use the experience to bid for future public and private contracts.278 
The current situation of instability in works contracts is not unique to the 
UK or Ireland, Vesel comments that the legal acceptance of low-priced 
tenders has resulted in the bankruptcy of primary contractors and the 
subsequent long delays of completion of contracts in Slovenia. This 
occurred in the Slovenia public contract for the construction of the 
Markovec tunnel at the Koper – Izola motorway.279 When assessing the 
validity of the procurement procedure, The Slovenian National Review 
Commission concluded that the principle of free-market competition 
allows for tenderers to submit low prices which guarantee their existence 
on the market.280 While, wider economic factors will have the greatest 
impact on the risk of large enterprises succeeding or failing, contracting 
authorities can take measures to reduce the risk of non-compliance and 
cost over-runs.281 One of the most efficient measures to reduce these risks 
is to set stringent controls on the assessment of abnormally low tenders 
and the subsequent monitoring of work and supply chain management 
during the performance of the contract.282 The procurer may not play a 
role in this part of the contract, monitoring and auditing reviews may be 
conducted by end-users, financial departments or independent review 
bodies.283  
                                                                                      
278 See SIGMA, ‘Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Public Procurement.’ (2017) 
Brief 33, OECD Publishing, Paris; See Commission, ‘Making Public Procurement work 
in and for Europe.’ (Communication) COM (2017) 572 final. 
279 T. Vesel, ‘Addressing social considerations in PP: best practices for fighting social 
dumping in Slovenia’ in G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, 
Abingdon, Oxon;New York, NY, 2015) 39. 
280 See No of Decision, 018-163/2009-21. See also; T. Vesel (n 279). 
281 S. Marwa and M. Zairi, ‘An exploratory study of the reasons for the collapse of 
contemporary companies and their link with the concept of quality’ (2008) 46(9) 
Management Decision 1342. 
282 Additionally, contracting authorities must ensure that the contractual performance 
clauses do not evolve beyond what was originally agreed at the tender stage. See Case 
C-454/06 Pressetext; Case 549/14 Finn Frogne [2016] pub. electr. EU:C:2016:634. 
283 Although, an important finding from each of the case studies demonstrates that 
motivated public sector employees are key in delivering the social requirements. 
Importantly, the employees driving change in the public contracts were engaged in each 
stage of the procurement cycle. 
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This research reviews the use of subcontractor considerations which 
encourage contractors to engage with SMEs. Current literature presents 
two arguments as to the most effective manner to introduce policy-led 
objectives into procurement practices. One side of the argument contends 
that a mandatory approach results in high levels of compliance and 
monitoring of the policy-led objectives, such as the inclusion of SMEs in 
the supply chain.284 This approach suggests that if contracting authorities 
wish to promote SME participation in the supply chain, they should make 
this requirement a compulsory contractual performance clause. The other 
side of the argument insists that compliance with a policy objective can 
be effectively met through the use of voluntary regimes.285 Contracting 
authorities following this approach would encourage rather than insist on 
the main contractor working with SMEs. Supporters of the voluntary 
approach argue that market pressure is a key factor in securing compliance 
levels with voluntary requirements, as contractors in fear of losing the 
contract or of losing future contracts will comply with the voluntary 
objectives set out by the contracting authority.286 It is further argued that 
voluntary criteria are more effective when they include a degree of 
flexibility to allow the contractor to respond to any economic changes in 
the marketplace.287 Counter-arguments can be made against both points; 
mandatory approaches may result in high levels of compliance but may 
additionally result in higher operational costs for both the contracting 
authority and economic operator. While a voluntary approach may be less 
expensive to manage, it does not guarantee compliance with the stated 
objective.288  
                                                                                      
284 See A.I. Anand, ‘Voluntary vs mandatory corporate governance: Towards an optimal 
regulatory framework’ (2005) in American Law & Economics Association Annual 
Meetings 44. Although such an approach in public procurement contracts would violate 
the TFEU principles.  
285 L. Senden, ‘Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in European Law: Where 
Do They Meet?’ (2005) 9(1) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law. 
286 See A.I. Anand (n 284). See also T.P. Lyon and J.W. Maxwell, ‘Corporate social 
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Environmental Economics and Policy 240. 
287 A. McWilliams and D. Siegel, ‘Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm 
perspective’ (2001) 26(1) Academy of Management Review 117. 
288 Y Fassin, ‘SMEs and the fallacy of formalizing CSR’ (2008) 17(4) Business Ethics: A 
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However, a mandatory approach is simply not possible for EU contracting 
authorities. Contracting authorities cannot set-aside proportions of public 
contracts or subcontracts for SMEs.289 To support SME participation in 
large contracts, contracting authorities can adopt voluntary subcontractor 
considerations. Contracting authorities may include voluntary contractual 
performance clauses in the contract asking the main contractor to consider 
the sustainability of the supply chain. Furthermore, contracting authorities 
may directly ask the main contractor to consider subcontracting with 
SMEs.290 As the requirements would be voluntary in nature, the 
contracting authority cannot apply penalties for non-performance. If the 
contracting authority is truly engaged with developing a sustainable 
supply chain, the contracting authority must make regular checks on the 
main contractor and all subcontractors assessing if the contractual 
performance requirements are being met.291  
Shockro and Sanchez-Graells have raised concerns around the imposition 
of subcontracting conditions, arguing that the impositions would unduly 
distort competition and would increase the likelihood of collusion 
between competitors.292 While this research accepts that a mandatory 
subcontracting requirement has the potential to distort competition by 
limiting the main contractor's freedom to fulfil their contractual duties as 
they see fit, this research argues that the use of voluntary SME 
subcontractor conditions facilitates competition rather than distorting 
competition. SMEs are currently excluded from large contracts, and one 
of the easiest routes for SMEs to gain a share of this capital is by 
subcontracting with a larger organisation. Contracting authorities who are 
invested in developing strong subcontractor clauses will monitor the 
                                                                                      
289 See Case 549/14 Finn Frogne [2016] pub. electr. EU:C:2016:634. 
290 Although, contracting authorities are not permitted to require subcontractors to 
contract with SMEs from a specific geographical location.  
291 H. Walker, L. Di Sisto and D. McBain, ‘Drivers and barriers to environmental supply 
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Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 69. 
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supply chain which in turn may mitigate the incidents of subcontractors 
not complying with contractual obligations set by the contracting 
authority and will additionally check to see that the subcontractors have 
received payment for their work. The research case studies assess if 
voluntary subcontractor considerations promote SME participation in the 
public contract. 
3.5.4 Pre-commercial Procurement 
Innovative procurement is designed to improve public services and 
procurement procedures.293 In a similar way, to environmental 
procurement, innovative procurement is studied as an independent sub-
theme of public procurement research. Chapter Two offered a broad 
overview of the innovative provisions set out by the Directive. This 
section summarises the main approaches to the study of innovative public 
measures and identifies which approach this research aligns with when 
analysing the impact of innovative practices on the facilitation of SME 
participation in public procurement. The Directive explicitly encourages 
the use of innovative procedures and criteria once the processes do not 
violate the fundamental TFEU principles.294 Contracting authorities are 
encouraged to carry out market consultations before the publication of a 
tender competition to make themselves aware of newly available 
technologies or solutions,295 secondly contracting authorities may include 
‘variants’ criteria, allowing economic operators to offer an alternative 
product or service other than what was specified in the competition 
notice.296 
 Literature differs as to the purpose, approach and study of innovative 
public measures. Obwegeser and Müller’s recent work offers an overview 
of the study of innovation as a policy tool and classifies three approaches 
                                                                                      
293 J. Edler and L. Georghiou, ‘Public procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the 
demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research Policy 949. 
294 Public Sector Directive, arts 2(1), 67(2), 70, 76(2).  
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adopted by current literature.297 The first approach focuses on innovations 
in the public procurement process, the second approach relates to the 
innovation of public services using procurement, and the third approach 
relates to the use of public procurement as a tool for demand-led 
innovation policy-making.298 The first approach ‘public procurement for 
innovation’ concentrates on using procurement as a demand-side tool to 
generate innovation.299 Contracting authorities would use such an 
approach to ask the market to develop and supply innovative solutions. 
The second approach, ‘public procurement of innovations’ uses 
procurement to modernise public bodies operations and to generate 
innovative goods and services for end-users.300 The third approach, 
innovative public procurement, reviews innovative internal practices 
adopted by contracting authorities.301 PCP falls under the second category, 
relying on demand-led innovation to develop solutions to public sector 
problems and to support the development of economic operators 
equally.302 
PCP is defined as the purchasing of research and development (R&D) of 
new innovative solutions.303 Public procurement refers to the procedures 
by which public bodies purchase goods, services or construction works.304 
Traditionally, there are three types of public contracts; public works 
contracts, public supplies contracts and services contracts.305 For these 
types of contracts, public contracting authorities detail the contract 
                                                                                      
297 N. Obwegeser and S.D. Müller, ‘Innovation and public procurement: Terminology, 
concepts, and applications’ (2018) 74-75 Technovation 1. 
298 N. Obwegeser and S.D. Müller (n 297). 
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specifications and requirements in a bidding document or a request for 
tender document.306 This document is then advertised electronically 
nationally or on a regional basis depending on the value of the contract. 
Interested economic operators are given sufficient time to complete and 
return the tender document.307 PCP does not follow this route.  
The key characteristics of PCP projects can be summarised as industry 
responding to a social problem and creating a solution using public 
funds.308 Whilst projects are funded using public money, the funds are not 
provided through a grant form. During the first stage of the PCP, public 
contracting authorities engage with a number of suppliers to identify 
possible solutions to a public problem. Contracting authorities select a list 
of preferred suppliers to progress to the second stage. At this stage, the 
suppliers, in partnership with the public body, are requested to prototype 
their solution.  Contracting authorities may carry out further negotiation 
or prototype stages with one or more suppliers. Suppliers retain 
intellectual property and gain valuable experience working with the public 
sector.309  
PCP modernises public services while creating contract opportunities for 
start-ups and small enterprises. For PCP to be effective, both the public 
sector and the private sector share the risks and benefits of undertaking 
new product or service developments.310 PCP programmes are regularly 
conducted in Germany, Denmark, the UK, Sweden, Finland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Belgium and Norway. Frameworks for 
PCP and pilot projects have been designed and implemented in Hungary, 
Poland, Iceland and Spain.311 States like Ireland, Lithuania and Portugal, 
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are in the process of developing policy and frameworks for the effective 
use of PCP projects.312 PCP contracts are used widely by Horizon 2020, 
and this broad spread exposure may encourage more contracting 
authorities to engage in similar procedures.313 Start-ups generally lack the 
experience, operational and financial capacity to bid for advertised below-
threshold contracts. For some start-ups, PCP will be their only entry route 
into the public sector. 
The use of PCP has additional societal benefits. One of the Europe 2020 
goals embedded in the Directives encourages innovative public 
procurement to contribute to a ‘smart’ economy. The smart objective 
encourages economic growth based on knowledge, research and 
innovation and delivered through the increased use of public-sector R&D 
and education.314 This objective is further supported by the adoption of 
the ‘Digital Single Market’.315 The European Commission’s ‘Digital 
Single Market’ strategy aims to promote access to online activities for 
individuals and businesses under conditions of ‘fair competition, 
consumer and data protection, removing geo-blocking and copyright 
issue.’316 As SMEs are key generators of innovation in the Single Market, 
public bodies are encouraged to turn to the market to seek assistance to 
improve public services and public sector operations. Over the last decade, 
there has been a remarkable uptake of public-private sector R&D 
developments, the most prominent of which is the adoption of the Smart 
Cities initiatives.  
Smart Cities initiatives are being implemented across the world; public 
authorities are forming partnerships with citizens, academia and private 
sector bodies to develop internet data infrastructures to improve urban 
                                                                                      
312 S. Bedin, F. Decarolis, and E. Iossa (n 311) 
313 See General Annexes of the Horizon 2020 Work Program (in Particular Annex C, D 
and E). 
314 Eurostat, ‘Smarter, Greener, more Inclusive? Indicators to support the 2020 Strategy’ 
(European Union, Luxembourg, 2016 edition). 
315 See Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (Communication) 
COM (2015) 0192 final. 
316 COM (2015) 0192 final. 
180 
 
living.317 Smart Cities initiatives are being undertaken in New York, 
Singapore and Copenhagen, among other cities. Initiatives range from the 
replacement of payphone kiosks in New York City with ‘Link’ structures. 
The ‘Links’ offer free public Wi-Fi, charging points and public supports 
such as electronic access to city services, maps and directions.318 
Singapore has used smart solutions to successfully address their 
significant congestion problems, through the introduction of road sensors, 
phased traffic lights and congestion charges.319 Copenhagen is on course 
to become the first carbon-neutral city by 2025, the city gathers and 
utilises data analytics to improve smart, green efficient growth.320  
In a world of growing urban populations, city officials are turning to 
digital solutions to address environmental concerns and promote 
economic growth and social equality.321 McLaren and Agyeman contend 
that Smart Cities have the potential to address these issues and to create a 
genuine, socially sustainable and innovative future.322 Kitchin suggests 
that the term ‘Smart Cities’ requires cities to have incorporated ‘pervasive 
and ubiquitous’ computing in daily operations and requires governance 
by innovative, entrepreneurial businesses and engaged citizens.323 Debate 
continues about the best strategies for managing digital cities, with one 
side of the argument contending that embedded digital monitoring 
increases the risk of privacy invasion, while the other side of the argument 
dismisses these fears, defending the use of data-gathering sensors to 
reduce congestion and improve public transport and urban living 
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standards.324 The research is intrigued by this debate, however, it is 
beyond the scope of this research to engage in this argument.  The research 
is concerned with how these initiatives are concluding PCP contracts and 
questions if the PCP procedures followed facilitate SME participation in 
public contracts. As the use of PCP and Smart City initiatives are growing, 
it is timely to assess what impact the use of these generally low-value 
public purchases have on SME participation. 
Two of the research case studies scrutinise the use of Smart City 
programmes adopted by Dublin City Council and Belfast City Council. 
The case studies are concerned with the potential increased demand for 
‘smart’ innovative services created by the smart cities’ programmes, the 
research questions how ICT focussed SMEs, start-ups, entrepreneurs, 
academics and non-profits can avail of these opportunities. Both 
programmes have adopted ‘Small Business Innovative Research’ (SBIR) 
initiatives to use public procurement to drive innovation in the public 
sector.325 Both programmes use PCP to carry out SBIR programmes. The 
public bodies can engage with innovative start-ups and micro-enterprises 
using PCP to find solutions to societal needs collectively.326 SBIR 
initiatives encourage the public sector to engage with enterprises during 
product or service development and design stage, allowing the enterprises 
to respond to public needs.327 This research questions if the use of PCP by 
the two Smart City programmes facilitates SME participation. In 
particular, the research will assess if the use of PCP facilitates the 
participation of start-ups, who are normally excluded from the public 
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procurement competitions due to their size, experience and financial 
capacities. Facilitating start-ups in PCP competitions has the potential to 
have a significant long-term impact for both the economic operators and 
the public bodies. The start-ups can use the experience to develop, 
prototype and test their proposed solutions. Post-completion of the 
contract, the start-up should be able to sell the product or service 
developed for the public sector to other public bodies and the wider private 
sector. When start-ups reach the ‘commercialisation’ stage, it is estimated 
that they employ four times more people than other forms of SMEs.328 As 
we will see later on, public bodies are using relatively small amounts of 
public funds to assist the private sector in developing products and 
services which improve urban living standards and assist in meeting 
national policy objectives.  
3.6 Implementing social and innovative changes in the public 
sector 
This research is interested in recent developments of public procurement, 
mainly the use of socially and innovatively driven procedures. However, 
the European Commission complains that approximately 55% of all 
contracts advertised on the OJEU are awarded on the basis of lowest 
cost.329 Contracting authorities may rely on the lowest cost award criteria 
for several reasons; contracting authorities have limited budgets; the 
lowest-cost award criteria is technically straightforward and easy to use, 
and there is minimal risk of legal challenge.330 SMEs frequently state the 
use of ‘lowest cost’ hinders their ability to compete for public contracts.331 
It is widely accepted that SMEs generate local employment growth and 
the Directive includes provisions which support SMEs. Contracting 
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authorities will have to change their procuring attitudes and procedures to 
promote SME competition. There are also a number of hurdles facing 
procurers in introducing change to the purchasing activities, namely, 
complex legislation, lack of policy supports and embedded cultural 
attitudes.332 
It is often reported that the private sector can introduce socially-driven 
changes in a more rapid manner than the public sector.333 One of the main 
differences between the public sector and the private sector is the quantity 
and complexity of rules and regulations governing their operational 
practices. Private enterprises must adhere to company law, financial 
legislation, such as taxation and insurance rules, labour and environmental 
laws. Public sector bodies, in addition to these requirements, must also 
adhere to public administrative law when carrying out operational tasks. 
Traditionally, robust regulatory systems were seen as a barrier to 
innovation and social changes, with public sector bodies focused on 
abiding by legislation rather than on changing or improving standard 
practices.334 Contracting authorities traditionally might have found it 
easier to purchase on the lowest-cost approach. In addition to regulatory 
constraints, the public sector capacity to change was further restricted by 
the global financial crisis.335 States were faced with reduced budgets 
without experiencing any significant reduction in the need for public 
services. Innovative and socially conscious practices and systems could 
assist states in utilising public finances in a sustainable manner that 
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achieves value for taxpayers’ money.336 Regulatory frameworks should 
not be seen as a barrier to change, and instead should be used as a 
facilitator for conducting innovative procedures. The Directive is no 
longer focussed on purely economic objectives and contains numerous 
provisions allowing contracting authorities to use procurement 
strategically to support the development of sustainable, inclusive and 
innovative market places. 
A recent OECD report outlines a framework for understanding public 
sector innovation and identifies a number of strategies for public bodies 
to employ to successfully drive socio-innovative practices at every level 
of the public sector.337 The report explains that change in public sector 
operations is dependent on four factors; ‘the individual innovator, the 
organisation in which they operate, adoption of new practices and 
improving the legislative framework.’ The framework relies on large-scale 
research gathered by the OECD’s ‘Observatory of Public Sector 
Innovation’.338  
Firstly, the framework acknowledges the importance of individuals, 
recognising that individual employees act as the creators of ‘change’. The 
change will occur when a key employee is willing to do something 
differently.339 Governments should encourage public sector employees to 
drive change within individual departments. Employees should be 
motivated and encouraged to implement changes or to develop a new 
process which helps improve public services. Public employees, unlike 
the private sector, may not reap financial awards for implementing new 
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changes, but instead, are motivated by promotion prospects and career 
development.340   
Secondly, the report finds that engaged employees must be supported by 
their organisation. The organisation must create an environment to allow 
innovative practices to be designed and implemented.341 The hypothesis 
outlined in the research argues that data information knowledge and 
learning is vital to promoting change in the public sector. This would 
suggest that the public sector bodies should willingly share and collect 
data on public service operations with the private sector, academia and the 
voluntary sector. By sharing information and data, the private sector 
would, in turn, offer advice or solutions on how to improve public 
services.342 For this approach to be truly effective, the public sector would 
have to encourage engagement with the private sector openly and should 
actively implement changes or ideas recommended by the private sector, 
the voluntary sector or by academia.343  
The third requirement of change identified by the report requires public 
bodies to work in new ways. If the public sector is to facilitate the new 
practices fully, they need to develop strategic partnerships across the 
public sector to harmonise improved services.344 Partnerships between the 
public sector and the private sector, academia and the voluntary sector are 
required to foster new ideas.345 The final requirement demands a review 
of the rules surrounding policy and procedures.346 Public sector bodies 
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should offer clarification of what procedures are permissible within the 
remit of public legislation. Internal policies and procedures should be 
modernised and revised if such rules are acting as a barrier to innovative 
processes. All four factors of change must exist for the public sector to 
fully support and implement new changes.347  
The European Commission published one of the most comprehensive 
reports on European public sector innovation in 2013.348 While the report 
initially praises European Member States for fostering innovation in the 
private sector, by providing finance to private entities to develop new 
technologies and ICT infrastructure, the report calls for the Member States 
to strengthen the public sector’s capacity to innovate. Facilitating 
innovative practices in the public sector is intended to assist in improving 
public services and to address societal problems such as the need to 
provide high-quality health care to support ageing populations.349 
Similarly, to the OECD report, the Commission report recognises that a 
lack of coordinated support for innovative leaders and administrative 
heavy legislation are acting as barriers to social change and innovation in 
the public sector. The report calls for the Member States to modernise their 
internal practices, to facilitate digital governance and to actively engage 
with the private and voluntary sector.350  
Sorensen and Torfing further support the argument that for social change 
to exist, the public sector must form a collaborative partnership with the 
private sector.351 Sorensen and Torfing outline a framework for 
collaborative innovation that closely reflects the OECD framework. Their 
framework is based on four propositions.  The first proposition is based 
on the sharing of knowledge. The hypothesis states that while individuals 
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are the initial inventors of new or improved developments, these ideas are 
only truly effective when they are shared or transformed with other 
parties. The second proposition argues that the ideas generated are best 
developed when shared with diverse non-competitive partners; for 
example, when a private entity shares an idea with a public sector body.  
Thirdly, the hypothesis argues that both sides must jointly implement the 
new developments, with both sides sharing the risk of failure or loss. 
Finally, the last proposition contends that the idea must be disseminated 
to other public bodies and private sector entities.352 Similarly, to the 
OECD research, this framework recognises the importance of individuals 
as innovators and the importance of sharing risk and ideas between the 
private and public sector.  Moreover, this framework additionally pays 
attention to the harmonisation of new processes or developments across 
the public sector by encouraging the dissemination of the new practices.353  
There is a recurring theme that suggests in order for change to take place, 
contracting authorities must be willing to take risks and develop ways to 
design tender specifications and award criteria. Unfortunately, there is 
limited ability for contracting authorities to change the procedures set out 
in the Directive.354 Contracting authorities are prohibited from engaging 
with SMEs during open and restricted competitions. Although contracting 
authorities may conduct market research prior to the design and 
publication of the call for competition.355 However, PCP offers 
contracting authorities flexibility in developing partnerships with the 
private sector. 
Lee, Hwang and Choi’s research relies heavily on practical case studies to 
further prove the theory that a public body’s capacity to change is directly 
                                                                                      
352 E. Sorensen and J. Torfing (n 351). 
353 J. Edler, S, Ruhland, S. Hafner, J. Rigby, L. Georghiou, L. Hommen, M. Rolfstam, C. 
Edquist, L. Tsipouri and M. Papadakou, ‘Innovation and public procurement. Review of 
issues at stake’ (ISI Fraunhofer Institute Systems and Innovation Research, Karlsruhe, 
2005). 
354 Case C-16/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-08315. 
355 Public Sector Directive, arts 26(5), 48(2). 
188 
 
related to its willingness to engage with the private or voluntary sector.356 
Examples provided by Denmark and the UK depict how collaborative 
partnerships between the sectors can result in significant changes and 
improvements to public services. Denmark and the UK have previously 
invited interested parties to offer advice on issues of public concerns, such 
as climate change and local community public services through their 
‘MindLab’ and ‘Public Services Lab’ programmes.357 Sweden has used 
PCP to design and implement new innovative traffic systems and is 
currently using the process to develop a robotic health care service for the 
elderly population.358 More recently, Ireland and Northern Ireland adopted 
the Smart Cities programmes to improve urban living standards. 
The public body must follow the four stages of change set out in the OECD 
report and reiterated in recent literature to successfully embed innovative 
procurement practices.359 Firstly, a motivated and engaged public sector 
employee will be the driver of the initiative, understanding the need to 
include social criteria in public procurement. Secondly, the public body 
must support the employee in implementing the initiative, allowing the 
employee to begin negotiations with the private or voluntary sector. 
Thirdly, the public body must engage with all stakeholders, including 
other public bodies, academia, local communities and the business sector. 
Finally, national policy and legislation must allow for the activity to take 
place.360 
The revised rules on public procurement make it easier for public bodies 
to incorporate social objectives into their public procurement practices, 
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such as the facilitation of SME participation. Results should be 
disseminated to other public bodies and the Member States. If public 
bodies successfully adopt procedures and provisions to facilitate all forms 
of SMEs, the public body should be willing to share their experiences with 
interested stakeholders. SME participation is facilitated by the use of the 
open procedure, use of electronic tools and eased selection criteria. The 
research asks if other criteria and procedures set out in the Directive and 
supporting policies; namely, the use of lots, use of community benefit 
clauses, use of subcontractor considerations and use of PCP facilitate SME 
participation in public procurement. In assessing the use of the social 
criteria, the research will consider the OECD requirements for change, by 
considering what impact the public body’s willingness to do something 
differently supported the effectiveness of the reviewed procurement 
procedure.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
SMEs dominate the Single Market, driving innovation and generating 
local employment growth. However, they are unfairly represented in 
public markets. There are a number of common reasons for this, they lack 
the capacity, experience and financial ability to carry out public contracts. 
Onerous tendering practices limit access to competitions and large 
organisations out-bid SMEs at the tendering stage. Supporting SME 
growth and development is at the heart of Single Market policies, 
recognising the socio-economic importance of supporting SMEs.  
European public procurement rules aim to level the playing field for 
SMEs. The Directive addresses the issue of inclusive qualification criteria. 
Contracting authorities must only include financial and economic criteria 
which are relevant and proportionate to the subject matter of the contract. 
The minimum turnover required for a contract should not normally exceed 
at the most twice the estimated contract value.361 Furthermore, the 
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Directive aims to ease the administrative burden on small business by 
introducing a ‘European Single Procurement Document’. Suppliers will 
have the ability to upload certificates and financial documents to this 
online document. Contracting authorities will be able to access supplier 
information from the procurement document.362  
This research is interested in assessing what impact the use of social 
criteria in public procurement has on SME participation. The research is 
interested in examining the use of social criteria which has the potential 
to facilitate all forms of SMEs in public contracts, including the 
facilitation of social enterprises and innovative start-ups. The case studies 
will assess the practical impact of dividing large contracts into lots, the 
use of community benefit clauses, the use of subcontractor considerations 
and the use of PCP on SME engagement. Procurers should rethink their 
spending behaviours to consider including initiatives that will increase 
SME competition. Public procurement has the potential to invigorate 
SMEs as a driving force within local economies and has the potential to 
achieve the socio-economic goals set out in the Single Market Act at a 
localised level.  
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The research adopts a mixed-method approach, relying on cross-national 
comparative case studies. A socio-legal approach allows for the research 
to effectively examine the impact of including social criteria in public 
contracts. The procurement procedures for four public contracts 
concluded by Irish and Northern Irish public bodies are reviewed. A 
primarily qualitative approach is adopted, semi-structured interviews with 
key public procurers and SMEs were conducted to gain a true 
understanding of the issues facing the inclusion of social criteria in public 
contracts. This chapter offers a summary of the research objectives and 
the research approach. An overview of how the case studies were selected, 
conducted and analysed is offered, with the chapter concluding by 
outlining the primary limitations of the research.  
 
4.2 Research Design 
 
4.2.1 Research Objectives 
The research examines the relationship between public procurement and 
SMEs. The research questions to what extent the inclusion of social 
criteria and innovative procedures in public procurement facilitates SME 
participation. SMEs are the key drivers of innovation and generators of 
local employment.1 However, SMEs are under-represented in the public 
markets. SMEs are in particular locked out of large contracts, and some 
forms of small businesses such as social enterprises and start-ups struggle 
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to bid for low-value contracts.2 The research examines what impact; the 
division of large contracts into smaller lots, use of community benefit 
clauses, use of subcontractor considerations and the use of PCP has on 
SME engagement. The research aims to identify the extent to which the 
use of social criteria and innovative procedures help to address market 
gaps in SMEs’ access. To achieve these objectives, a cross-country case 
study strategy is used to form an understanding of the practical 
implications of the use of social criteria. 
4.2.2 Socio-Legal Approach 
This thesis adopts a socio-legal methodology. The research employs 
empirical methods of analysis, such as the use of surveys and semi-
structured interviews to understand the purchasing context within which 
public procurement law exists.3 By choosing to study the effectiveness of 
public procurement law from a socio-legal approach, the research is 
required to demonstrate an understanding of the legal, social and political 
culture of each jurisdiction reviewed. It is not unusual for public 
procurement research and public procurement law research to adopt a 
mixed-method approach.4 The research uses multiple research production 
and analysis approaches to understand the legal, social and political 
culture of the Irish and Northern Irish public procurement landscapes.5  
A doctrinal approach was first used to identify; the objectives of the 
legislation; the permissible use of social criteria and innovative 
                                                                                      
2 K. Loader, ‘SME suppliers and the challenge of public procurement: Evidence revealed 
by a UK government online feedback facility’ (2015) 21(2) Journal of Purchasing and 
Supply Management 103. 
3 Mixed methods of data gathering are common in socio-legal studies. See S. Wheeler 
and P.A. Thomas, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in DJ Hayton, (ed), Law’s Future(s) (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2002) 217; R. Banakar and M. Travers, ‘Theory and method in socio-
legal research’ (Hart Pub, Portland, Or; Oxford; 2005) xiv. 
4 See R. Fee, A. Erridge and S. Hennigan, ‘SMEs and government purchasing in Northern 
Ireland: problems and opportunities’ (2002) 14(5) European Business Review 326; K. 
Loader, ‘SME suppliers and the challenge of public procurement: Evidence revealed by 
a UK government online feedback facility’ (2015) 21(2) Journal of Purchasing and 
Supply Management 103;A. Flynn and P. Davis, ‘Investigating the effect of tendering 
capabilities on SME activity and performance in public contract competitions’ (2017) 
35(4) International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 449. 
5 Multiple research methods were employed to deepen the researcher’s knowledge of the 
topic. For a discussion on the suitability of this approach see; D. Watkins and M. Burton 
eds., ‘Research methods in law’ (2nd edt., Routledge, 2017) 5. 
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procedures within the remit of the Directive; SME friendly provisions set 
out in the Directive; the relationship between SMEs and public 
procurement; the barriers faced by SMEs when tendering; and the SME 
friendly provisions of the Directive. A large-scale survey was also 
conducted during this period to offer an overview of the Irish public 
procurement landscape. Once the research identified suitable SMEs 
friendly provisions to review, the research was then tasked with 
identifying suitable case studies to review. Four individual case studies 
were reviewed. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
contracting authorities and with SMEs, and request for tender documents, 
call for competitions and excerpts from concluded contracts were 
reviewed. 
4.2.3 Case Study Approach 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the use of empirical 
research in legal scholarship.6 This is especially evident in research 
examining the use of economic law.7 A case study approach allows for the 
research to observe the functioning and effects of public procurement 
law.8 There are problems associated with empirical research, such as the 
use of poor research techniques and relying on skewed samples to produce 
generalisations.9 The research acknowledged these concerns and potential 
problems and took all necessary steps to conduct the empirical research in 
an informed, open, ethical and prescriptive manner. It would be difficult 
to assess the effect and efficacy of the use of SME friendly provisions 
through a doctrinal approach.10  
                                                                                      
6 M.R. Heise, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990-
2009’ (2011). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 700. 
7 R.C. Ellickson, ‘Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study’ (2000) 29 Journal of 
Legal Studies 528. 
8 J.M. Smits, ‘Law and interdisciplinarity: on the inevitable normativity of legal studies, 
Critical Analysis of Law’ (2014) 1 An International & Interdisciplinary Law Review 84; 
A. Argyrou, ‘Making the case for case studies in empirical legal research’ (2017) 
13(3) Utrecht Law Review 95. 
9 D.L. Rhode, ‘Legal Scholarship’ (2002) 115 Harvard Law Review 1327. 
10 C.A. Nard, ‘Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the 
Academy and Profession’ (1995) 30 Wake Forest Law Review 347. 
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When the research methodology was being designed, a primarily 
quantitative mixed-method research approach was considered. This 
approach proposed to gather data from calls for competition and contract 
notices published on the OJEU, etenders.ie and on etenders.ni.11 The 
approach would have relied on the publication of contract notices to 
statistically record how many SMEs were awarded contracts on the back 
of competitions which included social criteria. However, there were 
concerns regarding access to information using this approach. There are 
inconsistencies as to what information contracting authorities publish in 
calls for competitions and contract award notices. In a large number of 
cases, interested economic operators are required to express ‘their 
interest’ in the contract before they can access the bidding documents.12 
The researcher did not wish to falsely express an interest in a contract to 
gain access to the information. A more ethical and structured manner 
would have required partnering with the OGP in Ireland and with the CPD 
in Northern Ireland to retrieve access to contracts advertised on the 
etenders sites. This approach was rejected as it was difficult to estimate 
the amount of work that would have been required to conduct this form of 
research. Additionally, this approach failed to take into account the 
procurers and SMEs opinions and thoughts of incorporating social criteria 
into procurement practices.13   
When this approach was rejected, a case study strategy was explored. Yin 
notably remarks that case study strategies are a flexible form of study, 
allowing the researcher to utilise several data gathering techniques and 
tools. Data gathering tools available to researchers include and are not 
limited to; formal and semi-formal interviews, participant observation, 
non-participant direct observation, documentary analysis, use of surveys 
                                                                                      
11 A.J. Onwuegbuzie, R.M. Bustamante and J.A. Nelson, ‘Mixed Research as a Tool for 
Developing Quantitative Instruments’ (2000) 4(1) Journal of Mixed Methods Research 
56. 
12 This is to assist contracting authorities in gauging the interested competition in the 
contract and assisting the authorities in preparing for the administrative workload of 
evaluating submitted tenders.  
13 J.M. Smits (2014) (n 8) This approach may have limited the researcher’s understanding 
and appreciation of the practical implication of the rules on SME participation.  
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and questionnaires, and the management of relationships with key 
informants.14 The use of multiple data gathering tools enriches a 
researchers’ understanding of the practical implications of the studied 
activity, as well as offering an insight into interviewees’ perceptions and 
views on the studied topic. Additionally, case studies findings allow for 
hypothesis generation and concept building.15 The researcher can use the 
results of a limited number of studied circumstances to develop a working 
hypothesis which can contribute to the replication of positive results on a 
broader scale.16   
There is no definitive way to study the topic of public procurement law. 
The open-ended nature of case study data collection allowed for the 
research to examine the use of social criteria in considerable depth.17 The 
key benefit of adopting a case study strategy for this thesis is its inherent 
flexibility to study the practical impact of public procurement law on SME 
participation in public markets.  
Semi-formal interviews were conducted with the contracting authorities 
and with the awardee economic operator or operators. The findings of the 
case studies were applied to current and appropriate literature and are 
summarised in the final chapter of this thesis. This approach offered an 
insightful understanding of the practical constraints and opportunities 
faced by contracting authorities in attempting to incorporate non-
economic considerations into their procurement practices.18  
                                                                                      
14 R.K. Yin, ‘Applications of case study research’ (Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publishing, 
1993) 5. 
15 Concerns on the conduct of the case studies were considered throughout the research 
design, gathering and analysis stages. See P.B. Corcoran, K.E. Walker and A.E. Wals,  
‘Case studies, make‐your‐case studies, and case stories: a critique of case‐study 
methodology in sustainability in higher education’ (2004) 10(1) Environmental 
Education Research 7. 
16 R. Whipp, ‘Qualitative methods: technique or size? Researching the world of work’ 
(1998) Strategies and methods in studying industrial relations 51; K.M. Eisenhardt and 
M.E. Graebner, ‘Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges’ (2007) 
50(1) Academy of Management Journal 25. 
17 S.M. Barkan, B. Bintliff, and M. Whisner, ‘Fundamentals of Legal Research’ 
University of Washington School of Law Research Paper No. 2015-09; Fundamentals of 
Legal Research (Foundation Press 10th ed. 2015). 
18 R. Banakar, ‘Having one's cake and eating it: the paradox of contextualisation in 
socio-legal research’ (2011) 7(4) International Journal of Law in Context 487-503. 
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4.3 Case Study Selection 
A significant amount of time was spent on deciding which countries to 
study, which SME friendly provisions to review and the identification of 
suitable public contracts. Originally, the research identified Scotland as 
the main case study to review. Scotland is one of the leading Member 
States in pursuing socially driven procurement, adopting both policies and 
legislation to encourage the use of social clauses in public procurement.19 
This is, of course, true of all the UK and is evident in the adoption of  the 
Public Services (Social Value) Act 201220 and the Modern Slavery Act 
2015.21 However, a decision was made to review the use of strategic 
public procurement in Ireland and Northern Ireland for a number of 
pragmatic reasons. The researcher is based in Ireland and has strong 
connections with the public bodies, making it easier to access information. 
Furthermore, the long-term objective of the research is to encourage Irish 
public bodies to use public procurement as a strategic tool to improve 
socio-economic policy objectives. It was more appropriate to review and 
compare the Irish and Northern Irish public procurement landscape from 
the period 2014 – 2018. During the early stages of the research, neither 
state had adopted socially driven public procurement policies which were 
comparable to the Scottish example. A more rigorous approach was to 
study the developing public procurement policies in Ireland and Northern 
Ireland during this period. Both states have similarly sized economies 
dominated by SMEs.22 SMEs in both regions face similar administrative, 
financial and professional hurdles in bidding for contracts.23 The 
                                                                                      
19 Scotland’s Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014; Scottish Government, Scottish 
Model of Procurement (2016); Scottish Government The Public Procurement Reform 
Programme 2006-2016 Achievements and Impacts (2016). 
20 Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012. See also Lord Young’s supporting Review of 
the Social Value (2015). 
21 Modern Slavery Act 2015  
22 British Irish Governmental Strategy Study on All Island Economy ‘Comprehensive 
study on the All-Island economy’ (Intertrade Ireland, 2018) 45 
23 See R. Fee, A. Erridge and S. Hennigan, ‘SMEs and government purchasing in 
Northern Ireland: problems and opportunities’ (2002) 14(5) European Business Review 
326; A. Flynn, and P. Davis, ‘The policy–practice divide and SME-friendly public 
procurement’ (2016) 34(3) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 559. 
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Directives were transposed closely and similarly in Ireland and Northern 
Ireland.  
4.3.1 Public Procurement Law in Ireland and Northern Ireland 
The main source of public procurement law in Ireland and Northern 
Ireland is the EU Directives on procurement. Both countries have 
implemented the Directives into national law in similar manners. Both 
implementing instruments did not mandate for the division of contracts 
into lots.24 Neither instrument mandated for strict subcontractor 
requirements, tenderers are not required to declare their proposed use of 
subcontractors, neither permit contracting authorities to pay 
subcontractors directly.25 Both jurisdictions chose to implement 
mandatory electronic communication by the dates outlined.26 Some of the 
key socially centred provisions are discussed in further detail below. 
Use of Lots 
Contracting authorities may divide larger contracts into smaller lots to 
foster competition in the market.27 If a contracting authority does not 
divide an above threshold contract into smaller lots, the authority shall 
offer a justification of their decision not to subdivide the public contract.28 
The discretionary provisions were transposed in Reg 46(3) and Reg 46(4), 
allowing contracting authorities to limit the number of lots they may 
award to one tenderer.29 If the contracting authority chooses to limit the 
number of lots one tenderer may be awarded, they must clearly state this 
                                                                                      
24 Neither state had implemented mandatory provisions or adopted soft-law mechanisms 
on this before, unlike France and Germany. France and Germany mandated for the 
division of large contracts into lots, both states had some level of experience of imposing 
similar rules. See the global French framework on procurement ‘Ordinance no 2015-899 
of 23 July 2013’ and the German ‘Ordinance on the award of public contracts VGV. 
GWB, Part 4. Acts against Restraints of Competition.’ 
25 Public Authority Regulations reg 71; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 71. 
26 Both states actively promote the use of e-procurement for both above and below 
threshold contracts. Irish contracting authorities are encouraged to utilise the ‘eTenders’ 
national advertisement platform and Northern Irish contracting authorities are 
encouraged to utilise the ‘eSourcingNI’ and ‘eTendersNI’ online support platforms.  
27 Public Authority Regulations reg 46; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 46. 
28 Public Authority Regulations reg 46(1); (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 46(1). 
29 Public Authority Regulations reg 46(3); (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 46(4). 
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in the contract notice or in the invitation to confirm interest.30 Both the 
OGP in Ireland and the CPD in Northern Ireland encourage contracting 
authorities to use proportionate lots to encourage SME and social 
enterprise participation in public contracts.31  
Contract award criteria 
Contracting authorities can award contracts on the basis of cost, a life-
cycle costing or a best price-quality ratio.32 The best price-quality ratio 
may include qualitative, environmental or social aspects, once the criteria 
are linked to the subject matter of the contract. Such criteria may include 
social, environmental and innovative operational characteristics.33 
Weightings must be assigned to each criterion and should be transparently 
set out in the procurement documents. Qualitative criteria must not restrict 
competition or confer an unrestricted freedom of choice onto the 
contracting authority.34 This includes the freedom to include community 
benefit clauses. 
 
 
 
                                                                                      
30 McLaughlin & Harvey Ltd. v Department of Finance and Personnel (No 2) [2008] 
NIQB 91 (QBD, Deeny J, 11 September 2008) (Affirmed by NI Court of Appeal, 26 
September 2011 [2011] NICA 60). 
31 See Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’ 
Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services. (2019) Version 2.1; Department  
Accessible at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/national-public-procurement-policy-
framework/ Last accessed 02/06/19; Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland 
Public Procurement Policy (2014) Version 11. Available at; https://www.finance-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/dfp/ni-public-procurement-policy-version-11-
august-2014.pdf Last accessed 25th April 2019. 
32 Public Authority Regulations regs 67 and 70; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations regs 
67 and 70. 
33 The OGP and the CPD offer guidance on how to incorporate weighted criteria in tender 
competitions. See (n 31). 
34 Scott and Others v. Belfast Education and Library Board NICh D, Weatherup J, 
(2007); Release Speech Therapy Ltd v Health Service Executive [2011] IEHC 57, 
McMahon J; Easycoach Limited v Department of Regional Development (Northern Irish 
High Court, McCloskey J, 28 February 2012). 
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Subcontracting requirements 
Contracting authorities may ask tenderers to indicate in the tender whether 
the company intends to subcontract any element of the contract if it is 
awarded the contract.35 Contracting authorities may require 
subcontractors to submit a separate European Single Procurement 
Document (ESPD) to assess the subcontractor's suitability to carry out the 
contract.36 Tenderers may rely on the capacity of subcontractors to 
demonstrate compliance with the selection requirements, in circumstances 
where the subcontractor will perform the works or services for which its 
capacity is required.37 Winning tenderers are required to provide details 
and information of all subcontractors relied on during the life of the 
contract.38  
Contracting authorities in Ireland and Northern Ireland can pursue and 
incorporate both economic and non-economic criteria easily. Both states 
have a centralised system of public procurement and are actively 
promoting the facilitation of SMEs in public contracts in both above and 
below threshold contracts.39 
Use of PCP 
Below threshold procurement is governed by soft-law in both 
jurisdictions.40 There are no prescriptive rules on how to use innovative 
procedures. Contracting authorities can use the innovation partnership, 
include variants in open, restricted, competitive dialogue and negotiation 
with competition procedures.41 However, a significant amount of 
                                                                                      
35 Public Authority Regulations reg 71; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 71. 
36 The ESPD electronic service is freely available for suppliers via the national tender 
advertisement platforms. 
37 Public Authority Regulations reg 71; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 71. 
38 Public Authority Regulations reg 71(3); (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 71(3). 
39 See (n 31). 
40 See (n 31). 
41 Public Authority Regulations section 3; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations section 3. 
200 
 
innovative procurement is being conducted for low-value spends by Smart 
Cities initiatives.42 
The research was able to identify four public contracts which incorporated 
social criteria and innovative procedures into the procurement practices. 
The case studies provide new insights into the use of social criteria and 
innovative procedures in high and low-value public works, supplies and 
services contracts. The procurement procedures used to conclude four 
public contracts are reviewed. Two ‘above-threshold’ contracts are 
reviewed and two ‘below-threshold’ contracts are assessed. For the above 
threshold case studies, a construction contract for a New Children’s 
Hospital in Ireland is compared with a public service and supplies contract 
concluded by the Buy Social Unit in Northern Ireland. For the below-
threshold contracts, two PCP procedures conducted by Smart Dublin and 
Smart Belfast are reviewed. The case studies were selected as they 
represent changes occurring in the Irish and Northern Irish public 
procurement markets, contracting authorities in both states are 
incorporating community benefit clauses in large contracts and using PCP 
practices to secure ‘Smart City’ objectives. 
The National Children’s Hospital construction contract is currently the 
most expensive contract being undertaken in the State. The case study is 
directly compared with the large-scale services contract concluded by the 
Central Procurement Directorate and the Buy Social unit in Northern 
Ireland.43 Both contracts include community benefit clauses, 
subcontractor protection considerations, and elements of the contracts 
were divided into smaller lots. While the subject matter of the contracts 
                                                                                      
42 Chapter 7 Smart Dublin and Chapter 8 Smart Belfast review the recent increase in the 
use of innovative procurement strategies in detail.  
43 While the Central Procurement Directorate (CPD) is now known as the ‘Construction 
and Procurement Delivery’ (CPD), the case study chapters will continue to refer to the 
CPD as the Central Procurement Directorate. This is the title used in all of the call for 
competition and contracts notices reviewed for this thesis.   
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was considerably different, one being a works contract and one being a 
services contract, the clauses are similar.44  
Additionally, the Buy Social team offered assistance to the National 
Children’s Hospital’s Community Benefit Manager in designing the 
community benefit clauses.45 Both case studies included targeted 
recruitment and training community benefit clauses in their contracts to 
encourage the employment of long-term unemployed young people or 
disadvantaged persons. Both procuring teams received advice on the 
design and implementation of the targeted recruitment and training 
clauses from the same social procurement consultant.46 Such clauses are 
becoming increasingly common in Northern Ireland public contracts, 
whereas the use of employment-based clauses is still relatively new in 
Ireland.  
The two low-value case studies examine the use of PCP activities used by 
Smart Dublin and Dublin City Council, and Smart Belfast and Belfast City 
Council, to achieve smart cities objectives. The Smart Dublin case study 
examines the PCP used for a competition to improve cycling rates in 
Dublin city. The Smart Belfast case study reviews a competition 
conducted to maximise business revenue rates in the city. While the 
subject matter of the contracts is significantly different, the procedures 
followed are comparable.47  
4.4 Generalising Results 
The research was concerned with the validity and reliability of results 
produced by relying on a case study strategy.48 The initial quantitative 
methodology approach proposed for this research would have adequately 
offered reliable and generalised results. By reviewing the published call 
                                                                                      
44 Both contracts included community benefit clauses and SME focussed subcontractor 
considerations. Elements of the contracts were sub-divided into smaller lots.  
45 Interview with Ingrid McElroy, Community Benefit Programme Manager, National 
Paediatric Hospital Development Board Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management 
and Project Controls (Dublin, Ireland, 10 June 2016). 
46 See Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 45). 
47 Request for tender documents for both contracts were reviewed for this thesis.  
48 See D.L. Rhode (n 9). 
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for competition and contract award notices, the results generated would 
offer a reliable representation of public procurement expenditure in 
Ireland and Northern Ireland. However, the case study approach could not 
replicate this generalisation of results. Each of the public contracts 
reviewed is specialised, and the contracting authorities were committed to 
conducting competitions which incorporated both economic and non-
economic objectives. In each of the case studies, the public body 
demonstrated a commitment to use public procurement to achieve both 
social objectives and cost efficiencies. While the case study findings may 
not represent the views of the majority of public procurers, the findings 
can be used to improve future purchases by the case study participants or 
by the broader public sector.49 The case study findings can help predict 
what actions might occur if a particular procedure is adhered to under 
similar market conditions. Yin explains that basis of the generalisation in 
case study strategies is not concerned with the typicality of the object of 
the study, but it is concerned with the context of particular processes, 
which have the ability to influence future behaviours and actions.50  
This research investigated the impact of the inclusion of social criteria in 
public procurement on SME participation in public contracts. The findings 
of the four case studies are used to develop a hypothesis which predicts 
that under similar market conditions and public sector commitment, the 
use of the social criteria, namely, the use of lots, use of community benefit 
clauses, use of subcontractor conditions and use of PCP facilitates SME 
participation in both low-value and high-value public contracts. It is 
timely to conduct this form of research, as the purchasing objectives 
adopted by the four public bodies represent current changes in the public 
procurement landscape. The two high-value case studies incorporate 
community benefit clauses and subcontractor considerations, both of 
which are prominently promoted by national policies. The two low-value 
                                                                                      
49 As suggested by Sorensen and Torfing. See E. Sorensen and J. Torfing, ‘Enhancing 
collaborative innovation in the public sector’ (2011) 43(8) Administration and Society 
868. 
50 R.K. Yin, ‘Applications of case study research’ (Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publishing, 
1993) 39. 
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Smart Cities represent growing popularity in partnering with innovative 
suppliers to improve public supplies and services. The findings will be 
useful for public bodies which are committed to utilising public 
procurement expenditure to achieve social goals.  
4.5 Doctrinal analysis 
Desk-based research was conducted throughout the research approach. 
The purpose of this approach was to identify, analyse and synthesise the 
content of public procurement law governing the purchases of public 
works, supplies and services contracts.51 The research concentrated on 
gathering data from current European and national case law, relevant 
literature on the objectives and purposes of the legislation, European 
Commission assessment reports and national policy documents. The 
research gathered formed an underlying framework for field-based 
research activities.  Shortly after the research commenced, the European 
Directives on public procurement were revised.52 One of the major 
revisions of the rules was the focus it placed on SME participation in 
public markets.53 It was essential that the research identified, critiqued and 
analysed the SME friendly provisions contained in the rules. To this end, 
the research relied heavily on literature published from 2014 onwards.54  
This research focussed disproportionately on CJEU case law over 
domestic case law for a number of reasons. Case law shaping our 
understanding of the permissible use of non-economic criteria is primarily 
adopted by the CJEU,55 with domestic case law focussing on procedural 
                                                                                      
51 T. Hutchinson and N. Duncan, ‘Defining and describing what we do: doctrinal legal 
research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83. 
52 Directive 2014/23/EU; Directive 2014/24/EU; Directive 2014/25/EU. 
53 See Commission, ‘Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement 
policy: Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market’ COM (2011) 15/47. 
54 However, older research on; the purpose and changing objectives of the legislation; 
the normative use of socially driven procurement and PCP; suitable legal methodologies; 
and the economic importance of SMEs; were a vital resource to this research. 
55 Case C-31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v State of the Netherlands, [1988] ECR 4635; 
Case C-243/89 Commission v Denmark ("Storebaelt") [1993] ECR I-3353, para 33; Case 
C-87/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, para 54; Case C-225/98 
Commission v France (“Nord-pas-de-Calais”) [2000] ECR I-7445; Case C-513/99 
Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsinki Kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne (“Concordia 
Buses”) [2002] ECR I-7213; Case C-448/01, EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v Austria 
(“EVN”) [2003] ECR I-14527. 
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tendering issues, such as the acceptance of late tenders, abnormally low 
tenders, award and selection criteria.56 The majority of these judgments 
improve our understanding of the provisions of the Directives and clarify 
contracting authorities’ responsibilities in upholding the principles of non-
discrimination, proportionality, equal treatment and transparency. These 
clarifications will ultimately improve contracting authorities’ compliance 
with the rules, thus encouraging a competitive public market. However, 
the majority of the case law does not directly answer the research question 
asked. There is a limited number of public procurement judgments in 
Ireland compared with Northern Ireland. While the number of cases has 
been steadily increasing since 2009, 57 the judgments do not significantly 
shape our understanding of the use of social criteria.  
4.6 In the Field 
4.6.1 Surveys 
While the research used surveys to gauge the Irish public procurement 
landscape, these results are not used to answer the research question. The 
survey findings were relied on to assist in the identification of the legal 
measures used in the case study investigations. One of the key benefits of 
using large scale surveys is their abilities to generalise data findings.58  
Two large-scale surveys were conducted in partnership with Dublin City 
University (DCU) Business School, the National Procurement Service 
(NPS) and the OGP from 2014 - 2015.59 The survey was distributed using 
                                                                                      
56 See; Scott and Others v. Belfast Education and Library Board NICh D, Weatherup J, 
(2007);  
McLaughlin & Harvey Ltd. v Department of Finance and Personnel (No 2) [2008] NIQB 
91 (QBD, Deeny J, 11 September 2008) (Affirmed by NI Court of Appeal, 26 September 
2011 [2011] NICA 60);  
Resource (NI) Limited v Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunal Service [2011] NIQB 
121; 
 Easycoach Limited v Department of Regional Development (Northern Irish High Court, 
McCloskey J, 28 February 2012);  
RPS Consulting Engineers Limited v Kildare County Council [2016] IEHC 113; 
Sanofi Pasteur v Health Service Executive [2018] IEHC 566;  
Word Perfect Translation Services Limited v The Minister for Public Expenditure and 
Reform (No.3) [2018] IECA 156. 
57 Since the implementation of Directive 2007/66/EC (‘Remedies Directive’). 
58 D. De Vaus, ‘Surveys in social research.’ (Routledge, 2013). 
59 The findings of the survey were openly shared with the INTERREG 4A research team 
in DCU. There were many objectives of the survey including; to baseline current 
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Survey Monkey to approximately 70,000 suppliers and 4,000 public 
sector procurers registered on www.etenders.gov.ie. Responses were 
gathered over a four-week period, during this time, registered users were 
contacted on two separate occasions. The 2014 survey was conducted over 
one month, from 9th December 2013 to 7th January 2014. 5897 suppliers 
and 338 public purchasers responded to the survey. While the 2015 survey 
questions mirror the questions included in the 2014 survey, the survey was 
conducted over a significantly longer period of time. The 2015 survey was 
conducted from 1st December 2014 to 23rd February 2015. 4747 suppliers 
and 552 public purchasers responded to the survey.  
As this research commenced in January 2014, the 2014 survey results 
were used to identify a suitable research methodology. The 2015 survey 
results did not have a direct impact on the identification of which SME 
measures should be studied in the case studies. The 2015 survey was used 
as a controlling survey to identify any outliers and anomalies in the early 
survey. The survey questions are listed in Appendices E and F. The 2014 
supplier survey included 37 questions, and the procurer survey included 
35 questions.60 The public procurer survey included questions asking 
procurers; to indicate their average tendering practices; to indicate any 
problems they face when tendering; what the normal tendering procedures 
are used by the public body; and what measures does the public body take 
to facilitate SME participation in public contracts. The supplier survey 
asked registered suppliers to indicate; their company size; experience in 
                                                                                      
practices in public procurement from both a buyer and supplier point of view; to profile 
the individuals involved in tendering for public sector business and the firms in which 
they are employed; to profile public procurers and the public sector organisations in 
which they are employed; to establish the activities that make up the role of public 
procurers and the role of tenderers; to gauge the level of interaction and engagement 
between public procurers and suppliers; to establish the means through which public 
procurers advertise their contracts as well as the evaluation procedures used for the award 
of contracts; to identify how suppliers source public sector contracts and to examine the 
typical contract value they aim to win; to assess the implementation of Department of 
Finance Circular 10/2010 guidelines aimed at facilitating SME access to public 
procurement; to determine the key motivators for suppliers attempting to win public 
sector contracts and the factors that impede them in doing so;  and to scrutinise the impact 
of EU Directives on public procurement practice in Ireland from both a supplier and a 
buyer perspective. 
60 Some survey questions were common to both groups, and some survey questions were 
particular to either procurers or suppliers. 
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tendering for public contracts; the problems facing suppliers when bidding 
for public contracts; and the measures used to support suppliers in bidding 
for public contracts.61 The percentage completion rate for suppliers was 
75% and for public procurers 68%. Survey data is stored by DCU Business 
School and will be destroyed in compliance with the University’s internal 
data management rules. 
 
4.6.2 Semi-structured interviews 
18 semi-structured interviews were conducted with contracting 
authorities, policy advisors and SMEs.62 Each interview lasted between 
one to two hours and was conducted in person or by phone.63 There were 
a number of objectives to carrying out the research interviews including; 
to gain an insight into the regular procurement procedures of a contracting 
authority; to understand why and how public procurers include social 
criteria in public contracts; and to understand what impact the inclusion 
of social criteria has on SME participation. 
Several research questions were prepared in advance and emailed to the 
interviewees prior to the interview.64 However, as the interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured manner, it was difficult to predict how an 
interviewee was going to respond. The researcher was required to 
improvise during the interviews to ask relevant and appropriate follow-up 
                                                                                      
61 The following key books and journal articles were consulted prior to the design of the 
survey method and questions. See; D.A. Dillman, ‘Mail and telephone surveys: The total 
design method’ (New York: Wiley. Volume 19, 1987); F.J. Fowler, ‘Improving survey 
questions: Design and evaluation’ (Sage, 1995) 38; S.E. Gaddis, ‘How to design online 
surveys’ (1998) 52(6) Training & Development 67; J.R. Evans and A. Mathur, ‘The value 
of online surveys’ (2005) 15(2) Internet research 195; V.M. Sue and L.A. Ritter, 
‘Conducting online surveys’ (Sage, 2012). 
62 Appendix D lists the names of all of the interviewees. 
63 Site interviews were mainly carried out with the public procurers and phone interviews 
were conducted with suppliers. 
64 A mix of open and closed questions were used to gauge a deep understanding of the 
interviewees tendering actions and motivations. The following key book was consulted 
prior to the design of the interview questions. See; N.M. Bradburn, S. Sudman, E. Blair, 
W. Locander, C. Miles, E. Singer and C. Stocking, ‘Improving interview method and 
questionnaire design: Response effects to threatening questions in survey research’ (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass; 1979) A copy of the interview questions is listed in Appendices 
B and C. 
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questions. The fluidity of this approach allowed the researcher to gain an 
insight into the operational elements and constraints of the reviewed 
procurement competitions. A list of the interviewee questions is listed in 
Appendix B and C. 
For three out of the four case studies, the researcher had access to the call 
for competition documents for the reviewed contract prior to the 
interviews.65 However, the award of the National Children’s Hospital’s 
construction contract was delayed, and the first research interview took 
place without reviewing the contract documents. Follow up interviews 
took place after the researcher received information on the concluded 
contracts. Interviews with SMEs took place after work commenced on the 
project.66 SMEs were interviewed on their tendering experience and on 
their overall experience of working on the public contract. Unfortunately, 
the interviewee did not have access to interview the unsuccessful 
tenderers. 
The semi-formal interviews yielded the most insightful information, 
helping the researcher to understand the important role trained and 
dedicated public sector employees play in implementing change in the 
public sector. One of the research findings acknowledges the important 
role people play in implementing strategic public procurement.67 The 
interviewees detailed how they achieved changes to procurement practices 
during a time where public money was constrained, and there was a 
growing requirement to use standardised procurement documents and 
contracts or to purchase from centralised framework agreements. 
4.6.3 Field Notes and Sequential Analysis 
Becker and Geer’s ‘sequential analysis’ calls for researchers to conduct 
preliminary analysis during the research gathering stages to develop 
                                                                                      
65 This information is freely available on national advertising platforms. 
66 The research waited until any challenges were presented and dealt with by the public 
bodies. To assess the practical implications of subcontractor considerations, it was 
appropriate to let the contract commence before interviewing the winning bidders. 
67 This finding in discussed in detail in Chapter 9: Conclusions and Discussions. 
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working hypotheses.68 The continuous checking of data against the 
researcher’s interpretation of the results deepens and broadens the 
researcher’s understanding of the studied topic. The data gathered was 
analysed throughout the doctoral studies. The survey findings were 
analysed before the case studies were selected. The findings were used to 
identify which SME measures should be studied in the case studies. 
Additionally, follow-up semi-structured interviews were carried out post 
reflection of provisional case study findings. The follow-up interviews 
were required not only to follow up on the contract performance, but the 
interviews provided the researcher with the opportunity to ask questions 
that were missed, misunderstood or misinterpreted during the first round 
of interviews. 
4.7 Reflexivity 
Alongside the sequential analysis of the data, the researcher was required 
to reflex on her own perspectives, assumptions and key choices.69 To 
prevent subjectivity skewing the framing of the research questions and 
data collection, the researcher followed the ethical procedures set out by 
Maynooth University’s ethical protocols. Data collection tools were 
continuously reviewed to remove any bias in the research questions.70 
Ethical protocols and consent information is listed in Appendix G. 
 
4.8 Analysis 
 
4.8.1 Qualitative 
Interviews were either recorded on a digital audio recorder or notes were 
taken for review, depending on the preference of the interviewee.  
Permission was sought from the procuring officers to include their name 
                                                                                      
68 HS Becker and B. Geer, ‘Participant observation: the analysis of qualitative field data. 
In: Burgess RG, editor. Field research: a sourcebook and field manual.’ (London: Allen 
and Unwin; 1982). 
69 See R. Whipp, ‘Qualitative methods: technique or size?’ (1998) Researching the world 
of work: Strategies and methods in studying industrial relations 51. 
70 As suggested by R.Whipp. See (n 69). 
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and their organisation name in the thesis and research dissemination 
publications, such as academic journal articles, presentations and teaching 
case studies. However, permission was not sought to include transcripts 
in the thesis itself. Commercially sensitive information was discussed in 
each of the semi-structured interviews.71 The survey responses were 
stored on Survey Monkey and analysed using Microsoft Excel. As the 
survey was conducted in partnership with DCU and the Office of 
Government Procurement (OGP), the researcher did not retain ownership 
of the data, nor was the researcher responsible for storing the data. The 
data is retained and managed by DCU and the OGP.  
4.9 Limitations and Exclusions of the study 
 
4.9.1 Exclusion of Services of General Economic Interest 
This research focuses on assessing the impact of the inclusion of social 
criteria in public contracts as defined by the Directive. A public contract 
exists when a pecuniary interest is concluded in writing between one or 
more suppliers with one or more public bodies.72 The Directive sets out 
provisions on how contracting authorities and entities may purchase 
works, supplies and services contracts. The scope of the definition of 
works contracts extends to building and civil engineering contracts, 
supplies contracts extend to contracts for the purchase of supplies and 
services contracts extend to contracts for advertising, property 
management, cleaning, management consultancy, financial and ICT 
related services.73 This research is not concerned with the Services of 
General Economic Interest (SGEI) or hybrid-forms of SGEIs.74 SGEIs are 
services required by the State which the private sector does not fully 
provide, such as social housing or healthcare provisions.75 Such forms of 
                                                                                      
71 Confidential information discussed included procurers marking schemes, suppliers 
tendered costs, information around suppliers’ products and services developments. 
72 Public Sector Directive, art 2(1). 
73 Public Sector Directive, art 2(1). This is not an exhaustive list.  
74 See Commission, ‘A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2011) 900 final. 
75 See also, Commission, ‘Guide to the application of the European Union rules on state 
aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, 
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contracts may fall outside the remit of the Directive. This research is 
interested in the facilitation of SMEs in public services, supplies or works 
contracts which are governed by the procurement rules. PCP contracts 
generally fall outside the remit of the rules; however, a full tender 
competition may follow the completion of the PCP stage. 
4.9.2 State aid  
Similarly, the research does not extend its discussion to review State Aid. 
A 2016 press release from the Commission helps us understand the 
sometimes-blurred lines between public procurement and state aid. The 
statement concluded: ‘If public authorities buy goods or services through 
tenders, which respect EU rules on public procurement, this is in principle 
sufficient to ensure that the transaction is free of State Aid.’76 The National 
Children’s Hospital and the Buy Social case studies fully applied and 
complied with the applicable implementing rules on public procurement. 
The two low-value case studies were not required to follow the applicable 
implementing rules on public procurement.77  
However, the authorities procured the services on the back of competitive 
tender procedures which respected the fundamental principles of 
transparency, equal treatment, non-discrimination and proportionality. It 
can, therefore, be concluded that the contracts reviewed were free of State 
Aid.78 The primary objective of State Aid rules is to prevent 
protectionism; the contracts reviewed generated cross-border trade.79 The 
contracts reviewed were not set-aside for SMEs and measures included in 
the contracts did not favour locally based companies. The Smart Cities 
case studies explicitly state they were not engaging with State Aid 
activities. In the most simplistic terms, the competitions did not constitute 
                                                                                      
and in particular to social services of general interest.’ (Staff Working Paper) SWD 
(2013) 53 final/2. 
76 See Commission. ‘State aid: Commission clarifies scope of EU State aid rules to 
facilitate public investment’ (Press Release) 19 May 2016. Available at; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1782_en.htm Last accessed 27th May 2019. 
77 The contracts had an estimated value which fall far below the EU advertising 
thresholds. 
78 See Commission (2016) (n 76). 
79 See Commission, ‘Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (2016) OJ C 262. 
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as State Aid as the contracting authorities bought the services at market 
prices, the competitions were conducted openly, and importantly the 
contracting authorities do not enjoy exclusive use of the developed 
products and services.80 
4.9.3 Sheltered Workshops 
Originally, the research had considered reviewing the use of sheltered 
workshops alongside the use of community benefit clauses, lots, 
subcontractor protection considerations and PCP procedures. The research 
accepts that Article 20 of the Directive is an important tool for assisting 
social enterprises in accessing public contracts.81 The article permits 
contracting authorities to reserve certain public contracts for certain 
sheltered workshops and economic operators. Contracting authorities may 
reserve the right to participate in a public contract competition to sheltered 
workshops and economic operators whose primary operating purpose is 
the integration of disabled or disadvantaged persons. Alternatively, 
contracting authorities may provide for such contracts to be performed in 
the context of sheltered employment programmes, where at least 30% of 
the employees of the workshop or economic operator are disabled or 
disadvantaged workers.82  
Permissible operators must fulfil the following conditions; its objective is 
the pursuit of a public service mission linked to the delivery of the 
services; its profits are reinvested to achieve the organisation’s objectives; 
the ownership or management structure are based on employee ownership 
or participatory principles or require the active participation of employees 
or stakeholders; the organisation has not been awarded a services 
                                                                                      
80 This was made explicitly clear in Smart Belfast call for competition notice. (T107 
SBRI FAQ) This will be discussed further in Chapter 8 Smart Belfast. 
81 Public Sector Directive, art 20 allows contracting authorities to set-aside certain 
contracts for sheltered workshops or economic operators which aim to promote the long-
term employment of disabled and disadvantaged persons. See also; Case C-70/95 
Sodemare [1997] ECR 1-03395; Case C-113/13 Spezzino [2014] pub. electr. 
EU:2014:2440. 
82 Public Sector Directive, art 20. 
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contracted by the contracting authority pursuant to the Directive within 
the last three years.  
A fifth case study on the use of reserving contracts was carried out but 
was eventually removed from the thesis as there was little comparative 
material to use to assess the findings. The case study explored a 
procurement procedure used to procure a catering and café management 
contract for a new law building in the National University of Galway 
(NUIG). The building was funded by philanthropic means and is used to 
host community-driven institutes and disability law courses.83 Two 
interviews were conducted with one public sector employee and managing 
director of the awardee company for this case study. The purpose of the 
interview with the public sector employee was to discuss how the 
tendering procedure was chosen and managed.84 The interviewee noted 
that the procuring team and staff of the building collectively analysed 
three different procurement options.85 Firstly, the team considered 
procuring a commercially driven contract. However, they dismissed this 
idea on the grounds that it did not meet the ethos of the building. Secondly, 
the team considered procuring the services of an existing catering 
company on campus and asking the company to ensure that 50% of their 
employees were classified as persons with disabilities, this approach was 
overly complicated and appeared in conflict with procurement rules. 
Thirdly, the team considered and adopted an approach to set the contract 
aside for a sheltered workshop. A social enterprise was awarded the 
contract after a competitive procedure and managed the contract until 
summer 2018. It appears that the approach of setting the contract aside 
was beneficial and acceptable for the team, the team recently commenced 
a new competition for another sheltered workshop. A team member who 
                                                                                      
83 This information was obtained in an interview with Charlotte May-Simera, Researcher 
in NUI Galway (By phone, 8th August 2016). 
84  Interview with Charlotte May-Simera. See (n 83). 
85 Interview with Charlotte May-Simera. See (n 83). 
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was involved in the decision to set aside the contract was interviewed as 
part of the thesis research is August 2016.86  The interviewee stated; 
the café has had a massive impact. It has changed the feeling of the 
building; it is the heart of the building, people of the café are part 
of the community.87 
Since the research for the thesis was gathered, there has been further use 
of set-aside contracts in Ireland. The Irish Prison Service (IPS) has 
appointed a ‘Social Enterprise Manager’, and the IPS is currently 
conducting market soundings for the use of a set-aside contract.88 This is 
undoubtedly an important development and will be researched fully 
outside of this thesis. However, the research relies on this brief case study 
to put forward the argument that social enterprise participation is 
encouraged through the use of Article 20 of the Directive. 
4.10 Conclusion 
The research benefitted from adopting a mixed-method socio-legal 
approach. The survey findings shaped the direction and selection of the 
case study choices. The case studies offered valuable insights into the 
practical implications of pursuing socially-driven and innovative 
procurement procedures in both above and below threshold contracts. The 
data gathered was used to develop the working hypothesis; the research 
concludes that the use of lots, use of community benefit clauses, use of 
subcontractor considerations and the use of PCP facilitates SME 
participation. 
 
 
                                                                                      
86 Interview with Michael Smyth, Managing Director of the awardee company ‘Saol 
Café’(By phone, 11th August 2016). 
87 Interview with Michael Smyth. See (n 86). 
88 Interview with Siobhan Cafferty, Social Enterprise Project Manager, Irish Prison 
Service (By phone 19th December 2018). 
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Chapter Five National Children’s Hospital Case Study 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This case study examines the €1.7 billion works contract for the 
construction of the New Children’s Hospital in Dublin 8.1 The hospital 
has yet to be named and will hereinafter be referred to as the ‘NCH’.2 
Three forms of social criteria were contained in the request for tender 
documentation and replicated in the contract performance clauses. The 
purpose of this case study is to scrutinise the impact the criteria has on 
SME engagement, namely the impact of the division of the contract into 
smaller lots, the use of community benefit clauses and subcontractor 
protection criteria. To understand the rationale for the development of the 
socially conscious procurement procedure, the chapter opens with a 
discussion on the development of the favourable climate for societal 
change. Economic recovery and construction sector growth in contrast 
with prolonged poverty levels in the hospital locality and the outstanding 
need to provide a contemporary national paediatric hospital created a 
favourable environment for the adoption of socially responsible 
procurement practices.3 The chapter continues by reviewing the individual 
criteria included in the tender documents and assesses the impact they are 
having on SME participation at different stages of the procurement cycle. 
In summary, the use of subcontractor voluntary considerations is having a 
direct and verifiable impact on SME participation in the supply-chain. In 
                                                                                      
1 This estimate was accurate as of 27th June 2019. See J. Bray, ‘Children’s hospital costs 
to have ‘real implications’ for health service for years to come. Inside Politics: We could 
find ourselves in a position where we might need to borrow billions.’ The Irish Times. 
27th June 2019. 
2 See O. Kelly, ‘New children’s hospital faces legal action over ‘Phoenix’ name 
Arizona hospital warns Dublin hospital not to leverage ‘our name and goodwill’’ The 
Irish Times 6th December 2017. 
3 During the financial crisis, contracting authorities resorted to purchasing on the basis 
of cost-efficient criteria. See R. Hyman, ‘Social dialogue and industrial relations during 
the economic crisis: Innovative practices or business as usual?’ (Geneva: ILO, 2010); 
B.G. Peters, J. Pierre and T. Randma-Liiv, ‘Global financial crisis, public administration 
and governance: Do new problems require new solutions?’ (2011) 11(1) Public 
Organization Review 13. 
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contrast, the community benefit clause and use of lots did not create a 
pathway for the facilitation of small business participation in the works 
contract. The concluding section of the chapter offers an analysis of the 
verifiable research findings.  
5.2 Background to the design of socially conscious public 
procurement contracts 
Original political intentions to build a national paediatric hospital can be 
traced back to the late 1980s as plans to modernise the ageing national 
Temple Street Children’s hospital failed to come into fruition.4 In 1999, 
plans to construct a €300 million hospital on the grounds of the Mater 
Misericordiae University Hospital in Dublin were introduced.5 Forward 
onto 2006, no construction contracts for the hospital had been concluded, 
and a new National Paediatric Hospital Development Board (NPHDB) 
was established with the responsibility of amalgamating the three existing 
children’s hospitals into one national hospital of expertise.6 Initial public 
contracts for the design of the hospital were awarded with a plan to 
complete the construction of the hospital in 2012. However, planning 
permission for the hospital was refused in February 2012 and plans were 
once more delayed.7 Post completion of expert reviews, it was decided 
that the new hospital would be located on the St. James’s hospital site in 
Dublin 8. The reasoning for co-locating the new Children’s Hospital with 
St. James’s Hospital was based on the findings of leading independent 
reports.8  
The ‘National Model of Care 2015’ called for the building of a new 
national children’s hospital to effectively deal with the contemporary 
                                                                                      
4 Seanad Deb. 4th October 1988. Adjournment Matter. Temple Street Hospital, Dublin.  
5 See Phibsborough Local Area Plan Key Site Framework Strategy (2015) Chapter 6. p. 
62. 
6 See more on the Board’s membership and functions here; https://health.gov.ie/national-
paediatric-hospital-development-board/ Last accessed 9th March 2019. 
7 For detailed reasons as to why planning permission was denied see; P. Melia, ‘Height 
was the main reason that planners refused permission for the proposed National 
Children's Hospital in Dublin: National’ (Independent News & Media, Dublin, 2012) 
8 See the Bristol Inquiry into paediatric cardiac surgery in the UK 2001; Scottish review 
of paediatric services 2004; the McKinsey Report, “Children’s Health First” (2006); The 
Mollis (Queensland) Review 2006; Independent Review Group established by the 
Minister for Health 2011 and Dolphin Review Group 2012. 
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paediatric health care needs which are not currently being met by the 
current three separate paediatric services offered in Dublin.9 The new 
hospital will amalgamate the three current paediatric hospitals on one 
single campus on St. James’s Hospital grounds. The Children’s Hospital 
Group (CHG) and the NPHDB will monitor and oversee the merging of 
the three hospitals into one singular unit. Additionally, the hospital will 
operate in conjunction with two satellite centres at Tallaght Hospital and 
Connolly Hospital in Blanchardstown. The two satellite centres will 
operate as urgent care units where consultancy-led emergency care will be 
provided.10  
While the hospital is located in the centre of medical excellence in Ireland, 
it is important to understand the socio-economic reality of the location. 
The hospital is located in Dublin 8 which comprises of; Dolphin’s Barn, 
Inchicore, Islandbridge, Kilmainham, Merchants Quay, Portobello, South 
Circular Road, the Phoenix Parks and the Liberties. These areas 
experience high levels of crime, drug use and unemployment. The 
construction and operation of the hospital have the potential to transform 
the area by improving employment rates, thus reducing the number of 
people living in poverty.11  
These regions fall within two Garda districts, the North Central DMR and 
the South Central DMR. The Garda Recorded Crime Statistics 2010-2014 
indicate that two districts experience some of the highest recorded 
controlled drug offences, and theft and burglary offences in the State. The 
North Central DMR has the highest level of controlled drug offences in 
the country.12 The two divisions experience the highest levels of recorded 
                                                                                      
9 See National Model of Care (2015). 
https://www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/cspd/ncps/paediatrics-neonatology/moc/ Last 
accessed 11th March 2019. 
10 See the National Children’s Hospital’s Clinical Vision  (2015).; 
http://www.newchildrenshospital.ie/clinical-vision/delivering-the-right-care-in-the-
right-place-at-the-right-time-by-the-right-staff/ Last accessed 11th March 2019. 
11 See NCH ‘Harnessing the Potential – Report’ (2015). 
http://www.newchildrenshospital.ie/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/20151029-
Community-Benefit-Study-issued.pdf Last accessed 11th March 2019. 
12 The following figures were obtained from the Garda Recorded Crime Statistics (2018). 
218 
 
theft and related offences13 and the highest levels of recorded attempts or 
threats to murder, assaults, harassment and related offences.14  
These findings have been confirmed by studies conducted by independent 
institutions, public bodies and academic studies. The 2015 CSO ‘Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions’ noted that the consistent poverty rate 
for the entire Dublin region was 7.4%.15 The Dublin Dashboard collates 
data from Dublin City Council (DCC), Dublinked, Central Statistics 
Office (CSO), Eurostat and public-sector bodies. It was developed by the 
Programmable City Project and the All-Island Research Observatory 
(AIRO) at Maynooth University and is managed in partnership with DCC. 
Recent Dashboard data indicates that there has been a recorded increase 
across the Dublin area in the following offences; theft and related 
offences, public order and other social code offences, burglary and related 
offences, and sexual offences.16 Drug-use is also a prevalent problem for 
the city. A 12-month prospective study conducted by the Dublin 
ambulance services examined the number and location of opioid overdose 
(‘OD’) incidents among drug users in the city. The research studied the 
relationship between OD incidents with urban deprivation and the 
presence of addiction services. The study found that within one year there 
                                                                                      
13 The recorded figure for the South Central DMR was 9390 and the North Central DMR 
was 7651. See Garda Recorded Crime Statistics (n 12) 
14 The recorded figure for the South Central (SC) DMR was 932 and the North Central 
(NC) DMR was 797.  
Additionally, the two areas experience some of the highest rates in; 
‘robbery, extortion and hijacking offences’. (SC DMR; 395 / NC DMR; 342) 
‘burglary and related offences’ (SC DMR; 1766 / NC DMR; 1112) 
‘fraud, deception and related offences’ (SC DMR; 505 / NC DMR; 368) 
‘weapons and explosive offences’ (SC DMR; 225 / NC DMR; 214) 
‘damage to property and to the environment’ (SC DMR; 1433 / NC DMR; 1521) 
The two areas experience the highest levels of; 
‘public order and other social code offences’ (SC DMR; 2956 / NC DMR; 1803) 
‘offences against the government, justice procedures and organisations of crime’ (SC 
DMR; 159 / NC DMR; 3231) 
See Garda Recorded Crime Statistics (n 12). 
15 See CSO ‘Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC)’ Statistical Release (2018). 
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/silc/surveyonincomeandlivingconditio
ns2015/ Last accessed 17th March 2019. 
16 See Dublin Dashboard and AIRO Recorded Crime Monitoring Tool (2016). 
http://www.dublindashboard.ie/pages/DublinMapped_1 Last accessed 17th March 2019. 
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were 469 overdoses, the majority of which (86%) were concentrated in 
the city centre.17  
The tendered value of the hospital construction contract was €1 billion. 
This figure has risen to €1.7 billion, making it the most expensive public 
contract in Ireland.18 It is therefore imperative that there is a clear trickle-
down and significant impact of the spend in this area.19 The areas 
surrounding the hospital have been let down by successive political 
promises of social support. In 2017, the International Federation for 
Human Rights (FIDH) lodged a complaint to the European Committee of 
Social Rights requesting the Committee to find that Ireland was not in 
conformity with Articles 11,20 16,21 1722 and 3023 alone or in conjunction 
with Article E24 of the revised European Social Charter. The FIDH alleged 
that the State has failed to incorporate these provisions within the national 
housing legal, policy and administrative framework. It was argued that 
some local authorities violated the provisions in terms of the adequacy, 
habitability and suitability of allocated social housing.  
Furthermore, the FIDH argued that the regeneration programmes of the 
social housing estates violate the housing rights set out in the Charter. The 
Committee declared the complaint admissible on the 17th March 2015, and 
it is currently under examination. The FIDH logged the complaint on 
behalf of 130,000 residents living in 20 run-down housing complexes in 
inner-city Dublin and Limerick.25 The residents complained of 
                                                                                      
17 J. Klimas, M. O'Reilly, M. Egan, H. Tobin and G. Bury, ‘Urban overdose hotspots: a 
12-month prospective study in Dublin ambulance services’ (2014) 32(10) American 
Journal of Emergency Medicine 1168. 
18 The current estimate cost of the construction contract is €1.7 billion. See J. Bray (n 1). 
19 In terms of employment growth and wider economic stability. 
20 European Social Charter, article 11-1 The right to protection of health. 
21 European Social Charter, article 16 The right of the family to social, legal and 
economic protection. 
22 European Social Charter, article 17 The right of children and young persons to social, 
legal and economic protection. 
23 European Social Charter, article 30 The right to protection against poverty and social 
exclusion. 
24 European Social Charter article E Non-discrimination. 
25 See; European Committee of Social Rights, International Federation for Human 
Rights (FIDH) v. Ireland Complaint No. 110/2014. Decision of admissibility 17th March 
2015. 
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experiencing sewage problems, persistent leaks, harmful damp and 
mould. Some of the residents live in close proximity to the New Hospital, 
including residents from Dolphin’s House and St. Theresa’s Gardens.26  
DCC adopted a Regeneration Plan for Dolphin's House in August 2014; 
however, due to the budget deficits, the plan was only approved by the 
then Minister for Housing Simon Coveney in July 2016.27 The €16mn 
regeneration plan involves the development of 72 flats and the 
reconfiguration of three existing blocks to make 63 larger apartments. 
Work has commenced and is ongoing. Dolphin House and Park will 
remain to be Dublin’s largest public housing flat complex. The most 
recent figures estimate that 853 people live in the complex are 
characterised as being ‘highly disadvantaged’.28 It is estimated that 36% 
of the children living in the area do not progress beyond primary school; 
the national figure is 11%. There are high levels of youth unemployment, 
drug use and anti-social behaviour in the area. However, there are no 
independent statistics made available to reinforce these beliefs.29  
On a more positive note, there is a vibrant, supportive community, who 
are unwavering in their attempts to fight for the survival and regeneration 
of the flats and houses. The Dolphin House Community Development 
Association advocates for the improvement of the sub-standard housing 
and co-ordinates a number of community development services. The 
services include the Dolphin Community Employment Scheme,30 the 
Health Project Community Worker,31 Management of the Community 
                                                                                      
26 See (n 25). 
27 See O. Kelly, ‘€26m regeneration of 100 homes at Dolphin House complex is 
completed dilapidated. 1950s Dublin estate had persistent damp, mould and sewage 
problem’ The Irish Times (16th November 2018). 
28 See St. Teresa’s Gardens Regeneration Board, ‘Strategic Plan 2018 – 2021’ (August 
2018); See also; A. Dermody, C. Gardner, M. Quigley and P. Isard, ‘The People Make 
the Place, A Research Report to Inform the Social Regeneration of Dolphin House 
Estate’ (2014). 
29 See Dublin City Council, ‘St. Teresa’s Gardens Regeneration Programme update’ 
(2015). See also (n 28). 
30 For further information see; https://www.dolphinhouse.ie/cep/ Last accessed 17th June 
2019. 
31 See; https://www.dolphinhouse.ie/healthinitiative/ Last accessed 17th June 2019. 
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Centre,32 Computer and IT Training,33 and Community and Family 
Activities.34  
The area is also home to a diverse number of micro-enterprises, social 
enterprises and charities, some of whom are very welcoming of the 
addition of the hospital to the area. Aoife Carragher, owner of Reilly’s 
Pharmacy, Thomas Street, Dublin 8 stated; 
…as a business owner and resident of Dublin 8, I’m a huge supporter 
of the development of the new children’s hospital on a shared campus 
with St James’s Hospital. Dublin 8 is a wonderful area to work and live 
in, but it would benefit enormously from this kind of investment. I have 
no doubt that a development of this scale would result in a much-
needed regeneration for the wider community.35 
The largest construction contract is taking place in the heart of a deprived 
area of Dublin, and it is essential for this research to understand and trace 
the economic and social impact this expenditure will have on the local 
area. This is recognised by all stakeholders in the area. Kerrill Thornhill, 
managing director of MedicaleGuides in the Liberties’ Digital Hub further 
noted that; 
The new children’s hospital is the most significant capital investment 
project ever undertaken in healthcare in Ireland and businesses in 
Dublin 8 stand to gain a lot from the fact that it is being developed in 
our community. We are very cognisant of the potential for the 
development of a ‘technology corridor’ in close proximity to a major 
healthcare campus.36 
                                                                                      
32 See; https://www.dolphinhouse.ie/dhcda/ Last accessed 17th June 2019. 
33 See; https://www.dolphinhouse.ie/digitalproject/ Last accessed 17th June 2019. 
34 See; https://www.dolphinhouse.ie/familysupport/ Last accessed 17th June 2019. 
35 Testimonial from Aoife Carragher, owner of Reilly’s Pharmacy, Thomas Street, 
Dublin 8. Cited on the National Children’s Hospital website; 
http://www.newchildrenshospital.ie/ Last accessed 17th June 2019. 
36 Testimonial from Kerrill Thornhill, managing director of MedicaleGuides in the 
Liberties’ Digital Hub, an IT company that develops innovative software solutions for 
the health sector. Cited on the National Children’s Hospital website; 
http://www.newchildrenshospital.ie/ Last accessed 17th June 2019. 
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Four semi-structured interviews were conducted with the key procuring 
staff from 2016 – 2018 to assess the impact of the use of social criteria. 
Additionally, the social criteria provisions included in the call for 
competition and subsequent contractual performance clauses and 
conditions were scrutinised. The remainder of the chapter will offer a 
summary of the social criteria and assess the current impact on SME 
participation. 
5.3 Request for Tender for the Construction of a New National 
Paediatric Hospital  
 
5.3.1 Description of the project 
There are two boards responsible for the management of the NCH, the 
NPHDB is responsible for the design, build and construction of the 
hospital and the Children’s Board is responsible for bringing together the 
three existing hospitals.37 The design team was appointed in August 2014 
and planning permission was sought in April 2015. The first ‘enabling’ 
contract was awarded in August 2016,38 planning permission for the 
construction contract was approved in April 2017 and work commenced 
in August 2017. Construction of the hospital is due to be completed by 
2022. Considering the time-frame of the previous failed attempts to build 
the hospital, the Director for Project Management and Project Controls 
noted that the process appears to ‘have come a long way in a very short 
period of time, it reflects the efforts and commitment of the team to make 
this a success.’39 While the design and construction plans were completed 
relatively quickly, the NPHDB were very conscious off and ‘did address 
in the early stages the economic and social contribution of such a big 
spend’40 and what impact this would have on the local community and 
surrounding areas.41 The hospital board and the community were in 
                                                                                      
37 The three existing hospitals include; Our Lady’s Children Hospital, Temple Street, and 
the National Children’s Hospital, Tallaght. 
38 The enabling contract consisted of the demolition of existing buildings on the site and 
preparing the site for construction.  
39 Interview with Richard Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management and Project 
Controls, NPHDB (Dublin, Ireland, 10th June 2017). 
40 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
41 See NCH Harnessing the Potential (n 11). 
223 
 
support of including socially conscious practices from the outset. Some of 
the core design team had previously worked on large construction projects 
across Europe which incorporated social criteria. The community was 
instrumental in lobbying for the inclusion of social criteria.42 The team, 
the community activists and the regeneration policy creators are all fully 
supportive in delivering sustainable benefits from the construction 
contract. A ‘principle of collaboration and engagement’ underpins the 
foundation of the works contract.43 This extends to developing an active 
relationship with the contractor and with the whole supply chain. The 
Project Manager is the Chair of Construction Ireland Association and he 
recognises that the sector as a whole needs to change and is demonstrating 
a willingness to adopt more efficient and socially conscious practices to 
deliver better outcomes. The Project Manager further recognised that ‘this 
project could be an exemplar for the industry’ a standard which public 
bodies could base their future works projects on.44  
During the planning stage, the Community Benefit Programme Manager 
(CBPM) was responsible for identifying current socially responsible 
public procurement practices in the construction industry. The CBPM 
identified works contracts which trialled and pioneered social benefit 
clauses. The CBPM spent time with Scottish procurers and in Northern 
Ireland with the ‘Buy Social’ team.45 Once the research was completed, 
the CBPM identified the main opportunities and constraints for the NCH. 
At this time, the levels of unemployment were high in the State and in the 
area of Dublin 8.46 A core concern at this point was improving 
employment levels in the community. Assistance was sought from 
Richard MacFarlene, a procurement consultant who assisted in the 
                                                                                      
42 B. Checkoway, ‘Six strategies of community change’ (1995) 30(1) Community 
Development Journal 2; T. Bovaird, ‘Beyond engagement and participation: User and 
community coproduction of public services’ (2007) 67(5) Public administration review 
846. 
43 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
44 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
45 The Buy Social team assist Northern Ireland procurers in implementing social benefits 
in public works and services contract. This will be discussed further in Chapter 6 Buy 
Social Case Study. 
46 See NCH Harnessing the Potential (n 11) The report notes that approximately half of 
the electoral divisions in the vicinity of the hospital are classified as disadvantaged. 
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drafting of the wording of the clause.47 MacFarlene also assisted with the 
drafting of the NI Buy Social community benefit clauses. The wording of 
the two clauses is very similar with minor alterations.48  
Even though there was support from all stakeholders in promoting social 
engagement, views were divided on how this should be achieved. Initially, 
the NPHDB resisted the inclusion of a mandatory clause into the 
procurement process and the public contract. The CBPM was faced with 
questions on whether it would have been more beneficial to include the 
social benefit objective into a hospital or procurement ‘charter’ or a 
‘blanket paragraph’ in the tender documents. Arguments in support of a 
voluntary regime would argue that this approach has the potential to reap 
high levels of compliance with low levels of administrative burden and 
costs for suppliers and procurers.49 However, voluntary regimes cannot 
guarantee compliance with stated provisions, whereas mandatory 
provisions offer legal guarantees in relation to compliance with the 
contract conditions.50  
Revell and Blackburn,51 Studer et al.52 and Williamson et al.53 argue that 
SMEs will only comply with non-economic criteria if they are obliged to 
                                                                                      
47 R. MacFarlene is a leading private consultant who specialises in designing and 
evaluating social benefit clauses in public procurement. Interview with Ingrid McElroy 
Community Benefit Programme Manager, National Paediatric Hospital Development 
Board Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management and Project Controls (Dublin, 
Ireland, 18th July 2016). 
48 Replication of best practices is identified as an effective mechanism for implementing 
change in public sector operations. See A. De Wit, ‘Measurement of project success’ 
(1988) 6(3) International Journal of Project Management 164.; T. Entwistle and S. 
Martin, ‘From competition to collaboration in public service delivery: A new agenda for 
research’ (2005) 83(1) Public Administration 233. 
49 L. Senden, ‘Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in European Law: Where 
Do They Meet?’ (2005) 9(1) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law. 
50 Y Fassin, ‘SMEs and the fallacy of formalizing CSR’ (2008) 17(4) Business Ethics: A 
European Review 364. 
51 A. Revell and R. Blackburn, ‘The business case for sustainability? An examination of 
small firms in the UK's construction and restaurant sectors’ (2007) 16(6) Business 
Strategy and the Environment 404. 
52 S. Studer, R. Welford, P. Hills, ‘Drivers and barriers to engaging small and medium-
sized companies in voluntary environmental initiatives’ (2005) The University of Hong 
Kong Working Paper, November. 
53 D. Williamson, G. Lynch-Wood, and J. Ramsay, ‘Drivers of environmental behaviour 
in manufacturing SMEs and the implications for CSR’ (2006) 67(3) Journal of Business 
Ethics 317. 
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do so. Walker and Preuss offer a further element to this discussion, 
asserting the companies including SMEs will view socially responsible 
criteria as ‘commercial’ requirements, if they do not accept the tender 
conditions they will not win the contract or gain entry to the supply 
chain.54 As this contract was of significant value, presumably it was going 
to generate competitive bids from a small number of large well-
established construction companies, which may have interpreted the 
social clauses as commercial requirements.55  
To ensure maximum compliance with the social benefit ethos of the 
hospital, the board and procurement team decided to include a mandatory 
targeted recruitment and training community benefit clause. The clause 
targets new-entrant employees as this reflected the economic landscape in 
2014 - 2015. Secondly, the procurement documents include a number of 
voluntary subcontractor protection considerations and used partial lots for 
mixed associated public contracts. This research examined the clauses and 
considerations relating to community benefits, subcontractor 
considerations and division of the contract into lots.  
5.3.2 Lots 
Separate lots were used, mechanical and electrical contracts were awarded 
separately. The largest lot was for the construction of the hospital. 
Importantly, the social criteria equally apply to the separate lots.56 The 
value of the individual lots is described as ‘significant’, the research does 
not have access to these figures.57 The lots were not used to encourage 
SME participation. The lots represent the various complex elements of the 
contract.58 
                                                                                      
54 H. Walker and L. Preuss, ‘Fostering sustainability through sourcing from small 
businesses: public sector perspectives’ (2008) 16(15) Journal of Cleaner Production 
1600. 
55 G.L. Albano and M. Sparro, ‘Flexible Strategies for Centralized Public Procurement’ 
(2010) 1(2) Review of Economics and Institutions. 
56 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). This 
includes both the community benefit clauses and the subcontractor considerations. 
57 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
58 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
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5.3.3 Community Benefit Clauses  
A mandatory community benefit clause was included as a tender award 
criterion and a subsequent contract performance clause. The decision to 
include community benefit clauses was based on the findings of the 
independent report ‘Harnessing the potential: Maximising the community 
benefit from the New Children’s Hospital.’59 Secondly, the decision to 
include the community benefit clauses was made to ensure compliance 
with government policies on supporting sustainable economic 
development, namely the ‘Action Plan for Jobs’ and the ‘Planning Policy 
Statement 2015.’ The community benefit clause fundamentally requires 
the winning tenderer to employ a minimum number of ‘new entrant 
employees or trainees’ over the life-cycle of the contract. Alongside 
policy goals, the local community lobbied for the inclusion of employment 
promotion clauses and warmly welcomed the NPHDB’s commitment to 
including mandated requirements. A community stakeholder, Joe 
Donohoe, Project Manager of the Fatima Groups United noted that; 
The inclusion of Social Benefit Clauses as a conditional part of the 
public procurement process, is not an insignificant contract. [clause] 
It includes training elements with local schools and pathways to 
employment. Real and sustainable jobs are the only way to break 
poverty and the hospital offers employment opportunities during 
construction and when construction is completed. 60 
The clause aims to promote employment and appropriate training 
opportunities to young people under the age of 25 who are struggling to 
gain long-term employment.61 The clause states that;  
                                                                                      
59  See NCH Harnessing the Potential (n 11) The NPHDP’s primary justification for 
including the employment-based clauses was based on statistics of the local population 
living in and near the vicinity of the hospital. Over 50% of the local electoral divisions 
are classified as areas of disadvantage. 
60 Testimonial from Joe Donohoe, Fatima Groups United Project Manager. Cited on the 
National Children’s Hospital website; http://www.newchildrenshospital.ie/ Last 
accessed 20th March 2019. 
61 Request for Tender, clause 2.2. 
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…a minimum of xxx-person weeks of employment to be provided for 
‘new entrant employees / trainees’ that have an employment, 
apprenticeship or trainee contract with the contractor or a 
subcontractor, where a person week is the equivalent of one person 
employed for five days either on site, or through a mix of on-site work 
and off-site ‘training’.62  
The clause continues to define three different types of new entrant 
employees or trainees. It firstly defines a person who is leaving or has 
within the last 12 months left an educational establishment or a training 
provider. This definition extends to students who have completed paid 
work placements.63 Secondly, the definition extends to young people who 
are under the age of 25 and who have not worked in the construction sector 
for more than 52 weeks and are actively seeking employment that includes 
on or off-site training and assessment.64 The third classification covers 
persons aged 25 or over who have been registered as a job-seeker for more 
than 52 weeks and are actively seeking employment, which must include 
on-site training.65 Additionally, this option is open to existing ‘new entrant 
trainees’ who may have previously been employed by the contractor and 
are now seeking a fully new position to complete their new entrant period 
of employment.  
The ‘new position’ requirement is essential to prevent fraudulent 
behaviour.66 The clause was additionally included in the enabling part of 
the contract.67 If the contractor wishes to avail of this option, they must 
produce an evidentiary document to the NPHDB to verify that the 
previous new entrant employment had genuinely ended. This requirement 
                                                                                      
62 Request for Tender, clause 2.2 The exact amount of person weeks was not made 
available. 
63 Interview with Ingrid McElroy, Community Benefit Programme Manager, National 
Paediatric Hospital Development Board Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management 
and Project Controls (Dublin, Ireland, 10th June 2016). 
64 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
65 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
66 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
67 The purpose of the enabling contractor was to get the site ready for construction, it 
required demolition of St. James’s hospital buildings and removal of waste. It is 
important to note that this contract was concluded through a separate tender, not an 
individual lot.  Both contracts were awarded to BAM Construction Ltd. 
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will curb contractors from dismissing current trainees, with the plans to 
subsequently hire the ex-employees to comply with the community 
benefit requirements.68 A fourth classification includes apprentices who 
are registered with a recognised apprenticeship provider. This 
classification extends to professional trainees that are registered with a 
professional body or with an educational institute. However, the clause 
prohibits the contractor from employing more than 50% of new entrant 
employees or trainees person-weeks requirement from the apprenticeships 
and professional trainees’ classification.69 The winning contractor is 
required to notify the NPHDB of each new entrant employee or trainee 
vacancy.70  
Importantly, the community benefit clause outlines a procedural 
implementation plan. There is a requirement to register each new entrant 
employee and trainee with the CBPM. The new employee must be 
provided with the relevant training and accreditation for the tasks they are 
expected to perform. The contractor is required to facilitate these training 
opportunities by offering flexible working arrangements. New employees 
should additionally be offered support with numeracy, literacy and 
information technology if required, to further support the trainees 
                                                                                      
68 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63) See also; R. 
Macfarlane and M. Cook, ‘The Scottish Government: Community Benefits in Public 
Procurement: a Report Demonstrating the Methodology for Including Targeted 
Recruitment and Training Clauses in Public Sector Contracts’ (2008) Scottish 
Government; V. Sutherland, A. McTier, A. Glass and A. McGregor, ‘Analysis of the 
impact and value of community benefit clauses in procurement’ (University of Glasgow, 
eprints, 2015). 
69 Community benefit clauses should embody an element of flexibility, particularly for 
long-term contracts. The clauses should reflect socio-economic challenges; for example, 
if these clauses were designed in 2019, the apprenticeship requirement might be 
increased as this is reflective of the current market. There is a shortage of apprenticeships 
in the country. The Higher Education Authority has recently adopted policy promoting 
the use of apprenticeships in the private sector. See Higher Education Authority, 
‘Apprenticeship – Real-Life Learning. Developing a National Apprenticeship 
Handbook’. May 2017. Available at; http://hea.ie/assets/uploads/2017/06/Developing-a-
National-Apprenticeship-Handbook.pdf Last accessed 25th April 2019. 
70 Monitoring of use and compliance with the clause is one of the key instruments used 
to ensure compliance with non-standard provisions. V Sutherland, A McTier, A Glass, 
A McGregor, ‘Analysis of the impact and value of community 
benefit clauses in procurement’ Training and Employment Research Unit (University of 
Glasgow, eprints, 2015). 
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effectively completing the required training for the post.71 The contractor 
is solely responsible for the training and accreditation costs.72 A second 
essential element of the community benefit clause is the requirement to 
offer unpaid work experience and industry placements; 
…a minimum of xxx weeks of unwaged placement opportunities and 
industry placements across a range of disciplines and across a range 
of skill levels must be made available when requested by the NPHDB 
or an agency named by the NPHDB for this purpose and mentoring 
and support provided. 
Additionally, the main contractor and its subcontractors are required to 
notify the NPHDB and the named agencies of vacancies for skilled and 
experienced workers. The primary goal of this requirement is to maximise 
possible recruitment from the employment agencies named by the 
NPHDB. It also stretches the onus of the implementation of the 
community benefit clause from solely the main contractor to the 
subcontractor. Each member of the supply chain is responsible for 
ensuring compliance with the social requirements. Within four weeks of 
the contract being signed, the main contractor was required to produce a 
‘detailed workforce forecast’ with time-framed projections of all future 
employment positions.73  
When designing the social criteria, the procurers spoke with 
representatives from the OGP and Grangegorman, building on their 
experiences, success and failures of using socially responsible public 
procurement.74 The NHPDB did consider including penalties for failure 
to comply with the social requirements, however, ultimately this was not 
included on the basis that it was subjective in nature and was in conflict 
                                                                                      
71 This clause does not state how this element should be achieved. The CBPM and the 
main contractor will need to develop this requirement further over the life-cycle of the 
contract. As this contract is ongoing, it is difficult to assess to what extent the contractor 
will comply with this requirement. There are no penalties imposed for non-compliance. 
It will be interesting in future years to assess the effectiveness of this provision. 
72 Request for Tender, clause 2.3 Unpaid work experience and industry placements. 
73 Request for Tender, clause 2.5. 
74 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (18th July 2016). 
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with the community ‘buy-in’ nature of the clause.75 It was acknowledged 
that the clauses were ‘well received by the tenderers.’76  The OGP was 
uncertain if the social criteria should be marked and weighted in the award 
stage of the competition.77  
Initially, the criteria were contained in the appendices of earlier demolition 
contracts preceding the large construction contract, the use of social 
criteria was new to both the procurer and tenderers at this stage. There was 
a recognition that the quality of understanding and commitment to the 
criteria greatly improved post completion of the initial enabling contract.78 
Building on the success of the initial contract, the procurers included the 
community benefit clause as an award criterion. The NPHDB contend that 
the social criteria are an ‘integral part of the contract’79 and this was 
respected and acknowledged by the tenderers which integrated the 
requirements into the entirety of the tender submissions.80 The procuring 
team believe that the use of pre-market engagement activities and media 
exposure highlighting the long-term benefits of the use of social criteria 
motivated tenderers to structure and design their tender responses in a 
socially conscious manner.81 Most of the bids were described as 
innovative and detailed, reflecting the suppliers understanding of the long-
term impact of the spend in the local area.82 
A technical assistance panel was established to evaluate the bids. A ‘most 
economically advantageous award’ criteria was used. In the end, there 
was no weighting attached to the criteria. The technical assistance panel 
                                                                                      
75 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
76 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
77 In general, the OGP has demonstrated limited support for the use of social clauses in 
public contracts. The exception to this is the social procurement information note 
published in late December 2018. See Office of Government Procurement Social 
Considerations in Public Procurement. OGP. (2018). Accessible at this link; 
https://ogp.gov.ie/information-notes/ Last accessed 16th May 2019. 
78 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
79 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
80 This finding supports arguments raised by Piga and Tátrai, that tenderers will view 
social criteria as normal commercial practices. See G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public 
procurement policy’ (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon;New York, NY, 2015). 
81 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
82 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
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reviewed the social dimension of contract in isolation and reported back 
to the procurement evaluation team on the merits and demerits of the bids. 
The mandatory clauses were awarded on a pass or fail basis.83A goal of 
the research is to assess what impact the inclusion of these criteria has on 
SME participation in the procurement process. Current literature suggests 
that the inclusion of community benefit clauses facilitates social enterprise 
participation in large-scale works contracts but hinders for-profit SMEs 
from participating in public contracts.84 Findings will be discussed in 
section 5.4.  
 
5.3.4 Subcontractor Considerations 
Secondly, the NPHDB prioritise developing a sustainable supply chain by 
encouraging the main contractor to subcontract with SMEs and social 
enterprises. A number of voluntary social considerations were included in 
the tender award criteria and subsequent works contract. The 
considerations are not binding in nature.85 The main contractor was tasked 
with two primary goals; firstly, to participate in a market consultation 
event and to secondly assist and support small businesses in gaining access 
to the supply chain.86 Whilst the contract does not set any specific targets, 
it sets stipulations. In relation to the first goal, a ‘supply chain 
opportunities’ consideration requested the contractor to host a ‘Meet the 
Buyer’ event in Dublin 8 within four weeks of contract commencement. 
A Meet the Buyer event is a form of pre-market engagement. The main 
contractor meets with interested economic operators to inform them of 
                                                                                      
83 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39) 
However, a combined weighting mark was applied to a ‘contract delivery’ criteria, a sub-
section of this criteria assessed how each tenderer planned to manage supply-chains. 
84 D. Baden, I. Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The effects of procurement policies on 
‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: Content-analytic insights into the 
views and actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 29(3) International Small Business 
259; M. Loosemore, ‘Building a new third construction sector through social enterprise’ 
(2015) 33(9) Construction Management and Economics 724. 
85 Request for Tender, section 3. 
86 Request for Tender, section 3.  
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potential future subcontracts.87 The purpose of requiring the main 
contractor to host the networking events is to encourage a trickle-down 
effect, which would see the inclusion of SMEs in the supply chain.88  
The main contractor is encouraged to work with SMEs and social 
enterprises. The voluntary clause requests the main contractor to ‘engage 
positively with potential suppliers’ to identify and keep a note of micro-
businesses, which would not necessarily meet the professional and 
financial requirements to bid for government contracts, but have the 
potential to complete small elements or lots of the construction contract 
over the two years.89 The contractor is encouraged to work with the 
identified companies to offer them advice on how to prepare their 
businesses to compete for any potential subcontracts effectively. This is a 
novel approach, the NPHDB is essentially asking the prime contractor to 
mentor and offer tendering advice and support to micro-enterprises, which 
will most likely be small private and social businesses from the area who 
registered their interest to work with the contractor at the Meet the Buyer 
events.90  
It could be argued that this not as a responsible practice, that it is not 
economically or socially sensible to monitor and control the supply chain 
in this manner.91 It could further be argued that such requirements violate 
the fundamental principles which underpin procurement law by requiring 
the winning contractor to engage in locally centred activities.92 However, 
the procurement board have clearly outlined and maintained that the 
contract is not driven by economic objectives alone. The board have 
                                                                                      
87 For a wider discussion on the use of supplier engagement activities. See A.K. Cecil 
and J. Sperstad, ‘Investigating the Hosted-Buyer Model From the Buyer Perspective: An 
Exploratory Study’ (2015) 16(4) Journal of Convention & Event Tourism 298. 
88 A. Flynn and P. Davis, ‘Investigating the effect of tendering capabilities on SME 
activity and performance in public contract competitions’ (2017) 35(4) International 
Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 449. 
89 Request for Tender, section 3. 
90 We will discuss this further in section 5.5.3. 
91 M.J. Shockro, ‘An antitrust analysis of the relationship between prime contractors and 
their subcontractors under a government contract’ (1982) 51(4) Antitrust Law Journal. 
725; A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Public procurement and the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) 353. 
92 A. Sánchez Graells (n 91) 353. 
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incorporated clear and specific social objectives into the contractual 
performance clauses, which are related to the subject matter of the contract 
and support local policy goals.93  
The hospital is to be built for a significant sum of money in a deprived 
area of Dublin. The socio-sustainable elements of the project were 
designed in line with local and national policy, and the considerations are 
not implemented in a mandatory manner. Additionally, the practices do 
not exclude companies from other areas of Ireland, Europe or the world 
from expressing an interest in subcontracting or from participating in the 
networking events.94 The ‘mentoring’ element of the request, falls more 
in line with pre-market engagement techniques, the contractor is requested 
to inform potentially interested companies of future opportunities and to 
offer insightful hints and tips on how to submit a successful tender.95 
These forms of pre-market consultations are conducted regularly and 
openly by both private and public-sector purchases.96 It is actively 
encouraged in the preamble of the Directives and through the use of 
‘Buyer Profiles’ and ‘Prior Indicative Notices’ (‘PINs’) on the OJEU 
Tenders Electronic Daily website.97  
                                                                                      
93 See NCH Harnessing the Potential (n 11); Office of Government Procurement, 
‘National Public Procurement Framework’ Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods 
and Services.’ (2017) Version 1; St. Teresa’s Gardens Regeneration Board, ‘Strategic 
Plan 2018 – 2021’ (August 2018); See also; A. Dermody, C. Gardner, M. Quigley and 
P. Isard, ‘The People Make the Place, A Research Report to Inform the Social 
Regeneration of Dolphin House Estate’ (2014). 
94 The call for competition notice was advertised widely and the contracting authority 
hosted information events about the contract in the UK. See Interview with the Director 
for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
95 Under normal procurement conditions, this requirement might be considered excessive 
and going beyond the main subject-matter of the contract. However, this contract is of 
significant and growing financial value,  and it is underpinned by policies requiring the 
procurement spend to support sustainable growth in the impoverished area. Additionally, 
it is of benefit to the main contractor to foster a competitive supply-chain. As the 
considerations are voluntary in nature, they are not violating public procurement rules. 
There are no sanctions applicable for non-compliance with this consideration. 
96 In fact, the main contractor carries out these activities as part of their normal business 
operations. 
97 The Buyer Profile is an option available to contracting authorities who would like to 
keep the market informed of future potential opportunities. The buyer profile includes 
general information about the contracting authority together with information on ongoing 
invitations to tender, scheduled purchases, contracts concluded, and procedures 
cancelled. Prior Information Notices are an indication notice to the market of a 
forthcoming procurement The Directive sets out the content of a Prior Information Notice 
and refers to the standard format that must be used. This standard format is published by 
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The CBPM and the main contractor are tasked with trying to maximise 
the local supply chain.98  The word ‘trying’ is important here, the research 
sought to understand whether the contractor was in support of the 
voluntary request.99  The NPHDB’s decision to include the supply chain 
opportunities considerations as voluntary requests over a mandatory 
approach was based on the underpinning construction principles of 
‘collaboration and engagement’.100 The NPHDB wanted to build a 
flexible and integrated relationship with the contractor. The team 
recognise that one of the key elements to the successful operation of both 
of the social criteria, the community benefit clause and the sub-contractor 
considerations, is the monitoring and evaluation of the contractors’ 
performance.101   
 
5.4 Research Findings 
The main construction contract was award to BAM Ireland. The company 
is not an SME, BAM Ireland is a ‘wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Netherlands’ Royal BAM Group.102 BAM Ireland is one of the largest 
multinational construction businesses operating in the state. The 
company’s estimated turnover for 2018 was €550 million.103 Work 
                                                                                      
the European Commission on its website at www.simap.europa.eu. The format is the 
same for all types of contracts. See Public Sector Directive, art 48. 
98 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
Request for tender documentation, section 3. 
99 Unfortunately, the researcher was unable to interview a representative from the main 
contractor. Numerous attempts were made; however it was not possible due to the timing 
of the research, complications with the finalisation of the work and a delay in the 
appointment of a community-benefit co-ordinator. The contract is still in its infancy, 
major elements of the contract have not been commenced. The researcher hopes to 
continue researching this area post-submission of the thesis and plans to request to 
interview the contractor again when the works have progressed further. 
100 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39) 
101 V Sutherland, A McTier, A Glass, A McGregor, ‘Analysis of the impact and value of 
community benefit clauses in procurement’ Training and Employment Research Unit 
(TERU) (University of Glasgow, eprints, 2015); A. Edman and  P. Nohrstedt,  ‘No 
Socially Responsible Public Procurement without Monitoring the Contract Conditions’ 
(2017) 12 Eur. Procurement & Pub. Private Partnership L. Rev 352. 
102 BAM Ireland refers to itself as ‘the largest multinational construction business 
operating nationally with expertise and experience in the delivery of many of Ireland’s 
flagship infrastructural and building projects.’ See https://www.bamireland.ie/ Last 
accessed 4th February 2019. 
103 See BAM Ireland’s published financial statements; 
https://www.bamireland.ie/about/financials/ Last accessed 4th February 2019. 
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commenced on the project in August 2017 and is ongoing. The purpose of 
this case study is to examine what impact the inclusion of the use of lots, 
community benefit clauses and subcontractor protection considerations 
had on SME participation. This case study examines a works contract, and 
as such, it does not include a PCP element.  
5.5.1 Use of Lots Findings 
The use of lots was the first measure assessed. The research did not detect 
any evidence that the use of the lots encouraged SMEs to tender for the 
contract. There are several straightforward reasons for this result. The 
value, workload and speciality required for each of the lots would have 
deterred SMEs from bidding for the contract. The Director for Project 
Management and Project Controls suggested that due to the extremely 
specialised nature of the lots, SMEs would find it difficult to partner with 
enough entities to meet the qualification criteria.104  This finding confirms 
Trybus’s scepticism that the use of lots in large-scale contracts does not 
effectively meet the desired objective of promoting SME participation.105 
Trybus concludes that the number and size of lots determine the success 
of SME participation.106 SMEs benefit the most when contracts are 
divided into many (more than 10) small lots, and in cases where tenderers 
are prohibited from winning all advertised lots.107  
5.5.2 Use of Community Benefit Clauses Findings 
The second provision assessed, the use of community benefit clauses, did 
not facilitate SME participation in the public contract. A targeted 
                                                                                      
104 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). The 
Request for tender documentation, section 3 reiterated the importance of Recital 32, 
summarising that the lots should not be used in circumstances where they would render 
the execution of the contract excessively difficult or expensive. 
105 M. Trybus, ‘The Promotion of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Public 
Procurement: a Strategic Objective of the New Public Sector Directive?’ in F. Lichère, 
R. Caranta and S. Treumer (eds.), ‘Modernising Public Procurement: The New 
Directive’ (Djøf: Copenhagen, 2014) 255. See also; C. Nicholas and M. Fruhmann, 
‘Small and medium-sized enterprises policies in public procurement: time for a rethink?’ 
(2014) 14(3) Journal of Public Procurement 328. 
106 M. Trybus, ‘The Division of Public Contracts into Lots under Directive 2014/24: 
Minimum Harmonisation and Impact on SMEs in Public Procurement?’ (2018) 43(3) 
European Law Review 313. 
107 Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo and Zana, ‘Division into Lots and Competition in 
Procurement.’ Ch. 7 in Handbook of Procurement (2006) 168. 
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recruitment and training clause was included as an award criterion in the 
tender stage and was subsequently included as a contractual performance 
clause. The social benefit clause aims to promote pathways to long-term 
employment for new entrant employees.108  
As this research did not have access to the bids submitted by unsuccessful 
tenderers, the research does not help us understand whether the inclusion 
of the clause impacted the tenderer’s decision to submit a bid.109 Nor do 
these case study findings improve our understanding as to whether the 
inclusion of social criteria increases tender prices, thus inadvertently 
disadvantaging SMEs from participating in competitions. Thus, the results 
do not agree or disagree with arguments raised by Sánchez Graells on the 
competitive restriction of community benefit clauses.110 Nor do the results 
support arguments raised by Walker and Preuss contending that such 
clauses are deemed as ‘commercial’ requirements which do not have a 
significant impact on costs.111  
While the community benefit clause did not facilitate SME participation 
at the tendering stage, SMEs may have to comply with the requirements 
in the supply chain. The clauses are proportionately applied to 
subcontracts.112 SMEs can improve their chances of winning subcontracts 
by demonstrating an ability or willingness to meet the social requirements.  
SMEs may already be engaging in this area without labelling it as such, 
SMEs employ and train apprentices and offer work placements to trainees 
and school goers.113 It might be beneficial for SMEs to formalise their 
existing socially sustainable practices or agree upon new goals in an 
                                                                                      
108 Request for Tender, clause 2.2. 
109 This information is not freely made available. Contracting authorities are only 
required to publish the name of the preferred bidder. See Directive 2007/66/EC, art 2(a) 
110 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Public procurement and the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2015). 
111 H. Walker and L. Preuss, ‘Fostering sustainability through sourcing from small 
businesses: public sector perspectives’ (2008) 16(15) Journal of Cleaner Production 
1600 See also; V Sutherland, A McTier, A Glass, A McGregor, ‘Analysis of the impact 
and value of community benefit clauses in procurement’ Training and Employment 
Research Unit (TERU) (University of Glasgow, eprints, 2015). 
112 Request for Tender, section 3. 
113 F. Perrini, A. Russo and A. Tencati, ‘CSR strategies of SMEs and large firms. 
Evidence from Italy’ (2007) 74(3) Journal of Business Ethics 285. 
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internal charter of ethics to improve their chances of winning 
subcontracts.114 One of the unsuccessful tenderers in this case study 
implemented a new internal social policy to reflect the demands set out in 
this contract, this may help the economic operator in competing for future 
contracts which include community benefit clauses.115  
On a separate note, the main contractor is meeting the employment targets. 
At the time of writing, there were no updated figures on how many people 
were employed by the contractor. However, the contractor was 
successfully able to demonstrate that they exceeded the target set in the 
enabling contracts. As these contracts did not require a large workforce, 
there were on average 32 employees on-site daily, the targeted recruitment 
and training clause reflected this reality. A minimum of 126 person weeks 
of employment were to be provided for the enabling contract. The 
contractor provided for 147 employment person weeks throughout the 
contract, and this resulted in four new full-time employment positions 
being created accounting for 10% of the workforce.116 The new positions 
included an engineer’s assistant,117 a site manager,118 and two general 
operators.119 These positions were carried over onto the main construction 
contract, and the four people were still employed at the time of the 
publication of the most recent monitoring report.120  
An interesting finding of the research is the recent use of sheltered 
workshops. The sheltered workshop provision was relied on to procure a 
social enterprise to provide in-house catering and cleaning services.121 
Two additional people have since been employed and are receiving 
                                                                                      
114 K.R. Webb, ‘Voluntary codes: private governance, the public interest and 
innovation.’ (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science and Environment, Carleton 
University, 2004). 
115 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
116 These results were gathered and published by the Community Benefit Programme 
Manager and the main contractor. (n 63). Currently unavailable online. 
117 As of February 2018, this employee had been employed for 50 weeks. (See n 116). 
118 As of February 2018, this employee had been employed for 49 weeks. (See n 116). 
119 As of February 2018, these employees have been employed for 28 and 20 weeks 
successively. See (n 116). 
120 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
121 Public Authority Regulation, reg 20; Interview with the Community Benefit 
Programme Manager (Dublin, 3rd August 2018). 
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training to assist them in finding long-term employment elsewhere. Local 
SMEs are benefitting from other sections of the hospital construction 
project. One local community partnership was awarded a cleaning 
contract for the NPHDB and the NCH’s administrative offices, to date, 
this has resulted in the employment of two additional employees.122 
 
5.5.3 Subcontractor Considerations Findings 
The third provision assessed the use of subcontractor considerations. Non-
binding conditions were included in the tender award and contract 
performance stages which request the main contractor to consider 
including SMEs in the supply chain. The contractor was requested to host 
a Meet the Buyer market consultation event and to assist suppliers in 
obtaining the minimum standards or needs required to enter the supply 
chain and to trial small volumes of work with micro-enterprises.123 BAM 
Ireland has participated in two Meet the Buyer Events, one local event in 
October 2016 and one national Enterprise Ireland event in September 
2017. An estimated 128 companies from around the country attended the 
events.124 This was done in partnership with the NPHDB who identified 
suitable organisations, the identified groups included SMEs and social 
enterprises based in the proximity of the construction site.125  
While there was no requirement placed on the contractor to work with the 
identified companies, the clause states that the contractor ‘shall engage 
positively with potential suppliers and subcontractors’ identified at the 
Meet the Buyer event.126 Furthermore, the contractor was requested to 
undertake assessments of the potential subcontractors’ capability and to 
identify any additional standards suppliers needed to obtain to enter the 
supply chain. To further encourager smaller entities participation, the 
                                                                                      
122 Presumably there were no incumbent concerns, including TUPE issues, here as the 
contract was for cleaning services in a new building for the new development unit. 
123 Request for tender, section 3. 
124 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121). 
125 Request for Tender, section 3.1. 
126 Request for Tender, section 3.2. 
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contractor was requested to assist potential suppliers in obtaining these 
requirements and standards and was asked to design trial work packages 
or set aside small supply volumes of work for micro-enterprises, thus 
giving the small businesses a chance to prove their capabilities to bid for 
larger sub-contracts.127 The procurers did not want this provision to be 
exploited by the contractor and requested that the entities recruited to work 
on the trial basis were appointed on terms that are comparable with other 
subcontractors.128  
The procurers actively monitor the use of subcontractors. BAM Ireland is 
required to record the percentages of contracts awarded to subcontractors, 
ensuring that all subcontractors observe any applicable obligations in the 
fields of environmental, social and labour law.129 To date, BAM Ireland 
has only published subcontracting information for the enabling contract. 
93% of all subcontracts were awarded to SMEs, 32% of all goods and 
services subcontracts were awarded to companies based in Dublin 8 and 
12.130 This included the awarding of subcontracts to local micro-
enterprises based in the area to erect hoarding and to provide salvage 
facilities.131  
A business directory was generated by the  CBPM as there was a delay in 
the recruitment of BAM Ireland’s project social coordinator.132 
Communication from the NPHDB and BAM Ireland is made available on 
the directory, informing interested parties of development updates and 
future work plans. This is not a contract advertising site. However, it does 
include a business ‘search’ facility, whereby BAM Ireland can identify 
potential subcontractors. Local community groups and business support 
networks such as Dublin South City Partnership, SJH Lamp Project, 
                                                                                      
127 Request for Tender, section 3.2. 
128 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121). 
129 In compliance with Public Authority Regulation, art 71. 
130 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121). 
131 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121). 
132 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121). 
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Liberties Business Forum and Canals Business Network have access to 
the Directory.133  
Sánchez Graells’s arguments on the anti-competitive nature of social 
procurement would suggest that these conditions are curbing the main 
contractors purchasing power and discretion.134 If these clauses were 
introduced in a mandatory manner, it could be argued that such restrictions 
would violate the fundamental principles, curbing market competition, 
thus limiting taxpayers’ value for money.135 However, these clauses are 
voluntary in nature. No minimum requirements were set. Contracting 
authorities can encourage the main contractor to subcontract with SMEs. 
However, the contracting authority is not permitted to require bidders at 
the tendering stage to conclude partnership agreements with proposed 
subcontractors.136  
Trybus argues that SMEs do not want to enter the public market as sub-
contractors as they feel squeezed by larger companies.137 This concern 
raises the question should contracting authorities assist SMEs entering the 
supply chain in large contracts. In this case study, the contract is complex, 
expensive, and bespoke, which ultimately restricts SMEs from entering 
the competition as a single provider and makes it difficult for SMEs to 
tender as part of a consortium. Subcontracting is the only route for SMEs 
to access the contract.138 Voluntary considerations have resulted in the 
development of a business directory, the hosting of a Meet the Buyer event 
                                                                                      
133 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121). 
134 A. Sanchez Graells, ‘Truly competitive public procurement as a Europe 2020 lever: 
what role for the principle of competition in moderating horizontal policies?’ (2016) 
22(2) European Public Law 377. 
135 See Case C-249/81 Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982]; Case C-113/13 Spezzino 
[2014] pub. electr. EU:2014:2440. 
136 Case C-234/14 Ostas celtnieks SIA v Talsu novada pasvaldiba [2016] pub. electr. 
EU:C:2016:6 (ECJ); Case C-406/14 Wrocław - Miasto na prawach powiatu [2015] pub. 
electr. EU:C:2015:761 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpsto. 
137 M. Trybus, ‘The Promotion of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Public 
Procurement: a Strategic Objective of the New Public Sector Directive?’ in F. Lichère, 
R. Caranta and S. Treumer (eds.), ‘Modernising Public Procurement: The New 
Directive’ (Djøf: Copenhagen, 2014) 255. 
138 K. Loader, ‘Is public procurement a successful small business support policy? A 
review of the evidence’ (2013) 31(1) Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy 39. 
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and the appointment of a Community Benefits Officer. BAM Ireland has 
estimated that €500,000 of goods and services contracts have been 
subcontracted to companies based in Dublin alone.139  
Commitment by the NPHDB has been evident during the contract 
performance stage. The NPHDB, along with a procuring manager from 
St. James’s Hospital, participated in a social enterprise site visit organised 
by the Irish Social Enterprise Network. The purpose of the event was to 
investigate the feasibility of including social enterprise friendly practices 
in future procurement competitions. Six social enterprises were given ten 
minutes to present their companies services and supplies.140  
Alongside, the promotion of SMEs in the supply chain and the plans to 
maximise employment and training opportunities, the NPHDB has an 
additional social priority theme; ‘raising aspirations through 
education.’141 In achieving these aims, the NPHDB has hosted Career 
Days for local secondary schools and colleges of further education. 28 
teachers and 246 students attended the events. Additionally, the NPHDB 
are in the process of designing a nursing and healthcare programme and 
will soon deliver a six-week innovative engineer-driven education 
programme for students.142 As this contract is a long-term contract, the 
NPHDB are assisting in creating a trained and engaged future employment 
pool which will assist the contractor in achieving the targets set out in the 
community benefit clause.143 
It should be noted that the considerations were implemented in a voluntary 
manner.144 The main contractor cannot be penalised for lack of 
                                                                                      
139 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121). 
140 The researcher participated in this event. 
141 See NCH Harnessing the Potential (n 11). 
142 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121) Further 
supporting the Department of Education’s STEM Education Policy Statement (2017–
2026). 
143 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121) This indicates 
that the contracting authority is genuinely engaged in developing a sustainable supply 
chain. 
144 Note, the targeted recruitment and training clauses are mandatory in nature. Request 
for tender, section 2. 
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compliance with the requirements. One argument against the use of 
voluntary clauses suggests that contractors have limited reasons to engage 
fully and comply with the social objectives of the contract.145 Anand 
suggests contract performance auditors will not be motivated to check 
compliance of the clause as there are no penalties attached for non-
compliance.146 However, if the procurement board had adopted a 
mandatory social regime, this may have resulted in legal challenges on the 
anti-competitiveness of the measure and may have increased additional 
administrative and monitoring costs.147  
Research on the use of socially driven criteria argues that socially 
responsible practices are not achieved through legislation and are 
alternatively driven by commercial practices. Holmlund and Kock148 and 
Spence149 contend that social criteria are led by large organisations who 
are in a position to impose standards in the supply chain. This is evident 
by BAM Ireland’s commitment to other socially driven goals, such as 
schools-engagement programme. It seems that public sector buying 
preferences will motivate large companies to implement socially and 
environmentally responsible operational measures.150 Spence further 
argues that sustainable supply-chains and operations should be based on 
open and honest partnerships, whereby both parties adopt agreed-upon 
ethical policies.151 Baden et al.’s research echo this argument and calls for 
businesses to play a more significant role in the design of social and 
                                                                                      
145 Y Fassin, ‘SMEs and the fallacy of formalizing CSR’ (2008) 17(4) Business Ethics: A 
European Review 364. 
146 A.I. Anand, ‘Voluntary vs mandatory corporate governance: Towards an optimal 
regulatory framework’ (2005) in American Law & Economics Association Annual 
Meetings 44. 
147 I Harwood and S. Humby, ‘Embedding corporate responsibility into supply: A 
snapshot of progress’ (2008) 26(3) European Management Journal 166. 
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environmental criteria.152 The NPHDB collaborated with the local 
community and key stakeholders to develop the social objectives of the 
contract.   
A voluntary approach and a commitment by the NPHDB to ‘collaborate 
and engage’ has contributed to the success of the voluntary regime. The 
procurers are determined to work towards securing a ‘lasting, sustainable 
legacy of the project.’153 The success of the design and implementation of 
social criteria is due to the commitment and dedication of the hospital 
board champions.154 They have an acute awareness of the impact the 
expenditure could potentially have on the long-term development and 
growth of the area. A senior procurement manager of the co-located St. 
James’s hospital believes that the actions being taking now will ultimately 
result in the more efficient operation of the adult A&E department.155 This 
view is based on the belief that an improvement in business growth and 
employment creation in the community will reduce the number of new 
heroin users and incidents of heroin overdoses.156  
This finding extends to other stakeholders, in particular, the community 
stakeholders. The community was involved from the very beginning and 
not only are they concerned with gaining short-term employment and 
business growth, but they are also investing in developing a sustainable 
legacy for the area.157 The community groups act as an important external 
                                                                                      
152 D. Baden, I. Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The effects of procurement policies on 
‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: Content-analytic insights into the 
views and actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 29(3) International Small Business 
259. 
153 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
154 Namely, the Director for Project Management and Project Controls and the 
Community Benefit Programme Manager. For a discussion on the importance of 
employees in change management see; T. Cooke-Davies, ‘The “real” success factors on 
projects’ (2002) 20(3) International Journal of Project Management 185. 
155 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
156 A crude analysis suggests that the more capital and employment opportunities that 
there are in the local economy is directly related to the reduction of anti-social behaviour. 
For a broader discussion on why greater economic equality not greater wealth promotes 
a more equal society see; R. Wilkinson and K. Pickett, ‘The spirit level: Why greater 
equality makes societies stronger’ (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2011). 
157 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63) The Community 
Benefit Programme Manager hosts regular strategic meetings with the key community 
stakeholders. 
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auditor and conscious compass for the hospital boards, BAM Ireland and 
their subcontractors. Their role should not be underestimated, for it is 
these stakeholders who have the most to gain from the successful 
implementation of the community benefit clauses. Gordon Jeyes, 
Independent Chairman of the Community Benefits Oversight Group, said;  
The new children’s hospital is the largest capital investment in 
healthcare in the history of the State.  Through the construction 
phase and into the operational phase, a hospital of this nature 
brings enormous activity economically and socially – to the 
community and the focus of our group is to ensure that local people 
and businesses benefit from this as much as possible.158 
Compliance monitoring with the voluntary subcontractor clause is 
exceptionally high in this contract. This appears partly due to the 
dedication and enthusiasm showed by the CBPM, who was engaged with 
the process from the beginning.159 Subcontracting voluntary measures are 
securing social value for taxpayers’ money. The flexibility of the measure 
and the relationship built between the NPHDB and the main contractor 
appear to have contributed to the success of the social consideration. If the 
success of this consideration is to be replicated by other contracting 
authorities, it would be advisable to adopt a similar voluntary approach. 
Contracting authorities should tighten the relationship between the tender 
stage and the contract performance by involving the community benefit 
co-ordinator at each stage of the procurement process.160  
5.5 Overall Impact of the Contract Award and Performance 
The combination of the different social criteria is having a positive impact 
on the local community. From the outset, BAM Ireland was supportive of 
                                                                                      
158 Testimonial from Gordon Jeyes, Independent Chairman of the Community Benefits 
Oversight Group. Cited on the National Children’s Hospital website; 
http://www.newchildrenshospital.ie/ Last accessed 17th June 2019. 
159 Although, the commitment of the CBPM and the community stakeholders does not 
entirely remove the risk of non-compliance. 
160 The CBPM is key to the success of the implementation of the community benefit 
clause and subcontractor considerations in this contract.  
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and engaged with social benefit ethos. One small individual story 
illustrates the positive impact on the local community. Before the contract 
commenced, BAM Ireland employed the first ‘new entrant’ employee. 
BAM Ireland sourced the employee, the employee was a young man 
working in Naas.161 As the person was already employed, he did not meet 
the criteria set out in the social clause. BAM Ireland asked the Board to 
consider the young man’s situation. He aspired to commence a career in 
construction and applied to undertake construction studies at third level in 
Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT). However, the young man failed to 
gain the required Central Applications Office (CAO)162 points in his 
Leaving Certificate examinations.163 He was advised to apply to a 
construction Post Leaving Certificate (PLC)164 course and to gain relevant 
work experience, once he completed this, he could apply to DIT to 
undertake the construction degree. The Board on this occasion allowed for 
the employment to count as part of the targeted recruitment requirement 
as the young man’s probabilities of returning to full-time education and 
ultimately gaining long-term employment in the construction sector were 
vastly improved by completing the work experience.165 The clause was 
designed to be flexible and allows the Board to approve potential 
employees who fall outside the exact criteria included.166  
A recruitment pathway was established by the NPHDB to assist the 
contractor in meeting the employment targets.167 BAM Ireland is 
encouraged to use the local Intreo service to advertise employment 
opportunities. Intreo offices operate under the remit of the Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection. The offices offer employment 
                                                                                      
161 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
162 The Central Applications Office processes applications for undergraduate courses in 
Irish Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). 
163 The Leaving Certificate examinations are the terminal examinations of post-primary 
education. Students are graded on a points basis for the purposes of selection into further 
education, employment, training and higher education. 
164 PLCs are normally carried on a full-time basis by a vocational school.  
165 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
166 The importance of flexibility in social criteria is emphasised in; A. McWilliams and 
D. Siegel, ‘Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective’ (2001) 26(1) 
Academy of Management Review 117. 
167 This was not a mandatory requirement. 
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and training support for job seekers and employers.168 Both the NPHDB 
and the main contractor are responsible for securing and demonstrating a 
genuine commitment to the clause. BAM Ireland is responsible for 
creating work plans and histograms estimating the probabilities of 
workplace opportunities throughout the life-cycle of the contract.169 The 
communities are responding to these predictions and are offering relevant 
training and upskilling courses to potential employees.170 The CBPM 
stated; 
…we are in a community which is disadvantaged, which does not 
have a huge history in certain areas of people finishing school let 
alone going into college, it is incredibly important that the 
contractors and we ourselves in the development board engage with 
young people and show them the opportunities that are there.171 
All stakeholders displayed a commitment to the criteria in the 
procurement process. An unsuccessful tenderer has since incorporated the 
social plan they created for the bid into their internal operations plan.172 
This highlights that there is a willingness in the construction community 
to change their work practices. This finding has also reinforced the 
NPHDB’s belief that it was ‘the right decision’ to include the clauses into 
the award criteria, but which do not include penalties for non-
compliance.173 It was shown that the provisions designed in this manner 
could ultimately change the mindset and operations of large construction 
                                                                                      
168 Further information on the Intreo system is available at this link; 
http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Intreo.aspx Last accessed 4th February 2019. 
169 Request for Tender, section 2. 
170 Information derived from the work plans and histograms is passed onto employment 
support agencies in the local communities. Interview with the Director for Project 
Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
171 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
172 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
173 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
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companies.174 The procurers rank the community benefit clauses as 
important as the physical construction work.175  
Not only were the interested economic operators and public procurers 
committed to delivering the social objectives. Local businesses and the 
community at large have openly supported the inclusion of social criteria. 
Business advisory groups offered technical supports and training to local 
businesses and potential employees on how to navigate the social 
requirements. The contracting authority did not receive any criticism from 
interested economic operators regarding the social criteria.  
Employment targets were included in the enabling contracts. The majority 
of people who expressed an interest in working on these contracts were 
long-term unemployed people, and the team is considering how they can 
facilitate entry back into the workforce in subcontracting opportunities. 
Currently, there are more opportunities for apprenticeships at this stage of 
the construction contract.176 The team are identifying potential job 
opportunities for the life-cycle of the whole contract and plan to train up 
the cohort of long-term unemployed persons to get them ready for the next 
round of expected employment opportunities. The team are also working 
with youths in the area, young people who are at the Leaving Certificate 
cycle and encouraging Junior Certificate cycle students to continue with 
their academic studies.177 This indicates that the procuring team are 
concerned with the long-term impact of the spend on the local community 
and are invested in securing long-term value for tax-payers’ money.  
While the criteria are designed to support the local communities primarily, 
they do not discriminate against potential employees on the grounds of 
                                                                                      
174 However, as already suggested, the economic operators may be beginning to view 
these clauses as commercial clauses. The operators’ willingness to adopt new social 
measures is motivated by their desire to improve their chances of bidding for public 
contracts not by a desire to achieve socially driven objectives. 
175 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
176 Higher Education Authority, ‘Apprenticeship – Real-Life Learning. Developing a 
National Apprenticeship Handbook.’ May 2017. 
177 NCH Harnessing the Potential (n 11) The independent report called for the 
contracting authority to consider the long-term impact on the citizens living near the 
hospital. 
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nationality.178 One element of the criteria aims to support vulnerable 
workers who are employed from the other EU Member States. During the 
design of the targeted recruitment and training clauses, the team was 
mindful of the significant number of EU citizens with no formal training 
and education who had been made unemployed in the state during the 
recession years and who had few prospects of gaining long-term 
employment.179 There is a protective element in this clause which requires 
the contractor to offer language and other appropriate training to unskilled 
workers. The purpose of this is to assist short-term employees and ‘at-risk’ 
employees in gaining long-term sustainable employment. When 
discussing the use of these clauses with potentially interested economic 
operators, the NPHDB framed the benefits of creating a future sustainable 
workforce for the employers.180   
The NPHDB describes the contract as being the most ‘far-reaching 
[contract] to date and is also at some points loose which allows for 
innovation.’181 While the clause does not mention anything in relation to 
gender, during the research interviews, it was mentioned that the 
procuring team expressed a desire for the clause to encourage and embed 
the practice of diverse employment practices, including the practice of 
employing and encouraging more women to enter the construction 
sector.182 This desire to leave a socially sustainable impact is also evident 
in the NPHDB’s internal operations. The board are leading by example, 
they have leased out offices in a building which has been empty for over 
eight years since.183  
                                                                                      
178 The contractor is not required to employ local people or subcontract with local SMEs. 
The contractor retains the discretion on who they employ and award subcontracts to, once 
they comply with the contractual performance clauses.  
179 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39) 
During the recession in 2009, immigrants experienced a rate of job losses close to 20%. 
Whereas, national rates at this time were 7%.  See A. Barrett and E. Kelly, ‘The impact 
of Ireland's recession on the labour market outcomes of its immigrants’ (2012) 28(1) 
European Journal of Population 91. 
180 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
181 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
182 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
183 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 121). 
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The building is in the heart of Fatima Gardens, one of the core areas 
identified in the Regeneration Project. Catering contracts have been 
concluded with a local social enterprise based close to the offices. The 
team have been able to trace the impact the contracts have had on the 
social enterprise’s growth. The contracts have resulted in the social 
enterprise employing two new members of staff. Additionally, one of the 
former employees has left to commence permanent full-time work 
elsewhere.184 The increase in revenue has also resulted in increased 
training opportunities for their workers and financial support for the local 
creche. All of which is designed to assist the community workers in 
finding long-term sustainable employment. These findings have 
reinforced the team’s belief that they are ‘doing the right thing.’185 The 
preliminary successes have encouraged the procurers to consider how they 
will conduct the procurement procedures for the operational functions of 
the hospital, with a view to including more innovative and sustainable 
practices.186  
While the social benefits of promoting education and training have 
positive economic and social benefits, this research is interested in what 
impact the use of such clauses has on SME participation. The use of the 
clause did not generate social-enterprise participation in the tendering 
stage of the contract. However, the clause may still have an impact on 
SMEs in the supply chain. There will be over one hundred varies types of 
subcontracts concluded over the life-cycle of the contract, and each 
subcontractor will have to adhere to the social requirements of the main 
contract.187  
In relation to the subcontracting considerations, there are two things which 
the procurement team must continue to consider during the contract 
                                                                                      
184 It is important to note that this is a specific objective of the social enterprise, to provide 
‘at-risk’ employees with the experience and training to commence long-term 
employment elsewhere. 
185 Interview with the Director for Project Management and Project Controls (n 39). 
186 It is unclear at this stage what impact the significant costs-overruns will have on future 
procurement competitions.  
187 Post completion of the thesis, the research plans to assess what impact the use of social 
criteria has on SME participation in the subcontracts awarded by BAM Ireland. 
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performance stage. The first being, the trickle-down affect – the 
possibility of SMEs winning a smaller slice or crumbs of the large main 
construction contract.188 This is the only pathway for SMEs to generate 
direct income from the contract, some SMEs such as local cafes and shops 
will indirectly generate income from the contract.189 Within the first six 
months of the contract commencing, 93% of all subcontracts were 
awarded to companies based in the Dublin region.190 32% of the goods 
and services contracts were awarded to SMEs based in Dublin 8 and 11.191 
Secondly, the procurement team needs to consider what impact the 
inclusion of social clauses will have on SMEs once they have been 
successfully awarded a subcontract. It will only affect SMEs which will 
have to employ new employees to carry out the contract. This is a 
limitation of the research, due to the time the thesis will be submitted it 
will not have the capacity to trace the impact the clause will have on 
subcontractors.192  
BAM Ireland, in partnership with the hospital board, hosted a local small 
Meet the Buyer event prior to the commencement of the enabling 
contracts. 23 small and micro enterprises attended the event to meet with 
BAM Ireland’s two key procuring officers. Before the event, BAM Ireland 
specified the types of contracts which will be subcontracted throughout 
the contract, and these range from stationary contracts to contracts for 
fencing around the hospital grounds.193 As a follow-up procedure, the 
NPHDB asked for feedback from the participating companies. A common 
finding from the feedback was the suppliers ‘delight’ in meeting the 
                                                                                      
188 S.C. Lenny Koh, M. Demirbag, E. Bayraktar, E. Tatoglu and S. Zaim, ‘The impact of 
supply chain management practices on performance of SMEs’ (2007) 107(1) Industrial 
Management & Data Systems 103. 
189 L. Calvano, ‘Multinational corporations and local communities: A critical analysis 
of conflict’ (2008) 82(4) Journal of Business Ethics 793. 
190 NPHDB Construction Update, February 2018. Not currently available online. 
191 These areas are located in the vicinity of the construction site. 
192 Another question that must be asked is whether or not the social clauses apply to 
contracts sub-contracted by the subcontractors, follow up research will assess the long-
term impact on the supply-chain. 
193 Intertrade Ireland assists SMES across the island of Ireland in accessing business 
opportunities and has as an overriding goal of supporting cross-border trade. Intertrade 
host cross-border ‘Meet the Buyer’ events regularly. These events are normally generic 
in nature and are attended by various procurers and suppliers. 
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procuring officers and noted that was the ‘most useful thing’ for them.194 
Suppliers are now in the position to prepare for the potential subcontracts 
which may be advertised over the coming years. This may include getting 
their businesses operational ready and conducting training on how to 
successfully prepare tender bids. BAM Ireland operates a business 
mentoring scheme and offered a place on the scheme to one of the 
companies which attended the Meet the Buyer event.195 During the tender 
planning stage, the NPHDB considered the potential role social 
enterprises could play in the construction contracts. The board decided 
that the best way that they could incorporate social enterprises into the 
contracts was to inform and educate the main contractor on the role social 
enterprises play in society.196 
5.6 Conclusion 
The construction contract for the National Children’s Hospital illustrates 
the benefits of socially-driven public procurement. The inclusion of the 
community benefit clause has successfully promoted the integration of 
vulnerable groups and disadvantaged young people from the locality into 
the labour market. However, in answering the research question, the 
mandatory community benefit clause did not facilitate SME participation 
in the public contract.  
Overall, the findings conclude that voluntary socially responsible regimes 
can create a balance between the economic and social objectives of the 
legislation. The research demonstrates that the use of subcontractor 
protection considerations can successfully facilitate SME participation in 
the public market. Voluntary mechanisms like this can assist SMEs in 
competing for high-value contracts. A key factor for the success of this 
consideration is due to the relationship developed between all 
stakeholders. The Community Benefit Programme Manager was involved 
in the tender design, advertising and evaluation stage and is involved in 
                                                                                      
194 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
195 Interview with the Community Benefit Programme Manager (n 63). 
196 The contracting authority cannot insist on which companies the main contractor 
subcontracts with over the course of the contract. 
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monitoring contract performance. If this success is to be replicated by 
other public bodies, public procurers should tighten the relationship 
between the tender stage and the contract performance stage. This case 
study demonstrates that the success of socially responsible public 
procurement is dependent on the motivation of public sector ‘champions’, 
a supporting policy backdrop and a commitment from all key 
stakeholders. 
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Chapter Six Buy Social Case Study 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this case study is to question the extent to which the 
inclusion of social criteria in a public services contract facilitated SME 
participation in the Northern Irish public market. Whilst, the contract 
assessed in this case study is a public services contract, it included 
comparable social criteria with the National Children’s Hospital public 
works contract.1 It is also cited as the first large scale services contract to 
incorporate social clauses in Northern Ireland.  
Over the last five years, Northern Ireland has adopted socially responsible 
public procurement policies. Political willingness to adopt public sector 
reforms was enshrined in the ‘Programme for Government 2011-2015’ 
report,2 which complements the 2014 political Stormont House 
Agreement.3 Both agreements detail the necessity for public sector reform 
due to the reduction in the availability of UK grants and financial support, 
and the long-term political need to unify a ‘divided society.’4 A number of 
public sector administrative reforms have been made, including the 
establishment of a ‘Buy Social Unit’ in 2014.5 The unit was established to 
coordinate the use of social clauses in Northern Ireland’s public 
procurement contracts. The unit works in partnership with the Central 
                                                                                      
1 Both contracts included similar community benefit clauses, subcontractor 
considerations and elements of the contract were divided into smaller lots.  
2 See Northern Ireland Executive, ‘Programme for Government 2011-2015’ (2012) 27; 
Please note that a draft Programme for Government 2016-2021 has yet to be adopted 
since the collapse of the government in 2017. 
3 See the ‘Stormont House Agreement’ (2014).; 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmen
t_data/file/390672/Stormont_House_Agreement.pdf Last accessed 25th March 2019. 
4 The collapse of the Northern Irish government has delayed recent implementation of 
legislation and policies required to achieve agreed upon objectives. 
5 The Buy Social unit offers support and training on the incorporation of community 
benefit clauses in public works and services contracts. See more; https://buysocialni.org/ 
Last accessed 25/03/2019. 
254 
 
Procurement Directorate (CPD)6 and with the Strategic Investment Board 
(SIB). SIB seconded two employees to assist with the development and 
implementation of the social criteria.7 The unit is tasked with three core 
public procurement goals, to promote targeted recruitment and training for 
people who are long-term unemployed and leaving education, to create 
opportunities for people with disabilities or learning difficulties and, to 
ensure the provision of relevant training.8  
As in, the Irish case study, SMEs are the backbone of the economy. Over 
118,000 SMEs operate in Northern Ireland, accounting for approximately 
75% of all turnover and employment in the private sector.9 SME growth 
is required to maintain and support a sustainable and prosperous 
economy.10 This case study questions if the recent policy approaches on 
social procurement are conducive to supporting SME participation in the 
public market? 
This case study explores a socially-conscious competition concluded by 
the CPD and the Buy Social unit for the supply and operation of a 
cleaning, catering and ancillary services contract. Comparably, to the New 
Children’s Hospital construction contract, the contract included 
mandatory community benefit clauses, voluntary subcontractor 
considerations and the contract was divided into smaller lots. The research 
examines the impact the criteria had on SME participation at the tendering 
stage and also in the contract performance stage. The case study findings 
demonstrate a valid link between the use of social criteria and the 
                                                                                      
6 Now referred to as ‘Construction and Procurement Delivery’ (CPD). However, this 
terminology is not used for the remainder of the thesis as the unit was known as the 
Central Procurement Directorate when the tender competition was conducted.  
7 Interview with Hollie Carroll, Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (Belfast, Northern 
Ireland, 5th October 2016). 
8 The Buy Social Unit was established under the remit of the Strategic Investment Board 
to assist with the effective delivery of procurement policy goals. See CPD Public 
Guidance Note; ‘Integrating Social Considerations into Contracts’ (2016) PGN 01/13. 
9 Federation of Small Business Northern Ireland The realities of public procurement for 
SMEs in Northern Ireland (2014). Available at; https://www.fsb.org.uk/docs/default-
source/fsb-org-uk/the-realities-of-public-procurement.pdf?sfvrsn=1 Last accessed 25th 
April 2019. 
10 P. Cooke, S. Roper and P. Wylie, ‘The Golden Thread of Innovation” and Northern 
Ireland's Evolving Regional Innovation System’ (2003) 37(4) Regional Studies 365. 
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facilitation of SME engagement in public contracts, one of the contractual 
lots was awarded to a consortium partnership comprising of one large 
organisation and one micro social enterprise. Additionally, a subcontract 
was awarded to a B-corporation company.11 Data for this case study was 
gathered by interviewing public officials and awardee companies and by 
studying the published request for tender documents.12 The chapter opens 
with a discussion on the development and adoption of socially responsible 
procurement practices in the state. It continues by examining the 
parameters of the criteria included in the £27mn cleaning, catering and 
ancillary services contract.  
 
6.2 Case Study Background 
There were a number of policy developments which created a favourable 
environment for the widespread adoption of social criteria in works 
contracts. The Buy Social unit was established as a response to the 2010 
‘Sustainable Development Strategy for Northern Ireland’ and by the 
‘Programme for Government’ joint commitment to introducing social 
procurement.13 Both strategies called for the reform of public sector 
services, including the greater use of socially-driven public procurement. 
 One of the most influential factors on policy development was the 
adoption of the OECD Report ‘Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) 
Implementing Joined-up Governance for a Common Purpose’ in 2016.14 
The OECD published the report on the back of a request by the 
Government in 2014 for guidance on public-sector reform.15 This report 
                                                                                      
11 This is discussed in section 6.8.3 Note a B Corporation is a form of hybrid social 
enterprise. See D. Reiser, ‘Benefit Corporations - A Sustainable Form of Organization’ 
(2011) 46(3) Wake Forest L Rev 591. 
12 Five interviews were completed for this case study. Two with CPD Development 
Officers, one with a Legal Counsel, and two with the representatives from the awardee 
companies. See Appendix D. 
13 See Northern Ireland Assembly Commission Sustainable Development Strategy for the 
Northern Ireland (April 2010). See also Programme for Government (n 2). 
14 See OECD Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) Implementing Joined-up Governance 
for a Common Purpose (Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, 2016). 
15 See OECD (n 14) 5. 
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was completed before the Brexit referendum and the collapse of the 
government in 2017. The report highlighted that inconsistencies in the use 
of social clauses were limiting their long-term socio-economic benefits.16 
The government was encouraged to establish a coordinated and 
harmonised national approach for the incorporation of social clauses in 
public contracts. This recommendation provided greater backing for the 
adoption of the Buy Social unit.17 ‘Buy Social’ is not only the name of the 
support body, but it is also used as a procurement term. A universal ‘Buy 
Social’ term has been defined by SIB, defining the term as;  
…a way to maximise the benefits from public procurement in terms 
of personal well-being, social cohesion and inclusion, equal 
opportunities and sustainable development.18  
While the definition provided by the SIB is far-reaching, the Buy Social 
team are currently focusing on the incorporation of ‘targeted recruitment 
and training’ community benefit clauses in public contracts. The targeted 
recruitment and training standardised clauses designed by the Buy Social 
unit require contractors to set-aside a proportion of any new paid 
employment positions for ‘new entrant trainees’. A ‘new entrant trainee’ 
is any person; 
…who lack the skills and experience to compete for and sustain a 
job through the labour market e.g. because they have no substantial 
work experience (such as school or college leavers) or a long-term 
unemployed person with no experience in the sector they are seeking 
to join.19 
When this clause was designed, unemployment rates were a third higher 
in people aged 25 years or younger than those older than 25 years of age.20 
                                                                                      
16 See OECD (n 14) 247. 
17 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
18 See the SIB and Buy Social unit guidance What is Buy Social? (1). 
19 See the SIB and Buy Social unit guidance Who is a New Entrant Trainee? (1). 
20 The unemployment rate of young people (aged 18 to 24) in Northern Ireland from 2013 
was 20.4%. This figure has decreased significantly in recent years. See Statista Rate of 
youth unemployment in Northern Ireland from 2013 to 2018 (2018). 
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Contracting authorities are requested to use public procurement to assist 
young people, who are at risk of gaining full-time paid employment.21 
When the clauses were being designed, advice was sought from the 
Equality Commission and from the internal legal team to ensure that the 
clause did not discriminate on the basis of age. The clause was not found 
not to be discriminatory in nature as it aligned closely with government 
policies on the promotion of the employment of young people.22  
Cross-departmental support for the promotion of social procurement is 
evident, the Department of Finance’s Procurement Board has formally 
adopted the ‘Buy Social’ term as a purchasing principle.23 The OECD 
recommendations, the public-sector acceptance of the Buy Social term 
and the concentration of employment promotion policies allowed for the 
design and adoption of national Buy Social procurement requirements.24 
Since the 5th November 2015, procurers are required to include Buy Social 
requirements in building contracts exceeding £2m and in civil engineering 
contracts with a value of £4m or more. The Procurement Board enforces 
this requirement.25 Following the publication of the ‘Strategic Review of 
Social Clauses’, a ‘Buy Social Construction Model’ was implemented in 
April 2016.26 The targeted recruitment and training requirements were 
extended to cover supplies and services contracts.27 
                                                                                      
21 See CPD Public Guidance Note, ‘Integrating Social Considerations into Contracts’ 
(2016) PGN 01/13. 
22 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). See also; See Northern 
Ireland Assembly Commission Sustainable Development Strategy for the Northern 
Ireland (April 2010) (n 13) See also Programme for Government (n 2). 
23 See the CPD and Department of Finance Sustainable Procurement in Construction; 
Sustainability Requirements; Model Contract Clauses and Guidance (2019). 
24 Austen and Seymour argue that a lack of industry commitment to policy objectives 
results in high levels of non-compliance and minimal benefits for either side. See; S. 
Austen and R. Seymour, ‘Can governments use their construction contracts to improve 
training outcomes?’ (2009) 15(1) Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 43. 
25 See CPD Public Guidance Note (n 21). 
26 To date, the Unit has successfully included social criteria in the contracts ranging from 
£2mn - £110m works contracts for the Department for Regional Development, 
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, Department of Health, Social 
Services and Public Safety, Central Procurement Directorate, Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Investment, Education Authority, Department of Education and the 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. See the Buy Social Unit Case 
Studies. 
27 However, the revisions made did not extend to imposing penalties apply for non-
compliance. See CPD Public Guidance Note (n 21). 
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Prior to the creation and operation of the Buy Social unit, the 
‘Construction Industry Federation Northern Ireland’ (CIFNI) included 
targeted recruitment and training clauses into certain works contracts. The 
clauses were designed for construction contracts only, and they were not 
included in supplies or services contracts.28 The clauses were designed in 
partnership with the construction sector. During the research interviews, 
the Buy Social interviewees identified some inherent issues the CIFNI 
clauses. One problem identified referred to the lack of payment offered to 
the work experience recipients.29 The clauses were also uniformed in 
nature and were ‘copied and pasted’ from contract to contract.30 This did 
not always result in the most successful operations.31  
The recipients were in receipt of social welfare. The clauses required 
contractors to offer work experience rather than offering paid-work 
placements.32 The Buy Social clauses are primarily concerned with paid 
work placements and training, with the long-term view of improving 
unemployment rates in the region.33 Another issue raised with the CIFNI 
clauses was the emphasis placed on recruiting people from the Department 
of Employment and Learning’s approved list of unemployed persons.34 
The clauses were inflexible in nature, people were automatically selected 
to work on the construction contracts. This did not automatically ensure 
that the most appropriate person was placed onto a suitable contract.35 
This had negative repercussions and associations for the person placed on 
the work experience and for the primary contractor. A significant number 
of people placed on work experience were required to work approximately 
                                                                                      
28 The former clauses have been replaced by the; CPD and Department of Finance, 
‘Sustainable Procurement in Construction; Sustainability Requirements; Model 
Contract Clauses and Guidance’ (2019). See also See CPD Public Guidance Note (n 21). 
29 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
30 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7) The importance of 
flexibility in social criteria is emphasised in; A. McWilliams and D. Siegel, ‘Corporate 
social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective’ (2001) 26(1) Academy of 
Management Review 117. 
31 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7) This resulted in untrained 
and unmotivated people being placed with construction firms. 
32 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
33 See CPD (n 28).  
34 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
35 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
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35-40 hours per week and in turn received a £15 supplement to their social 
welfare payment.36 There was little incentive for the recruited employees 
or trainees to engage with the practice fully.37  
The Buy Social initiative offers a more flexible structure, allowing 
contracted suppliers to source employees from a wide list of non-
governmental employment schemes, they do not require the contractors to 
solely use the list of people provided by the Department of Employment 
and Learning.38 The unit established a ‘brokerage’ website to assist 
contractors in finding ‘employability brokers’ to assist them in meeting 
their targeted recruitment and training requirements.39 Contractors are not 
expected to meet the employment targets on their own, the Buy Social unit 
offers practical assistance to contractors in finding suitably trained and 
available trainees and employees.  
A further significant change introduced by the Buy Social unit is the use 
of monitoring mechanisms. Data collected from the CIFNI clauses was 
difficult to review, data was not reported and was analysed in an ad-hoc 
and non-harmonised manner.40 The Buy Social unit is committed to 
reviewing the effectiveness and the socio-economic impact of the use of 
the community benefit clauses. The Buy Social unit was established to 
address the problems associated with the former CIFNI clauses and to 
support the strategic use of public procurement.41 
                                                                                      
36 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
37 See also; CFP Report on the Inquiry into Public Procurement in Northern Ireland 
(2010). available online at: 
http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/finance/2007mandate/reports/Report_19_08_09R.htm
#3 Last accessed 28th March 2019. 
38 This appears in compliance with the TFEU principles of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment.  
39 This is an example of how the Buy Social unit is making it easier for procurers and 
suppliers to comply with community benefit clauses. See 
https://buysocialni.org/contractors/find-a-broker/ Last accessed 28th March 2019. 
40 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
41 See OECD (n 14). 
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6.3 Case Study Details 
This case study examined a three-year supplies and services contract.42 
The ‘Cleaning, Catering and Ancillary Services’ contract had an overall 
value of £27million. The tender procedure was conducted by the CPD and 
the Buy Social unit. The request for tender and accompanying contract 
was unique in design as it was one of the first services contracts to include 
social clauses.43 The CPD carried out the procurement process on behalf 
of various public-sector bodies.44 Work commenced on the contract in 
May 2016.  
While this was the first socially-responsible supplies and services contract 
carried out by the CPD and the Buy Social unit, the two bodies had 
previously included social criteria in procured works contracts. Initially, 
when the two bodies commenced working together, the relationship was 
described as a ‘strained’ one.45 Similarly, to the issues faced by the 
National Children’s Hospital’s CBPM, CPD was reluctant to incorporate 
any clauses which would increase legal uncertainty, costs and 
administrative burden for interested economic operators and public 
bodies.46 One of the initial problems identified by the team was the 
unwillingness of the public service to change their attitudes towards 
procurement practices. The Buy Social Development Officer commented 
that;  
…when you are working with the public sector, unless it is black and 
white and has to be done, then they question ‘why should I do that?’ 
                                                                                      
42 The contract period was initially for two years, with the option to extend the contract 
for a further 12 months subject to annual review. The request for tender documents and 
contract clauses were reviewed. The request for tender documents were made freely and 
openly available to all interested suppliers.  
43 Interview with Anna Grey, Legal Counsel, Buy Social Unit (Belfast, Northern Ireland, 
5th October 2016). 
44 Request for Tender, Lots 1 and 2 Specification Schedule (P19012.Cft29343). 
45 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
46 L. Georghiou, Y. Li, E, Uyarra and J. Edler, ‘Public procurement for innovation in 
small European countries.’ A Report from the ERA-PRISM: Policies for Research and 
Innovation in Small Member States to Advance the European Research Area  (OMC-Net 
Project, Brussels 2010); C.P. McCue, E. Prier, and D. Swanson, ‘Five dilemmas in public 
procurement’ (2015) 15(2) Journal of Public Procurement 177. 
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and people were doing it [using social criteria] out of the kindness 
of their heart because nobody was making them.47  
These fears have been reiterated by Baden et al. and Sánchez Graells 
questioning the administrative costs and burden of implementing 
employment-based social considerations.48 Changes introduced to public 
sector operations is dependent on the support of public sector officials.49 
However, the relationship improved quickly between the Buy Social unit 
and the CPD, this was mainly due to the introduction of social 
procurement legislation in the rest of the UK and the successful 
implementation of social clauses in pilot work contracts.50 Socially-driven 
procurement practices were becoming more established and seen as “the 
norm” in high-value works contracts in Scotland.51 Repeating others’ 
successes reduces public bodies’ unwillingness and fears of introducing 
change to established practices.52 By the time, the social criteria were 
being designed for the request for tender and accompanying contracts, 
CPD was actively supporting socially responsible procurement practices. 
Recently the CPD introduced a guidance note setting out instructions for 
the inclusion of social criteria in works, supplies and services contracts.53 
When the clauses were first used, the Buy Social team spent between 4-5 
months negotiating the clause with CPD.54 Since completing this pilot 
project, it now ‘only takes days to one week’ to negotiate the inclusion of 
social criteria in works and services contracts. Whilst CPD were initially 
                                                                                      
47 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
48 D. Baden, I. Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The effects of procurement policies on 
‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: Content-analytic insights into the 
views and actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 29(3) International Small Business 
259. 
49 See J. Barton Cunningham and J.S. Kempling, ‘Implementing change in public sector 
organizations’ (2009) 47(2) Management Decision 330. 
50 Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012. See also Lord Young’s supporting Review of 
the Social Value (2015). 
51 Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act, 2014 
52 A. De Wit, ‘Measurement of project success’ (1988) 6(3) International Journal of 
Project Management 164.; T. Entwistle and S. Martin, ‘From competition to 
collaboration in public service delivery: A new agenda for research’ (2005) 83(1) Public 
Administration 233. 
53 CPD and Department of Finance, ‘Sustainable Procurement in Construction; 
Sustainability Requirements; Model Contract Clauses and Guidance’ (2019). See also 
See CPD Public Guidance Note (n 21). 
54 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
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reluctant to implement community benefit clauses, the Directorate had 
previously published a procurement guidance note in 2012 aimed at 
‘helping SMEs benefit from subcontracting opportunities in public 
contracts.’55 The Directorate also published two additional procurement 
guidance notes to assist both SMEs and social enterprises ‘access public 
sector contract opportunities.’56 The reviewed contract included several 
provisions to support SME participation which reflected the best practices 
set out in the procurement guidance notes. The request for tender and 
accompanying contract reviewed included a community benefit clause, 
subcontractor conditions, and the contract was divided into three lots. 
6.4 Division of contract into smaller lots 
The contract was divided into three heterogeneous lots, with each lot 
representing a different contractual need. The procurement documents 
directly state that the purpose of dividing the contract into lots was ‘to 
ensure the security of supply, preserve competition and encourage 
participation by small and medium size enterprises (SMEs).’57 While each 
tenderer could bid for all three lots, a proportionate measure was included 
by the CPD, only allowing one supplier to win an individual lot.58 
Tenderers were required to confirm that their organisation had a minimum 
annual turnover of 1.5 times the value of the individual lots for the past 
two years.59 The minimum annual turnover to qualify for Lot 1 was 
£4.5million, £3million for Lot 2 and £6million for Lot 3.60 
As each lot had different end-users, the lots were evaluated by different 
panels of representatives. Lots 1 and 2 were divided up by Post Code.  Lot 
1 and 2 were reviewed by a panel composing of representatives from NI’s 
                                                                                      
55 See CPD, ‘Helping SMEs Benefit from Subcontracting Opportunities’ (2012) PGN 
06/12. See also; Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland, ‘Public Procurement 
Policy’ (2014) Version 11.  
56 See CPD, ‘A Guide for Social Economy Enterprises’ (2011) PGN 01/11;  
Helping Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Social Economy Enterprises 
(SEEs) access Public Sector contracting opportunities (2011) PGN 02/11. 
57 Request to Tender Instruction to Tenderers, section 19. 
58 Public Contracts Regulations reg 46(4). 
59 Or for the period the tenderer has been trading if this is less than two years. Public 
Contracts Regulations, reg 58. 
60 Request to Tender Instruction to Tenderers. 
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Civil Service departments and NI Water. Representatives from the Police 
Service NI (PSNI) and the Forensic Science NI (FSNI) evaluated Lot 3.61  
As tenderers were limited to the number of lots they could be awarded, to 
ensure fairness in the process, Lot 3 with the highest value was awarded 
first, Lot 1 was awarded secondly with the next highest value and finally, 
Lot 2 was awarded.62  Even though tenderers were limited in the number 
of lots they could be awarded, there was no restriction placed on their 
subcontracting choices.63 A large enterprise was awarded Lot 2 and was 
subsequently sub-contracted to work on Lot 1. This case study examined 
Lot 1. Specifically, Lot 1 required catering and hospitality services for the 
following public bodies and offices; the Causeway Exchange (DCAL), 
Clarendon Road (DE), Clarence Court (DRD), County Hall, Ballymena 
(DRD), County Hall Coleraine (DRD), Goodwood House, (DFP) and the 
Great Northern Tower (DSD).64  
6.5 Community Benefit Clauses 
A ‘targeted recruitment and training’ community benefit clause was 
included in the procurement documents. The clause required that 40% of 
all new employees employed to work on the contract are classified as new 
entrant employees in years one and two. This requirement rises to 50% in 
year three.65 Furthermore, 10% of these positions must be set-aside for 
people with disabilities registered with the Disability Employment 
Service, Department of Communities.66 The Buy Social unit would have 
ultimately liked to include a more ‘prescriptive’ clause in the services 
contracts, similar to the clause attached to the National Children’s 
Hospital case study.67 However, all parties to the procurement competition 
                                                                                      
61 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
62 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
63 Public Contracts Regulations, reg 71. 
64 Request for Tender, Lot One Specifications, section 1. 
65 Request for Tender, Lot One Specifications, section 19. 
66 Request for Tender, Lot One Specifications, section 19. Note contracting authorities 
should also take into account the definitions of disabled worker, disadvantaged worker 
and sheltered employment set out in Art. 2(3), 2(4), 2(100) Regulation (EU) 651/2014. 
67 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
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agreed on a ‘per-annum’ assessment clause.68  By contrast, the National 
Children’s Hospital clause requires the main contractor to deliver a set 
number of employment hours. The Buy Social team argued that the 
approach used by the National Children’s Hospital guaranteed 
employment and training opportunities.69  There was no guarantee on how 
many new entrant trainees would benefit from the clause contained in this 
contract.  
Unlike the New Children’s Hospital construction contract, this contract 
had to take transfer of undertakings (TUPE) compliance considerations 
into account.70 The TUPE regulations protect the rights of employees 
where the company in which they are employed is transferred to a new 
owner, and this regularly occurs in the cleaning and catering sectors. 
During the tender design stage, the procuring team identified three 
approaches to reduce TUPE complications. The first approach identified 
sought to attach a specific employment and training target to each million 
awarded, the team deemed that this approach was suitable where TUPE 
applied to 0 – 50% of the estimated workforce.71 The second approach 
attached employment and training targets on an annual basis rather than a 
financial basis. It was concluded that this approach was suitable, where 
TUPE applied to more than 50% of the estimated workforce.72 The third 
approach was an ‘add-on’ where the first or second approach is suitable, 
and additionally, the clause requires the employment of people with 
disabilities, employment of ex-prisoners and young adults moving from 
the full care of the Health and Safety Executive into the workforce.73  
The cleaning and catering contract adopted the second approach. This 
approach was adopted (using a percentage rather than set working weeks) 
                                                                                      
68 Interview with Legal Counsel, Buy Social Unit (n 43) This form of targeted recruitment 
and training clause is more suitable to services contracts than works contracts. This is 
due to the size of the contracts and employment generation potential.  
69 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
70 The contracting authority and contractor were required to comply with the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 and the Service Provision 
Change (Protection of Employment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 (TUPE). 
71 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
72 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
73 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
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to avoid adding extra costs to the project. When TUPE does not apply, 
10% of the new workforce must be identified as ‘new entrant trainees’.74 
The targets are designed based on the labour value of the contract; 
construction contracts by their very nature will have higher targets set than 
those included in a services contract. The disability requirement in the 
contract ensures that at least 4% of the overall workforce must be sourced 
from the Department of Communities, Disabilities Employment Service.75 
This service offered ‘exceptional support and assistance’ to the Buy 
Social team.76 The Buy Social team attempted to build a strong 
relationship with the preferred contractor from the start of the contract, 
assisting the main contractor in meeting the employment targets. 
The social clauses were included as part of the tender award criteria. 
Among other things, the tenderers were asked to demonstrate how they 
would meet the sustainability aspects of the contract, including meeting 
the targeted recruitment and training clauses. The weighting attached to 
the overall criteria was 21%.77 Tenderers were required to confirm that 
their organisations had the capability;  
…to deliver the contract conditions relating to recruitment and 
training, including the appointment, mentoring and support of new 
entrant trainees; the notification of all vacancies to agencies named 
by the client and the provision of equal opportunities for candidates 
applying through these agencies; and the provision of related 
monitoring and verification information.78 
There were no penalties imposed for non-compliance with the social 
criteria. However, the unit is currently considering and researching the 
                                                                                      
74 See; Strategic Investment Board and Buy Social Unit, ‘Buy Social Training 
Toolkit: Targeted Recruitment & Training’ (Version 1, 2016, p.41). For a discussion on 
the impact of TUPE when tendering see; A. Kerr and M. Radford, ‘TUPE or not TUPE: 
competitive tendering and the transfer laws’ (1994) 14(4) Public Money & Management 
37. 
75 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
76 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
77 Request for Tender, Qualitative Award Criteria. AC1. Service Delivery to meet the 
Specification. 
78 Request to Tender, Instructions to Tenderers MR1. 
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possibilities and ways to introduce penalties for future contracts.79 There 
is a belief that if the clauses are set as a contract performance clause, they 
should be treated as a standard contract clause which normally carries 
penalties for non-compliance.80 The Buy Social Development Officer 
suggested that a penalty in the form of non-compliance certificates could 
be potentially be used, suggesting that if suppliers receive three or more 
certificates over a set period, they could be barred from participating in 
future competitions.81 These penalties would have to include a time 
limitation period, and the barring penalty could not be imposed for an 
undisclosed period.82  
The Buy Social team has recently developed an online toolkit to assist 
public procurers using social clauses.83 Public procurers considering 
incorporating community benefit clauses into services contracts can utilise 
the online toolkit by submitting financial details of the contract, the length 
of the contract and the approximate turnover of potential contractors, the 
online diagnostic tool calculates whether the clauses are suitable or not for 
the contract. If the clauses are found to be suitable, the procurers can then 
include the appropriate social clause designed by the team, thus 
eliminating any legal uncertainty, additional costs or time to the 
procurement procedure.84 
6.6 Subcontractor considerations 
A voluntary subcontractor consideration was included in the contract. The 
Buy Social team was responsible for drafting and incorporating the 
targeted recruitment and training community benefit clause. CPD was 
                                                                                      
79 Interview with Nuala Griffiths Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 5th October 2016).  This is discussed further in section 6.8.2. 
80 See C. D'Alpaos, M. Moretto, P. Valbonesi and S. Vergalli, ‘Time overruns as 
opportunistic behavior in public procurement’ (2013) 110(1) Journal of Economics 25. 
81 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7).  
82 Public Contracts Regulations, reg 57. 
83 Strategic Investment Board and Buy Social Unit, ‘Buy Social Training Toolkit: 
Targeted Recruitment & Training’ (Version 1, 2016). 
84 See Strategic Investment Board and Buy Social Unit (n 83). The toolkit has diminished 
the operational fears reiterated by; D. Baden, I. Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The effects 
of procurement policies on ‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: 
Content-analytic insights into the views and actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 
29(3) International Small Business 259. 
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responsible for the inclusion of all other social and environmental 
criteria.85 A voluntary consideration was included encouraging the 
winning contractor to make ‘use of small and medium enterprises within 
the supply chain.’86 All onus was placed firmly on the main contractor to 
ensure that subcontractors were compliant with all the contractual 
requirements and expectations.87 No specific details were included on how 
such subcontracting relationships should be formed or maintained.  The 
consideration states;  
The Client encourages the use of small and medium enterprises within 
the supply chain. The Contractor may enter into agreements with 
supply chain partners, as well as utilising the Contractor’s own 
resources.  The Contractor shall institute a stringent vetting procedure 
when working with external supply chains.  Any relationship entered 
into will be subject to the Conditions of the Contract and any reference 
to the Contractor shall be taken as a reference to any service partner 
working with or on behalf of the Contractor. The Contractor shall 
warrant that the performance measures which they are expected to 
operate within have been transferred contractually, to any supply chain 
partners.88 
Unlike the National Children’s Hospital case study, this consideration was 
not bespoke to this contract. The National Children’s Hospital 
subcontractor consideration was included with the purpose of encouraging 
the main contractor to actively engage with SMEs, with the consideration 
going as far as requesting the main contractor to host Meet the Buyer 
networking events, identifying future subcontracting opportunities and 
outlining minimum requirements for future subcontracting elements.89 
                                                                                      
85 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7).  
86 Request for Tender, Specifications, section 16. These forms of clauses are permissible, 
once the contracting authority does not set aside public contracts for SMEs. See Case C-
113/13 Spezzino [2014] pub. electr. EU:2014:2440. 
87 Request for Tender, Specifications, sections 16 and 19. As discussed in section 3.5.3, 
contracting authorities should maintain an active monitoring role during the contract 
performance stage. 
88 Request for Tender, Specifications, section 16.1 There is an element of flexibility and 
fairness in this section.  
89 See section 5.3.4. 
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The consideration differs to the National Children’s Hospital case study 
as it was not solely attached to this contract, it forms part of CPD’s 
sustainable buying practices. The wording of both considerations is 
similar in parts, requesting the main contractor to monitor all 
subcontractor’s activity over the life-cycle of the contract.90  
The consideration encourages contractors to consider developing a 
sustainable economic supply chain. In particular, contractors are 
encouraged to work with small and micro-enterprise and social 
enterprises.91 Noticeably, the public body requires the main contractor to 
declare that they will pay all subcontractors promptly in line with public 
pay agreements, the specifications require ‘payment to subcontractors 
must be made within 30 days of receipt of a valid invoice.’92 
Similarly, to the National Children’s Hospital case study, an envisaged 
partnership between the contracting authority and supplier is outlined in 
the tender specifications. Guiding principles contained in the 
specifications outline a partnership based on the delivery of high-quality, 
efficient services, prompt payments and a joint commitment to 
implementing a sustainable structure which promotes continuous 
improvements and innovations. The core operational components of the 
contract require the contractor to provide a clean and safe working 
environment for employees, to deliver a high-quality, consistent service 
to all public-sector bodies, and to ensure compliance with all relevant 
forms of health and safety and food legislation.93 
                                                                                      
90 Public Authority Regulations reg 71(3); (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 71(3) 
Contracting authorities should also monitor contractors and subcontractors compliance 
with the criteria. 
91 Request for Tender, Specifications, section 19.3. See also Department of Finance and 
CPD Northern Ireland, ‘Public Procurement Policy’ (2014) Version 11. Available at; 
https://www.finance-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/dfp/ni-public-
procurement-policy-version-11-august-2014.pdf Last accessed 25th April 2019. 
92 Request for Tender, Specifications, section 16.1 See also Directive 2011/7/EU of 16 
February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions OJ L 48/1. 
93 Including compliance with the Food Safety (NI) Order 1991, Regulation (EC) No 
852/2004, Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, Regulation (EC) 178/2002, Food Hygiene 
Regulations (NI) 2006, Food Premises (Registration) Regulations 1991, Food Safety 
(General Food Hygiene) Regulations 1995 and Food Safety (Temperature Control) 
Regulations 1995, Food Information Regulations 2014(EC) Nos 1169/2011. 
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Contract performance and monitoring criteria were outlined in detail in 
the request for tender documents. The initial duration of the contract was 
two years, with the option of extending the contract by 12 months 
depending on contract performance. Prices were fixed for the initial two 
years.94 Contractors were required to submit bi-annual assessments, 
including a ‘Continuous Improvement Plan’ outlining a strategic review 
of resources with a view of improving environmental and operational 
inefficiencies. Contractors throughout the life-cycle of the contract are 
encouraged to introduce innovative improvements to realise cost savings 
and reduce energy usage. 95  
An essential part of the procurement cycle is the monitoring and 
evaluation of the implementation of operations.96 The primary contractor 
was required to meet with the contracting authority within ten days of the 
contract commencement to agree day to day ‘Operational Procedures’ 
and ‘Key Performance Indicators’.97 Weekly progress updates are 
required throughout the remainder of the contract. The contractor is 
responsible for providing all the necessary training required for the 
transfer of any employees under TUPE. In addition to this, the primary 
contractor is responsible for regularly informing the contracting authority 
of subcontractor’s performances.98 Importantly, the Buy Social co-
ordinator has been involved at every stage of the procurement cycle to 
ensure compliance and commitment to the community benefit clauses.99 
  
6.8 Research Findings 
Lot 1 was awarded to a consortium, lots 2 and 3 were awarded to large 
private organisations. This case study reviewed lot 1 which was awarded 
                                                                                      
94 Request for Tender, Specifications, section 5.1. 
95 Request for Tender, Specifications, sections 5 and 19. 
96 L. Georghiou, J. Edler, E. Uyarra and J. Yeow, ‘Policy instruments for public 
procurement of innovation: Choice, design and assessment’ (2014) 86 Technological 
Forecasting & Social Change 1. 
97 Request for Tender, Specifications, section 6. 
98 Request for Tender, Specification, section 6. 
99 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
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to a consortium partnership comprising of one large multinational 
corporation, G4S Northern Ireland Ltd., hereinafter referred to as ‘G4S’, 
and one small local social enterprise, Loaf Catering, operating under the 
NOW Group. The NOW Group specialises in supporting people with 
learning difficulties and autism in finding long-term employment. Loaf 
catering specialises in ‘outside catering’ and operates three cafes in 
Belfast city.100 G4S describes itself as ‘the leading global integrated 
security company, specialising in the provision of security products, 
services and solutions.’101 The purpose of this case study is to examine 
what impact the inclusion of the use of lots, community benefit clauses 
and subcontractor considerations had on SME participation. As this case 
study examines a service and supplies contract, it does not include a pre-
procurement element.  
6.8.1 Use of Lots Findings 
The first measure assessed questioned what impact the division of the 
large contract into smaller lots had on SME participation. The £27mn 
contract was divided into three £9mn lots. G4S and the NOW Group’s 
‘Loaf Catering’ suggested that the division of the contract into smaller lots 
had an impact on their decision to bid. The consortium was awarded ‘Lot 
1’. It was the first time that the two companies partnered on a contract and 
the contract was of significant value and size for the social enterprise.102 
The minimum annual turnover to qualify for Lot 1 was £4.5million.103 
Considering the value of the size of the lot, it could be argued that SMEs 
would be deterred from bidding for the contract as sole providers.104 Loaf 
Catering would not have had the capability or capacity to bid for this 
contract on their own. On the other hand, G4S had the financial, 
                                                                                      
100 Loaf Catering is a small social enterprise employing 14 people. See more about the 
company at; https://www.loafcatering.com/our-team Last accessed 30th April 2019. 
101 G4S is a large organisations that employs over 34,000 people in the UK and Ireland. 
See; www.g4s.ie Last accessed 30th April 2019. 
102 Interview with Maeve Monaghan, CEO NOW Group (by phone, 26th October 2016) 
and Interview with Brendan Flynn, Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (by 
phone, 10th November 2016). 
103 Request for Tender, Lot One Specifications, section 1. 
104 M. Trybus, ‘The Division of Public Contracts into Lots under Directive 2014/24: 
Minimum Harmonisation and Impact on SMEs in Public Procurement?’ (2018) 43(3) 
European Law Review 313. 
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professional capability and experience to tender for the contract on their 
own, they could have subcontracted the social benefits requirements to 
Loaf Catering, or they could have appointed a social benefits manager as 
BAM Ireland did to carry out the social benefit requirements. 
However, G4S choose to partner with Loaf Catering. The company 
indicated that the decision to split the contract into smaller lots had an 
impact on their decision to submit a tender as part of a consortium.105 The 
value of the contract was significant enough for G4S to adopt new social 
practices by partnering with a social enterprise.106 G4S’s Operations 
Manager indicated that the size of the contract was ideal for trialling a new 
partnership with Loaf Catering.107 This supports EU and national policy 
on the encouragement to divide large contracts into smaller lots to 
encourage SME participation.108  
6.8.2 Community Benefit Clauses Findings 
The research secondly examined the use of a targeted recruitment and 
training community benefit clause. Unlike, the National Children’s 
Hospital case study, the inclusion of the clause had a direct impact on the 
decision of the winning consortium to bid for the contract. This finding 
suggests that the social clause encouraged the participation of a social 
enterprise in the public contract.109  
                                                                                      
105 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
106 Companies are willing to adopt operational changes to secure profitable contracts or 
investments. See; M.A. Ayadi, M.I. Kusy, M. Pyo and S. Trabelsi, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Corporate Governance and Managerial Risk-Taking’ (2015) 11(1) The 
Journal of Theoretical Accounting Research 50. 
107 The Operations Director indicated that the company wished to expand their CSR 
policies and the company was inspired by the impact the social enterprise has on people 
living in deprived areas of Belfast. See Interview with the Operations Director, G4S (n 
102). 
108 Even though the social enterprise could not have competed for the lot on their own 
merit, the division of the contract into the smaller lots assisted the social enterprise in 
gaining a share of the contract. See Commission, ‘European Code of Best Practices 
Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts’ (SWP) COM (2008) 
2193; Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland Public Procurement Policy 
(2014) Version 11. 
109 Loosemore argues that social enterprises are optimal consortia partners for large 
companies as the social enterprises have the ability to carry out or manage the community 
benefit clauses. See M. Loosemore, ‘Social procurement in UK construction projects’ 
(2016) 34(2) International Journal of Project Management 133. 
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G4S was interested in the public contract, but due to a lack of 
understanding of community benefit clauses, they were unsure as to how 
to bid for the public contract. As this form of community benefit clause 
had not been incorporated into services contracts before, the G4S Belfast 
branch was not overly familiar with the social requirements.110 However, 
they were extremely familiar with tendering and tender evaluation 
systems. The company believe that that they are ‘fairly well tuned in, how 
they [tenders] are marked, we go after every mark, treat it like an 
exam.’111 The team normally adopts a structured tendering approach, 
however, they ‘struggled to find the right approach’ for this contract, they 
struggled to ‘identify what the real objective [of the contract] was’, 
concluding it was ‘not clear’ in the request for tender documents.112 To 
improve their chances of winning the public contract, G4S offered to 
partner with Loaf Catering. They hoped that the social enterprise would 
assist them in understanding, implementing and monitoring the 
community benefit requirements.113 It appears that G4S viewed the 
targeted recruitment and training clause as a ‘commercial’ requirement 
and understood that the company could not successfully bid for the 
contract without adopting operational changes.114  
The social enterprise, on the other hand, was familiar with both public 
contracts and community benefit requirements. This was not the first 
public contract the social enterprise was awarded. Now Group had 
previously been awarded contracts relating to training and employment of 
people with disabilities and the long-term unemployed.115 Loaf Catering 
is a subsidiary of the Now Group. Loaf Catering was previously awarded 
a contract with Belfast City Council to establish a café in Belfast City 
                                                                                      
110 See Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
111 See Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
112 See Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
113 See Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
114 As suggested by H. Walker and L. Preuss, ‘Fostering sustainability through sourcing 
from small businesses: public sector perspectives’ (2008) 16(15) Journal of Cleaner 
Production 1600. 
115 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102) . 
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Hall.116 This contract was defined as a ‘flagship contract’ by the social 
enterprise, it was a public services contract which was awarded on a 
MEAT basis and did not include any social clauses.117 The contract was 
award on the basis of price and quality, and the duration of the contract 
was 2.5 years.118 G4S believed that the social enterprises’ experience and 
business objectives made them the ideal partner for this contract.119 
The CEO of the Now Group acknowledged that the community benefit 
clause ‘opened a conversation [with G4S] that wouldn’t have happened 
otherwise.’120 The inclusion of the social clause opened up public sector 
opportunities for the company, without the inclusion of the clause, the 
social enterprise and its subsidiaries would not have had the capability or 
interest in carrying out large contracts, like the catering, cleaning and 
ancillary services contract.121 The company was interested in the contract 
for a number of reasons, Loaf Catering could deliver pre-packed 
sandwiches, the company could deliver the targeted recruitment and 
training requirements and the 10% disability recruitment requirements 
particularly enthused the company.122 
                                                                                      
116 The company competed against for-profit SME competitors to win the contract. See 
Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). 
117 On a separate note, social enterprises should also tender for public contracts which do 
not include social criteria, as public contracts offer a reliable source of income. See J. 
Barraket and J. Weissman, ‘Social procurement and its implications for social 
enterprise: a literature review’ Working Paper No. CPNS48 (The Australian Centre for 
Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, 2009). 
118 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). 
119 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102) G4S were able 
to pass some of the social responsibilities onto Loaf Catering. Loaf Catering were in a 
better position to achieve the targets due to their connection to the local community and 
their adopted social agenda. See N. Cornelius, M. Todres, S. Janjuha-Jivraj, A. Woods 
and J. Wallace, ‘Corporate social responsibility and the social enterprise’ (2008) 81(2) 
Journal of Business Ethics 355. 
120 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). 
121 For a discussion on the barriers faced by social enterprises see; S. Munoz, ‘Social 
enterprise and public sector voices on procurement’ (2009) 5(1) Social Enterprise 
Journal 69; A. Erridge and S. Hennigan, ‘Sustainable procurement in health and social 
care in Northern Ireland’ (2012) 32(5) Public Money and Management 363; A. Argyrou, 
‘Providing Social Enterprises with Better Access to Public Procurement: The 
Development of Supportive Legal Frameworks’ (2017) 12 Eur. Procurement & Pub. 
Private Partnership Law Rev 310. 
122 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). 
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 However, the CEO of the NOW Group questioned the overall benefits of 
community benefit clauses. The CEO emphasised the importance of 
monitoring and evaluating the social requirements throughout the contract 
performance stage and went as far as suggesting that penalties should be 
applied for non-compliance.123 The Buy Social unit has designed targeted 
recruitment and training clauses which should be used in defined 
circumstances. The clauses do not impose penalties for non-
compliance.124 Additionally Loaf Catering and G4S expressed concerns 
around the monitoring and evaluation of the social clauses in the supply 
chain. The biggest risk factors for G4S is the monitoring of 
subcontractor’s compliance with social clauses. G4S suggested that the 
social clauses added another layer of risk to the company, adding 
‘performance and reputational risk’ for non-compliance.125 The company 
noted that partnering with social enterprises is ‘part of the solution’ in 
mitigating against these risk factors.126  
Overall, the consortium appears in favour of social clauses and strongly 
praise the network established by the Buy Social team. They credit the 
work done by the Buy Social team in making the implementation of the 
clause manageable and achievable.127 G4S indicated that the partnership 
with the Now Group was of ‘personal interest.’128 The company believed 
in the values and work conducted by the organisation. G4S commended 
the brokerage system set up and managed by the Buy Social team. The 
                                                                                      
123 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). This opinion is in line with the 
Development Officers view on penalties for non-compliance. See Interview with 
Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
124 Although, there are no penalties imposed for non-compliance, contracting authorities 
may rely on Public Contract Regulations, reg 57(8)(c), to exclude tenderers from 
competitions for prior behaviour in a public contract. Reg 57(8)(c) allows a contracting 
authority to exclude a tenderer in circumstances where the supplier has shown persistent 
or significant deficiencies in the performance of a prior public contract. However, 
contracting authorities can generally only rely on this regulation in circumstances where 
the deficiencies in past performance led to early termination of the contract. See Case C-
470/13 (Generali). 
125 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
126 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
127 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102); Interview with 
the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). Both interviewees acknowledged the practical and 
helpful support that they received from the Buy Social Development Officer (Hollie 
Carroll). 
128 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
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employees, trainees and apprentices recruited through the system were of 
an extremely high calibre and are in general well briefed and prepared for 
the work.129  
Loosemore’s research asserts the belief that social enterprises are ideal 
consortium partners for private enterprises tendering for UK construction 
contracts.130 This case study supports Loosemore’s argument and extends 
his argument beyond construction contracts, suggesting that social 
enterprises are ideal consortium partners for any public contract which 
includes targeted recruitment and training clauses.131 If the success of this 
case study is to be replicated in Ireland, further training and specific policy 
supports for social enterprises should be put in place.132 Overall, the 
finding indicates that the inclusion of the mandatory community benefit 
clause facilitated a social enterprise in entering the market as a partner on 
a high-value contract. The social enterprise entered the contract as a 
partner and not a subcontractor.  
 
6.8.3 Subcontractor Considerations Findings 
The third measure tested examined the use of subcontractor 
considerations. The considerations were not as prescriptive as those set 
out in the National Children’s Hospital contract. The research findings 
indicate that the inclusion of the considerations facilitated SME 
participation in the supply chain. A subcontract was awarded to a form of 
social enterprise.133 Since the research was gathered, G4S subcontracted 
with ‘Ingeus’ to assist with their targeted recruitment and training 
                                                                                      
129 This finding demonstrates the importance of the commitment of the public body to 
the social objectives. See E. Sorensen and J. Torfing, ‘Enhancing collaborative 
innovation in the public sector’ (2011) 43(8) Administration and Society 868. 
130 See Loosemore (n 109). 
131 This comment refers to social enterprises which specialise in the training and 
employing of ‘at risk’ individuals. 
132 As suggested in; Commission, ‘Powering European Public Sector Innovation: 
Towards a New Architecture Report of the Expert Group on Public Sector Innovation’ 
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013); OECD The Innovation 
Imperative in the Public Sector: Setting an Agenda for Action (OECD, Publishing, Paris, 
2015).  
133 A subcontract was awarded to a hybrid form of social enterprise. 
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requirements. Ingeus is a global employing and training organisation and 
is a founding member of the B-Corp community in the UK.134  
Social enterprises and benefit corporation or b-corporations sit between 
charities and SMEs. Dees et al., Cummings and Marquis et al. 
acknowledge the difficulty of defining the now blurred roles of for-profit 
and different forms of social businesses.135 Traditionally, social objectives 
were mainly pursued by charities and SMEs were driven by the need to 
secure profits.136 Social enterprises have two objectives, an objective to 
generates profit and an objective to use the profit earned to support a 
societal goal.137 Benefit companies or ‘B-corporations’ are established 
private companies, and enjoy benefits associated with the registered form 
of companies, such as limited liability, and equally pursue a social goal.138 
Reiser argues that B Corporations are a form of hybrid social enterprise.139 
Hiller identifies that in order for a business to identify as itself as a ‘B-
corporation’ it must meet the following five requirements. Firstly, the 
company must be able to able to show that the identified social objective 
has a social benefit. This may include the pursuit of increasing 
employment opportunities for people with disabilities and for people who 
are unemployed. Secondly, the social operations of the company are 
subject to an independent annual audit by a certified body. Thirdly, the 
company must not prioritise profits or maximise shareholders dividends. 
Fourthly, the company’s activities must be conducted transparently. 
                                                                                      
134 Ingeus assists public bodies and employers design and deliver services to solve 
complex challenges caused by social and technological change.’ See 
https://www.ingeus.com/ Last accessed 3rd June 2019. 
135 B. Cummings, ‘Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the 
Public Interest’ (2012) 112 Columbia Law Review 578. 
136 J.G. Dees and B.B. Anderson, ‘Sector-Bending: Blurring Lines between Nonprofit 
and For-Profit’ (2003) 40 Society 16; C. Marquis, M.A. Glynn and G.F. Davis, 
‘Community Isomorphism and Corporate Social Action’ (2007) 32(3) The Academy of 
Management Review 925. 
137 Some countries have legislated for this type of company, including Italy, France, 
Germany, Russia and Japan. See Commission, ‘Social Business Initiative Creating a 
favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and 
innovation’ (Communication) COM (2011) 0682 final. 
138 E.A. Peterson and D.S. Patel, ‘Benefit Corporations: Fostering Socially Conscious 
Corporate Leadership’ (2016) 8 Southern Journal of Business and Ethics 92. 
139 D. Reiser, ‘Benefit Corporations - A Sustainable Form of Organization’ (2011) 46(3) 
Wake Forest L Rev 591. 
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Fifthly, the company will be penalised for lack of compliance with the 
stated social objectives.140  
‘B-Corp’ is a global certification with over 1000 certified companies 
operating in 33 countries.141 A B Corporation certification in the UK 
requires businesses to redefine success by verifying that the certified 
companies meet stringent standards of social and environmental 
performance, accountability and transparency. Ingeus is a for-profit 
organisation which has legally formalised their social and environmental 
commitments in their Articles of Association.142 In a recent Buy Social 
case study publication, Ingeus stated; 
We are delighted to work in partnership with G4S.  It’s early days, 
but already eight of our job seekers have found employment in 
cleaning and catering.  Part of our service is to support not only the 
job seeker but also the employer.  We have built quality and trusting 
relationship with G4S, and we look forward to continued success.143 
The subcontractor considerations combined with the community benefit 
clause has resulted in the direct inclusion of a socially conscious company 
in the supply chain. This research suggests that the inclusion of the social 
criteria has changed the culture of the large organisation.144 If it were not 
for the social criteria, the large company would not have contracted with 
the social enterprises.145 This is having a direct and positive impact on the 
local economy. Two small stories illustrate the positive impact on the local 
                                                                                      
140 J.S. Hiller, ‘The Benefit Corporation and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2013) 118 
Journal of Business Ethics 287. See also; Peterson and Patel (n 138). 
141 The B Corp Certification measures a company’s entire social and environmental 
performance.  
142 This is a requirement of the B Corp Certification. It has been argued that companies 
are turning to the B Corp Certification due to a lack of legal supports for social 
enterprises. See M.J. Stecker, ‘Awash in a sea of confusion: Benefit corporations, social 
enterprise, and the fear of “greenwashing”’ (2016) 50(2) Journal of Economic Issues 
373. 
143 See the Buy Social Unit Case Studies https://buysocialni.org/about-buy-social/case-
studies/ Last accessed 25th March 2019.  
144 McCrudden discusses the benefits of using procurement to drive social change in; C. 
McCrudden, ‘Using public procurement to achieve social outcomes’ (2004) (4) 
in Natural Resources Forum 257-267. 
145 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
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community. A cleaning operator position was offered to a person who was 
unemployed since 2004, and the newly employed operator commented 
that; ‘The job’s brilliant.  It’s good to have a bit of dignity back, I feel 
more self pride.’ Another cleaning operator stated, ‘I signed up to Steps to 
Success with Ingeus five months ago and am so pleased to get this job, I 
love the fact that I’m busy all the time.’146  
Similarly, to the National Children’s Hospital case study, this finding 
questions Trybus’s argument that SMEs do not want to enter the public 
market as subcontractors.147 The case study’s finding demonstrates that 
social enterprises are willing to enter the market as subcontractors and 
consortium partners. The National Children’s Hospital case study argued 
that subcontracting opportunities are a realistic public procurement entry 
route for SMEs, this case study extends this argument to include social 
enterprises. It is interesting to note that the inclusion of the social criteria 
did not inadvertently distort market competition by encouraging the 
contractors to subcontract with SMEs.148 The contractors additionally 
awarded a subcontract to a large enterprise.149 The subcontractor 
considerations did not restrict the main contractor's freedom and 
discretion to chose to subcontract elements of the contract.150  
The subcontractor considerations findings in this case study support 
Davies and Crane’s arguments on the efficiency of incorporating social 
criteria related criteria through voluntary regimes.151 G4S was not under 
                                                                                      
146 See the Buy Social Unit Case Studies https://buysocialni.org/about-buy-social/case-
studies/ Last accessed 25th March 2019. 
147 M. Trybus, ‘The Division of Public Contracts into Lots under Directive 2014/24: 
Minimum Harmonisation and Impact on SMEs in Public Procurement?’ (2018) 43(3) 
European Law Review 313. 
148 As feared by Baden et. al. See D. Baden, I. Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The effects 
of procurement policies on ‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: 
Content-analytic insights into the views and actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 
29(3) International Small Business 259. 
149 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). 
150 Public Contracts Regulations, art 71(2) See Case C-314/01 Siemens AG Osterreich, 
ARGE Telekom & Partner and Hauptverband der osterreichischen 
Sozialversicherungstrager, judgment of 18 March 2004.  
151 I.A. Davies and A. Crane, ‘Corporate social responsibility in small‐and medium‐size 
enterprises: investigating employee engagement in fair trade companies’ (2010) 19(2) 
Business Ethics: A European Review 126. 
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any mandatory requirements to demonstrate delivery of social benefits in 
the supply-chain but were still motivated to do so. G4S further believe that 
there is a broader opportunity to engage with SMEs in the supply chain in 
a more structured manner.152 Both G4S and Loaf Catering would like to 
see contracting authorities to not only focus on employment clauses but to 
take into account subcontractor considerations additionally. G4S would 
like to see a clause introduced which requires the main contractor to 
subcontract to a targeted number of SMEs.153 G4S would recommend a 
scored awards criterion that offered marks for plans to subcontract with 
SMEs. Such an approach is not permitted by European public 
procurement.154 But it is interesting to note that the large company 
supports the strategic use of public procurement. It may be worthwhile for 
the Commission to review it’s guidance for below threshold procurement, 
reviewing if it is suitable to reserve elements of low-value contracts for 
SMEs based in the EU Member States. 
The use of lots, community benefit clauses and subcontractor mechanisms 
facilitated the participation of two forms of social enterprises in the public 
contract. While each criterion individually encouraged participation, the 
community benefit clause is the central provision in this case study. If it 
were not for this provision, neither party would not have worked together, 
and Loaf Catering would not have expressed an interest in the contract.155 
The combination of the three clauses created a favourable climate for the 
promotion of social enterprises in the main contract and the supply-
chain.156 The main contractors demonstrated and implemented the social 
objectives actively throughout the contract. This research can assume that 
                                                                                      
152 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
153 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102) The Operations 
Director suggested that this approach would increase competition and job opportunities 
in the local markets.  
154 However, this form of discriminatory behaviour would distort rather than foster 
competition. See Case C-249/81 Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982]. 
155 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). 
156 Albany recognises that innovation, or social change, occurs when the change is 
supported by a combination of facilitating provisions. See D. Albury, ‘Fostering 
innovation in public services’ (2005) 25(1) Public Money and Management 51. 
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the inclusion of the social clause, in particular, has facilitated the 
participation of a sub-forms of SMEs in the public contract. 
6.8 Overall Impact of the Contract Performance Stage 
At the time the research was gathered, the consortium was successfully 
managing the contract and complying with the employment-based social 
clauses, with 80% of the all-new employees defined as ‘New Entrant 
Trainees’.157 The uniqueness of this case is the willingness of the two 
different organisations to work together. Both parties relied on each 
other’s operational practices and capabilities to tender for the contract. 
However, it should be noted that the relationship was not without 
difficulties. Loaf Catering had to invest in their operations to meet the 
high-quality standards set by G4S. The level of business was limited at the 
start of the contract, and the initial income stream was different than 
expected. G4S acknowledged that they ‘did not appreciate’ Loaf 
Catering’s operational standards.158 
 Although both parties recognised that there were some differences in 
operational standards at the start of the contract, both parties equally 
complimented the other for encouraging them to adopt changes in their 
organisations. Loaf Catering expressed gratitude for the advice and 
assistance offered by G4S on how to improve operational standards.159 
The social enterprise hoped that the changes made to their internal 
operations would improve efficiency and assist the company in bidding 
for future public contracts. The consortium experience encouraged G4S to 
engage with the social criteria further. The initial consortium inspired G4S 
to subcontract with different forms of social enterprises.160  
                                                                                      
157 See the Buy Social Unit Case Studies https://buysocialni.org/about-buy-social/case-
studies/ Last accessed 25th March 2019. 
158 Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
Working with large organisations assist social enterprises in improving their operational 
capabilities. See E. Skloot, ‘Evolution or extinction: A strategy for nonprofits in the 
marketplace’ (2000) 29(2) Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 315. 
159 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102). See also; E. Skloot (n 158). 
160 This finding supports Holmlund, Kock and Spence’s theories that commercial 
practices drive CSR related actions. G4S was motivated by the changes in the procurers 
buying preferences to work with the social enterprise. Older studies conducted by 
Williamson et al. and by Revell and Blackburn similarly conclude that suppliers’ 
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Harwood and Humby question if the use of social criteria is 
counterproductive, arguing that socially-related criteria set out by 
procurers in the selection criteria can result in a ‘ceiling effect’ whereby 
companies view the criteria set out as the upper limit of standards they 
need to achieve.161 This suggests that companies are deterred from 
embracing stronger social practices than those set out in the contractual 
requirements. However, the case study’s findings indicate that the use of 
the community benefit clause had a wider impact on the winning tenderers 
internal operations. The consortium partnership encouraged G4S to adopt 
additional social practices, further supporting their existing CSR 
policies.162 The inclusion of the community benefit clause had a long-term 
impact on the awardee company. 
If this case study is to be replicated by other large companies and social 
enterprises, the companies will need to evaluate the costs and potential 
benefits of working together. The companies will need to first invest in a 
potential relationship, outlining any training or accreditations which are 
required for the contract.163 There are long term efficiency and operational 
benefits for social enterprises, which will assist them in working for or 
partnering with larger corporations or public bodies in the future. Large 
organisations will benefit from the expertise of the social enterprises in 
putting forward a combined focus on achieving social goals, which they 
can incorporate into their business strategies or corporate social 
responsibility aims.164 
Similarly, to the National Children’s Hospital case study, the partnership 
between the public body and the contractor was essential to the successful 
                                                                                      
motivation to incorporate socially-related related objectives is intrinsically linked to the 
business environment and regulation. 
161 I Harwood and S. Humby, ‘Embedding corporate responsibility into supply: A 
snapshot of progress’ (2008) 26(3) European Management Journal 166. 
162 See Interview with the Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
163 Porter and Kramer argue that social ‘value creation’ is achieved through multiple 
partnerships. This research suggests that contracting authorities should aim to replicate 
the success of this case study by actively encouraging all forms of companies to tender 
as a consortium. This is an appropriate request once it does not lead to collusive 
behaviour between companies. See; M.E. Porter and M.R. Kramer, ‘Creating shared 
value. In Managing sustainable business’ (Springer, Dordrecht, 2019) 323. 
164 See M.E. Porter and M.R. Kramer (n 163). 
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incorporation of the social criteria. One of the reasons for the success of 
this case study is the motivation and commitment of the individuals 
involved. All parties appeared equally motivated and invested in making 
the contract a success.165 The Buy Social team were aware that they were 
introducing additional operational tasks to the services sector and 
introduced some measures to support the contractors carrying out the 
social clauses.166 The unit established a brokerage website to remove the 
administrative burden and costs of recruiting the new entrant trainees 
independently.167 
While the brokerage site offers support on the fulfilment of the social 
criteria, the Buy Social team attempted to build a strong relationship with 
the contractor from the start of the contract.168 When this procurement 
competition was being designed, the construction sector was experienced 
in assessing and monitoring the implementation and operation of the 
social criteria, however, the services sector was not familiar with 
managing the targeted recruitment and training requirements. The team 
developed a generic monitoring ‘intelligent’ excel sheet which procurers 
download to check the implementation of the clause.169 This information 
is updated monthly by the contractor’s project manager.  The information 
is inputted into a reporting tool on etenders.gov.ni platform. Using this 
platform, ‘we [the public body] can run reports on the value of contracts, 
how many work weeks were delivered, how many people were employed 
to deliver them.’170 These reports include a profile on the new employees, 
                                                                                      
165 Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102); See Interview with the Operations 
Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). 
166 Interview with Legal Counsel, Buy Social Unit (n 43). 
167 The brokerage’ website assists contractors in finding suitability trained ‘new entrant’ 
employees. If this case study is to be replicated by other public bodies, the contracting 
authority should put supports, akin to the brokerage site, in place to aid to compliance 
with the social requirements. Contracting authorities should not place undue 
administrative on SMEs. See Commission ,‘Think Small First” - A “Small Business Act” 
for Europe’ (Communication) COM (2008) 0394. 
168 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 8) The Development Officer 
participated in every stage of the procurement cycle. 
169 The intelligent excel sheet is used to analyse, report and manage contract performance. 
Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7). 
170 Interview with Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (n 7).  
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distinguishing whether the employees fall within the social clause’s 
definition.171  
If other public bodies would like to replicate the case study, they should 
ensure that a motivated employee is appointed to manage and control the 
inclusion of social criteria. Spence and Baden et al. further call for 
businesses to play a greater role in the design of socially responsible 
criteria.172 Both contractors in this case study expressed a desire to change 
the current subcontractor considerations. The contractors voiced their 
support for scored subcontractor criteria in the tender stage. Both 
contractors recognised the importance of sustainable supply-chains and 
argued that this was often overlooked in procurement processes. The 
contractor’s expressed frustration with certain elements of the community 
benefit clause. The companies argued for greater sanctions for non-
compliance with such clauses. This is an interesting approach for a 
contractor to call for a more stringent application of social clauses.173 
Contracting authorities wishing to introduce social criteria, should, 
therefore, engage with the private sector to design bespoke criteria for all 
forms of public contracts. 
                                                                                      
171 SIB, CPD and the Buy Social Unit should monitor and review these reports closely to 
assess what impact the social criteria is having on the supply chain and local employment 
market. As youth employment continues to fall, the public bodies will need to assess the 
appropriateness of the targeted recruitment and training clauses. For a discussion on the 
evaluating sustainability in the supply chain see; M.J. Hutchins and J.W. Sutherland, ‘An 
exploration of measures of social sustainability and their application to supply chain 
decisions’ (2008) 16(15) Journal of Cleaner Production 1688. 
172 L. Spence, ‘Business ethics and social responsibility in small firms’ in E. Chell, M. 
Karataş-Özkan, ‘Handbook of research on small business and entrepreneurship’ 
(Edward Elger, Chelthenham, Northampton, UK, MA, USA, 2014) 374; D. Baden, I. 
Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The effects of procurement policies on ‘downstream’ 
corporate social responsibility activity: Content-analytic insights into the views and 
actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 29(3) International Small Business 259. 
173 See Interview with the CEO, NOW Group (n 102); See Interview with the Operations 
Director, G4S Northern Ireland (n 102). The contractors called for the contracting 
authority to set-aside elements of the contract for SMEs. While this is not possible under 
EU law, the contracting authorities should use this feedback when reviewing the use of 
the social criteria. The public bodies should also engage with the suppliers when 
reviewing or developing new social criteria. See also; E. Vigoda, ‘From responsiveness 
to collaboration: Governance, citizens, and the next generation of public administration’ 
(2002) 62(5) Public Administration Review, 527; J.W. Selsky and B. Parker, ‘Cross-
sector partnerships to address social issues: Challenges to theory and practice’ (2005) 
31(6) Journal of Management 849. 
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In line with the National Children’s Hospital case study findings, these 
findings also indicate the need for procurement practice to recognise the 
importance of  facilitating all forms of businesses in the public market. 
CPD is leading the way in introducing government guidance notes 
supporting the inclusion of social enterprises in public contracts. Initial 
policy documents were introduced in 2001 and were updated in 2016.174 
CPD actively encourages the use of SME and social enterprise friendly 
criteria in public procurement practices. The Buy Social unit focuses on 
the inclusion of community benefit clauses, which as we have seen, can 
facilitate social enterprise participation. However, a wider argument 
questions whether such clauses should be included in supplies and 
services contracts or should be restricted to construction or works 
contracts.175 This research argues that social criteria should be included in 
both works and services contracts. The inclusion of social criteria in this 
services contract facilitated SME participation in the public contract. If it 
was not for the social criteria, it is unlikely that the social enterprise would 
have tendered for the main contract or any subcontracts. This debate is 
limited in Northern Ireland as recent policy developments require the 
inclusion of employment clauses in all types of  works, supplies and 
services contracts.176 However, the argument still exists in Ireland. The 
2013 ‘Social Clauses Bill’ failed to gain enough momentum to pass the 
Bill into legislation.177  
                                                                                      
174 See CPD Policy Government Notes;  
A Guide for Social Economy Enterprises (2011) PGN 01/11 
Helping Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Social Economy Enterprises 
(SEEs) access Public Sector contracting opportunities (2011) PGN 02/11 
Public Procurement: A Guide for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) (2012) 
PGN 02/12 
Helping SMEs Benefit from Subcontracting Opportunities (2012) PGN 06/12 
Abnormally Low Tenders (2013) PGN 03/13 
Integrating Social Considerations into Contracts (2016) PGN 01/13 
Innovation in Public Procurement (2017) PGN 02/17 
Human Rights in Public Procurement (2018) PGN 03/18. 
175 R. Macfarlane and M. Cook, ‘Achieving community benefits through contracts: Law, 
policy and practice’ (Policy Press, 2002). 
176 Integrating Social Considerations into Contracts (2016) PGN 01/13. 
177 Note, the Bill is still under review, but it is unlikely that it will succeed to the next 
stage. The majority of private members bills are not enacted. See B. Farrell, ‘The political 
role of cabinet ministers in Ireland. Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government’ 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994) 73. 
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6.9 Conclusion 
Vesel argues that large companies tendering for large contracts are 
incentivised to submit low bids which price SMEs out of the market.178 
This case study demonstrates that the division of larger contracts into 
smaller lots and the inclusion of social clauses and considerations 
facilitated the participation of two forms of social enterprises in the public 
contract. One of the original reasons for comparing the NCH procurement 
documents and contracts with the Buy Social ancillary catering and 
cleaning contract was that they both contained similar, nearly mirror 
images, community benefit clauses. Both approaches have facilitated 
SME participation in the public contracts either as main contractors or 
subcontractors.  
The difference between the two case studies is the use of community 
benefit clauses to promote social enterprise engagement in the market as 
an equal consortium partner. The findings suggest that large enterprises 
should consider partnering with social enterprises when bidding for large 
contracts which include community benefit clauses. The large companies 
may not have the expertise to facilitate, or be interested in, the wider 
community goals of the targeted recruitment and training requirements 
and partnering with social enterprises will alleviate concerns the company 
might have about meeting the employment-based targets. 
                                                                                      
The political drive appears to have furthered declined with the reduction in the 
unemployment rates and an increase in the construction sector growth.  
178 T. Vesel, ‘Addressing social considerations in PP: best practices for fighting social 
dumping in Slovenia’ in G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, 
Abingdon, Oxon;New York, NY, 2015) 39. 
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Chapter Seven Smart Dublin Case Study 
 
7.1 Introduction 
When this research commenced in 2014, there was an urgent economic 
and political need to assist SMEs’ recovery from the financial crisis.1 As 
time passed, this need diminished, SMEs have recovered from the 
financial crisis2 and are becoming more successful in their endeavours to 
enter the public market.3 However, limited research is available on the 
relationship between innovative start-ups and public procurement in 
Ireland. This case study examines the impact the emerging role of the 
‘Smart Dublin’ programme is having on the Irish public procurement 
landscape. Traditionally, innovative SMEs and start-ups have been 
hindered from tendering for public sector contracts.4 There are a number 
of reasons for this, procurers tend to favour standardised tender documents 
that set standard financial and qualification criteria.5 SMEs and start-ups 
                                                                                      
1 See Commission, ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ access to Public Procurement Markets in the 
EU.’ (2010) Final Report; Commission ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets 
and aggregation of demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
2 2017 witnessed the greatest number of new company registrations in one year in Ireland. 
22,354 were registered in the state in 2017 according to the Annual Review 2018 Business 
Barometer. However, there are a number of hurdles facing SME growth. Access to 
finance is one of the key challenges faced by newly established business. PCP offers a 
solution to this problem, offering innovative enterprises limited financial support and an 
opportunity to develop and test their proposed solutions. See Commission, ‘Pre-
commercial Procurement: driving innovation to ensure sustainable high-quality public 
services in Europe’ (Communication) COM (2007) 0799 final. 
3 See Office of Government Procurement, ‘Public Service Spend and Tendering 
Analysis’ (2013). Available at; http://www.procurement.ie/sites/default/files/ogp-public-
service-spend-tendering-analysis-2013-1.pdf Last accessed 1st June 2016. 
4 A. Erridge, ‘Public procurement, public value and the Northern Ireland unemployment 
pilot project’ (2007) 85(4) Public Administration 1023; A. Erridge and S. Hennigan, 
‘Sustainable procurement in health and social care in Northern Ireland’ (2012) 32(5) 
Public Money and Management 363. 
5 See Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’ 
Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services. (2019) Version 2.1. Accessible 
at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/national-public-procurement-policy-framework/ Last 
accessed 2nd June 2019. 
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are often prohibited from tendering for the public contracts as they fail to 
meet the mandatory selection criteria.6   
The Smart Dublin initiative was launched in 2016 and is tasked with 
engaging with citizens, researchers and businesses to develop intelligent 
internet solutions to address societal challenges, such as flooding, illegal 
dumping and bathing water quality. This case study scrutinises Smart 
Dublin’s approach to conducting low-value research and development 
(R&D) contracts. The research questions to what extent does the use of 
PCP facilitate SME participation in public procurement. This case study 
critically examines the procurement process used by Smart Dublin. A PCP 
procedure was used to generate solutions to improve cycling rates in 
Dublin city. In particular, the research examines what impact the use of 
PCP processes has on SME engagement. This case study is exploratory 
and interpretative in nature.7 Interviews with the key public procurer and 
contracted companies were conducted over two-years.8 The tender 
documents were studied in detail.9 The evidence from this case study 
suggests that the use of lots and PCP procedures facilitates SME 
participation. Innovative ICT start-ups successfully entered the public 
market. The innovative procedure resulted in five companies been 
awarded €12,500 contracts, with four out of the five companies 
successfully awarded a second €25,000 contract.  
This chapter opens with an overview of the Smart Dublin programme and 
continues by offering a detailed analysis of the completed tender. A ‘Small 
Business Innovation Research’ (SBIR) PCP competition was conducted, 
it sought to increase the number of cyclists in Dublin city by 25%. The 
chapter concludes by summarising the research results. The case study 
                                                                                      
6 K. Karjalainen and K. Kemppainen, ‘The involvement of small-and medium-sized 
enterprises in public procurement: Impact of resource perceptions, electronic systems 
and enterprise size’ (2008) 14(4) Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 230. 
7 As outlined in Chapter Four Methodology, the research adopts a socio-legal approach. 
8 Interviews were conducted on-site and by telephone. Four interviews were conducted 
with the Smart Dublin Programme Manage and the CEOs and Managing Directors of the 
awardee companies. 
9 These documents were made available to any interested party on www.etenders.gov.ie. 
These documents were shared openly with the researcher, data was gathered during and 
after the completion of the competition. 
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offers an empirical assessment of a PCP procedure used for the smart 
cities programme. The results of this investigation show that socially 
responsible procurement practices can encourage start-up growth.  
7.2 Smart Cities and Public Procurement  
The overall objective of the smart cities initiatives is to improve city life 
for citizens, businesses and stakeholders.10 The cities work in 
collaboration with all interested stakeholders to develop bespoke solutions 
for individual cities challenges.11 The Smart Dublin programme was 
adopted in 2016 and has similar objectives to existing global initiatives. 
The programme has four objectives to; provide better services, promote 
innovative solutions, improve economic activity and to increase 
collaboration and engagement with all stakeholders in the city.12 Smart 
Cities works with citizens, businesses and academia to transform 
innovative solutions into reality.13 The initiative was founded by the four 
Dublin Local Authorities, Dublin City Council, South Dublin County 
Council, Fingal County Council and Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County 
Council, to provide innovative solutions to the city’s challenges. Smart 
Dublin works with smart technology providers, third level institutions and 
citizens to find smart solutions to improve city life. The initiative works 
in collaboration with Intel, IBM, Maynooth University, LERO, the Irish 
Software Research Centre, Connect Networks of the Future, Docklands 
Business Forum, DCU, Kingspan Senson, Enterprise Ireland, Insight and 
the Programmable City.  
The Directive encourages the use of co-financed R&D initiatives, 
acknowledging that eco-innovation and social innovation are core drivers 
                                                                                      
10 H. Schaffers, N. Komninos, M. Pallot, B. Trousse, M. Nilsson and A. Oliveira, ‘Smart 
cities and the future internet: Towards cooperation frameworks for open innovation. 
In The future internet assembly’ (Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011) 431. 
11 J. Lee and H. Lee, ‘Developing and validating a citizen-centric typology for smart city 
services’ (2014) 31 Government Information Quarterly S93. 
12 Smart Dublin is an initiative of the four Dublin Local Authorities. 
13 H. Chourabi, T. Nam, S. Walker, J.R. Gil-Garcia, S. Mellouli, K. Nahon, T.A. Pardo, 
and H.J. Scholl, ‘Understanding smart cities: An integrative framework’ (2012) In 2012 
45th Hawaii international conference on system sciences 2289. 
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of future growth.14 However, the Directive only applies to research and 
development activities which are solely funded by the public authority and 
the exclusive right to use the developed product or service is retained by 
the contracting authority.15 PCP involves asking suppliers to propose a 
new solution. Suppliers offer to share the initial benefits of the new 
solution with the contracting authority, the public body is not permitted to 
retain exclusive use of the designed service.16 The company will own the 
developed service and should commercially exploit their product post 
completion of the contract. Contracting authorities must ensure that the 
process does not include elements of State Aid, they can do this by 
undertaking a competitive, open and transparent process.17 
PCP is the process used to procure research and development services.18 
Pantilimon Voda defines PCP as the successive development of a 
marketable product or service with the risks shared between a private 
operator and a public body under market conditions.19 Companies and 
public bodies must both accept an element of risk in these processes, both 
sides or one side may decide not to prototype the service post the 
completion of a solution exploration stage.20 The PCP ends when the 
solutions developed are market-ready, this stage is followed by the 
                                                                                      
14 Public Sector Directive, recital 47, arts 2(1), 67(2), 70, 76(2); See Commission, 
‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.’ (2010) COM 
2020 final. 
15 Public Sector Directive, recital 35, art 14. See also; COM (2007) 799 final. 
16 If the public body requires exclusive use of the proposed solution and will be fully 
responsible for the numeration of the solution design and prototyping, the public body is 
required to comply with the applicable procurement Directives. Procurers seeking 
defence solutions may require exclusive use of a developed solution. 
17 See Commission, ‘Guide to the application of the European Union rules on state aid, 
public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, and 
in particular to social services of general interest.’ (Staff Working Paper) SWD (2013) 
53 final/2. 
18 COM (2007) 799 final. 
19 O.S. Pantilimon Voda, ‘Innovative and sustainable procurement: framework, 
constraints and policies’ in C. Bovis, ‘Research handbook on EU public procurement 
law’ (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 228; See also; J. Edler and L. Georghiou, ‘Public 
procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research 
Policy 949. 
20 This prevents PCP being viewed incorrectly as a ‘grant’ scheme.  
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completion of a tender competition for a traditional public supply, services 
or mixed contract.21 Figure 1.0 below illustrates a PCP procedure.  
 
 
Figure 1.0 Typical Product Innovation Cycle 
Taken from Communication from the Commission: Pre-Commercial 
Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality 
public services in Europe 
Most PCP takes place over three successive stages before the contracting 
authority completes a competitive tender for the developed solution. The 
first stage involves the identification of innovative solutions. Phase two 
allows for the prototyping of the proposed solution. This phase allows for 
the development and assessment of shortlisted solutions.22 The final stage 
tests the product or service on a small scale. Once the contracting authority 
                                                                                      
21 J. Rigby Review of pre-commercial procurement approaches and effects on innovation. 
Nesta Working Paper No. 13/14 (Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, 
Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, 2013). 
22 See O.S. Pantilimon Voda (n 19) 229. 
291 
 
is ready to purchase the developed and tested commercial solution, they 
are required to comply with the applicable Directives and implementing 
national legislation.23 Even if the proposed contract falls below the 
advertising thresholds, the contracting authority must uphold the principle 
of non-discrimination.24 
PCP is suitable in cases where there is a ‘market failure’, where there is 
no available product or service which could effectively meet the public 
sector needs.25 The public sector, therefore, needs to support and share the 
costs and risks with private entities to develop new ways to meet the public 
needs and to address societal challenges.26 The research case study 
examines the SBIR ‘Smart Dublin Cycle Challenge’ PCP process.  The 
contracting authority sought the assistance of the private market to help 
design innovative software solutions to improve cycling rates in the city. 
Interested economic operators were asked to design services or products 
which would improve cycling safety and reduce the potential of cycling-
related thefts.27 In this case study, Smart Dublin was not the only source 
of demand for the proposed services and goods. This was not a monopoly 
situation.28 The research makes the assumption that the PCP process was 
initially conducted in a ‘dependent’ market, where the public buyer was 
the main purchaser of these types of services and goods in 2016 in Dublin 
city. The positive prototyping and piloting of these specific services paved 
the road for the creation of a ‘commercial’ market.29 Cyclists and other 
public bodies will become the target market for the awardee companies. 
                                                                                      
23 COM (2007) 799 final. 
24 COM (2007) 799 final. R&D contracts are exempt for the Public Sector Directive, 
however, the procurers must comply with the fundamental principle of non-
discriminatory. 
25 L. Miles and J. Rigby, ‘Demand-led innovation’ (Innovation Policy Challenges for the 
21st Century. Routledge, 2013) 36. 
26  See O.S. Pantilimon Voda (n 19) 216. 
27 Request for Tender, Specifications. 
28 A monopolistic market exists in situations where there is one dominant economic 
operator. See A.C. Harberger, ‘Monopoly and resource allocation. In Essential Readings 
in Economics’ (Palgrave, London, 1995) 77. 
29 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Public procurement and the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) 45. 
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Smart Dublin will no longer be the dominant buyer at the end of the 
process.  
According to Edler and Georghiou, this could be considered a form of 
catalytic procurement, whereby the private sector is requested to develop 
a product or service to assist the contracting authority in achieving a stated 
goal.30 Apostol further suggests that at the end of a catalytic procedure, 
the public sector demand for the service will be eliminated and private 
consumers will exclusively use the solution.31 This classification appears 
to define the process used in the case study.32 The contracting authority 
never stated from the outset that it intended to conduct a procurement 
competition to purchase the commercialised products or services at the 
end of the PCP stage.33   
Alternatively, the procedure could also be classified as a co-operative 
procurement, as the development and prototyping of the new product or 
service are of mutual benefit to the end-user, supplier and public body.34 
The process was undertaken to fulfil item 98 of the Action Plan for Jobs 
(APFJ) 2016 which tasked Enterprise Ireland with the responsibility of 
carrying out SBIR projects.35 However, it is more accurate to classify the 
procedure as ‘catalytic’, as the underpinning characteristic of this 
competition was the purchase, development and support of highly-
technologised software and products to improve cycling safety and 
                                                                                      
30 J. Edler and L. Georghiou, ‘Public procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the 
demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research policy 949 See also; C. Edquist and L. Hommen, 
‘Government technology procurement and innovation theory’ (1998) Innovation 
Systems and European Integration Research Project Report. 
31 A.R. Apostol, ‘Pre-commercial procurement in support of innovation: regulatory 
effectiveness’ (2012) 21(6) Public Procurement Law Review 213. 
32 Interview with Jamie Cudden, Smart Cities Programme Manager, Dublin City Council 
(Dublin, Ireland, 24th April 2016).  
33 Neither the Request for Tender or accompanying forms referred to the possibility of 
the contracting authority purchasing the commercial ready product at the end of the 
process. When referring to the scope of the pre-commercial procurement process in the 
request for tender, the contracting authority noted; ‘This is an excellent opportunity to 
establish an early customer for a new technology and to fund its development’ (section, 
4). 
34 See J. Edler,and L. Georghiou (2007) (n 30). 
35 Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation. National ‘Action Plans for Jobs 2016’. 
(2016) Action 98. https://dbei.gov.ie/en/Publications/Publication-files/Action-Plan-for-
Jobs-2016.pdf Last accessed 11th June 2019. 
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cycling rates. It is unlikely that the contract will be continuously ‘re-
bought’.36 Defining the PCP process accurately will assist interested 
economic operators in assessing whether it is economically viable to 
develop a new product or service for the public sector. Economic 
operators will need to identify the target market for the developed product 
or service when the PCP has ended, will the public sector be the main 
target market and if so, is there a demand from other public bodies to 
purchase the innovative solutions. Additionally, the economic operator 
should consider if there is a wider demand from the private sector.37 
7.3 Cycling Challenge 
The case study examines a low-value procuring competition conducted by 
the Smart Dublin initiative. The purpose of this PCP procedure was to 
improve cycling rates across the Dublin region and in the city centre. An 
overriding goal of the Smart Dublin initiative is to facilitate 25% of all 
journeys made in the city to be by bicycle.38 The tender was published on 
the etenders.gov.ie centralised procurement site on 8th March 2016. The 
process fell outside the remit of the Directives and implementing Irish 
legislation.39 However, to encourage competition, the call for competition 
was freely and openly advertised on the national eTenders platform.40 A 
simplified version of the open procedure was adopted to reduce the 
administrative burden faced by SMEs.41 Similarly, to an open procedure, 
                                                                                      
36 See L. Hommen and M. Rolfstam, ‘Public procurement and innovation: towards a 
taxonomy’ (2008) 8(3) Journal of public procurement 17.  
37 It is therefore important for contracting authorities to carefully indicate whether it plans 
to purchase the developed solutions through the use of a competitive procedure at the 
end of the pre-commercial stage.  
38 Request for tender, section 2. 
39 The contracting authority was required to comply with the TFEU principles and soft-
law measures. The competition embodied many of the provisions set out in Circular 
10/2014, ‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement’ 2014. The competition was 
conducted in an open manner and the selection criteria was set in a proportionate manner.  
40 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 32) See also provisions 
set out in Circular 10/2014, ‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement’ 2014. 
41 Open forms of competitions are conducive to SME participation. See; A.H. Glas and 
M. Eßig, ‘Factors that influence the success of small and medium-sized suppliers in 
public procurement: evidence from a centralized agency in Germany’ (2018) 23(1) 
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 65. 
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the competition was open to all interested economic operators.42 Dublin 
City Council was responsible for carrying out the competition.  
The pre-commercial invitation to tender sought to find low cost, smart and 
innovative solutions to increase the number of cyclists in the region and 
the city.43 In particular, the invitation to tender requested ‘technology data 
driven proposals which aim  to; improve the use of existing cycling data 
to inform the solution, produce new cycling data to understand the issues 
better, address cycling safety including actual accidents and perceptions 
of safety and address bike safety including cycle parking and bicycle 
theft.44 The Smart City programme was building on the success of the 
2003 DublinBikes scheme which resulted in a 43% increase in cycling 
rates.45 
The invitation to tender was quite informative, it outlined that Smart 
Dublin was in particular interested in developing and funding ideas which 
assisted; tracking bicycle routes, travel times, parking, monitoring cycling 
behaviour, offered inclusive cycling ideas and reduced bicycle accidents 
and theft.46 The Smart Dublin team had conducted market research to 
assess what products and services were readily available on the market. 
The research activities assisted the team in designing the list of what types 
of products or services would potentially meet their procuring needs.47 
The PCP was carried out in two-stages. The first phase was launched on 
8th March 2016 and was concluded within three months. The purpose of 
                                                                                      
42 See Public Authorities Regulations, reg 27. 
43 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 32). 
44 Request for Tender, section 3.3. 
45 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 32); See also; B. Caulfield, 
‘Re-cycling a city–Examining the growth of cycling in Dublin’ (2014) 61 Transportation 
research part A: policy and practice 216; P. Carroll, B. Caulfield and A. Ahern, 
‘Exploring a case of car usage and ownership reduction in Dublin through car-shedding 
interventions’ (2017) In Universities Transport Study Group (UTSG) Conference, 
Dublin 1-12. 
46 Request for Tender, section 3.2. 
47 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 32); Regulation 40 of the 
Public Authorities Regulations allows for contracting authorities to conduct market 
consultations with a view to preparing the call for competition notices. However, the 
contracting authority must always uphold the principle of equal treatment. Economic 
operators involved in the market consultations must not receive favourable treatment or 
confidential information.  
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the first phase sought to assess the technical feasibility of a proposed 
concept. Successful applications at this stage were awarded €50,000 
(between companies) for a maximum of three months to develop the 
proposed concept.48 During this period, the companies were expected to 
‘provide a robust, evidence based case for the viability of their proposed 
solution.’49 Originally, only two applicants would progress to Phase Two 
of the competition. At this stage, the companies were offered an additional 
€50,000 (including VAT) to further develop their solution aiming for 
commercial implementation. The invitation to tender clearly outlined that 
this was not a grant system and payments were made on the successful 
completion of agreed milestones.50  
The PCP process was classified as an SBIR challenge. Link and Scott 
define SBIR as a partnership between a public body and a private entity 
or entrepreneur, where the public body funds the private sector R&D 
projects.51 The public body embodies entrepreneurial characteristics by 
accepting ‘innovative risks’, contracting authorities offer public money to 
develop a solution which is not guaranteed to succeed.52 This risk is 
significantly lower or absent in standard public goods or services 
contracts.   
The process itself incorporated best practice set out in European and 
national policy to make the tender stage more conducive to small business 
participation.53 The competition was conducted by electronic means, 
using the submission tool on etenders.gov.ie. While, the Directive 
                                                                                      
48 Request for Tender, section 5. 
49 Request for Tender, section 5; See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme 
Manager (n 32). 
50 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 32) This is one of the key 
differences between the purchase of R&D and the use of state-aid activities. See A. 
Sanchez Graells, ‘Public Procurement and State Aid: Reopening the Debate?’ (April 10, 
2012). Public Procurement Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2037768 Last accessed 3rd March 2019. 
51 A. Link and J. Scott, ‘Government as entrepreneur: Evaluating the commercialization 
success of SBIR projects’ (2010) 39(5) Research Policy 589. 
52 See A. Link and J. Scott (n 51). 
53 See Commission, ‘Think Small First” - A “Small Business Act” for Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2008) 0394; Commission, ‘European Code of Best Practices 
Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts’ (SWP) COM (2008) 
2193; Circular 10/2014, ‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement’ 2014. 
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imposes e-procurement requirements for above-threshold contracts, these 
requirements do not extend to low-value contracts. Although, as suggested 
by Albano et al.’s e-procurement practices also facilitate small business 
participation in low-value contracts.54 A tax clearance certificate was only 
required to be produced upon the award of the contract. The Request for 
Tender (RFT) was designed in a simple, proportionate and straightforward 
manner.55 It compromised of; details of lead applicant or organisation, title 
and abstract for publication, description of proposed idea or technology, 
technical project summary, economic viability, the current state of the art 
and intellectual property, project management and methodology, technical 
team and expertise and application finance. There were no minimum 
requirements set.  The request for tender was not prescriptive, allowing 
suppliers to dedicate their time to describe how their proposed solution 
would improve cycling rates in Dublin.56 
Companies were given the freedom to set their own project milestones and 
to identify risks and mitigation actions related to them. A guidance 
document was attached to the RFT, offering helpful instructions on how 
to answer each section. The invitation to tender was accompanied by a 48-
page document outlining the current cycling landscape in Ireland and 
reiterating that the purpose of the initiative is to tackle congestion, reduce 
pollution and greenhouse emissions and to generate health and wellbeing 
benefits. In compliance with the pre-tender procurement requirements, the 
contracted businesses, for the most part, retained the intellectual property 
generated from the project.57 From the outset, all forms of suppliers were 
encouraged to bid on an equal footing, the traditional barriers to tendering 
                                                                                      
54 G.L. Albano, F. Antellini Russo, G. Castaldi and R. Zampino, ‘Evaluating Small 
Businesses Performance in Public e‐Procurement: Evidence from the Italian 
Government's e‐Marketplace’ (2015) 53(1) Journal of Small Business Management 229. 
55 This demonstrates how the social objectives of the Directives can be pursued in below 
threshold contracts. 
56 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 32) The contracting 
authority aimed to make the process easy for micro-businesses to bid for the contract. 
57 COM (2007) 799 final. Companies must be able to exploit the developed product or 
service. See also; C. Edquist and J.Zabala‐Iturriagagoitia, ‘Pre‐commercial 
procurement: a demand or supply policy instrument in relation to innovation?’ (2015) 
45(2) R&D Management. 
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were removed, the tender submission forms were user-friendly and were 
supported by a weight of additional information.58  
The contracts could only be awarded to registered companies or charities. 
However, the main contractor could subcontract to unregistered pre-start-
up companies. Applications were also accepted from Universities which 
could demonstrate a route to market and which designed a viable plan to 
commercialise project results.59 Tenderers were required to declare that 
the company was not bankrupt and not the subject of proceedings for a 
declaration of bankruptcy. Tenderers were required to state that they had 
fulfilled relevant social security and tax obligations and had not been 
convicted of fraud, money laundering or corruption.60 While the 
application was designed to be accessible to all, some interested parties 
expressed concern over the tax clearance requirements and the definition 
of legal entities.61 This is a concern pre-start-ups might face, especially in 
circumstances where the start-up is set up as a part of a University-funded 
venture and is not incorporated on an individual basis.62 However, it 
would be risky for a contracting authority to contract with an unregistered 
company. A contracting authority even when spending small amounts of 
public money must ensure that they achieve value for taxpayers’ money.63 
In contrast to the flexibility of the selection criteria, the procurer closely 
controlled the financial criteria. The justification of costs was broken 
down into seven sections (labour costs, material costs, capital equipment 
costs, subcontract costs, travel costs, indirect costs and other costs). 
Suppliers were not informed of the allocation of marks to each category. 
                                                                                      
58 However, during the supplier interviews one company did state that they would have 
preferred if the tender response document was not in a Word format. Interview with Sile 
Ginnane, Co-founder, FluidEdge (By phone, 24th July 2018). 
59 Many start-ups and pre-start-ups are established in Universities, the companies tend to 
exploit University-assigned inventions. See S. Shane and T. Stuart, ‘Organizational 
Endowments and the Performance of University Start-ups’ (2002) 48(1) Management 
Science 154. 
60 This is reflective of the social, labour and environmental compliance requirements set 
out in the Public Authorities Regulation, regs 18(4), 57.  
61 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 32). 
62 Large number of start-ups are ‘spun-out’ of Universities invention labs. See S. Shane 
and T. Stuart (n 59). 
63 See Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’ 
Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services. (2017) Version 1. 
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An assumption can be made to suggest that this decision was made to 
ensure the procurers received competitive pricing as well as high-quality 
bids.64 
7.4 Challenge Outcomes 
Market consultations were completed instead of using Prior Information 
Notices (PINs).65 The consultations had a dual purpose, they were first 
used to assist the procuring team in completing their assessment of current 
market offerings and secondly the market-sounding exercises informed 
potential suppliers of the upcoming competition.66 One of the winning 
companies stated in the research interview that if it were ‘not for the 
market consultations’ they would not have known about the 
competition.67 This company did not search for public contracts on the 
eTenders site, as they believed that they could not effectively compete for 
even the lowest value contracts (€25,000 for supplies and services) 
advertised on the site. The company praised Dublin City Council’s efforts 
in advertising the market consultations and for working closely with the 
local Chambers of Commerce to promote the consultations.68  
At the request for tender stage of the competition, 98 companies submitted 
an ‘expression of interest’ which translated into 23 completed 
applications. 14 companies out of these 23 were invited to pitch their ideas 
for 10 minutes.69 The pitch process was completed over two days and was 
conducted in partnership with Enterprise Ireland. The companies included 
spin-outs, self-employed, consultancy services based in Ireland and 
                                                                                      
64 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 32) The procurer was 
motivated to generate competition in the market place.  
65 PINs have since been used for the SMART Bins competition and only generated a 
limited number of responses. Interview with Jamie Cudden, Smart Cities Programme 
Manager, Dublin City Council (Dublin, Ireland, 20th June 2017).   
66 See COM (2008) 0394.  
67 See Interview with the Co-founder, FluidEdge (n 58). 
68 See Interview with the Co-founder, FluidEdge (n 58). 
69 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65). 
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France.70 Proposals were marked on confidence and quality.71 At this 
stage, the procurers had only planned to award exploratory contracts to 
three companies. However, five companies were awarded funds for their 
proposed solutions, Ambie, See Sense, FluidEdge, Hidnseek and Smart 
Charge LTD. The companies displayed ‘real enthusiasm’ and offered 
‘outstanding quality’ solutions.72 Each company was awarded €12,500 to 
develop their solution over three months. The flexibility of the approach 
benefitted the contracting authority and awardee companies. 
The first awardee ‘Ambie’ proposed the ‘BikeLook’ solution. BikeLook is 
a software device which monitors bicycle usage and reduces the chances 
of theft.73 BikeLook aims to improve cycle safety by installing sensors on 
bike racks and bicycles across the city. In the occurrence of a bicycle being 
stolen, the sensor sends a notification to the bicycle owner. Once the 
sensors have been placed throughout the city, the sensors will be able to 
locate and track a stolen bicycle within a 450m range of any one of the 
sensor racks in the city. The solution is operated using an app.74  
The second awardee ‘FluidEdge’ proposed the ‘Liberty Bell’ solution, a 
software device which records cyclists actual or perceived obstacles. 
Liberty Bell aims to improve cycling safety by gathering and analysing 
cyclists and pedestrians’ movements throughout the city. One of the novel 
elements of the solution is the technologies ability to gather qualitative 
data on unreported ‘near-misses’ incidents which deter or scare cyclists. 
                                                                                      
70 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65) The competition did 
not generate interest from large-sized enterprises, presumably this was due to the value 
of the contract and the potential requirement to share new product or services solutions 
with the public body or with potential competitors. Large organisations have the financial 
capacity to conduct this level of R&D internally. Whereas, this form of R&D funding is 
critical to the survival and development of small or micro enterprises. See also; See 
Commission, ‘Europe’s next leaders: the Start-up and Scale-up Initiative’ 
(Communication) COM (2016). 
71 Request for Tender, section 6. 
72 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65); Smart Dublin, 
Published Case Studies. 
73 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65); Smart Dublin, 
Published Case Studies.; Smart Dublin, Published Case Studies; available; 
https://smartdublin.ie/smart-stories/ Last accessed 20/06/2019 
74 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65); Smart Dublin, 
Published Case Studies; available; https://smartdublin.ie/smart-stories/ Last accessed 
20/06/2019 
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The technology pinpoints areas and locations of concern for the cyclists 
in a cost-efficient manner.75 It is clear that participation in the public 
competition has benefited the company, since completing the pilot 
contract Liberty Bell won the 2017 Colorado Department of 
Transportation International ‘Road X Bicycle and Pedestrian 
Challenge’.76  
The third awardee ‘Hidnseek’, a French company, offered a solution 
which aims to design low-power devices to track assets remotely and to 
generate real-time data. The software device is attached to a bicycle and 
measures GPS co-ordinates and environmental conditions. Data gathered 
can easily be integrated with other data sources, allowing the company, 
Smart Dublin and DCC to obtain a rounded understanding of the cycling 
conditions and cycle theft rates in the city.77  
The fourth awardee ‘Limeforge LTD.’ created the ‘See.Sense’ software 
tracker. The tracker designed in Northern Ireland is placed inside an 
‘ICON’ light which is attached to bicycles. 500 cyclists participated in a 
pilot run, and participants were offered to purchase the product at a 
subsidised rate of €20.00. The tracking device is placed onto the bicycle 
and uses Bluetooth to connect to the bicycle owner’s Android smartphone. 
The tracking device sends alerts to the owners’ phone and notifies next of 
kin of the exact location of any accidents.78 The See.Sense additionally 
gathered anonymised and aggregated cycling data. The novel element of 
the solution is the safety measure of an ‘ICON’ light, which reacts to the 
environment. The light becomes stronger in hazardous situations, such as 
exiting a roundabout, meeting oncoming vehicles with full headlights on 
or passing through busy intersections. The lightweight product has long 
                                                                                      
75 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65); Smart Dublin, 
Published Case Studies; available; https://smartdublin.ie/smart-stories/ Last accessed 
20/06/2019. 
76 See Interview with the Co-founder, FluidEdge (n 58). 
77 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65); Smart Dublin, 
Published Case Studies; available; https://smartdublin.ie/smart-stories/ Last accessed 
20/06/2019. 
78 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65); Smart Dublin, 
Published Case Studies; available; https://smartdublin.ie/smart-stories/ Last accessed 
20/06/2019.   
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battery life and is the winner of many global innovation awards.79  The 
fifth awardee ‘MC2 Smartcharge LTD.’ offered a data harvesting software 
tool to track and log bicycle use in the city. The purpose of this tool is to 
assist cyclists in finding bicycle parking facilities and predicting the safest 
routes for cyclists’ journeys. The companies are classified as small and 
micro-entities.80  
The second phase was launched as part of the ‘Dublin Cycling Campaign’ 
six months later. One of the key learning outcomes for DCC from the first 
phase of the competition was the organisation of payments. During the 
first phase, irregular payments were made upon the receipt of invoices. 
This created an unnecessary administrative burden for both the Council 
and the suppliers. For the second phase, the Council paid 50% of the funds 
at the start of the project and released the remaining 50% upon completion 
of the contract. The flexibility of the PCP allowed for the contracting 
authority to quickly respond to this problem by introducing changes to the 
contractual conditions at the second stage of the competition.81  
The five suppliers pitched to progress to the second phase. The Smart 
Dublin’s team ‘expectations were exceeded’, each company aptly 
displayed progressive growth and development within a short period of 
time and with minimal financial investment.82 The purpose of the second 
phase pitches was to assess the suppliers’ ability to commercialise their 
solutions and their plans to enter into the private market. The contracting 
authority had budgeted to fund two companies at this phase; however, due 
to the quality of the proposals and solutions offered contracts were 
ultimately offered to four of the suppliers.83 Each company received 
€25,000 in the second phase. DCC suggested that it “might be more 
                                                                                      
79 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65); Smart Dublin, 
Published Case Studies; available; https://smartdublin.ie/smart-stories/ Last accessed 
20/06/2019 
80 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65); Smart Dublin, 
Published Case Studies; available; https://smartdublin.ie/smart-stories/ Last accessed 
20/06/2019 
81 O.S. Pantilimon Voda (n 19) 229 
82 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65). 
83 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65). 
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beneficial” to increase this figure to €50,000 for future competitions.84 
The flexible, straightforward and open PCP facilitated SME participation 
in the public market. The flexible nature of the procedure allowed for 
important changes to be introduced at the second stage of the competition.   
7.5 Research Findings 
The objective of this research is to question whether the inclusion of social 
considerations and clauses in procurement procedures facilitates SME 
participation in public markets. It questions whether the use of community 
benefit clauses, subcontractor considerations, use of lots and use of PCP 
activities encourage SME participation. A community benefit clause was 
not included in this competition. The use of PCP is directly assessed in 
this case study, with the subcontractor considerations and use of lots 
indirectly assessed.  
The findings suggest that the decision to use a PCP procedure resulted in 
the awarding of public contracts to five small companies and the 
subsequent award of second prototyping contracts to four of these 
companies. By adhering to the fundamental principles of transparency, 
non-discrimination, equal treatment and proportionality, the contracting 
authority encouraged cross-border competition amongst small 
businesses.85 23 completed tenders were submitted from spin-outs, self-
employed, consultancy services and start-ups. These forms of companies 
are generally excluded from the public procurement markets.86 Recent 
industry reports suggest that SMEs are primarily interested in tendering 
for low-value contracts awarded by contracting authorities based in the 
locality of the SMEs.87 This suggests that SMEs only bid locally. This 
                                                                                      
84 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65). 
85 Additionally, following best practice set out in; Commission, ‘European Code of Best 
Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts’ (SWP) COM 
(2008) 2193; Circular 10/2014, ‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement’ 2014. 
86 See Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
87 See Commission, ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ access to Public Procurement Markets in the 
EU.’ (2010) Final Report; Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets 
and aggregation of demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report; A. Flynn and P. Davis, 
‘Investigating the effect of tendering capabilities on SME activity and performance in 
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research does not necessarily conform to these suggestions; the results 
show that a French company was interested in and was successfully 
awarded a low-value public contract.88  
This suggests that PCP competitions can contribute to cross-border 
trading in the Single Market. The highly technical nature of the contract 
is more than likely the contributing factor for this finding. Innovative start-
ups specialising in developing services may find it easier and financially 
attractive to compete for PCPs in other Member States.89 This finding 
bodes well for innovative start-ups as more public bodies are adopting 
Smart City programmes across the EU, creating new opportunities for the 
companies. This supports the overall objective of the Directive to promote 
competitive cross-border trade in the Single Market. 
It is difficult to assess the use of lots as an individual independent measure 
in this case study. A form of ‘lots’ are inherently built into PCP 
procedures; the processes involve the assessment of a number of solutions. 
An interesting finding is an approach taking by the contracting authority 
to increase the number of solutions it accepted at stage one and stage 
two.90 At both stages, the contracting authority offered more contracts 
than it planned to, suggesting that the procedure successfully facilitates 
SME participation in a flexible manner.  
Similarly, to the use of lots, it is difficult to assess the subcontracting 
consideration in isolation. This is primarily due to the low-value nature of 
the contract; €12,500 may not warrant the need to subcontract a significant 
proportion of the contract. Subcontracting was strongly encouraged by 
Smart Dublin, only requiring the lead contractor to provide organisational 
                                                                                      
public contract competitions’ (2017) 35(4) International Small Business Journal: 
Researching Entrepreneurship 449. 
88 This is likely due to the global nature of start-ups. A recent survey completed by the 
European Commission suggest that 88% of start-ups focus on ‘internationalising’ their 
products or services. See; Commission, ‘Europe’s next leaders: the Start-up and Scale-
up Initiative’ (Communication) COM (2016) Strasbourg, 22 November. 
89 For a broader discussion on the ability of start-ups to source international funding see; 
Ø. Moen, ‘The born globals: a new generation of small European exporters’ (2002) 
19(2) International marketing review 156. 
90 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65). 
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details such as registered company name and VAT registration number in 
their tender submission. The invitation to tender stated; ‘We particularly 
welcome applications that enable small companies to participate within 
the supply chain.’ which encouraged Smartcharge LTD. to subcontract 
with another micro company to develop their solution.91  
The research argues that the use of PCP facilitates SME participation in 
the public market. In particular, the procedures encourage the participation 
of innovative young start-ups and entrepreneurs. PCP encouraged the 
participation of SMEs, which are typically hindered and limited from 
bidding for and winning public contracts.92 Working on the public 
contracts has had a positive impact on the awardee companies. The 
awardee companies have subsequently received funding from other 
sources. Building on their successful partnership with Smart Dublin. 
BikeLook received €50,000 further funding from Enterprise Ireland. 
Fluidedge incorporated ‘Liberty Bell’ as a separate company, which was 
subsequently successfully awarded a USD 75,000 innovation contract 
with Colorado Department of Transport.93 One thing to note about this 
case study is the fact that this will be a ‘once-off’ purchase. DCC does not 
wish to control or maintain these cycle services, and it is hoped that the 
companies post completion of the public contract will become active 
sellers in the private market.94 This will reduce future costs for the city. 
The contract will hopefully have fostered competition in the market place 
as several businesses were progressed to stage two of the contract.  
This case study demonstrates the successful use of innovative change in 
the public sector. The literature review analysed a number of frameworks 
set out by the OECD, European Commission and academics which 
identified strategies for achieving innovation in public sector services and 
operations. The OECD’s observatory of public sector innovation suggests 
                                                                                      
91 Request for Tender, section 5; Interview with Michael Berry, Chief Technical Officer, 
SmartCharge (By phone, 25th July 2018). 
92 See Interview with the Co-founder, FluidEdge (n 58). 
93 See Interview with the Co-founder, FluidEdge (n 58). 
94 See C. Edquist and J.Zabala‐Iturriagagoitia (n 57). 
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that innovation in the public sector will successfully take place in 
circumstances where; there is an individual innovator, who is supported 
by their organisation, a willingness to adopt new practices and to improve 
the underlying legislative framework.95 A 2013 European Commission 
report on ‘Powering European Public Sector Innovation.’, additionally 
argues that a lack of coordinated support and administratively burdensome 
legislation are the key barriers to public sector innovation.96 Sorensen and 
Torfing’s framework on public sector innovation, further builds on these 
observations, emphasising the importance of forming collaborative 
partnerships.97 Public-sector bodies must assist innovative partners in 
developing and testing new solutions which should be then disseminated 
across the public sector.98  
The contracting authority in this case study successfully implemented 
innovative changes to the procurement structures. The contracting 
authority implemented provisions which reflect the measures set out by 
the OECD and the Commission. The changes introduced were led by an 
individual innovator, the Smart Cities Programme Manager, who was 
supported by DCC, the Smart Cities Team and arguably by the 
participating economic operators.99  One common finding derived from 
the research interviews highlighted the vital role the Programme Manager 
played in implementing change in DCC. The Programme Manager’s 
enthusiasm, dedication and knowledge is a critical factor in the success of 
the Smart Dublin programme.100 The awardee companies reflected on the 
                                                                                      
95 OECD The Innovation Imperative in the Public Sector: Setting an Agenda for Action 
(OECD, Publishing, Paris, 2015). 
96 Commission, ‘Powering European Public Sector Innovation: Towards a New 
Architecture Report of the Expert Group on Public Sector Innovation’ (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2013). 
97 E. Sorensen and J. Torfing, ‘Enhancing collaborative innovation in the public sector’ 
(2011) 43(8) Administration and Society 868. 
98 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65) The Smart Dublin 
programme has started disseminating the project findings nationally and internationally 
with other Smart Cities programmes.  
99 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65). 
100 See Interview with the Co-founder, FluidEdge (n 58) Interview with the Chief 
Technical Officer, SmartCharge (n 91) This further supports the view that public sector 
change is driven up motivated and supported champions. See; S. Fernandez and H.G. 
Rainey, ‘Managing successful organizational change in the public sector. In Debating 
Public Administration’ (Routledge, 2017) 7. 
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importance of the ‘voluntary buy-in’ from all partners of the project.101 
During the research interviews, the Smart City Programme Manager 
identified five specific requirements for the successful implementation of 
an SBIR competition;  
You need the right person, you need to build a good relationship, 
ability to access infrastructure, easy payments systems and an 
understanding that it is not ‘free money’.102 
DCC, the Smart Team and the economic operators were committed and 
engaged with the PCP. This is a determinable factor to the success of this 
case study. If this PCP case study is to be replicated by other public bodies, 
the contracting authorities should attempt to replicate the underpinning 
supporting relationship between the public body and the private sector.103 
DCC’s commitment to the companies was further displayed in the effort 
that was put into the launch of the competition which took place in the 
Mansion House, in Dublin city.104 DCC approached this contract in a truly 
collaborative manner. This finding supports Lee et al.’s empirical studies 
on public sector innovation, which suggest that a public body’s capacity 
to innovate is directly related to its willingness to collaborate with the 
private sector.105 This was also a key finding from the research studies, 
the interviewed companies each commented on the trusting, supporting 
and educational relationship developed with the Smart City Programme 
Manager throughout the contracts.  
Enthusiasm for ‘doing things differently’ was expressed by the contracting 
authority and awardee companies.106 All parties were committed to 
conducting business in a collaborative and supportive manner. Risks were 
                                                                                      
101 See Interview with the Co-founder, FluidEdge (n 58) Interview with the Chief 
Technical Officer, SmartCharge (n 91). 
102 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65). 
103 See World Bank, ‘World Bank Group Support for Innovation and Entrepreneurship: 
An Independent Evaluation’ (Washington, D.C, World Bank, 2014) 81. 
104 See Interview with the Smart Cities Programme Manager (n 65). 
105 S.M. Lee, T. Hwang and D. Choi, ‘Open innovation in the public sector of leading 
countries’ (2012) 50(1) Management decision 147. 
106 See Interview with the Co-founder, FluidEdge (n 61) Interview with the Chief 
Technical Officer, SmartCharge (n 91). 
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borne by both sides, with some of the risks transforming into fruitful 
commercial products. The PCP procedure was conducted in a simple, 
straightforward manner. The procedure upheld the fundamental 
principles, resulting in achieving cross-border trade.107  
Additionally, the case study implemented the OECD and Commission’s 
recommendations to reduce the legislative and administrative burden for 
both the procurer and supplier. The Public Sector Regulations did not 
apply to the case study. The procurement was governed by soft-law policy 
and guidance documents.108 It is ‘best practice’ in Ireland to use the 
OGP’s standardised ‘Request for Tender’ templates.109 The contracting 
authority chose not to use these documents, creating their own documents 
to best suit the PCP competition. The documents used reflected the social 
spirit of the Directive, the documents were designed in a manner which 
aimed to promote competition amongst all forms of companies. Interested 
economic operators based in other Member States could freely and easily 
access the call for competition notices.110 Tenderers were asked to meet 
proportionate financial and professional criteria. The simple structure of 
the tender allowed for tenderers to focus on the proposed solution for the 
public body. The document successfully embodied the best practices set 
out in the Commission’s PCP and Code to Facilitating SME Participation 
guidance policies.111   
However, the Smart Dublin programme has not fully incorporated 
Sorensen and Torfing’s recommendation for other public-sector bodies to 
                                                                                      
107 Furthermore, due to the ‘global’ nature of start-ups, EU contracting authorities should 
consider conducting joint PCP programmes to promote further competition and drive 
wide-scale innovative developments. For a discussion on joint procurement, see; G.L. 
Albano, G. Spagnolo and M. Zanza, ‘Regulating joint bidding in public procurement’ 
(2008) 5(2) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 335. 
108 Namely, the OGP policies and Dublin City Council’s internal operational policies. 
109 The templates aim to promote harmonised procedures which reduce administrative 
costs for both contracting authorities and public bodies. The templates do not promote 
the sourcing of innovative solutions. See Office of Government Procurement, ‘National 
Public Procurement Framework Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and 
Services.’ (2019) Version 2.1. 
110 The notices were published on the etenders.gov.ie platform.  
111 See COM (2008) 0394; Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets 
and aggregation of demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
308 
 
replicate the innovative practices.112 It could also be argued that it is not 
within the cities remit to suggest how other authorities should conduct 
their procurement activities. Perhaps, this is a task which could be 
undertaken by the OGP in Ireland or the  CPD in Northern Ireland. Smart 
Dublin openly shares the results of their ‘challenge competitions’ by 
hosting and attending events nationally and internationally to demonstrate 
the results of the programme.113 The programme engages with 
Universities, with local community stakeholders and with businesses of 
all sizes but to further replicate the success of the PCP and to facilitate 
SMEs further the initiative should be shared and replicated by other cities 
and large towns across Ireland. 114 Although it should be noted that the 
programme is actively engaged with other Smart Cities programmes. DCC 
has recently joined the ‘SynchroniCity’ which explores how innovative 
solutions can improve urban living standards. Over 40 cities are 
participating in the programme, and DCC is currently collaborating with 
Antwerp and Manchester to run a follow-up ‘Smart Cycling Project’. This 
project is ongoing and aims to map cycling trends in the cities.115 
To further embed these socially-sustainable practices, this research 
suggests that Smart Dublin and the DCC should consider conducting 
future PCP activities in partnership with other contracting authorities. It is 
also possible for the contracting authority to conduct procurement 
competitions with public bodies based in other Member States.116 
Collaborative competitions have the potential to replicate the success of 
this case study on a grand scale, assisting innovative companies accessing 
valuable public contracts.117 Start-ups will benefit from the capital 
                                                                                      
112 See E. Sorensen and J. Torfing (n 97). 
113 The programme publishes ‘open data’ on the Dublinked Open Data Platform. See 
European Communities (Re-use of Public Sector Information) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2015 of 24 November 2015, reg 5. 
114 As suggested by E. Sorensen and J. Torfing (n 97). 
115 This programme will run from June – August 2019. For more information on the 
‘SynchroniCity’ programme, please see; https://synchronicity-iot.eu/cities-pilots/ 
Accessed 21/06/2019 
116 However, it should be noted that it is uncertain if this form of partnership would 
increase costs and it may suit larger companies over smaller start-ups and increase legal 
uncertainty. 
117 See G.L. Albano, G. Spagnolo and M. Zanza (n 107). 
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injection and the development and testing of the proposed solution. This, 
in turn, will support the start-ups’ growth. Value for taxpayers’ money 
will be achieved when low sums of capital are invested in improving the 
innovative capabilities and structure of public services. 
Building on the experience gained from the contract, two of the awardee 
companies have subsequently been successful in tendering for smart cities 
contracts in Northern Ireland and in the US. An ability to grow quickly 
and to maximise the commercialisation of a developed solution is  the key 
determinable factor to a start-ups chances of survival.118 Unfortunately, 
start-ups have an extremely high failure rate, with the majority of EU start-
ups failing to survive pass the crucial two-three year operational stage. 
Supporting start-ups financially at the early stages of incorporation will 
improve their chances of long-term survival.119 Improving start-ups access 
to public contracts has the potential to support start-up growth rates which 
in turn will lead to the creation of new jobs.120 Start-ups create 
significantly more jobs than small businesses.121 However, concerns have 
been raised about the sustainability of the jobs created by start-ups due to 
their instability and chances of failing within the first two years of 
incorporation.122 However, when start-ups successfully scale-up, their 
employment growth rate is generally regarded as significant.123 
7.6 Conclusion 
Overall, this case study successfully demonstrates that the use of PCP 
facilitates SME participation in public procurement. Moreover, PCP is 
used as a flexible tool to find new digital solutions to public-sector 
challenges. A limited amount of public funds was used to improve long-
                                                                                      
118 S. Birley and P. Westhead, ‘A taxonomy of business start-up reasons and their impact 
on firm growth and size’ (1994) 9(1) Journal of Business Venturing 7. 
119 N. Huyghebaert, ‘On the determinants and dynamics of trade credit use: empirical 
evidence from business start‐ups’ (2006) 33(1-2) Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 305. 
120 P. Davidsson and M. Henrekson, ‘Determinants of the prevalance of start-ups and 
high-growth firms’ (2002) 19(2) Small Business Economics 81. 
121 Start-ups in general employ 7 people, and small businesses employ 2-3 people. 
122 J. Haltiwanger, R.S. Jarmin and J. Miranda, ‘Who creates jobs? Small versus large 
versus young’ (2013) 95(2) Review of Economics and Statistics 347. 
123 See J. Haltiwanger, R.S. Jarmin and J. Miranda (n 122). 
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term cycling rates in Dublin city while subsequently supporting start-up 
growth. This procurement procedure is an important example of how 
procurement can be used to support an inclusive, innovative and 
sustainable economy. 
An implication of this finding may suggest that once the start-ups develop 
their solutions to a commercial level, the public sector will no longer need 
to purchase the innovative solution.124 In this example, citizens can now 
avail of the safe cycling tools, and the city can use the data gathered during 
the contract stage to shape future policy on promoting cycling rates. 
Overall, the establishment of Enterprise Ireland’s national PCP initiative 
‘Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Ireland’ and the introduction 
of Smart Cities programmes by DCC and Limerick City Council has 
created new entry routes into public markets for small businesses. These 
findings are compared with a ‘Smart Belfast’ competition in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                                                      
124 This is a form of catalytic procurement. See L. Hommen and M. Rolfstam, ‘Public 
procurement and innovation: towards a taxonomy’ (2008) 8(3) Journal of Public 
Procurement 17. 
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Chapter Eight Smart Belfast Case Study 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Northern Ireland is facing an uncertain future, the state is operating 
without a government since January 2017, and the threat of a ‘hard’ Brexit 
looms in the background. Public procurers continue their daily operational 
tasks while procurement policy is at a standstill.1  SMEs are the backbone 
of the economy and supporting them will encourage stability and growth 
in these uncertain times.2 Over 132,000 SMEs operate in the state. Export-
orientated science and technology companies dominate the sector.3 In 
recent years, the state has introduced measures to promote the 
development of innovative technology companies and innovation in the 
public sector.4 A 2010 European summary assessment report noted that 
the state was performing slightly below the other Member States in 
facilitating ‘innovation finance’ and encouraging ‘collaboration and 
networking’ in the sector.’5 To address these concerns, the state has 
encouraged the use of ‘Small Business Research Initiatives’ (SBRI) R&D 
contracts. From the period of 2009 – 2015, over 2,200 SBRI contracts with 
a combined value of over £270 million were concluded by over 70 public 
bodies.6  
                                                                                      
1 Take for example, a draft proposal for a Buy Social Value Act has been put on hold 
since the collapse of the devolved government in 2017. 
2 See Federation of Small Businesses and Ulster University, ‘The contribution of small 
businesses to Northern Ireland’ (2015). Available at; 
https://www.fsb.org.uk/docs/default-source/Publications/the-contribution-of-small-
businesses-to-northern-ireland.pdf?sfvrsn=1 Last accessed 15th April 2019. 
3 See Statista, ‘Number of small and medium enterprises (SME) in the private sector in 
Northern Ireland from 2010 to 2018’ (2018). Available at; 
 https://www.statista.com/statistics/668790/number-small-and-medium-businesses-
northern-ireland/ Last accessed 15th April 2019. 
4 See Northern Ireland Executive, ‘Innovation Strategy for Northern Ireland 2014-2025’. 
(2014) Innovate UK.  
5 L.R. León, K. Männik, B. MacAulay, ‘Summary Assessment of Northern Ireland’ 
(2013) ESIC European Service Innovation Centre Report. 
6 See Innovate UK Government Challenges, Ideas from Business, Innovative Solutions - 
SBRI (2014). 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmen
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In 2016, Belfast City Council implemented a ‘Smart Cities’ initiative for 
this first time, building on the success of the SBRI contracts.7 The 
programme aims to encourage cross-sectoral innovation, working in 
collaboration with the private sector, academia and community to develop 
data-driven technologies to improve public services and urban living.8 
This chapter is tasked with reviewing the programme’s early procurement 
practices. The case study chosen is directly comparable with the Smart 
Dublin cycling challenge. This chapter reviews an SBRI challenge for 
‘Maximising Business Revenue Rates’ by Belfast City Council, under the 
smart city umbrella. This challenge was the first procedure used by the 
state in procuring a solution for a smart city initiative. In a similar manner 
to the Dublin competition, a two-stage PCP competition was used.9 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the use of PCP is 
conducive to the participation of SMEs in the public market. SMEs, 
especially, start-ups and social enterprises operating in Northern Ireland 
face similar barriers to participation as their Irish counterparts do, they are 
hindered by the lack of knowledge of contract opportunities, lack of 
tendering skills, lack of experience, and lack of insurance and financial 
capability to carry out the contract.10 This case study questions if the use 
of social considerations in innovative procedures assists SMEs in 
overcoming these barriers. 
                                                                                      
t_data/file/436237/CO-011_SBRI_JUN15_Brochure_WEB_FINAL.pdf Last accessed 
16th June 2019. 
7 The Smart City objectives were formalised in the Belfast City Council, ‘Supporting 
Urban Innovation - The Smart Belfast Framework 2017 to 2021’. The framework was 
adopted to support the implementation of the Belfast Agenda. The Belfast Agenda is the 
city’s first community plan, developed by city partners, residents and community 
organisations. It sets out long-term priority goals for the city. See The Belfast Agenda; 
https://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/council/Communityplanning/BelfastAgenda.aspx Last 
accessed 16th June 2019. 
8 See the Smart Belfast Framework 2017 – 2021 (n 7). 
9 The procedure used reflected the PCP set out in the Commission’s guidelines. See 
Commission, ‘Pre-commercial Procurement: driving innovation to ensure sustainable 
high-quality public services in Europe’ (Communication) COM (2007) 0799 final 
10 R. Fee, A. Erridge and S. Hennigan, ‘SMEs and government purchasing in Northern 
Ireland: problems and opportunities’ (2002) 14(5) European Business Review 326; K. 
Loader, ‘Is public procurement a successful small business support policy? A review of 
the evidence’ (2013) 31(1) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 39. 
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The research was conducted over two years, the request for tender and 
sample contracts were reviewed, and interviews were conducted with the 
lead project manager and with an awardee company.11 The case study is 
exploratory in nature.12 The case study findings contribute to current 
literature, as they indicate that small businesses are at the forefront of 
developing innovative solutions to public challenges.13 Four small 
companies were awarded a £5,000 at phase one, and two companies were 
awarded a £50,000 at phase two to prototype and test the proposed 
solutions.14 One of the awardee companies identified approximately 
£0.5million of unpaid business revenue rates for the Council, and 
subsequently used the experience gained from the contract to win a further 
six SBRI competitions, one of which was awarded by Smart Dublin.15 The 
initial results indicate that the use of PCP procedures by smart cities 
initiatives encourage SME participation in the public market. 
The chapter is divided into three parts; the first section offers an overview 
of the operation of the smart cities programme and the second section 
reviews the PCP process in detail and briefly analyses the challenge 
findings. The third section analyses the research findings in more detail 
and pays particular attention to the importance of classifying different 
forms of PCP.  
8.2 Smart Cities in Northern Ireland 
The Smart Belfast initiative was adopted in 2016 and tasked Belfast City 
Council (BCC) with forming and managing partnerships with industry, in 
particular with the SME sector, academia and with the community to 
develop creative, technical and digital solutions using data science to 
                                                                                      
11 These documents were made available freely on the Sourcing NI platform. See 
https://e-sourcingni.bravosolution.co.uk/web/login.shtml Last accessed 16th June 2019. 
12 As with the other chapters, the research explored the public sector and SME responses 
to the use of the pre-commercial procurement.  
13 C. Richter, S. Kraus and P. Syrjä, ‘The Smart City as an opportunity for 
entrepreneurship’ (2015) 7(3) International Journal of Entrepreneurial Venturing 211. 
14 Interview with Deirdre Ferguson, Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team (By phone, 
28th June 2017). 
15 Interview with Conor Dumigan, Head of Data Analytics Solutions (By phone, 27th July 
2018). 
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address policy goals.16 The initiative was inspired by the successes of 
similar projects conducted namely in Dublin, New York City in the US17, 
Santander in Spain18 and Barcelona in Spain19 Additionally, the 
programme was explicitly inspired by Bristol City Council’s procuring 
activities, Westminster’s smart parking scheme, and Transport for 
London’s ticketless public transport scheme, and Glasgow’s smart street 
lighting programme.20 In particular, the operational framework focuses on 
replicating SBRI challenges similar to that conducted by Smart Dublin. 
The framework outlines eight guiding principles aligning with the goals 
set out in the Belfast Agenda. The principles include the development of 
innovative data infrastructure, eco-systems and data security.21 
Importantly, one of the principles requests Smart Belfast participants to 
avoid focussing on technology-led outcomes and to instead focus on 
environmental, social and economic outcomes. Another essential 
principle encourages participants to strengthen and support local 
technology businesses and entrepreneurs.22 
The guiding principles are supported by a series of interlinked streams, 
aimed at building governance structures, developing an internal team, 
communicating and engaging with all stakeholders to develop an 
innovative network.23 When deciding to use PCP, contracting authorities 
are encouraged to consider;  
..the size of potential impacts and costs, risks, stakeholders, likely 
funding sources or potential business model, known barriers to 
                                                                                      
16 See the Smart Belfast Framework 2017 – 2021 (n 7). 
17 Digital NY is the official public-private online hub of the New York City start-up and 
technology ecosystem. See https://www.digital.nyc/about Last accessed; 17th June 2019. 
18 See J. Gutiérrez Bayo, ‘International Case Studies of Smart Cities: Santander, Spain’ 
(2016) Inter-American Development Bank.  
19 Barcelona’s Digital City’s strategy focuses on ‘investing in digital public 
infrastructures that can enable higher-quality public services and usher in a more 
sustainable and collaborative economy and society.’ See 
https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/digital/en Last accessed; 17th June 2019. 
20 See R. Cowley, S. Joss and Y Dayot, ‘The smart city and its publics: insights from 
across six UK cities’ (2018) 11(1) Urban Research & Practice 53. 
21 See the Belfast Agenda (n 7). 
22 See the Belfast Agenda (n 7) 12. 
23 See the Belfast Agenda (n 7). 
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feasibility and mitigation planned, assessment of delivery channel, i.e. 
open competition vs. collaborative partner delivery, offer a route to 
market for commercial partners.24  
This indicates that the State supports the use of strategic procurement and 
will actively support innovative procurement in circumstances where 
there is adequate market demand and availability. Some of the potential 
projects that the programme plans to conduct include; understanding 
visitor trends, a public transport challenge, building an integrated 
employment pathway, establishing a Belfast Innovation Hub Network, 
understanding the future labour market, a Belfast health and leisure 
passport, a circular economy ‘grand’ waste challenge, predicting anti-
social behaviour and leveraging the public estate.25 
When the first challenge ‘Maximising Business Revenue Rates’ was 
conducted by the initiative, the programme was in its infancy, and the 
‘Smart Belfast’ title was not used at this stage. The initiative was referred 
to as ‘Belfast Smart City Programme’.26 Belfast City Council (BCC) will 
be referred to as the contracting authority to avoid any confusion with the 
two titles. BCC was the lead procuring partner on the contract.  
8.3 Maximising Business Revenue Rates Competition 
This low-value comparative case study scrutinises a PCP competition for 
‘Maximising Business Rates’ in Belfast city. Approximately 45% of the 
City Council’s income is generated through the collection of domestic and 
commercial rates.27 There are two separate bodies responsible for the 
collection, distribution and management of business revenue rates in 
Northern Ireland. BCC is responsible for managing and distributing 
collected rates to improve local services and facilities. Land and Property 
Services (LPS) provided the data groundwork for the scheme; it is 
                                                                                      
24 See the Smart Belfast Framework 2017 – 2021 (n 7) 27. 
25 See the Smart Belfast Framework 2017 – 2021 (n 7). 
26 For a brief period, the programme was also referred to as ‘Smarter Belfast.’. 
27 Belfast City Council, Land and Property Services Northern Ireland, Rates 2016 – 2017. 
Openly available at; https://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/council/rates/rates2016.aspx Last 
accessed 16th June 2019. 
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responsible for the collection and management of land and property 
information. LPS is responsible for the processing and management of 
revenues for the state.28  The Future Cities Catapult facilitated the design 
of the SBRI process. Future Cities Catapult is a private organisation whose 
primary objective is to advance urban innovation and business growth to 
‘make cities better.’29 BCC requested the help of Future Cities Catapult to 
design the innovative process. BCC was the public procurer for the 
competition.30  
As with the Smart Dublin case, this contract fell outside the remit of the 
Public Contract Regulations.31 The contracting authority could award the 
contract on the basis of cost alone or on the best price:quality ratio. 
However, Rigby highlights that there are problems associated with using 
‘costs’ as a defining feature of research and development contracts, 
particularly around setting available funds.32 Contracting authorities 
should set their maximum allowance for the challenge transparently at the 
start of the competition; this requires the contracting authority to have a 
good level of knowledge of the marketplace.33 Calculating potential costs 
might prove problematic for procurers who do not have the expertise to 
estimate potential figures. Structured market soundings could assist 
procurers in calculating estimate costings.34 Definitions of PCP offered in 
the literature tend to focus on the processes of the procedure avoiding 
direct references to costings; for example, Pantilimon Voda defines PCP 
as the successive development of a marketable product or service with the 
risks shared between a private operator and a public body under market 
                                                                                      
28 The rate collection system was reviewed after the recent Local Government Reform. 
See; 
https://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/council/localgovernmentreform/localgovernmentreform
.aspx Last accessed 16th June 2019. 
29 Future Cities Catapult is a non-profit organisation which assists public bodies in 
implanting Smart changes. See; https://futurecities.catapult.org.uk/ Last accessed 16th 
June 2019. 
30 Invitation to Tender, SBRI_001. 
31 Public Contracts Regulations, reg 14. 
32 J. Rigby, ‘Review of pre-commercial procurement approaches and effects on 
innovation’ (2013) Manchester Institute of Innovation Research: Manchester. 
33 In order for the contracting authority to set a proportionate budget, the procurers should 
have some knowledge of the general costs to design and develop apps.  
34 Public Contracts Regulations, reg 40. 
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conditions. The PCP ends when the solutions developed are market-ready, 
this stage is followed by a traditional public supply or services contract 
competition.35 Process-driven definitions offer contracting authorities the 
flexibility they need to design proportionate and relevant contract 
objectives and cost structures. 
BCC’s definition of PCP does not help distinguish if the PCP used in this 
competition was a catalytic or co-operative procedure. This case study 
could be classified as a co-operative PCP; it involved the development and 
prototyping of a bespoke solution which was of mutual benefit to the 
councils, LPS, BCC and the companies delivering the solution.36 The 
contract is referred to as an ‘innovation and development project’ carried 
out under the pre-commercial principles and not under the Public 
Contracts Regulations.37 The contracting authority procured the research 
and development services and goods under market conditions. The 
contracting authority does not enjoy exclusive rights and usage of the 
developed innovative solution.38 Therefore, the contracts are defined as a 
public services contract and should not be classified as a State Aid activity, 
even though the public body is using public money to assist small 
businesses in developing and testing their innovative ideas. This again 
demonstrates the underlying ‘partnership’ trait of the competition; each 
party must invest in the proposed solution from the outset.39 The 
competition did not constitute State Aid as the contracting authority 
bought the goods and services at a fair market price, the competition was 
conducted openly, and the contracting authority did not enjoy exclusive 
use of the developed products and services. 40 
                                                                                      
35 O.S. Pantilimon Voda, ‘Innovative and sustainable procurement: framework, 
constraints and policies’ in C. Bovis, ‘Research handbook on EU public procurement 
law’ (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 228. See also; COM (2007) 799 final. 
36 Invitation to Tender, SBRI_001. 
37 Public Contracts Regulations, reg 14. 
38 Invitation to Apply, T1707, SBRI 007 Sample Contract. This is a fundamental 
requirement for pre-commercial procurement activities. See also; COM (2007) 799 final 
39 M.A.B. Blay, ‘The strategic use of public procurement in support of innovation’  
(2014) 9 Eur. Procurement & Pub. Private Partnership L. Rev. 3. 
40 Invitation to Apply, T107, SBRI FAQ. See also; D.C. Dacian and B. Racolta, 
‘Comparing Legal Instruments for R&D&I: State Aid and Public Procurement’ (2017) 
12 Eur. Procurement & Pub. Private Partnership L. Rev. 408.  
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Although the advertised contract fell outside of the EU rules due to their 
research and development nature, the subject-matter of the contract still 
had the potential to create a cross-border interest.41 Consequently, the 
contracting authority adhered with the fundamental TFEU principles of 
transparency, equal treatment, proportionality and non-discrimination. In 
upholding these principles, the advertised request for bids clearly stated 
that the competition was open to any economic operator based in the EU. 
The documents did not extend these statements further to include 
economic operators based in states which are members of the WTO GPA. 
This was not significantly important at the time; however, depending on 
how the Brexit trade negotiations are carried out, this may become more 
important in the future for public contracts.42 
Overall, the contracting authority sought to procure cost-effective data-led 
solutions which would maximise the income generated from the collection 
of business rates in the city. The tender submission document was 12 
pages long, similarly to the Smart Dublin challenge, it concentrated 
heavily on the proposed solution and potential product or service 
development.43 It was primarily outcome-based and did not onerously 
focus on the capability and experience of the tenderers.44 Open-ended 
questions allowed for tenderers to dedicate the majority the application to 
outline the public benefit of their proposed solution.45 The contracting 
authority offered examples on ways the collection of rates could be 
maximised. Economic operators were encouraged to develop solutions to; 
increase identification of occupancy states of non-domestic properties; 
identification of businesses; identification of the functions of non-
domestic properties; identification of occupants of non-domestic 
                                                                                      
41 Case C-59/00 Vestergaard [2001] ECR I-9505. 
42 On the 27th February 2019 the WTO approved the UK’s request to join the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement once it leaves the EU. 
43 As with this competition, Rigby suggests that PCP competitions should not be driven 
by costs and should be designed to promote innovative solutions. See J. Rigby (n 32). 
44 Invitation to Tender, SBRI_001. 
45 C. Perry, ‘Supporting SME access to public procurement opportunities’ (2011) 12(1) 
Research and Information Service Research Paper 12. 
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properties and identification of mechanisms to issue invoices to new 
properties.46 
Even though this is an entry-level contract, the request for tender 
documents embedded the guidance offered in the recitals of the Directive 
on the facilitation of SME participation in public contracts.47 The 
competition was open to all forms of legal entities including pre-start-ups, 
universities, charities and non-commercial organisations. As with the 
Smart Dublin case study, these companies are normally excluded from 
public contracts due to lack of operational and financial capabilities.48 
Interested economic operators were asked to identify if any components 
of the proposed work required the recruitment of subcontractors or 
specialised consultants.49 If the contractor wished to subcontract any 
element of the contract during the performance stage, they were required 
to seek prior permission from BCC.50 Subcontractors are required to meet 
the BCC’s standards to ensure the suitability of contractors.51 
The invitation to apply and accompanying documents were freely 
advertised on the ESourcingNI portal. The process was conducted 
electronically, phase one commenced on 19th August 2016 and closed on 
26th August 2016.52 The competition was conducted over two phases: the 
purpose of the initial phase was to test the technical feasibility of the 
proposed solutions. An initial £30,000 was made available with the 
intention of funding five to six businesses during the first phase. Phase 
one was conducted over six weeks. A further £100,000 was offered at 
                                                                                      
46 Invitation to Apply, SBRI 001. 
47 See Commission, ‘European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to 
Public Procurement Contracts’ (SWP) COM (2008) 2193. 
48 R. Fee, A. Erridge and S. Hennigan, ‘SMEs and government purchasing in Northern 
Ireland: problems and opportunities’ (2002) 14(5) European Business Review 326. 
49 Invitation to Apply, T107 SBRI FAQ. 
50  Invitation to Apply, T1707, SBRI 007 Sample Contract. 
51  Invitation to Apply, T1707, SBRI 007 Sample Contract. Similarly, with the Smart 
Dublin case study, it is unlikely that such low-value contracts would require the need of 
subcontractors.  
52 Invitation to Apply, SBRI 001. 
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phase two, with the intention of funding two to three businesses to develop 
and test prototypes.53  
Interested suppliers were provided with a detailed breakdown of the 
scoring matrix for Phase One.54 There were seven individual assessment 
criteria, each with a weighting of 10 or 20 marks.55 Overall, a qualitative 
award criterion was used to assess the tenderer’s capability to deliver a 
sustainable solution. Interested economic operators were not informed of 
any sub-weightings. Instead, the request for tender document stated the 
number of marks that were available for each category, such as proposed 
solution, technical approach, innovative nature of the proposal, 
applicant’s capability to carry out the contract, applicant’s skill sets, cost 
breakdown and commercialisation plans.56  
Confidentiality and protection of product development and intellectual 
property (IP) is a core issue for tenderers bidding for innovative 
contracts.57 Tenderers were requested to identify any commercially 
sensitive information in the bid, outlining any implications the 
publications or disclosure of such information may have on the company. 
The contracting authority endeavoured to maintain confidentiality while 
also recognising their potential obligations under the  Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) 2000.58 In terms of IP, the contracting authority 
owns the ‘background’ IP used during the contract performance stage.59 
                                                                                      
53 Interview with the Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team (n 14). 
54 Interview with the Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team (n 14) Detailed feedback 
assists SMEs in improving their tendering skills. See A. Flynn and P. Davis, ‘Firms’ 
experience of SME-friendly policy and their participation and success in public 
procurement’ (2016) 23(3) Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 616. 
55 Invitation to Apply, SBRI 001. 
56 While contracting authorities must disclose the weightings attached to the award 
criteria, procurers are not required to disclose all sub-criteria weightings. See Easycoach 
Limited v Department of Regional Development (NIHC, McCloskey J, 28 February 
2012); Clinton t/a Oriel Training Services v Department for Employment and Personnel 
(NIQB 2 – NICH, McCloskey J, QBD, 24 January 2012). 
57 J. Edler and L. Georghiou, ‘Public procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the 
demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research Policy 949. 
58 Invitation to Apply SBRI 001 See the Freedom of Information Act 2000. 
59 Invitation to Apply, section 16.2 The contract states that the contractor grants the 
contracting authority a ‘UK wide irrevocable, royalty-free non-exclusive licence to use 
the Foreground IP, together with any Background IP supplied by the contractor during 
the Project that is required to use the Foreground IP at a fair and reasonable market 
price.’ Background IP refers to existing IP owned by the awardee companies and 
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The contractor remains the owner of all ‘foreground’ IP; however, 
contractors granted a royalty-free non-exclusive license to the contracting 
authority to use the technology developed.60 The contractor is encouraged 
to commercially exploit the final results of the project to generate revenue 
or capital.61 Robust monitoring and reporting requirements were included 
to ensure timely project progression and protection of commercially 
sensitive information; the suppliers were required to submit progress 
interim reports alongside any verbal or written reports requested explicitly 
by the contracting authority.62 Interested economic operators were made 
aware that the competition was not a grant scheme to develop and support 
the innovative company. A public services contract was originally planned 
for the end of the procedure, and it has yet to be procured.63 
Contractors received monthly payments in this contract. Interested 
economic operators were made aware of this payment schedule at the 
tendering stage.64 This should have eliminated any concerns the operators 
had about financial security. A clear payment schedule is essential in these 
forms of procedures, as economic operators were ultimately investing in 
the development and prototyping of a new bespoke good or service. A 
clear payment schedule would have eased the administrative difficulties 
faced by Smart Dublin during the contract performance stage of the 
cycling competition.65  
In adherence to national policy, the request for tender asked interested 
economic operators to make themselves ‘aware’ of BCC’s ‘Good 
                                                                                      
Foreground IP refers to new technologies developed by the company while working on 
the public contract. See H.R. Hertzfeld, A.N. Link and N.S., ‘Vonortas Intellectual 
property protection mechanisms in research partnerships’ (2006) 35(6) Research Policy, 
825. 
60 Invitation to Apply, SBRI 001. See also; COM (2007) 799 final. 
61 Invitation to Apply T1707 SBRI 007 Sample Contract. See also; V. Lember, T. Kalvet 
and R. Kattel, ‘Urban competitiveness and public procurement for innovation’ (2011) 
48(7) Urban Studies 1373. 
62 Invitation to Apply, T1707, SBRI 007, Sample Contract. 
63 Interview with the Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team (n 14). 
64 Invitation to Apply T1707 SBRI 007 Sample Contract Section 4 (20). 
65 See Chapter 7, section 7.3. 
322 
 
Relations Strategy’.66 The strategy aims to promote equality and good 
relations in every aspect of public work to improve Belfast citizen’s 
quality of life and business environment. Principles of fairness, equality 
and respect underpin all public activities and policy in the state.67 The 
strategy outlines the city’s commitment to transforming itself from a city 
of historical ‘division’ to a city that is ‘shared by all’.68 A social dimension 
is evident throughout the request for tender documents, the tender upheld 
national and European policy on SME engagement and required tenderers 
to make themselves familiar with city policy on equality and business 
ethics.69  
8.4 Challenge Outcomes 
 Four companies were awarded a £5000 contract at the first phase, two of 
the winning companies ‘Analytics Engines’ and ‘RF Proximity Ltd.’ are 
based in Belfast, one company ‘NQuiringminds Ltd.’ is based in 
Southhampton and the final awardee ‘The Behaviouralist’ is based in 
London.70 Phase I of the project lasted six weeks. Two companies were 
awarded contracts at the second phase of the competition, Analytics 
Engines and NQuiring Minds.71 A qualitative assessment was used in 
Phase II. Contractors final project report formed part of the assessment. In 
the final project report, contractors were required to outline milestones 
met or missed, to outline costs and to discuss the reasons for developing 
and prototyping the tested concept.72 This approach, similar to the Smart 
Dublin example was a proportionate and straightforward procedure. 
Payment at phase II was based on the completion of project milestones.73  
                                                                                      
66 The Good Relations Strategy sets out public bodies’ obligations under Section 75 of 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998.   
67 See Belfast City Council, ‘Equality and Good Relations Strategy -  Promoting equality 
and good relations. A shared, peaceful, welcoming and open city.’ 
68 See Belfast City Council Equality and Good Relations Strategy (n 67) 1. 
69 Best practices are compiled in the Department of Finance and CPD Northern Ireland, 
‘Public Procurement Policy’ (2014) Version 11.  
70 Interview with the Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team (n 14). 
71 Detailed competition findings are only available from Phase II. This case study focuses 
on what impact the PCP had on SME participation.  
72 Invitation to Apply, T1707 – SBRI – 009; Interview with the Senior Consultant, Smart 
Cities Team (n 14). 
73 Interview with the Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team (n 14). 
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Analytics Engines developed an analytical software system ‘COBALT’ 
which used ‘multiple data points and advanced analytics to identify 
businesses’ failing to pay the correct revenue rates.74 The COBALT 
system quickly increased efficiencies for the City Council by identifying 
£390,000 of unclaimed non-domestic businesses rates in its first two 
weeks of operation. Over £500,000 unclaimed rates were identified within 
six months of operation. It has been suggested that the system additionally 
increased inspection efficiency rates by 250%.75 The developed solution 
assists the city council in identifying; properties listed as vacant by 
occupied, contact details of business owners, domestic properties 
operating as non-domestic and new businesses that have just opened.76  
Analytics Engines is a small company with 17 employees based in Belfast. 
The company has successfully been awarded data analytical led contracts 
for six similar innovative public contracts, one of which was awarded by 
Smart Dublin.77 In this case, the company were awarded a contract under 
an SBRI competition to develop innovative solutions to tackle illegal 
dumping in the city. Using historical data, Analytics Engines are currently 
designing a new software tool to predict the location and timing of illicit 
dumping in the county.78  
The company was successfully awarded a phase I SBRI contract by 
Innovate UK.79 The Innovate UK challenge centred on identifying 
mechanisms to utilise machine learning or artificial intelligence to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. Additionally, 
the company has won a health analytics related contract with the EU 
funded ‘Meaningful Integration of Data Analytics and Services’ (MIDAS) 
                                                                                      
74 Interview with the Head of Data Analytics Solutions (n 15). 
75 Smart Belfast, ‘Published Case Studies.’ https://smartbelfast.city/story/ Last accessed 
20th June 2019. 
76 Interview with the Head of Data Analytics Solutions (n 15). 
77 Interview with the Head of Data Analytics Solutions (n 15) This further demonstrates 
the ability of PCP to promote cross-border trade.  
78 Interview with the Head of Data Analytics Solutions (n 15). This is a tool which the 
company could potentially sell to public bodies in all Member State, further 
demonstrating the internationalisation potential of start-ups. See Commission, ‘Europe’s 
next leaders: the Start-up and Scale-up Initiative’ (Communication) COM (2016). 
79 Interview with the Head of Data Analytics Solutions (n 15). 
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project. MIDAS focuses on improving the use and gathering of healthcare 
data to assist with the development of healthcare policy and improve cost-
efficiencies in the healthcare sectors. Ulster University leads the project 
and partners of the project include Dublin City University, Arizona State 
University, the UK’s NHS and Ireland’s HSE. NI public bodies awarded 
two further contracts to the company.80 Overall, Analytics Engines 
estimates that the experience working on the BCC contract helped the 
company successfully bid for six further SBRI competitions. This case 
study shows that facilitating innovative small businesses and start-ups in 
public procurement can support business growth. 
Another awardee, NQuiringminds developed innovative ‘data analysis 
and workflow management tools’ to maximise the income generated from 
‘business revenue rates collection management systems’.81 The data 
analytics company was founded in 2010.82 They have successfully been 
awarded a number of Smart Cities contracts and government and industry 
awards, including an Innovate UK ‘Parliamentary Nomination for 
Productivity Innovation’, an SBRI contract for the UK Future Cities Data 
Integration Platform, a public contract for Transport Solutions in London, 
a public contract with Southampton City Council for the development of 
data monitoring and gathering for domestic energy and housing sensors 
for council-owned domestic dwellings and a contract with the UK based 
charity ‘Center Point’ to gather data to improve homelessness reporting.83 
Further research could be conducted to assess the long-term economic 
impact of facilitating start-up and innovative small business participation 
                                                                                      
80 This further demonstrates that PCP can be effectively used to drive societal change by 
involving all community, public, academic and business stakeholders. See L. Dale-
Clough, ‘Public procurement of innovation and local authority procurement: 
procurement modes and framework conditions in three European cities’ (2015) 28(3) 
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 220. 
For more information on the MIDAS project see; http://www.midasproject.eu/ Last 
accessed 20th June 2019. 
81 Interview with the Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team (n 14) Smart Belfast, 
‘Published Case Studies.’ https://smartbelfast.city/story/ Last accessed 20th June 2019. 
82 See https://nquiringminds.com/ Last accessed 20th June 2019. 
83 As with Analytics Engines, PCP contracts offer innovative companies a secure source 
of income, which assists the company’s transition from a start-up to a scale-up. See N.M. 
Bocken, ‘Sustainable venture capital–catalyst for sustainable start-up success?’ (2015) 
108 Journal of Cleaner Production 647. 
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in public procurement. Assessments should evaluate the impact the 
participation had on employment generation and business growth. 
8.5 Research Findings 
The central thesis research question asks if the use of social criteria and 
innovative practices facilitates SME participation. Both of the PCP case 
studies share some common findings. The findings suggest that the use of 
PCP facilitates SMEs who are typically excluded from the public market. 
The Smart Cities approach differs from previous SBRI practices as it has 
an overall objective of improving the technology infrastructure of the 
city.84 It is not solely concerned with the development of innovative small 
businesses. Smart Cities tend to operate in partnership with large 
technology organisations such as IBM and Siemens.85 Both Smart Cities 
case studies have adopted social business practices by implementing low-
value PCP contracts. Both city councils and partnering organisations 
appear proactive in trying to develop sustainable demand-led innovative 
competitive markets.86  
As with the Smart Dublin case study, it is difficult to assess ‘lots’ as a 
direct independent measure. The PCP involved the awarding of multiple 
contracts to successful tenderers. While both PCP cases, encouraged the 
use of subcontractors, the BCC case study did not directly facilitate SMEs 
in the supply chain. Interestingly, this case required the contractors to seek 
approval from BCC to subcontract any element of the work. It is unclear 
what internal procedures BCC follow for approving or rejecting 
subcontracting requests.87  
                                                                                      
84 R. Kitchin, ‘The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism’ (2014) 79(1) GeoJournal 
1. 
85 D. McNeill, ‘Global firms and smart technologies: IBM and the reduction of cities’ 
(2015) 40(4) Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 562. 
86 During the interviews, both procurers commented that they designed flexible and 
proportionate procedures to generate competition to secure best value for money.  
87 Presumably, this criterion would reflect the selection criteria set out in the Invitation 
to Tender; for example, rejection for declarations of bankruptcy or criminal convictions. 
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This case study also applies the strategies for public sector innovation set 
out by the OECD, 88 European Commission89 and Sorensen and Torfing.90 
BCC was committed to adopting new practices, they built on the existing 
simplified SBRI pre-commercial procedures and worked in partnership 
with Future Cities Catapult.91 Similarly, to each of the other three case 
studies, the innovative procurement was driven by a motivated and 
dedicated small team.92  
At the heart of both programmes, there is a public acceptance that the 
services can be delivered through different mediums. Both the contracting 
authority and tenderers accepted the risks in implementing change in the 
public sector. The small procurement team were motivated to improve 
public sector services.93  Public officials were publicly supportive of the 
actions taken by the team. At the time the second phase of the competition 
was launched, the then Finance Minister Máirtín Ó Muilleoir said;  
Rates are a vital source of public revenue. Money raised through 
our rates funds our schools, hospitals and other essential public 
services and so I welcome this investment in the development of 
cutting edge technology to help us maximise rates revenue.94 
with the Economy Minister Simon Hamilton stating;  
                                                                                      
88 OECD, ‘The Innovation Imperative in the Public Sector: Setting an Agenda for Action’ 
(OECD, Publishing, Paris, 2015). 
89 Commission, ‘Powering European Public Sector Innovation: Towards a New 
Architecture Report of the Expert Group on Public Sector Innovation’ (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2013). 
90 E. Sorensen and J. Torfing, ‘Enhancing collaborative innovation in the public sector’ 
(2011) 43(8) Administration and Society 868. 
91 Interview with the Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team (n 14). 
92 S. Fernandez and H.G. Rainey, ‘Managing successful organizational change in the 
public sector.’ In Debating Public Administration (Routledge, 2017) 7. 
93 B.E. Wright, R.K. Christensen and K.R. Isett, ‘Motivated to adapt? The role of public 
service motivation as employees face organizational change’ (2013) 73(5) Public 
Administration Review 738. 
94 Finance Minister O’ Máirtín, ‘Belfast and LPS invest in big data projects to Maximise 
Business Rates Revenue in Belfast’ 8th December 2016. https://www.finance-
ni.gov.uk/news/belfast-and-lps-invest-big-data-projects-maximise-business-rates-
revenue-belfast. Last accessed 19th April 2019. 
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The project is an example of the kind of lean innovation which SBRI 
can help the public sector apply to policy and operational issues. 
There is significant scope to apply data analytics to improve public 
services and also boost the economy, and I hope to see more of these 
kinds of projects in future.95  
Both procedures were conducted in a proportionate two-stage manner; 
both the procurer and the suppliers accepted the risk that the proposed 
solution might fail. The contracting authority accepted the risk of not 
achieving value for taxpayers’ money in circumstances where the solution 
failed. Fortunately, the contracting authority and awardees reaped the 
rewards of the successful development of the proposed solutions. The 
developed products offered improvements to public services and assisted 
the start-ups in developing innovative products which have been 
successfully used by other public bodies.  
Although, the procurers did not adopt Sorensen and Torfing’s 
recommendation to disseminate the competition findings to other public-
sector bodies.96 From the outset, the solutions developed would be suitable 
for duplication by other local authorities and city officials. Other 
contracting authorities would have to conduct a full tender competition for 
the solution, framing the tender specifications on the challenge findings. 
The public procurement directives do not allow for the subsequent, direct 
purchase of the solutions development post-completion of the PCP stage. 
A full competitive procedure is required to ensure compliance with 
applicable national instruments.97 As with the Smart Dublin findings, 
innovation will flourish when there is co-operation and sharing of results 
and information between public bodies.98  
                                                                                      
95 Economy Minister Simon Hamilton, ‘Belfast and LPS invest in big data projects to 
Maximise Business Rates Revenue in Belfast’ 8th December 2016.   https://www.finance-
ni.gov.uk/news/belfast-and-lps-invest-big-data-projects-maximise-business-rates-
revenue-belfast. Last accessed 19th April 2019. See also; S. Fernandez and H.G. Rainey 
(n 92). 
96 See E. Sorensen and J. Torfing (n 90). 
97 See O.S. Pantilimon Voda (n 35) 226 See also; COM (2007) 799 final. 
98 As both programmes are in the infancy stage, post-thesis research will follow the 
disseminating impacts of the Smart Cities teams. 
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Another finding suggests that the adoption of simplified PCP procedures 
and the upholding of the fundamental principles facilitated competition 
within the UK.99 Literature and recent assessment reports indicate that 
SMEs tend to bid for contracts within their local regions.100 Rigby 
suggests that SBRI activities support the development of local technology 
companies, due to the low value of the initial contract and short-
timeframes for developing their product or service.101 However, these case 
studies indicate that Smart Cities PCPs can facilitate the participation of 
SMEs from outside the local region. This may bode well for the successful 
contractors, as they can use this experience to bid for similar contracts in 
other Smart Cities, as we saw with Analytics Engines. Cross-border trade 
enhances competition for contracting authorities, which may result in 
improved tender submissions and offerings.102  
Similarly, to the Smart Dublin study, this case study highlights the 
importance of classifying the type of PCP. PCP is put forward as the key 
driver for delivering research and development services by the European 
Commission.103 A significant proportion of literature focuses on the 
relationship between PCP and innovation, questioning whether the 
demand-led instrument is effective in producing innovative solutions. 
This research concerns itself more with the actual process of the PCP. 
Contracting authorities enjoy a degree of flexibility in how they conduct 
processes.104 The Smart Dublin case study could be classified as a 
                                                                                      
99 Advertising the contract openly, use of non-discriminatory, proportionate criteria. See; 
COM (2007) 799 final. 
100 See Commission, ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ access to Public Procurement Markets in the 
EU.’ (2010) Final Report; Commission, ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets 
and aggregation of demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report; A. Flynn and P. Davis, 
‘Investigating the effect of tendering capabilities on SME activity and performance in 
public contract competitions’ (2017) 35(4) International Small Business Journal: 
Researching Entrepreneurship 449. 
101 See J. Rigby (n 32). 
102 C.Bovis, ‘The new public procurement regime: a different perspective on the 
integration of public markets of the European Union’ (2006) 12(1) European public law, 
73. 
103 See; COM (2007) 799 final. 
104 J. Edler and L. Georghiou, ‘Public procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the 
demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research Policy 949 See also; C. Edquist and L. Hommen, 
‘Government technology procurement and innovation theory’ (1998) Innovation 
Systems and European Integration Research Project Report. (www. tema. liu. se/tema-
t/sirp/PDF/322_1. pdf). 
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catalytic PCP, it was designed to address a social problem, and to date, the 
procurer has not tendered for the purchase of the commercialised products 
or services. The awardee companies interviewed appeared satisfied with 
this approach, as they used the experience gained to develop new services, 
which in turn, they sold onto other public authorities and private 
consumers.105 Significant short and medium-term benefits were recorded 
from their participation in the challenge. Catalytic PCP is very suitable for 
companies that can sell their developed solution to the private sector.106  
Suppliers should be informed at the start of the process, at the request for 
the tender stage, that a catalytic procedure is being undertaken as this type 
of procedure may not be suitable for suppliers, which plan to sell their 
services to the public sector. Awardee companies in this case study 
developed bespoke solutions for BCC to collect and identify business 
revenue rates. This is not a service which would generate private sector 
demand. This contract could be classified as a co-operative process. Most 
PCP takes place over three successive stages before the contracting 
authority completes a competitive tender for the developed solution.107 
The first stage involves the identification of solutions; phase two allows 
for the prototyping of the proposed solution. This phase allows for the 
development and assessment of shortlisted solutions.108 The final stage 
tests the product or service on a small scale. These case studies were 
conducted over a two-phase competition. Post-completion of the PCP 
stage, contracting authorities can decide if they have a need to purchase 
the commercially ready products or services. If the contracting authority 
                                                                                      
105 The awardee companies have been able to use the technology developed to secure 
additional public contracts. See Chapter 7, section 7.4. 
106 C. Edquist and J.Zabala‐Iturriagagoitia, ‘Pre‐commercial procurement: a demand or 
supply policy instrument in relation to innovation?’ (2015) 45(2) R&D Management. 
107 L. Hommen and M. Rolfstam, ‘Public procurement and innovation: towards a 
taxonomy’ (2008) 8(3) Journal of Public Procurement 17; V. Lember, T. Kalvet and R. 
Kattel, ‘Urban competitiveness and public procurement for innovation’ (2011) 
48(7) Urban Studies 1373. 
108 See; COM (2007) 799 final. 
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has a need to purchase the goods or services, a full tender competition 
must be conducted.109 
The difference between both the Smart Cities case studies is the 
contracting authorities plans to conduct a full tender competition at the 
end of the PCP. Smart Dublin have clearly informed the tenderers that the 
authority has no current plans to conduct a competitive procurement 
competition to procure the developed services.110 BCC indicated that it 
would consider conducting a competitive procurement procedure post the 
completion of the PCP. One of the winning bidders from the Belfast case 
study emphasised that the company would only secure a financial return 
from the developed solution if they could successfully tender for a public 
services contract.111 The company invested in the bespoke solution for 
BCC with the hope that they could commercially tender the service to the 
public body.112  
This raises an additional question, if public authorities are going to 
undertake a co-operative PCP, should they indicate when they plan to 
undertake a full tender competition at the end of the research and 
development process? At the time of writing, neither of the Smart Cities 
pre-commercial procedures were followed by a ‘public procurement of 
innovation’ process. SMEs bidding in co-operative procedures need to 
carefully assess the level of risks they are willing to accept, if the solution 
does not succeed or if it does succeed and the full tender competition is 
not conducted, will they be able to absorb any financial losses internally. 
In preserving competition in the internal market, it is not permissible for 
the public body to purchase or to continue using the commercial ready 
                                                                                      
109 At this stage, the contracting authority can no longer rely on Public Contracts 
Regulations, reg 14. The contracting authority will be purchasing a public supplies or 
services contract. 
110 Interview with Jamie Cudden, Smart Cities Programme Manager, Dublin City Council 
(Dublin, Ireland, 20th June 2017). 
111 Interview with the Head of Data Analytics Solutions (n 15) Although, the company 
has used the experience gained from the contract to win further contracts with other 
public bodies.  
112 Interview with the Head of Data Analytics Solutions (n 15). 
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product or service.113 One of the companies interviewed made an 
interesting comment regarding the cost set out by another public body 
conducting an SBRI competition in Northern Ireland; the company 
suggested that the available costs outlined in the call for competition did 
not reflect the ‘challenge specifications’. The company was happy to exit 
the competition after phase I. According to the European Commission 
PCP communication, public authorities should clearly state their 
maximum budget allocations in the tender advertising documents. This 
will ensure compliance with state aid rules.114One recommendation for 
public procurers when considering conducting a PCP procedure is that 
they should indicate to suppliers what type of process they plan to use and 
clearly indicate the maximum budget allocation for the individual 
contracts. 
8.6 Conclusions 
This case study successfully demonstrates that the use of PCP facilitates 
SME participation in public procurement. In particular, the PCP facilitated 
innovative small businesses and start-up participation in the public 
market. This case study, like the Smart Dublin case study, demonstrates 
that PCP can be used as an effective tool to find new digital solutions to 
public-sector challenges, delivering the Single Market goals at a local 
level. As in the Smart Dublin case study, the Smart Belfast procurement 
actions should be shared and replicated by other cities and large towns 
across Northern Ireland. However, it is important for future PCP 
programmes to inform the market if the public body has funds to purchase 
the developed solution at the end of the prototyping and testing stages. 
Overall, PCP should be used to support start-up growth, creating a 
                                                                                      
113 Although, a continuation process is permissible using the ‘innovation partnership.’ 
Contracting authorities should consider this approach if they plan to conduct a complex 
smart project. See Public Contracts Regulations, reg 31. 
114 If the contract was not purchased at current market prices, the procedure could 
potentially fall within the state aid remit of Art. 107(1) TFEU. See Commission, ‘Guide 
to the application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the 
internal market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest.’ (Staff Working Paper) SWD (2013) 53 final/2. 
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flexible, proportionate and easy public market entry route for innovative 
small businesses.   
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Chapter 9 Discussions and Findings 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the thesis is to assess which measures facilitate SME 
participation in public procurement. Specifically, the research asks if the 
inclusion of community benefit clauses, the division of large contracts into 
smaller lots, the inclusion of subcontractor considerations and the use of 
PCP facilitate SME participation in public contracts. This chapter 
summarises and discusses the core thesis findings. The chapter opens with 
a synopsis of the reasons for pursuing this study of enquiry using a cross-
country comparative case study approach. The research findings suggest 
the use of lots, community benefit clauses, subcontractor considerations 
and use of PCP facilitates SME participation. The research further 
suggests that the effectiveness of the socially-driven competitions is 
dependent on a supportive policy environment and motivated public 
sector ‘champions.’ The thesis concludes by calling for public procurers 
to incorporate social criteria in public procurement to facilitate SME 
participation. 
 
9.2 Thesis summary 
SMEs are consistently described as the backbone of EU economies, and 
this description is not made without merit.1 SMEs represent approximately 
99% of all enterprises operating in Europe and are hailed as essential 
initiators and catalysts for the development, design and implementation of 
                                                                                      
1 P. Alajääskö and A Roodhuijzen, ‘Eurostat, Structural business statistics and global 
value chains’. ISSN 2443-8219 Micro data linking in business statistics. Eurostat online 
publication. Available at; https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Microdata_linking_in_business_statistics_-
_introduction#Statistics_on_small_and_medium-sized_enterprises_-
_Dependent_and_independent_SMEs_and_large_enterprises Last accessed; 29th April 
2019. 
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innovative goods and services.2 This is due to their proximity to local 
markets and their organisational and financial flexibility.3 European 
Commission evaluation reports estimate that SMEs hold 46% of the public 
market share, which is relatively small considering their importance in the 
business economy.4 Weaknesses associated with working with SMEs 
include lack of financial guarantees and technical capabilities. SMEs 
chances of successful tendering for public contracts are dependent on the 
type of procurer, size and value of the contract, type of procedure and 
evaluation methods.5 However, there is a positive societal impact for 
facilitating SMEs as they contribute heavily to local employment 
generation.6 
Large scale research conducted on behalf of the Commission concludes 
that local and regional authorities award a higher proportion of public 
contracts to SMEs than those awarded by central departments.7 SMEs 
stand a greater chance of winning contracts with a value falling below the 
EU financial advertising thresholds. Contracts with an estimated value 
close to or exceeding the thresholds which are divided into proportionate 
lots encourage SME participation. Open tender procedures are the most 
conducive procedure for encouraging SME participation. While the 
restricted procedure and the former negotiated procedure also facilitate 
SME participation to some extent, the competitive dialogue competitions 
disincentivise SMEs from bidding.8 SMEs on average bid for contracts 
                                                                                      
2 Note start-ups are the primary drivers of innovation. See Commission, ‘Europe’s next 
leaders: the Start-up and Scale-up Initiative’ (Communication) COM (2016). 
3 S. Roper, ‘Product Innovation and Small Business Growth: A Comparison of the 
Strategies of German, U.K. and Irish Companies’ (1997) 9(6) Small Business Economics 
44. 
4 See Commission ‘SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of 
demand in the EU 2014.’ (2014) Final Report. 
5 See Commission ‘Evaluation of SMEs’ access to Public Procurement Markets in the 
EU.’ (2010) Final Report. 
6  P. Schreyer, ‘SMEs and Employment Creation: Overview of Selected Quantitative 
Studies in OECD Member Countries’ OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working 
Papers, No. 1996/04 (OECD Publishing, Paris, 1996).  
https://doi.org/10.1787/374052760815. Last accessed; 29th April 2019. 
7 See Commission (2014) (n 4). 
8 The percentage of contract gained by SMEs operating in an open procedure is 38%, this 
reduces to 6% in competitive dialogues. Competitive dialogues by their very nature are 
only suitable for complex large scale contracts. See Commission (2010) (n 5). 
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which fall below the advertising thresholds.9 Limited information is 
available on the number of start-ups and social enterprise participating in 
public contracts.10 Research tends to focus on the impact start-ups, and 
social enterprises have on national economies.11 
A cross-border comparative case study was adopted to review public 
works and services contracts concluded in Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
Both states have adopted policies to promote SMEs in the marketplace 
and more recently the two regions have focussed on the adoption of Smart 
Cities objectives and the inclusion of community benefit clauses in above-
threshold contracts.12 The case studies reflect these recent changes, 
assessing to what extent the adoption of innovative procedures and 
socially driven competitions facilitate SMEs in gaining a share of a public 
contract. The combined findings indicate that the use of lots, PCP 
procedures and the inclusion of subcontractor protection considerations 
and community benefit clauses facilitate all forms of SMEs. These 
measures promoted SME engagement when they were supported and 
driven by motivated public-sector champions, who were committed to 
implementing effective change in the organisation. Domestic and internal 
policies supported the successful implementation of socially responsible 
public procurement. 
                                                                                      
9 K. Loader, ‘SME suppliers and the challenge of public procurement: Evidence revealed 
by a UK government online feedback facility’ (2015) 21(2) Journal of Purchasing and 
Supply Management 103. 
10 The exception to this is research conducted by C. Edquist; A. Erridge; M. Loosemore, 
L. Preuss and R. Rothwell. These contributions have been significantly relied on 
throughout the thesis. 
11 Notable contributions include; J.A. Baum, T. Calabrese and B.S. Silverman, ‘Don't go 
it alone: Alliance network composition and startups' performance in Canadian 
biotechnology’ (2000) 21(3) Strategic management journal 267; N. Bosma, M. Van 
Praag, R. Thurik, R. and G. De Wit, ‘The value of human and social capital investments 
for the business performance of startups’ (2004) 23(3) Small Business Economics 227; 
C. Borzaga and J. Defourny, J. eds., ‘The emergence of social enterprise’ (Psychology 
Press, Vol. 4, 2004); J. Battilana and M. Lee, ‘Advancing research on hybrid organizing–
Insights from the study of social enterprises’ (2014) 8(1)The Academy of Management 
Annals 397. 
12 It should be noted again that while both states have adopted socially responsible public 
procurement policies and some public bodies have adopted Smart City objectives, 
Northern Ireland has adopted a more structured policy approach to facilitating 
community benefit clauses in large public contracts. 
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9.3 Definition of SMEs 
An important research finding highlights a problem with the broad 
definition of ‘SME’  adopted in public procurement policies.  European 
and national policies on public procurement tend to treat SMEs as a 
homogenised group.13 Medium sized-enterprises are defined as any 
business entity which employs fewer than 250 employees and has an 
annual turnover not exceeding €50million. Small businesses are business 
entities which employ fewer than 50 employees and have an annual 
turnover not exceeding €10million. Micro-enterprises are business entities 
which employ fewer than ten employees and have an annual turnover not 
exceeding €2million.14 The number of employees and turnover rate 
categorises businesses. The research findings indicate that there is a 
greater need for public bodies to conduct procedures which are conducive 
for appropriate forms of businesses; for example, including provisions 
which encourage social enterprises, start-ups, pre-start-ups and research 
groups in innovative or low-value contracts. This might require 
contracting authorities to re-evaluate the criteria used to award contracts. 
Contracting authorities should consider reviewing the emphasis placed on 
demonstrating ‘profits’ in the selection criteria.15 
Irish public procurement policy serves to facilitate SMEs into traditional 
public-sector markets.16 These policies do not make any distinction 
between conventional SMEs and social enterprises. Bernie Walsh who 
                                                                                      
13 L.J. Spence, ‘CSR and small business in a European policy context: The five “C” s of 
CSR and small business research agenda’ (2007) 112(4) Business and society review 
533; J. Wyld, G. Pugh and D. Tyrrall, ‘Can powerful buyers “exploit” SME suppliers?’ 
(2012) 19(2) Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 322. 
14 See Commission, ‘Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (notified under document number C(2003) 1422)’ 
(2003) OJ L 124/36, annex 2. 
15 Public Sector Directive, art 58(3) prevents contracting authorities from setting 
financial criteria which exceeds two times the estimated contract value, except in duly 
justified cases. 
16 See Circular 10/2014, ‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement’ 2014. 
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operates one of the oldest established forms of social enterprises in Dublin 
claims;17 
Social enterprises are not like other businesses. You can’t treat them 
the same. They need different resources. It’s like comparing two 
schoolchildren. One child goes to school happy, fully dressed, fed, 
with all his school books and lunch. The other child goes to school 
hungry, without all his uniform and books, without lunch and tired 
from being up half the night listening to his parents fight. It’s the 
same with social enterprises. They don’t have the same resources as 
private businesses do. They work with the most disadvantaged 
people, working in the areas with the highest level of poverty. Social 
enterprise need all of the same inputs and outputs as any other 
enterprise but have an added dimension.18 
Social enterprises experience the same problems in tendering for public 
contracts as SMEs do, along with additional issues unique to their sector.19 
A primary difference between the two forms of companies is how they 
value success and profit.20 Procurers are encouraged not only to consider 
profits calculated on financial gains alone and are also encouraged to view 
profit from a return on social investment calculation.21 Procurers are 
                                                                                      
17 Bernie Walsh, CEO Sunflower Recycling, Dublin Ireland. This quote was obtained 
with permission from a Dublin City Social Enterprise Committee Meeting, 12th 
September 2018. 
18 Ms. Walsh further commented that ‘comparing enterprises and social enterprises is 
like comparing Fred Astair and Ginger Rogers, she did everything he did, but in high 
heels and backwards. But he got all the recognition’. See (n 17). 
19 S. Munoz, ‘Social enterprise and public sector voices on procurement’ (2009) 5(1) 
Social Enterprise Journal 69; A. Argyrou, ‘Providing Social Enterprises with Better 
Access to Public Procurement: The Development of Supportive Legal Frameworks’ 
(2017) 12 Eur. Procurement & Pub. Private Partnership Law Rev 310. 
20 P.W. Ryan and I. Lyne, ‘Social enterprise and the measurement of social value: 
methodological issues with the calculation and application of the social return on 
investment’ (2008) 2(3) Education, Knowledge & Economy 223.; R. Millar and K. Hall, 
‘Social return on investment (SROI) and performance measurement: The opportunities 
and barriers for social enterprises in health and social care’ (2013) 15(6) Public 
Management Review 923. 
21 M. Aiken, ‘Towards market or state? Tensions and opportunities in the evolutionary 
path of three UK social enterprises’ in M. Nyssens, ed., ‘Social enterprise: At the 
crossroads of market, public policies and civil society’ (Routledge, New York and 
London, 2006) 259; J. Defourny, and M. Nyssens, ‘Social enterprise in Europe: At the 
crossroads of market, public policies and third sector’ (2010) 29(3) Policy and Society 
231. 
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encouraged to set proportionate financial specifications and to use a most 
economically advantageous tender award criteria or a life-cycle approach; 
this is expected to assist all SMEs in tendering for the advertised 
contract.22 The Directive, national implementing instruments and national 
policies include several provisions supporting both SMEs and social 
enterprises participation in the public markets.23 The social enterprise 
provision relates primarily to the setting aside of  contracts for sheltered 
workshops.24 However, social enterprises should not have to rely on set-
asides to enter the market. There are opportunities for social enterprises, 
voluntary organisations and charities to contract with public bodies. 
Northern Ireland had adopted a specific policy on encouraging social 
enterprise participation in public contracts.25 The Irish Office of 
Government Procurement (OGP) is encouraged to replicate the policy 
approach taken by the Northern Irish Central Procurement Directorate 
(CPD).  
Similarly, innovative start-ups face additional difficulties to traditional 
SMEs in tendering for public contracts. Notably, in circumstances where 
they are offering innovative services or goods, which have not previously 
been bought or utilised by the public sector. Circular 10/14 ‘Initiatives to 
assist SMEs in public procurement’ encourages Irish public procurers to 
promote innovative solutions by allowing for variants to specifications 
                                                                                      
22 Public Sector Directive arts 67 and 68. 
23 The main Public Sector Directive provisions include; 
Art. 18(2) Mandatory social clause 
Art. 20 Reserved contract 
Art. 40 Preliminary market consultations 
Art. 42(1) Technical specifications and accessibility requirements 
Art. 46 Division of contracts into lots 
Art. 56 Choice of participants and award of contracts 
Art. 57 Exclusion grounds 
Art. 67 Contract award criteria 
Art. 69 Abnormally low tenders 
Art. 70 Conditions for performance of contracts 
Art. 71 Subcontracting. 
24 Public Sector Directive, art 20. See also; Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR 1-
03395; Case C-113/13 Spezzino [2014] pub. electr. EU:2014:2440. 
25 See CPD Policy Government Notes;  
A Guide for Social Economy Enterprises (2011) PGN 01/11 
Helping Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Social Economy Enterprises 
(SEEs) access Public Sector contracting opportunities (2011) PGN 02/11. 
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where possible.26 Procurers are additionally urged to consider the design 
of output-orientated functional requirements which enable the suppliers to 
offer innovative suppliers or services.27 The fundamental flaw with this 
approach is that it only encourages participation from innovative 
companies which have the capacity and experience to meet the minimum 
financial, professional and capacity criteria. These specifications alone 
will not promote start-up participation in public contracts. The findings 
from the two Smart Cities case studies demonstrate that the start-ups could 
not meet these criteria and sought to find a different entry route to market. 
PCP practices offer an efficient solution for start-ups and innovative 
companies in tendering for initial contracts, to trial and develop solutions 
which assist in improving public services and living and business 
standards.28 Both states have pursued the use of SBIR and SBRI activities 
over the last five years. The Smart Cities initiatives are new to both 
countries. It is an ideal time for both countries to review national policy 
and guidance documents on innovative procurement for low-value 
contracts, offering guidance on how to conduct PCP procedures.  
9.4 Lots 
The European Commission inserted Article 46 in the Directive to promote 
SME competition in the Single Market by encouraging public procurers 
to divide large contracts into smaller lots.29 Ireland and the UK did not 
gold plate the transposition of this article, adopting the least prescriptive 
measures.30 Both statutory instruments implementing the Directive did not 
transpose the option of requiring contracting authorities to award large 
contracts in the form of separate lots. Contracting authorities retain the 
                                                                                      
26 See also; Office of Government Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement 
Framework Public Procurement Guidelines for Goods and Services.’ (2019) Version 
2.1. 
27 See Office of Government Procurement (n 26). 
28 Public Sector Directive reg 46. 
29 Public Sector Directive, recital 39 and art. 46(2). Overall, the findings lean towards 
Spagnolo and Yukins argument calling for contracting authorities to retain the freedom 
to choose when it is suitable to split large contracts into small lots based on their 
procuring expertise and market knowledge, and both procuring teams enjoy this freedom 
of choice. G. Spagnolo and C. Yukins, ‘Lots – the Economic and Legal challenges of 
centralised procurement.’ Colloqium in G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement 
policy’ (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon;New York, NY, 2015) 61. 
30 Public Authority Regulations reg 46; (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 46. 
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freedom to choose when to use lots.31 Lots were used in the National 
Children’s Hospital and Buy Social case studies.  
In the National Children’s Hospital case study, the use of lots did not 
encourage SME participation. This was due to the size, value and 
specialised nature of the heterogeneous lots. The National Children’s 
Hospital case study findings support Trybus’s theory that SMEs will only 
benefit from the use of lots when the lots are of proportionate size and 
value.32 The use of lots impacted the awardee consortium’s decision to bid 
for the contract in the Buy Social case study. The case study demonstrates 
that social enterprises can enter the market and win a lot of a large contract 
if they partner with a private organisation. The research outcome suggests 
that the combination of the use of lots and community benefit clauses 
facilitated the social enterprise successfully tendering for the services and 
supplies contract.  
Recent empirical research by Glas et al. contests Nicholas and Fruhmann’s 
claim that the use of lots is an SME-friendly initiative, arguing instead that 
there is no underlying empirical evidence on which to base this claim.33 
Furthermore, Glas and Eßig assert that there is a disconnect between 
European legislation and policy and public procurement, summarising 
that the use of lots does not improve SMEs chances of successfully 
tendering for public contracts.34 While this research does not provide 
large-scale empirical evidence to dispel or support the empirical findings 
put forth by Glas and Eßig, the Buy Social finding indicates that the use 
                                                                                      
31 Contracting authorities are still required to report their reasons for not using lots. Public 
Authority Regulations reg 46(1); (UK) Public Contracts Regulations reg 46(1). 
32 M. Trybus, ‘The Promotion of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Public 
Procurement: A Strategic Objective of the New Public Sector Directive?’ in Chapter in 
F. Lichère, R. Caranta and S. Treumer (eds.), ‘Modernising Public Procurement: The 
New Directive’ (Djøf: Copenhagen, 2014), 255; M. Trybus, ‘The Division of Public 
Contracts into Lots under Directive 2014/24: Minimum Harmonisation and Impact on 
SMEs in Public Procurement?’ (2018) 43(3) European Law Review 313. 
33 C. Nicholas and M. Fruhmann, ‘Small and medium-sized enterprises policies in public 
procurement: time for a rethink?’ (2014) 14(3) Journal of Public Procurement 328; A.H. 
Glas and M. Eßig, ‘Factors that influence the success of small and medium-sized 
suppliers in public procurement: evidence from a centralized agency in Germany’ (2018) 
23(1) Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 65. 
34 See A.H. Glas and M. Eßig (n 33). 
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of lots had a positive impact on the consortium’s decision to bid for the 
contract. 
Regarding the two Smart Cities case studies, the division of public 
contracts into smaller lots is in embedded in the choice to use PCP. Nine 
micro-enterprises participated in initial solution exploration contracts. 
However, the success of the participation of the companies in the public 
contracts was as a result of the procedure chosen not the deliberate 
decision to divide the contracts into smaller lots.35 Overall, the use of lots 
did assist the social enterprise in gaining access to the public market in the 
Buy Social case study. The research findings demonstrate that the division 
of large contracts into smaller lots will facilitate SME participation once 
other measures encouraging participation are included in the procurement 
competition. Other measures can include the use of community benefit 
clauses, use of subcontractor considerations and use of innovative 
procedures. Despite this finding, this section concludes by agreeing with 
Glas et al.’s call for further empirical research to be conducted on the 
impact the use of lots has on SME engagement in contracts which fall 
above and below the EU thresholds.36 Lots, in and of themselves, have 
limitations facilitating SME participation, but the case study research 
findings tentatively suggest that, in combination with other social criteria, 
such as community benefit clauses, they can be effective.37 
9.5 Community benefit clauses  
The case studies findings differed on what impact the use of community 
benefit clauses has on SME engagement. The targeted recruitment and 
training clauses included in the National Children’s Hospital case study 
did not facilitate SME participation at the tender stage or the contract 
performance stage.38 By contrast, the community benefit clause included 
                                                                                      
35 If lots were not used, only two companies could potentially win the contracts. 
36 See A.H. Glas and M. Eßig (n 33). 
37 The use of open procedures, Best Price: Quality award criteria, proportionate financial 
and qualification selection criteria may also assist the effective use of lots. See also; See 
Commission, ‘European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public 
Procurement Contracts’ (SWP) COM (2008) 2193. 
38 To date. The researcher will monitor the impact of the social criteria post completion 
of the thesis. 
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in the Buy Social case study had a direct impact on a social enterprise’s 
decision to bid for a high-value contract in partnership with a large private 
enterprise. The primary finding associated with this measure is the 
suitability of community benefit clauses in promoting social enterprise 
participation in large-scale contracts. This finding directly builds on 
Loosemore’s research outlining the socio-economic benefits associated 
with facilitating social enterprises in UK construction contracts.39 The 
finding builds on this argument, by demonstrating that social enterprises 
can equally succeed in delivering socio-economic benefits in services 
contracts, as either a consortium partner or as a subcontractor.40 The 
findings specifically note that the use of community benefit clauses has a 
direct impact on social enterprise participation.  
The inclusion of the community benefit clauses in the two case studies 
benefitted the local communities through the creation of new jobs. In 
circumstances where the use of social objectives generated benefits for the 
local community, it would be wise for public bodies to persist with 
community benefit clauses. Although the clauses did not directly facilitate 
for-profit SME participation, the National Children’s Hospital and the 
Buy Social case studies illustrate that community benefit clauses are not 
solely imposed on the main contractor. 41 The clauses are also included in 
subcontracts. Therefore, SMEs will need to review their abilities to meet 
social objectives when bidding for subcontracts. In some cases, this might 
mean formalising what they already do, such as organising 
apprenticeships or by accepting interns from local public employment 
agencies or schools.42  
                                                                                      
 
39 M. Loosemore and D. Higgon, ‘Social enterprise in the construction industry: Building 
better communities’ (Routledge, 2015); M. Loosemore, ‘Building a new third 
construction sector through social enterprise’ (2015) 33(9) Construction Management 
and Economics 724; M. Loosemore, ‘Social procurement in UK construction projects’ 
(2016) 34(2) International Journal of Project Management 133. 
40 This includes the socio-economic benefits delivered by the Benefit-Corporation 
accredited subcontractor. 
41 The community benefit clauses may still have an impact on SME participation in the 
supply-chain. 
42 Brooks comments that SMEs already engage with socially responsible activities 
without naming or acknowledging the importance of the activities. See S. Brooks, ‘The 
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SMEs that consider adopting community benefit clauses into their internal 
operations may increase their chances of successfully bidding for future 
works contracts or subcontracts, which include socially-driven clauses.43 
Take for example the following hypothetical scenario; 
Two hypothetical small construction companies have equal 
experience and success in tendering for public works contracts both 
as main contractors and as subcontractors. Both are aware of 
recent inclusions of targeted recruitment and training clauses in 
large works contracts awarded by local contracting authorities. 
Company A decides that compliance with such community benefit 
clauses would increase operational costs disproportionately and 
makes the decision that it is not economically viable to adopt 
recruitment and training clauses. Company B expresses the same 
fears as Company A but recognises that the community benefit 
clauses are a requisite to winning certain public works contracts. 
As public bodies are increasingly using targeted recruitment and 
training clauses, Company B strategically adopts private 
employment and training clauses. 
A hypothetical works contract is advertised by a local authority 
which includes mandatory targeted recruitment and training 
clauses. Company A and Company B both bid for the contract. 
Company B can demonstrate experience of complying with private 
employment and training clauses, giving Company B an automatic 
advantage over Company A. Additionally, Company B is the more 
desirable subcontractor.  
SMEs planning on tendering for public contracts or tendering to enter the 
supply chain as subcontractors should consider reviewing the suitability 
and financial viability of meeting social criteria as part of their operations. 
                                                                                      
practice and construction of corporate social responsibility among small to medium 
sized enterprises in South Wales’ (2004) 17(1) Contemporary Wales 162. 
43 Perrini et al. suggest that SMEs can quickly and effectively adopt a social agenda  See 
F. Perrini, A. Russo and A. Tencati, ‘CSR strategies of SMEs and large firms. Evidence 
from Italy’ (2007) 74(3) Journal of Business Ethics 285. 
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SMEs may improve their chances of successful tendering, by 
implementing private employment and training clauses, investing in a 
domestic CSR policy or exploring potential partnerships with social 
enterprises. This finding supports arguments put forward by researchers 
examining the reasons why SMEs would engage with CSR related 
activities in general. It supports arguments raised by Webb, suggesting 
that businesses should attempt to pre-empt policy changes to improve their 
competitiveness by adopting and implementing similar operational 
practices in advance of the adoption of policy changes.44 Additionally, this 
finding supports arguments raised by Tátrai, Walker and Preuss 
contending that the sustained use of particular clauses will eventually 
become standard operational practices.45 If contracting authorities 
continue to incorporate community benefit clauses, SMEs will need to 
view these clauses as ‘commercial’ criteria’; if they wish to work on the 
contract either as a contractor or a subcontractor, they will need to comply 
with the community benefit clauses.46 
However, it is not realistic for SMEs to develop plans and strategies by 
themselves, particularly micro-enterprises. If public bodies plan to 
incorporate community benefit clauses widely, they should adequately 
inform and support suppliers in achieving these goals.47 The public sector 
cannot shift full responsibility of achieving the social employment goals 
onto private operators. Such an approach has the potential to distort 
                                                                                      
44 K. Webb, ‘Understanding the voluntary codes phenomenon’ (2004) Voluntary codes: 
Private governance, the public interest and innovation, 3; K. Webb 2 Voluntary codes: 
private governance, the public interest and innovation. (Carleton Research Unit for 
Innovation, Science and Environment, Carleton University, 2014). 
45 H. Walker and L. Preuss, ‘Fostering sustainability through sourcing from small 
businesses: public sector perspectives’ (2008) 16(15) Journal of Cleaner Production 
1600; G. Piga and T. Tátrai, ‘Public procurement policy’ (Routledge, Abingdon, 
Oxon;New York, NY, 2015); T. Tátrai, ‘Stages of development towards sustainable 
public procurement.’ In International Public Procurement (Springer, Cham 2015) 271. 
46 H. Walker and L. (2008) 16(15) (n 45); D. Baden, I. Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The 
effects of procurement policies on ‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: 
Content-analytic insights into the views and actions of SME owner-managers ‘(2011) 
29(3) International Small Business 259. 
47 The Northern Ireland Buy Social Unit formulate the community benefit clauses for 
public procurers and manage a brokerage tool to assist contractors in meeting their 
recruitment targets. 
345 
 
market competition and increase tendering costs.48 This research 
recommends that in circumstances where national policy requires public 
bodies to consider pursuing community benefit clauses in public 
procurement, national procurement bodies should offer support for SMEs. 
Intertrade Ireland offers public procurement support and training to 
SMEs in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Specific social benefit ‘upskilling’ 
training could potentially be offered at Intertrade Ireland’s ‘Meet the 
Buyer’ or ‘Go-to-tender’ training and networking events.49 This form of 
training would support SMEs in tendering for future public contracts.  
Additionally, support would be required to assist the winning bidder and 
subcontractor in carrying out the community benefit requirements. The 
Buy Social public body in Northern Ireland successfully supports both 
public procurers and economic operators in designing and carrying out 
targeted recruitment and training requirements.50 The interviewed 
contractors expressed their appreciation for the support services.51 
Likewise, in the National Children’s Hospital case study, a dedicated 
community benefits officer was appointed to assist with the design and 
implementation of the targeted recruitment and training requirements and 
is responsible for engaging with the contractor and with the wider 
community to deliver the social benefits requirements.52 However, 
training on the use of community benefits clauses would assist the general 
SME population in bidding for public contracts which incorporate social 
clauses.  
Overall, the research findings indicate that the use of community benefit 
clauses in the Buy Social case study demonstrates that targeted 
                                                                                      
48 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Public procurement and the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) 9. 
49 The all-island networking events are offered freely to SMEs. There is a small charge 
for the training seminars. The Go-to-Tender training seminars are hosted by specialist 
procurement training entities. 
50 The Buy Social Unit was established under the remit of the Strategic Investment Board 
to assist with the effective delivery of procurement policy goals. See CPD Public 
Guidance Note, ‘ Integrating Social Considerations into Contracts’ (2016) PGN 01/13. 
51 Interview with Maeve Monaghan, CEO NOW Group (by phone, 26th October 2016) 
and Interview with Brendan Flynn, Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (by 
phone, 10th November 2016) 
52 See NCH ‘Harnessing the Potential – Report’ (2015). 
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recruitment and training clauses facilitated social enterprise participation 
in public contracts and had an overall positive impact on employment 
rates. Similar clauses included in the National Children’s Hospital case 
study did not directly facilitate SME or social enterprise engagement, 
however, as the targeted recruitment and training requirements are being 
successfully met, it is imaginable that this success may encourage other 
public bodies to replicate and implement community benefit clauses in 
their tendering practices.53  
9.6 Subcontractor considerations 
Findings from three out of the four case studies, excluding the Smart 
Belfast case study, indicate that subcontractor considerations facilitate 
SME participation in the supply chain. The National Children’s Hospital 
case study demonstrates a strong link between the inclusion of 
subcontractor considerations and the participation of SMEs. The 
voluntary subcontractor considerations in this case study require the main 
contractor to host Meet the Buyer events and to consider SME 
participation in the supply chain. To date, the awardee company has only 
published subcontracting information for the enabling stage of the works 
contract. The early findings conclude that 93% of all subcontracts were 
awarded to SMEs, 32% of which were awarded to companies based in 
Dublin 8 and 12, this equates to approximately €500,000.54 Subcontracts 
were awarded to local micro-enterprises based in the area to erect hoarding 
and to provide salvage facilities. This finding does not support Trybus’s 
remarks that SMEs do not wish to enter a public contract as a 
subcontractor as they do not wish to be controlled and managed by a larger 
entity.55  
                                                                                      
53 As suggested by E. Sorensen and J. Torfing, ‘Enhancing collaborative innovation in 
the public sector’ (2011) 43(8) Administration and Society 868. 
54 Interview with Ingrid McElroy, Community Benefit Programme Manager, National 
Paediatric Hospital Development Board Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management 
and Project Controls (Dublin, Ireland, 8th August 2018). 
55 M. Trybus, ‘The Division of Public Contracts into Lots under Directive 2014/24: 
Minimum Harmonisation and Impact on SMEs in Public Procurement?’ (2018) 43(3) 
European Law Review 313. 
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The Buy Social case study findings indicate that subcontractor 
considerations will support SME participation when incorporated with 
other social criteria. The unique combination of the three social criteria; 
division of large contracts into smaller lots, use of community benefit 
clauses and subcontractor considerations created optimal competition for 
social enterprises to enter the market and supply chain.56 The two Smart 
Cities research findings support this combination test. In these case 
studies, the use of PCP with its inherent use of lots and overriding 
innovative socio-economic Smart Cities goals created unique 
opportunities for start-ups and micro-enterprises to enter the public market 
and develop solutions to current societal challenges.57  
The research demonstrated the success of implementing voluntary 
subcontractor considerations in public contracts, and the research further 
argues that there is a need for key procurers to maintain a monitoring role 
during the contract performance stage. At the time the research 
methodology was designed, the research did not extend the assessment to 
examining compliance with statutory and additional subcontractor 
requirements, such as the prompt payments requirements or  the potential 
to make direct payments to subcontractors.58 However, these issues are of 
current and growing importance to the UK and Irish economies with the 
recent collapse of large construction companies. Recent developments in 
the UK and Irish construction sectors have highlighted concerns and risks 
associated with procurement procedures and management of public works 
contracts. In January 2016, the UK’s second largest construction 
                                                                                      
56 The combination of social criteria additionally demonstrates the public bodies 
commitment to generating competition amongst all forms of SMEs in the public market. 
The public body relied on the SME friendly provisions set out in the Directive to secure 
the Value for Money objectives set out in national policy. See Department of Finance 
and CPD Northern Ireland, ‘Public Procurement Policy’ (2014) Version 11. Available 
at; https://www.finance-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/dfp/ni-public-
procurement-policy-version-11-august-2014.pdf Last accessed 25th April 2019. 
57 The flexible approach adopted by Smart Dublin allowed for the awarding of additional 
contracts. Interview with Jamie Cudden, Smart Cities Programme Manager, Dublin City 
Council (Dublin, Ireland, 24th April 2016). 
58 The UK and Irish S.I.’s transposing the Public Sector Directive did not implement the 
option requiring contracting authorities to pay subcontractors directly for works 
completed. The research did not assess the prompt payments laws in the case studies. See 
Directive 2011/7/EU of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial 
transactions OJ L 48/1. 
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company, Carillion Plc., collapsed with a debt pile of over £1.5 billion. 
This resulted in the loss of jobs, non-completion of public contracts and 
non-payments to subcontractors.59 This research is not tasked with 
investigating how these procurement competitions were conducted nor 
how these contracts were managed. However, it is a crucial time for 
procurers to review how they implement and monitor voluntary 
subcontractor criteria in the request for tenders and contract performance 
clauses. This research calls for contracting authorities to strengthen the 
connection between the tender-stage and the contract performance stage.60 
Contracting authorities involved in the case studies have been involved in 
the tender design and evaluation and are engaged and motivated to ensure 
compliance with the social criteria during the contract performance 
stage.61  
This research examined whether the inclusion of subcontractor protection 
considerations facilitated SME participation in public procurement. The 
findings positively show that subcontractor considerations actively 
encourage SME participation in the supply chain. The research argues that 
the voluntary subcontractor considerations used by the Buy Social and the 
National Children’s Hospital case studies connected the tendering stage 
with the contract performance stage, requiring the contractors to embody 
the social tendering objectives throughout the management of the contract.  
                                                                                      
59 D. Rogers, ‘Not-so-sudden death: How Carillion disguised its ailing finances just 
enough’ (2018) 9(2) Construction Research and Innovation 44; S. Wren-Lewis, ‘What 
Carillion's collapse tells us about public sector outsourcing’ (2018) British Politics and 
Policy at LSE. 
60 Each of the case studies had one or more ‘champions’ driving the social change, these 
champions were involved in each stage of the procurement cycle. This is discussed 
further in section 9.10 of this chapter. 
61 The ‘champions’ identified in the case studies were the driving forces for successful 
change in the public contracts. See; S. Fernandez and H.G. Rainey, ‘Managing successful 
organizational change in the public sector.’ In ‘Debating Public Administration’ 
(Routledge, 2017) 7. 
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9.7 Pre-commercial procurement 
Approaches taken by the Smart Cities teams were outcome focussed, 
driven by environmental, social and economic outcomes.62 The Dublin 
competition sought to improve cycling rates in the city, while the Belfast 
competition sought to improve internal operational practices. The 
National Children’s Hospital and the Buy Social studies scrutinise the 
tendering processes for pecuniary contracts, which had an objective of 
providing the construction of a children’s hospital and the provisions of 
catering, cleaning and ancillary services contracts. Both contracts were 
concerned with what impact the significant figures of public money would 
have on local economies. Both contracts prioritised the promotion of 
targeted recruitment and training of at-risk young unemployed persons. 
The Smart Cities case studies are concerned with concluding public 
contracts to develop technology-based goods and services to assist in 
developing solutions for societal problems.  
Smart City programmes in Ireland and Northern Ireland are using PCP 
practices to engage with start-ups, local communities, large corporations 
and academia to develop innovative mechanisms to improve urban city 
living standards. PCPs offers innovative small businesses, 
microenterprises and start-ups an entry route into the public market.63 
These companies under standard tendering procedures would be hindered 
from successfully bidding for low-value public contracts.64 However, the 
use of PCP practices undertaken by the two Smart Cities case studies 
resulted in nine start-up companies successfully winning public services 
and supplies contracts. Four of these companies used this work experience 
to successfully bid for further public-sector work with Smart City 
programmes in the other Member States and the US. From the Smart 
                                                                                      
62 N. Vergoulias, ‘Smart Cities: Is Cutting-Edge Technology the Method to Achieving 
Global Sustainable Goals?’ (2017) 32(2) Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 
271. 
63 J. Edler and L Georghiou, ‘Public procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the 
demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research Policy 949. 
64 E. Uyarra, J. Edler, J. Garcia-Estevez, L. Georghiou,and J. Yeow, ‘Barriers to 
innovation through public procurement: A supplier perspective’ (2014) 34(10) 
Technovation 631. 
350 
 
Dublin competition, an awardee company received €50,000 further 
funding from Enterprise Ireland and another awardee company 
incorporated the developed solution as a separate company, which was 
subsequently successfully awarded a USD 75,000 innovation contract 
with Colorado Department of Transport.65 An awardee company from the 
Smart Belfast case study has successfully been awarded data analytical 
led contracts for six similar innovative public contracts.66 A second 
awardee company has successfully been awarded an SBRI contract for the 
UK Future Cities Data Integration Platform, a public contract for 
Transport Solutions in London, a public contract with Southhampton City 
Council, alongside government and industry awards, including an 
Innovate UK ‘Parliamentary Nomination for Productivity Innovation.’67 
Participating in the Smart Cities contracts is having a significant impact 
on the economic viability and growth of the enterprises. The public funds 
were essential to the development and prototyping of the enterprise’s new 
goods and services, and the public contracts assisted the small enterprises 
and entrepreneurs in developing their abilities to enter the private market 
as a competitive entity.68 
Apostol argues that public authorities do not widely use PCP activities due 
to fears of legal uncertainty and the burden of conducting a new 
competitive procedure at the end of the project.69 These case studies 
demonstrate that PCP procedures are an effective tool for improving 
public services and can facilitate innovative start-ups participation in the 
public market. Smart Dublin’s choice to award additional contracts 
demonstrates the flexibility of the procedure. The procurer could tailor the 
                                                                                      
65 See Smart Dublin, Published Case Studies.; available; https://smartdublin.ie/smart-
stories/ Last accessed 20th June 2019. 
66 Interview with Conor Dumigan, Head of Data Analytics Solutions (By phone, 27th July 
2018). 
67 Smart Belfast, Published Case Studies. https://smartbelfast.city/story/ Last accessed 
20th June 2019. 
68 Start-ups will grow quicker than other forms of SMEs, which results in creation of new 
jobs.  The capital injection and the testing of the service will assist start-ups growth and 
chances of survival. See Commission, ‘Europe’s next leaders: the Start-up and Scale-up 
Initiative’ (Communication) COM (2016) Strasbourg, 22 November. 
69 A.R. Apostol, ‘Pre-commercial procurement in support of innovation: regulatory 
effectiveness’ (2012) 21(6) Public Procurement Law Review 213. 
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competition outcomes to work with more competitors, and this may not 
have been possible under traditional public procurement competitions.70 
This research recommends widespread use of PCP to facilitate start-up 
participation in public contracts and to improve public sector services.71 
This finding builds on Edler and Georghiou, Hommen and Rolfstam, 
Lember, Kalvet, and Kattel’s call for increased use of PCP to realise 
significant improvements to public sector operations.72 This 
recommendation comes with one warning; public procurers should 
indicate to suppliers what type of process they plan to use. The Smart 
Dublin case study was a catalytic PCP; it was designed to address a social 
problem; the procurer did not intend to tender for the purchase of the 
commercialised products or services.73 Smart Dublin utilised a low sum 
of public funds to reduce the need for the public body to invest in this area 
in the future. The Belfast case study is described as a co-operative 
procurement, whereby the development and prototyping of the new 
product or service are of mutual benefit to the end-user, the supplier and 
public body.  Public bodies normally have a need to purchase the 
developed solution at the end of the PCP stage.74 The start-ups have 
invested up-front in the Belfast case with the hope of selling the 
commercially ready product to the Council. By defining which form of 
procedure is being conducted will assist start-ups and SMEs in evaluating 
whether it is beneficial to submit a proposal.  
                                                                                      
70 Research and Development contracts are generally exempt from the Public Sector 
Directive, art 14. However, contracting authorities can adopt flexible competitive 
processes when carrying out innovation partnerships. Public Sector Directive, art 31. 
71 Improving start-up participation will support high-rates of employment growth. See 
M. Henrekson and D. Johansson, ‘Gazelles as job creators: a survey and interpretation 
of the evidence’ (2010) 35(2) Small Business Economics 227. 
72 J. Edler and L Georghiou, ‘Public procurement and innovation—Resurrecting the 
demand side’ (2007) 36(7) Research Policy 949.; Public procurement and innovation: 
towards a taxonomy (2008) 8(3) Journal of Public Procurement 17; V. Lember, T. Kalvet 
and R. Kattel, ‘Urban competitiveness and public procurement for innovation’ (2011) 
48(7) Urban Studies 1373. 
73 See L. Hommen and M. Rolfstam, ‘Public procurement and innovation: towards a 
taxonomy’ (2009) 9(1) Journal of Public Procurement 17.  
74 See J. Edler,and L. Georghiou (n 72). 
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9.8 Voluntary or Mandatory approaches 
Current literature which examines the promotion of social objectives in 
business activities dismisses the ‘mandatory versus voluntary’ debate. 
The literature argues that the distinction between the two approaches are 
largely exaggerated, outdated and often oversimplifies important issues.75 
However, this research cannot ignore the distinction between the 
‘mandatory and voluntary’ implementation of the social criteria used in 
the case studies. The community benefit clauses were included as 
mandatory contractual performance clauses. The subcontractor 
considerations were incorporated in a voluntary manner, encouraging the 
main contractor to support SMEs in the supply chain. Interestingly, both 
approaches facilitated SME participation in the public contracts studied.  
Arguably the community benefit clauses are delivering the desired 
objectives, the contractors are creating new job opportunities for 
unemployed people and for young people who are not in education or 
apprenticeship programmes.76 Suitable training is offered to the 
employees, which will assist the employees or interns in finding 
permanent employment positions when the contract is completed. Thus, 
the employees will become successful contributors to the economy.77 If 
the research was to assess the effectiveness of the use of community 
benefit clauses, the research would conclude that the mandatory approach 
is extremely efficient. Targets set by both the National Children’s Hospital 
and Buy Social unit are being met and in some cases, exceeded. It is 
therefore imaginable that public bodies will continue to support the 
mandatory use of community benefit clauses. This research asks a separate 
question; it asks what impact the inclusion of community benefit clauses 
                                                                                      
75 F. Wettstein and S.Waddock, ‘Voluntary or mandatory: That is (not) the question: 
Linking corporate citizenship to human rights obligations for business’ (2005) 
6(3) Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Unternehmensethik 304. 
76 This is evident in the both the National Children’s Hospital and Buy Social case 
studies. See also V. Sutherland, A. McTier, A. Glass and A. McGregor, ‘Analysis of the 
impact and value of community benefit clauses in procurement’ (University of Glasgow, 
eprints, 2015). 
77 R. Macfarlane and M. Cook, ‘The Scottish Government: Community Benefits in Public 
Procurement: a Report Demonstrating the Methodology for Including Targeted 
Recruitment and Training Clauses in Public Sector Contracts’ (2008). 
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has on SME participation in public procurement. The use of contractual 
community benefit clauses facilitated a social enterprise in a large contract 
in Northern Ireland. As discussed already, if it were not for the inclusion 
of the social clause, the social enterprise and large organisation would 
have never formed a partnership. The social enterprise further indicated 
that they favoured the mandatory approach adopted and further called for 
the inclusion of mandatory penalty clauses for non-compliance with the 
requirements laid out in the clause.78  
The research findings acknowledge that the inclusion of mandatory 
community benefit contractual clauses can facilitate social enterprise 
participation in public procurement. The use of mandatory clauses 
promoted SME participation in the Buy Social case study and did not 
promote SME participation in the National Children’s Hospital’s 
construction contract. One reason for this could be due to the lack of 
policy support and limited experience of using community benefits in 
Ireland.79 Northern Ireland adopted strategic policies on the use of 
socially-driven public procurement and legislative bills on social 
procurement were drafted before the government collapsed.80 This 
research argues that mandatory community benefit clauses are more 
effective where there is a supportive policy environment.  
Additionally, the research findings suggest that the use of voluntary 
subcontractor considerations support SME participation.  This research 
did not examine the subcontractor provisions relating to payments of 
subcontractors, as this provision impacts SMEs which have already 
entered the public contract through the supply-chain.81 This research is 
interested in the facilitation of SMEs into the supply-chain and focuses on 
                                                                                      
78 Interview with Maeve Monaghan, CEO NOW Group (by phone, 26th October 2016) 
and Interview with Brendan Flynn, Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (by 
phone, 10th November 2016). 
79 There is growing political support for the regulation of community benefit clauses. A  
Public Services and Procurement (Workers’ Rights) Bill 2017 is currently at the second 
stage of review. 
80 Although, a community benefit focused policy was adopted in 2013 and updated in 
2016. See Integrating Social Considerations into Contracts (2016) PGN 01/13. 
81 However, the researcher plans to conduct empirical research in this area. 
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examining the use of subcontractor considerations during the procurement 
design, request for tender and contractual performance stage. The National 
Children’s Hospital and Buy Social case studies included voluntary 
subcontractor provisions which requested the main contractor to consider 
supporting SMEs in the supply chain. Arguments in favour of mandatory 
requirements assert that full compliance is only met when social 
objectives are incorporated as contractual requirements.82  However, it 
would have been a violation of the fundamental principles of the TFEU to 
insert such voluntary requests as mandatory clauses.  
Davies and Crane claim that procurers can ensure high levels of 
compliance with socially related criteria when they are included 
voluntarily.83 The voluntary subcontractor considerations included in the 
National Children’s Hospital and Buy Social case studies facilitated SME 
participation in the supply chain. Holmlund and Kock’s observations 
suggest that large companies are motivated to implement social practices 
in response to procurers’ buying preferences’.84 This is evident in both of 
the high-value case studies.85 The main contractor in the National 
Children’s Hospital contract hosted ‘Meet the Buyer’ events to inform 
locally-based SMEs of potential future subcontracting opportunities; the 
contractor invited a local SME to join the contractor’s internal business 
support and training initiative.86 Within six months of contract 
                                                                                      
82 A.I. Anand, ‘Voluntary vs mandatory corporate governance: Towards an optimal 
regulatory framework’ (2005) in American Law & Economics Association Annual 
Meetings 44. 
83 I.A. Davies and A. Crane, ‘Corporate social responsibility in small‐and medium‐size 
enterprises: investigating employee engagement in fair trade companies’ (2010) 19(2) 
Business Ethics: A European Review 126. 
84 M. Holmlund and S. Kock, ‘Buyer dominated relationships in a supply chain-a case 
study of four small-sized suppliers’ (1996) 15(1) International Small Business Journal 
26. 
85 Williamson et al. and by Revell and Blackburn similarly conclude that suppliers’ 
motivation to incorporate socially-related objectives is intrinsically linked to the business 
environment and  supporting regulation. See D. Williamson, G. Lynch-Wood, and J. 
Ramsay, ‘Drivers of environmental behaviour in manufacturing SMEs and the 
implications for CSR’ (2006) 67(3) Journal of Business Ethics 317; A. Revell and R. 
Blackburn, ‘The business case for sustainability? An examination of small firms in the 
UK's construction and restaurant sectors’ (2007) 16(6) Business Strategy and the 
Environment 404. 
86 One of the networking events was conducted in partnership with Enterprise Ireland. 
Lee et al. assert that public bodies should collaborate with all stakeholders to fully embed 
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commencement, the main contractor had awarded over €500,000 worth of 
subcontracts to SMEs. The voluntary subcontractor considerations are 
having a direct and verifiable impact on the local economies in Dublin 8 
and 11. These findings suggest that voluntary subcontractor consideration 
promote SME participation in supply-chains of above-threshold contracts. 
Public procurers wishing to replicate the success of this element of the 
contract should consider including voluntary subcontractor considerations 
into public contracts. Baden et al. and Spence call for public procurers to 
design social criteria in partnership with the businesses.87 The National 
Children’s Hospital case study demonstrates the benefits of developing a 
strong relationship with the local community and interested economic 
operators. A dedicated social benefits manager was appointed who 
connects community groups, local SMEs and social enterprises with the 
hospital group. Community and business committees were established 
before the design and publication of the request for tender.88 The initial 
social plans were presented to the committees and their advice and 
recommendations assisted in the design and implementation of the 
socially led considerations and clauses.89 Furthermore, the committee’s 
role was not diminished post the award of the contract, the committees 
now play an essential role in monitoring compliance of the social 
objectives and will assist in the design of criteria for future hospital 
operational contracts.90 
                                                                                      
the social changes. See S.M. Lee, T. Hwang and D. Choi, ‘Open innovation in the public 
sector of leading countries’ (2012) 50(1) Management Decision 147. 
87 L.J. Spence, ‘CSR and small business in a European policy context: The five “C” s of 
CSR and small business research agenda’ (2007); 112(4) Business and Society Review 
533 D. Baden, I. Harwood and D. Woodward, ‘The effects of procurement policies on 
‘downstream’ corporate social responsibility activity: Content-analytic insights into the 
views and actions of SME owner-managers’ (2011) 29(3) International Small Business 
259. 
88 See also; Lee et al. (n 86). 
89 It is important to note that the public procurers were willing to engage with public 
procurers based in other Member States. The procurers engaged with Scottish procurers 
to learn from their experiences of implementing targeted recruitment and training 
clauses. The sharing of best practices between contracting authorities is encouraged in 
the OECD The Innovation Imperative in the Public Sector: Setting an Agenda for Action 
(OECD, Publishing, Paris, 2015). 
90 Interview with Ingrid McElroy, Community Benefit Programme Manager, National 
Paediatric Hospital Development Board Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management 
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The winning contractors in the Buy Social case study additionally adopted 
socially conscious buying practices which reflected the procuring 
practices of the public body. A subcontract was awarded to a B-corp 
company. The Buy Social case study also illustrates that the inclusion of 
voluntary subcontractor considerations facilitates SME participation.91 
Overall, the use of voluntary subcontractor considerations is having a 
positive impact on SME engagement. The success of the voluntary 
subcontractor considerations is dependent on the commitment of all 
stakeholders.92 This research argues that public procurers should consult 
with interested economic operators and communities to assist all 
stakeholders to ‘buy-in’ and support the social goals of the public bodies 
to develop a competitive SME driven supply chain.  
9.9 Legislative and Policy Support 
This research accepts that the objectives of public procurement legislation 
have evolved from purely economic goals to include social objectives. 
Contracting authorities are complex actors93; they are entering markets as 
important buyers and are additionally tasked with the pursuit of achieving 
their perceived conception of ‘VfM’.94 The maturity of the social 
objectives of the legislation supports public procurers in achieving their 
tendering goals.95 However, the interviewee participants from the 
National Children’s Hospital and Buy Social case studies described initial 
concerns about incorporating social criteria into their tendering 
                                                                                      
and Project Controls (Dublin, Ireland, 8th August 2018) The committees will be involved 
for the remainder of the contract. 
91 This suggests that the inclusion of the social criteria has changed the culture of the 
large organisation. Procurers are leading by example and influencing the private sector 
See C. McCrudden, ‘Using public procurement to achieve social outcomes’ (2004) (4) 
Natural Resources Forum 257-267. 
92 See I. Henriques and P. Sadorsky, ‘The relationship between environmental 
commitment and managerial perceptions of stakeholder importance’ (1999) 
42(1) Academy of Management Journal 87. 
93 C. McCrudden, ‘Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement and Legal 
Change’ (Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford 2007). 
94 N. Dimitri, ‘“Best value for money” in procurement’ (2013) 13(2) Journal of Public 
Procurement 149. 
95 H. Walker and N. Jones, ‘Sustainable supply chain management across the UK private 
sector’ (2012) 17(1) Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 15. 
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practices.96 The National Children’s Hospital Community Benefit 
Manager acknowledged that the procurers were initially reluctant to 
include any social criteria which would increase legal uncertainty, tender 
costs or administrative burden for interested economic operators and the 
public body.97 The Buy Social interviewee participants referred to the 
initial ‘strained’ relationship with CPD which did not improve until pilot 
projects were conducted, and policy was adopted clarifying the 
permissible use of social criteria in Northern Ireland.98 
Policy support differed in both the Northern Irish and Irish case studies.99 
The Buy Social case study highlights the importance policy support has 
on the use of social criteria. There are two key developments which shaped 
the Northern Irish public procurement landscape. Firstly, the landscape 
was shaped by the enactment of the English and Welsh Social Value 
Act100 and the Scottish Buy Social Act.101 Plans were made for the 
implementation of a similar law in Northern Ireland, which has been 
suspended since the collapse of the government.102 Secondly, the adoption 
of the Buy Social Unit and the subsequent adoption of community benefits 
policies shaped the strategic use and acceptance of the use of social criteria 
in public procurement.103  
                                                                                      
96 Interview with Richard Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management and Project 
Controls, NPHDB (Dublin, Ireland, 10 June 2017); Interview with Ingrid McElroy, 
Community Benefit Programme Manager, National Paediatric Hospital Development 
Board Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management and Project Controls (Dublin, 
Ireland, 10 June 2017); Interview with Hollie Carroll, Development Officer, Buy Social 
Unit (Belfast, Northern Ireland, 5th October 2016). 
97 Similar barriers to the use of socially-sustainable procurement have been expressed 
by; E. Fisher, ‘The Power of Purchase: Addressing Sustainability through Public 
Procurement’ (2013) 8 Eur Procurement & Pub Private Partnership L Rev 2; J. 
Hasselbalch, N. Costa and A. Blecken, ‘Examining the relationship between the barriers 
and current practices of sustainable procurement: a survey of UN organizations’ (2014) 
14(3) Journal of Public Procurement 361. 
98 Interview with Hollie Carroll, Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 5th October 2016); Interview with Anna Grey, Legal Counsel, Buy 
Social Unit (Belfast, Northern Ireland, 5th October 2016). 
99 Northern Ireland has adopted policies to promote the strategic use of socially 
responsible public procurement. See CPD Government Policy Note, ‘Integrating Social 
Considerations into Contracts’ (2016) PGN 01/13. 
100 Social Value Act (UK), 2012. 
101 Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act, 2014. 
102 A draft proposal for a Buy Social Value Act has been put on hold since 2017. 
103 See CPD Government Policy Note, ‘Integrating Social Considerations into 
Contracts’ (2016) PGN 01/13. 
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Policy supports for the use of social criteria in Ireland is somewhat 
lacking. When the National Procurement Service was in operation, the 
soft-law ‘Circular 10/10 Facilitating SME Participation’ was introduced 
to great success.104 The non-binding document was widely adopted, and 
the impact of its success is still visible. It is common practice for public 
bodies to upload request for tenders on the etenders website.105 Since the 
OGP commenced operations in 2014, policy creation and adoption has 
been somewhat limited, with the focus shifting more towards the 
centralisation and the management of large-scale contracts with 
accompanying framework agreements.106 One reason for this was the 
practical need to firstly recruit and train new employees while 
simultaneously designing and managing centralised contracts. Over the 
initial commencement period of operations, the OGP introduced measures 
to assist aggrieved SMEs.107 More recently, the OGP adopted an overall 
procurement guide in 2017108 and a social considerations policy document 
in 2018.109 These soft-law measures have a strong focus on encouraging 
SME participation. However, the guidance is silent as to whether public 
bodies should incorporate community benefit clauses into their 
practices.110 The document does not pay attention to the importance of 
social enterprises or start-ups in the public market.  
                                                                                      
104 Now incorporated into Circular 10/2014, ‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public 
Procurement’ 2014.  
105 This is a soft-law requirement and there is no regulation in place requiring contracting 
authorities to advertise below-threshold contracts on the national advertising platform. 
Although, McDermott J recently accepted that Circular soft-law requirements create 
enforceable obligations. See Copymoore Ltd & ors -v- Commissioners of Public Works 
of Ireland [2016] IEHC 709 para 28. 
106 The OGP concentrates on the use of framework agreements, choosing not to use 
dynamic purchasing systems. See Office of Government Procurement ,‘Communications 
Strategy 2018 – 2020’. 2. 
107 Circular 10/2014, ‘Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement’ 2014. 
108 The national framework was revised in 2019. See; the Office of Government 
Procurement, ‘National Public Procurement Framework’ Public Procurement 
Guidelines for Goods and Services. (2019) Version 2.1. 
109 Office of Government Procurement, ‘Social Considerations in Public Procurement.’ 
OGP. (2018). Accessible at this link; https://ogp.gov.ie/information-notes/ Last accessed 
16th May 2019. 
110 The ‘Social Considerations’ information note informs contracting authorities on how 
to include social criteria in tender competitions and public contracts, however, there is 
no policy requiring contracting authorities to adopt socially-responsible practices.  See 
OGP (2018) (n 109). 
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Concerning start-ups and innovative SMEs, both Ireland and Northern 
Ireland have actively supported the use of SBIR and SBRI 
competitions.111 Guidance documents have been drafted by trade 
institutions offering advice on the economic and social value of the pursuit 
of innovative public services.112 Both contracting authorities relied on the 
experience gained by other public bodies using these procedures to 
influence their PCP competitions. Both case studies relied on existing 
practices to guide their processes.113 Policy support for Smart Cities is 
promoted at a regional level, encouraging the development of a ‘Smart 
Union’.114 Smart Cities policies are driven at local levels, where public 
procurers have adopted initial plans to improve urban living standards in 
their cities.115 It is this commitment to the overall social goal, which 
allows for public bodies to take risks, to work with innovative start-ups 
and with the voluntary sector to develop bespoke solutions for the 
contracting authority.116  
Arguably, the supports for innovative procurement are less controversial 
than the use of community benefit clauses.117 The public sector 
                                                                                      
111 The Smart Cities programmes in Dublin and Belfast have used the SBRI and SBIR 
PCP procedures to engage with innovative start-ups. The programmes are operating in 
co-operation with the start-ups to develop solutions to societal problems.  
112 Intertrade Ireland runs an All-Island Innovation Programme offering  innovation 
lectures, masterclasses and annual conferences with international speakers to inform both 
regions on the latest developments in innovation practices and theories. 
113 Interview with Jamie Cudden, Smart Cities Programme Manager, Dublin City Council 
(Dublin, Ireland, 24th April 2016). 
114 See Commission, ‘Pre-commercial Procurement: driving innovation to ensure 
sustainable high-quality public services in Europe’ (Communication) COM (2007) 0799 
final; See Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (Communication) 
COM (2015) 0192 final; Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, National 
(Ireland) ‘Action Plans for Jobs 2016’. (2016) Action 98; . 
https://dbei.gov.ie/en/Publications/Publication-files/Action-Plan-for-Jobs-2016.pdf Last 
accessed 11th May 2019; Belfast City Council, ‘Supporting Urban Innovation - The 
Smart Belfast Framework 2017 to 2021’. The framework was adopted to support the 
implementation of the Belfast Agenda. See The Belfast Agenda. 
115 A.T. Chatfield and C.G. Reddick, ‘Smart City Implementation Through Shared Vision 
of Social Innovation for Environmental Sustainability: A Case Study of Kitakyushu, 
Japan’ (2016) 34(6) Social Science Computer Review 757. 
116 R.K.R. Kummitha and N. Crutzen, ‘How do we understand smart cities? An 
evolutionary perspective’ (2017) 67 Cities 43. 
117 A reason for could be the perceived increased legal risk of including non-economic 
criteria in high-value contracts. The community benefit clauses in the case studies were 
attached to above-threshold contracts. The full remit of the Public Sector Directive 
applied to these contracts. However, the rules were not applicable to the low-value PCP 
innovative contracts.  
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interviewee participants referred to some initial hesitance from the legal 
advisors on designing new processes. However, the scope of the R&D 
activities is exempt from the public procurement rules. Therefore, the 
Directive did not apply to the procedures. The procedures were required 
to comply with the fundamental principle of non-discrimination and with 
national guidance documents.118 The combination of regional and national 
policies and the value of the contracts assisted the Smart Cities 
programmes in adopting innovative procedures.119 The procedures 
embody the SME friendly objectives of the Directive and the SBA.120 
Regional policy support offers depth to the EU rules. However, perhaps it 
is time to reassess the importance of public procurement in Europe. Public 
procurement is referred to in many pieces of social and economic policies 
as an ‘important vehicle’ to drive change in society.121 Some of the key 
policy documents such as the guidance document on PCP, social 
enterprises and the Buy Social guide are outdated.122 The documents have 
not been updated since the adoption of the updated Directive. The Buying 
Social guide is currently under review. 
It is important for the policies to be updated, and this research encourages 
the policies to refrain from treating SMEs as a homogenised group. 
Specific advice on the permissible use of social criteria would assist 
SMEs, social enterprises, start-ups, and the third sector enter into more 
                                                                                      
118 See COM (2007) 0799 final. 
119 See Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, National (Ireland) ‘Action Plans 
for Jobs 2016’. (2016) Action 98; Belfast City Council, ‘Supporting Urban Innovation - 
The Smart Belfast Framework 2017 to 2021’. (2017).The framework was adopted to 
support the implementation of the Belfast Agenda. See The Belfast Agenda; 
https://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/council/Communityplanning/BelfastAgenda.aspx Last 
accessed 16th June 2019. 
120 See Commission, ‘Think Small First” - A “Small Business Act” for Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2008) 0394. See also; See Commission, ‘European Code of 
Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts’ (SWP) 
COM (2008) 2193. 
121 See Commission, ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth.’ (2010) COM 2020 final; Commission, ‘Single Market Act II Together for new 
growth.’ (Communication) COM (2012) 0573 final. 
122 See COM (2007) 0799 final; Commission, ‘Buying Social A Guide to Taking Account 
of Social Considerations in Public Procurement’ (Guide) SEC (2010) 1258, final; 
Commission, ‘Social Business Initiative Creating a favourable climate for social 
enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation’ (Communication) 
COM (2011) 0682 final. 
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inclusive and accessible public markets, thus aligning to the overall goals 
of the EU. This would assist public procurers in understanding the wide 
remit of the goals outlined in the opening paragraphs of the Directives, 
assisting them in implementing the wider Single Market goals in a 
proportionate, measurable local manner.123  
9.10 Role of procurers and impact on procurers 
The successful implementing of change in public procurement is 
dependent on the political willingness and individual leadership.124 
Informed public officials will drive social changes in procurement when 
there is a political will to solve public sector challenges.125 Once the 
informed and supported officials successfully pilot new procedures, it is 
more likely that other public bodies will replicate the changes.126 Lack of 
institutional support will inhibit the effectiveness of the socially-driven 
changes introduced by the contracting authority.127 
A common finding from each of the four case studies is the importance of 
developing and maintaining a partnership between the public body and the 
business entities when attempting to achieve social and innovative 
procurement practices. Each public body, when interviewed agreed that 
they were ‘trying to do something new, trying to do something 
differently.’128 Contract awardees indicated that they ‘felt supported’ by 
                                                                                      
123 Public Sector Directive, recital 2 calls for procurers to make better use of public 
procurement in support of common societal goals. 
124 J. Smith, G. Andersson, R. Gourlay, S. Karner, B.E. Mikkelsen, R. Sonnino and D. 
Barling, ‘Balancing competing policy demands: the case of sustainable public sector 
food procurement’ (2016) 112 Journal of Cleaner Production 249. 
125 P. de Oliveira, J.A. Doll, C.N.H. O. Balaban, P. Jiang, M. Dreyfus, A, Suwa, R. 
Moreno-Peñaranda and P. Dirgahayani, ‘Green economy and governance in cities: 
assessing good governance in key urban economic processes’ (2013) 58 Journal of 
Cleaner Production 138; M.B. Rise, and A. Steinsbekk, ‘Long Term Effect on 
Professionals' Knowledge, Practice and Attitudes Towards User Involvement Four Years 
After Implementing an Organisational Development Plan: A Controlled Study’ (2016) 
11(3) PloS One. 
126 L. Nogueiro and T.B. Ramos, ‘The integration of environmental practices and tools 
in the Portuguese local public administration’ (2014) 76 Journal of Cleaner Production 
20. 
127 S. Brammer and H. Walker, ‘Sustainable procurement in the public sector: an 
international comparative study’ (2011) 31(4) International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management 452. 
128 Versions of these phrases were used throughout the interviews. Each of the public 
‘champions’ were motivated to achieve long-term value for taxpayers’ money. The 
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the public body.129 The public body remained in close connection with the 
businesses during the contract performance stage. In the National 
Children’s Hospital case study, a dedicated manager liaises closely with 
the winning bidder and their appointed social benefits manager, along with 
the NCH and NPHDB, and the SME, social enterprises and community 
stakeholders. An environment of transparency, professionalism and 
respect has been developed and maintained.130 In the Buy Social case 
study, the awardee consortium expressed gratitude and satisfaction with 
the Buy Social led supporting ‘Brokerage’ website.131 G4S indicated that 
this tool has made the targeted recruitment and training requirements easy 
to achieve, assisting them in recruiting appropriately trained employees 
and trainees.132 Awardee companies working on separate contracts have 
also expressed satisfaction with the brokerage site.133  
                                                                                      
implementation of socially responsible public procurement is dependent on the 
commitment of motivated champions. See; S. Fernandez and H.G. Rainey, ‘Managing 
successful organizational change in the public sector.’ In ‘Debating Public 
Administration’ (Routledge, 2017) 7. 
129 Each of the public bodies put supports in place to help the contractors meet the social 
criteria and to develop the innovative solutions. This ranged from establishing lists of 
potential new entrant trainees in partnership with state and private recruitment agencies, 
hosting subcontractor information events and networking events with other interested 
stakeholders.  The success of the social elements of the contract is dependent on a 
working relationship between the public body and contractors. See S. Cicmil and D. 
Marshall, ‘Insights into collaboration at the project level: complexity, social interaction 
and procurement mechanisms’ (2005) 33(6) Building Research & Information 523; J. 
Barraket, R. Keast, and C. Furneaux, ‘Social procurement and new public governance’ 
(Routledge, 2015). 
130 The interviewed awardees commented that the public contracts differed to other 
public contracts completed. The main difference being the commitment of the public 
sector champions to deliver the social objectives.  
131 The Brokerage website is managed and controlled by the Buy Social unit. See 
https://buysocialni.org/contractors/find-a-broker/ Last accessed 28th March 2019. 
132 Interview with Brendan Flynn, Operations Director, G4S Northern Ireland (by phone, 
10th November 2016). Presumably, this will be of benefit to both the new entrant trainee 
and the contractor. The trainee will be motivated to be in a paid employment position in 
an area which they trained to work in and the contractor will then reap the benefits of 
having an engaged and motivated employee. For a discussion on the benefits of 
motivated employees see; S. Ramlall, ‘A review of employee motivation theories and 
their implications for employee retention within organizations’ (2004) 5(1/2) Journal of 
American Academy of Business 52. 
133 Interview with Hollie Carroll, Development Officer, Buy Social Unit (Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 5th October 2016). The contractor in charge of a £68.3 million ‘Gas to 
the West’ contract is retaining a significant proportion of the ‘new entrant trainees’ 
employed to meet the social criteria. The company is offering the employees specialised 
‘gas pipe laying’ training and has offered many employees full-time paid positions in the 
company. The employees are gaining a valuable skill set which will assist them gaining 
employment elsewhere, if they choose to leave the company.  
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The commitment of the public-sector individuals is central to the success 
of these case studies. The pursuit of socially-driven public procurement 
could have had a negative impact on procurers, as such procedures have 
the potential to increase costs, administrative burden and legal 
complexity.134 The relationship between the contractors and public bodies 
was an essential factor in the successful implementation of the social 
criteria and development of innovative solutions.135 The key personnel 
involved in the design of the social criteria and PCP procedures were 
equally involved in the tender award and contract performance stages. The 
public sector champions were engaged with the social objectives of the 
public contract from the beginning and actively sought to achieve the 
targets. Supports were put in place to assist the awardee companies in 
achieving the social requirements.136 The motivated public sector 
champions actively publicised their procurement activities.137 Each of the 
four contracting authorities showcases companies’ success on their 
websites and at conferences. The PCP awardees have benefitted from the 
advertising the companies received from participating in the public 
contracts. This raised the company’s public profiles. Additionally, the 
procurers support the awardees by inviting them to attend corporate 
networking events and conferences to introduce the start-ups to potential 
international business partners. Procurers are the drivers of change in the 
public bodies. The National Children Hospital’s Community Benefits 
Programme Manager (CBPM) connected the project with the community. 
Building on the success of the initial contracts, the Coordinator concluded 
two further contracts using ‘set-aside’ requirements.138  
                                                                                      
134 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘Public procurement and the EU competition rules’ (2nd edn 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) 9. 
135 P. Bansal and K. Roth, ‘Why companies go green: a model of ecological 
responsiveness’ (2002) 43(4) Academy of Management Journal 717. 
136 See a list of the supports (n 129) See also; S. Cicmil and D. Marshall (n 129). 
137 I am deeply grateful to the public bodies for sharing these case studies with me, for 
letting me examine the tender documents and for participating in the interviews. 
138 The contracts were awarded to a social enterprise post completion of a competitive 
procedure, relying on reg 20, Public Authorities Regulations. This form of controlled 
competition is rarely used in Ireland. As briefly mentioned earlier, it appears that only 
NUI Galway, the National Children Hospital construction board and the Irish Prison 
Service are actively relying on Public Sector Authorities, reg 20 to support social 
enterprise participation in public contracts.   
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It is now important that these case studies are disseminated to a broader 
audience.139 The case studies demonstrate the use of lots, use of 
community benefit clauses, use of subcontractor considerations and use of 
PCP facilitates SME participation. The social criteria do not demand 
preferential treatment for SMEs and instead ‘level the playing field’ for 
SMEs to compete to enter the public markets. Not only does the use of 
these social criteria support SME participation, but the use of the criteria 
has also resulted in the generation of new jobs and the improvement of 
public services. These procedures should be replicated and used by other 
public sector bodies to yield lasting impacts for the Irish and Northern 
Irish economies. The centralised procurement bodies, the OGP and the 
CPD alongside with the Buy Social unit, should take responsibility for the 
dissemination and duplication of the case study results. 
9.11 Future Research  
When the data for this thesis was gathered, the case studies were ongoing 
and in some contracts are still ongoing. The next stage of the research is 
to assess the long-term impact of the use of the social criteria. The research 
plans to trace what impact the case studies are having on other public 
bodies purchasing activities, questioning if the success of these projects 
has shaped procurement expenditure in Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
Other elements of the National Children’s Hospital procurement approach 
have been less successful, and the research intends to question what 
problems are associated with conducting competitive socially responsible 
procurement in a volatile construction sector.  
9.12 Final Concluding Remarks 
The thesis concludes in the same manner as it started, by recognising the 
important role SMEs play in public procurement. SMEs are the generators 
of innovation and drivers of local employment. However, given their 
significance and dominance in the Single Market, they are 
                                                                                      
139 The dissemination of the research results will improve procurers’ understanding of 
the impact of socially responsible public procurement practices. See J. Enders, ‘Border 
crossings: Research training, knowledge dissemination and the transformation of 
academic work’ (2005) 49(1-2) Higher Education 119. 
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disproportionately underrepresented in public contracts. The Directive 
and supporting policies outline a number of provisions to assist the 
facilitation of SMEs in public procurement. Academic literature has 
continuously shown that measures such as the use of electronic 
procurement, use of open procedures, awarding contracts on a MEAT 
basis rather than on cost alone and the use of self-declarations support 
SMEs in successfully tendering for public contracts. Recently, there has 
been an increase in the use of community benefit clauses in large scale 
works and services contracts, and an increasing use of PCP procedures to 
improve urban living standards. This research builds on this knowledge 
by examining what impact the recent changes are having on SME 
participation in public contracts.  
The research argues that the use of lots, use of community benefit clauses, 
use of subcontractor considerations and the use of PCP facilitates SME 
participation. The social criteria will effectively support SME 
participation when supported by policy and dedicated public sector 
champions.  The research argues that the procedures used in the case 
studies should be replicated by other public bodies to generate large-scale 
change in public markets. Furthermore, the research calls for contracting 
authorities and policy to recognise the different needs of various 
categories of SMEs. SMEs should not be treated as a homogenised group. 
The needs of a small start-up differ significantly than that of a medium-
sized company. As the definition of SMEs extends to micro-enterprises, 
innovative start-ups and social enterprises, policymakers must adequately 
promote criteria which facilitates all forms of SMEs. The research finally 
concludes by encouraging contracting authorities to continue to promote 
SME participation in public contracts to enhance competition, to use 
innovative solutions to improve public sector services and generate local 
employment and economic growth. Public bodies are encouraged to adopt 
the specific recommendations listed below. 
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Policy blueprint for promoting SME participation in public 
procurement based on empirical research 
The long-term objective of this research is to facilitate SME participation 
in Irish and Northern Irish public contracts. Facilitating SME participation 
in public contracts will benefit the economic operator, the public body and 
the wider community. Current literature and policy on supporting SME 
participation in public contracts tend to focus on the promotion of fair and 
open competitive tender procedures. The literature and policy consistently 
calls for procurers to; 
• use open, straightforward and electronic procurement procedures; 
• set relevant and appropriate selection and qualification criteria; 
• offer clear and fair communication; 
• openly advertise contract opportunities and contract notices; 
• participate in pre-market engagement activities; 
• provide useful and accurate feedback to unsuccessful tenderers; 
•  and designate redress options for aggrieved unsuccessful 
tenderers. 
All policy documents should continue to be based on these fundamental 
objectives. These core principles will level the playing field for SMEs 
competing against larger companies. This research builds on these 
foundations by reviewing how different forms of social criteria facilitate 
all forms of SMEs in public procurement. The research questions what 
impact ‘the division of large contracts into small ‘lots’; the use of 
community benefit clauses; the use of subcontractor considerations; and 
the use of pre-commercial procurement (PCP) procedures’ has on SME 
participation. Current literature and policy offer supports to SMEs, which 
have the ability to compete for advertised contracts and offers assistance 
on how to ease the tender requirements and experience for SMEs. This 
research offers a broader perspective, and it assesses how different criteria 
assists SMEs entering contracts which they are normally excluded from, 
such as large contracts and assists SMEs in entering the public market for 
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the first time. The research does not focus primarily on improving SMEs’ 
tendering skills and abilities and focuses on how public procurers can 
design more inclusive and socially conscious procurement practices to 
facilitate SME participation.  
The research findings suggest that there are four ways SMEs can enter the 
public market. SMEs can enter the public market as; 
1) The main contractor - in this circumstance the SME tenders for 
a contract as an individual company. The SME has the 
individual capacity and capability to carry out the contractual 
specifications. 
2) As part of a consortium - this occurs where an SME partners 
with another economic operator. This occurs where two or 
more companies pool their resources to meet the tender and 
contract specifications.  
3) As a subcontractor - in circumstances where an SME cannot 
meet the tender or contract specifications, the SME can gain 
entry to the public contract by carrying out subcontracts for the 
awardee company.  
4) Certain contracts may be set-aside for certain types of SMEs, 
namely, social enterprises. In this circumstance, the SME 
competes against similar forms of companies to tender for the 
set-aside contract.  
Current public procurement policies focus on improving tender practices 
for SMEs, this research suggests that a broader approach should be 
adopted. Policies should be updated to reflect and support various forms 
of SMEs entering the public market via the four key routes; as a main 
contractor, as a consortium partner, as a subcontractor, and by competing 
for set-aside contracts. This research uses empirical evidence to assess 
how various forms of SMEs can enter the public market through these 
different routes. The research suggests that current policies on SME 
participation in public procurement should focus on supporting SMEs 
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enter the market rather than solely focusing on improving tender 
techniques.  
The research calls for public procurers to consider; 
1) Promoting the inclusion of community benefit clauses in high-value 
contracts to facilitate social enterprise participation.  
2) Promoting the inclusion of subcontractor considerations in all 
procured public supplies, services and works contracts to facilitate the 
general SME population enter public contracts.  
3) Promoting the use of PCP to encourage start-up participation in public 
markets.  
4) Promoting the division of large contracts into smaller, proportionate 
and relevant lots to facilitate all forms of SME participation. 
To facilitate all forms of SME participation in public procurement, 
procurers need to consider including social criteria in all contracts, 
including high and low-value contracts. SMEs can contribute to high-
value contracts, by tendering as part of a  consortium with one or more 
economic operators or tendering for subcontracts from the main 
contractor. The inclusion of community benefit clauses in high-value 
contracts will assist the public body in using public funds to support the 
development of an inclusive, competitive and sustainable economy. The 
use of innovative PCP procedures will result in the improvement of public 
services and will support the development of a knowledge-based 
economy. Policy thus far has neglected the important role all forms of 
SMEs, including start-ups and social enterprises, can play in the public 
market. Training and tender supports should be offered to both public 
procurers and SMEs to support the effective implementation of policy 
changes. It is no longer viable to view public procurement as a tendering 
task alone which prioritises the awarding contracts on the basis of costs. 
It is time for procurers to re-think their purchasing objectives and use the 
limited amount of public funds in a more strategic manner, which 
facilitates the participation of SMEs in public contracts.   
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Appendix A: Advertising Thresholds 
 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2365 of 18 December 
2017 amending Directive 2014/24/EU in respect of the application 
thresholds for the procedures for the award of contracts 
Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement: 
Central 
Government 
authorities 
Works contracts, subsidised works 
contracts 
€5,548,000 
 
All services concerning social and other 
specific services listed in Annex XIV 
€750,000 
All subsidised services €221,000 
All other service contracts and all design 
contests 
€144,000 
All supplies contracts awarded by 
contracting authorities not operating in the 
field of defence 
€144,000 
Supplies contracts 
awarded by contracting 
authorities operating in 
the field of defence 
Concerning 
products listed in 
Annex III 
€144,000 
Concerning other 
products 
€221,000 
Sub-central 
contracting 
authorities 
Works contracts, subsidised works 
contracts 
€5,548,000 
 
All services concerning social and other 
specific services listed in Annex XIV 
€750,000 
All other service contracts, all design 
contests, subsidised service contracts, all 
supplies contracts 
€221,000 
 
Retrieved from the European Commission, Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs, The European Single Market; Public 
Procurement; https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-
procurement/rules-implementation/thresholds_en 
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Appendix B: Public Procurer Interview Questions 
Public Procurer Interview Questions 
Q1. Please describe the general procurement process used by the Council.  
Q2. Which tendering procedure do you ordinarily use in the case of 
procuring supplies and services contracts valued above €207,000? 
Q3. Which tendering procedure do you ordinarily use in the case of 
procuring supplies and services contracts valued below €207,000? 
Q4. How important do you consider the following factors when procuring 
services, supplies or works contracts; 
a) Small and Medium Size Enterprises (“SMEs”) access 
b) Innovation in public contracts 
c) Environmental sustainability 
d) Local economy sustainability 
e) Engaging with the not-for-profit sector 
Q5. Do you break contracts into lots wherever possible in order to 
facilitate SME access? 
Q6. Are you flexible in the type of proof of financial capacity you accept? 
Q7. Do you ensure that pre-qualification criteria are relevant and 
proportionate to the circumstances of the contract? 
Q8. Do you encourage joint bidding among SMEs? 
Q9. What award criteria do you mostly use? For example, lowest price, 
most economically advantageous tender, life cycle costing. 
Q10. Have you previously (or would you consider) attaching local 
conditions to certain public contracts? (For example, including 
employment conditions to construction contracts) 
Q11. Have you previously (or would you consider) setting aside contracts 
in certain circumstances? (For example, setting aside contracts for 
sheltered workshops or sheltered employment workshops.) 
Q12. If at all, how do you protect sub-contractors? 
Q13. Have you previously organised pre-commercial procurement 
activities? Pre-commercial procurement is defined as the purchasing of 
research and development of new innovative solutions. 
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Q14. Have you any experience in designing, prototyping or testing new 
products and services with suppliers?  
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Appendix C: Supplier Interview Questions 
Could you please describe what your company does? 
Was this your company’s first time working on a public contract? 
If not, what was your company’s experience in tendering for public 
contracts? 
Could you please describe your experience of tendering for the [case 
study] contract? 
Did you face any barriers when tendering for the contract? 
Could you identify any factors which assisted your company in tendering 
for the contract? 
What impact has the participation in the contract had on your company? 
Did you subcontract any element of the contact? 
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Appendix D List of Interviewees 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
▪ Interview with Jamie Cudden, Smart Cities Programme Manager, Dublin 
City Council (Dublin, Ireland, 24th April 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Ingrid McElroy, Community Benefit Programme 
Manager, National Paediatric Hospital Development Board Fitzpatrick, 
Director for Project Management and Project Controls (Dublin, Ireland, 
10 June 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Charlotte May-Simera, Researcher in NUI Galway (By 
phone, 8th August 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Dr. Olga Martin-Ortega, Reader in Public International 
Law, University of Greenwich, School of Law (By phone, 12th August 
2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Michael Smyth, Managing Director of the awardee 
company ‘Saol Café’ (By phone, 11th August 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Hollie Carroll, Development Officer, Buy Social Unit 
(Belfast, Northern Ireland, 5th October 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Anna Grey, Legal Counsel, Buy Social Unit (Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 5th October 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Björn Claeson, Director, Electronics Watch (By phone, 
10th October 2016)  
 
▪ Interview with Nuala Griffiths Development Officer, Buy Social Unit 
(Belfast, Northern Ireland, 5th October 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Maeve Monaghan, CEO NOW Group (By phone, 26th 
October 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Brendan Flynn, Operations Director, G4S Northern 
Ireland (By phone, 10th November 2016) 
 
▪ Interview with Richard Fitzpatrick, Director for Project Management 
and Project Controls, NPHDB (Dublin, Ireland, 10 June 2017) 
 
▪ Interview with Ingrid McElroy, Community Benefit Programme 
Manager, National Paediatric Hospital Development Board Fitzpatrick, 
Director for Project Management and Project Controls (Dublin, Ireland, 
10 June 2017) 
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▪ Interview with Jamie Cudden, Smart Cities Programme Manager, Dublin 
City Council (Dublin, Ireland, 20th June 2017) 
 
▪ Interview with Deirdre Ferguson, Senior Consultant, Smart Cities Team 
(By phone, 28th June 2017) 
 
 
▪ Interview with Sile Ginnane, Co-founder, FluidEdge (By phone, 24th 
July 2018) 
 
▪ Interview with Michael Berry, Chief Technical Officer, SmartCharge 
(By phone, 25th July 2018) 
 
▪ Interview with Conor Dumigan, Head of Data Analytics Solutions (By 
phone, 27th July 2018) 
 
▪ Interview with Ingrid McElroy, Community Benefit Programme 
Manager, National Paediatric Hospital Development Board Fitzpatrick, 
Director for Project Management and Project Controls (Dublin, Ireland, 
8th August 2018) 
 
▪ Interview with Siobhan Cafferty, Social Enterprise Project Manager, 
Irish Prison Service (By phone 19th December 2018) 
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Appendix E: Public Procurer Survey Questions 
2014 Buyer Survey Questions 
• How many years have you worked as a public sector buyer or have 
had some involvement in buying? 
• Please indicate which of the following best describes your role 
• Does your role involve performing any of the following activities? 
• Have you undertaken buying-related training within the last 3 
years? 
• Do you hold a qualification in purchasing, supply chain 
management, or related area? 
• In what type of public sector organisation are you employed? 
• Does your organisation deliver services at a predominantly at a 
local, regional or national level? 
• Supplier development is any activity that a buyer undertakes to 
improve a supplier’s performance. Please indicate development 
activities that you have given to suppliers in the last 12 months 
• Are you familiar with the content of any of the following circulars 
and policies concerning public procurement in Ireland? 
• Which tendering procedure do you ordinarily use in the case of; 
• A supplies and general services contract worth under 25,000 
euro? 
• A supplies and general services contract worth between 25,000 
and 125,000 euro? 
• A works and related services contract worth under 50,000 euro? 
• A works and related services contract worth between 50,000 and 
250,000 euro? 
• What percentage of the total number of contracts issued by you for 
the year ending 2013 has been won by Irish-based SMEs? SME is 
defined as a firm having 1-250 employees. 
• What percentage of the total number of contracts issued by you for 
the year ending 2013 has been won by firms based outside the Irish 
Republic? 
• How important do you consider the following factors when 
procuring supplies, services or works? (1 =  no importance and 5 
= highly important) 
• SME access; Innovation; Environmental sustainability; Local 
economy sustainability; Engaging with the not-for-profit sector 
• Please state your level of agreement with the following statements; 
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• I break contracts into lots wherever possible in order to facilitate 
SME access 
• I am flexible in the type of proof of financial capacity I accept (e.g. 
regarding number of years of turnover) 
• I ensure that pre-qualification criteria are relevant and 
proportionate to the circumstances of the contract 
• I encourage joint bidding among SMEs 
• Do you allow suppliers at the time of tendering only to declare that 
they have; 
• The relevant and proportionate financial capacity which is 
necessary to undertake the contract 
• The relevant and proportionate insurance capacity which is 
necessary to undertake the contract 
• Are you using the National Procurement Service's Standardised 
Suite of Documents for tendering? 
• Why are you not using the National Procurement Service's 
Standardised Suite of Procurement Templates? 
• Do you purchase from national framework agreements? 
• What is the reason(s) for not purchasing from framework 
agreements put in place at national level? 
• To what extent does your organisation provide feedback to 
unsuccessful firms after a contract has been awarded? 
• In what form does your organisation provide feedback to 
suppliers? 
• Please indicate your knowledge of the following pieces of Public 
Procurement Legislation; 
• S.I. 329 of 2006 implementing EU Public Procurement Directive 
2004/18/EC 
• S.I. 50 of 2007 implementing EU Public Procurement Directive 
(Utilities Sector) 2004/17/EC 
• S.I. 130 of 2010 / S.I. 131 of 2010 implementing EU Public 
Procurement Remedies Directive 2007/66/EC 
• S.I. 339 of 2011 European Communities (Clean and energy- 
efficient Road Transport Vehicles) Regulation 2011 
• S.I. 62 of 2012 European Union (Award of Contracts Relating to 
Defence and Security) Regulations 2012 
• What impact do you believe the Public Procurement Directives 
(incl. Remedies Directive) have had on the following; 
• Transparency and clarity in the procurement process 
• SME participation in the procurement process 
• Competition between suppliers 
• Costs involved in the procurement process 
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• What impact has the implementation of the Remedies Directive 
into Irish law in 2010 had on legal challenges for your 
organisation? 
• Do you undertake the following relevant checks when you award 
a contract? 
• Tax Clearance Certificate 
• Insurance Certificates 
• Previous Employment Law Compliance 
• Economic and Financial Company Reports 
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Appendix F: Supplier Survey Questions  
2014 Survey Supplier Questions 
• What is the legal form of your firm? 
• How many staff are employed in your firm? 
• What was the annual turnover of your firm for the most recent 
financial year in which accounts were submitted? 
• Which sector does your firm belong to? 
• Please specify the industry to which your firm belongs? 
• How many years has your firm been trading? 
• In which jurisdiction is your firm based? 
• What is the predominant market focus of your firm? 
• How many years’ experience does your firm have in tendering 
for public sector contracts? 
• How is the tendering process managed in your firm? 
• How many public sector contracts did your firm tender for in 
2013? 
• How many public sector contracts did your firm win in 2013? 
• What percentage of public sector contracts tendered for 
throughout 2013 did your firm succeed in winning? 
• On a scale of 1-7, where 1 = no success whatsoever and 7 = 
highly successful, where does your firm rank in winning public 
sector contracts? 
• What percentage of your firm's annual revenue over 2013 has 
come from winning public sector contracts? 
• What is the typical value of a public sector contract your firms 
goes after? 
• Did you or someone in your firm undertake tender-related 
training during 2013? 
• Are you familiar with the content of the following procurement-
related circulars and policy guidance documents issued by the 
Irish government? 
• Circular 10/10 Facilitating SME Participation in Public 
Procurement 
• Green Tenders - An Action Plan of Green Public Procurement 
• Does your firm find out about available public sector contracts 
in Ireland through any of the following means? 
• Request for Quotation (RFQ) from public sector procurers 
• www.etenders.gov.ie 
• Websites of public sector organisations 
• Press (local/national) 
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• Word of mouth 
• Of the total number of Irish public sector contracts that your firm 
tendered for over the last 3 years, what percentage came to your 
attention through www.etender.gov.ie? 
• Has your firm tendered for public sector contracts in any of the 
following jurisdictions outside the Irish Republic in the last 3 
years? 
• Please state your level of agreement with the following 
statements in respect of public procurement in Ireland 
• Contracts are divided into lots in order to facilitate SME access 
• Contracting authorities are flexible in the type of proof of 
financial capacity they accept (e.g. regarding number of years 
of turnover) 
• Pre-qualification criteria are relevant and proportionate to the 
circumstances of the contract 
• Joint bidding among SMEs is encouraged 
• When tendering for Irish public sector contracts is it your 
experience that.... 
• Your firm only has to declare that it meets the financial capacity 
criteria at the initial tendering stage? 
• Your firm only has to declare that it meets the relevant insurance 
criteria at the initial tendering stage? 
• Have any of the following issues posed a problem for your firm 
when tendering? 
• Identifying available public sector contracts  
• Communicating with public sector buyers  
• Understanding questions asked in the request for tender 
documentation 
• Costs of compiling a tender (incl. time)  
• Meeting financial capacity requirements  
• Meeting insurance requirements 
• Organisational capacity for managing a contract  
• Requirements for professional qualifications/accreditations 
(incl. health and safety) 
• Requirements for previous experience in supplying to public 
sector 
• Finding a partner firm in which to make a joint bid for a contract
  
• Please state your level of agreement with the following statement 
• Receiving feedback from public sector buyers helps me to 
improve my future tender submissions? 
381 
 
• Please indicate your knowledge of the following pieces of Public 
Procurement Legislation 
• S.I. 329 of 2006 implementing EU Public Procurement Directive 
2004/18/EC 
• S.I. 50 of 2007 implementing EU Public Procurement Directive 
(Utilities Sector) 2004/17/EC 
• S.I. 130 of 2010 / S.I. 131 of 2010 implementing EU Public 
Procurement Remedies Directive 2007/66/EC 
• S.I. 339 of 2011 European Communities (Clean and energy- 
efficient Road Transport Vehicles) Regulation 2011 
• S.I. 62 of 2012 European Union (Award of Contracts Relating to 
Defence and Security) Regulations 2012 
• Has your firm initiated any legal challenges under the Remedies 
Directive? 
• Was the challenge successful? 
• Do you believe that any of the following factors act as a barrier 
for unsuccessful tenderers to initiate a legal challenge under the 
Remedies legislation? Tick all that apply. 
• Cost of legal representation 
• Reputational risk 
• Duration of legal proceedings 
• Time period provided to initiate a challenge 
• Lack of knowledge of the Procurement and Remedies legislation
  
• In your experience, do contracting authorities undertake the 
following relevant checks before signing the contract? 
• Tax Clearance Certificate 
• Insurance Certificates 
• Previous Employment Law Compliance 
• Economic and Financial Company Reports 
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Appendix G: Research Participant Information and 
Consent 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Research Request  
We invite you to take part in the Irish Research Council funded Ph.D. research 
project ‘Facilitating Small and Medium Size Enterprise (SME) participation in 
Public Procurement.’ The research will be carried out by the doctoral candidate 
Emma McEvoy. The research is supervised by Prof. Michael Doherty, 
Department of Law, Maynooth University.  
Research Overview 
Public bodies spend billions of Euro purchasing goods and services, making 
procurement an important lever for achieving societal goals. The research 
examines the relationship between public procurement and small and medium 
size enterprises (“SMEs”). Public procurement refers to the procedures by which 
public bodies purchase goods, services or construction works. The research 
questions to what extent the inclusion of social clauses in public procurement 
facilitates SME participation. Whilst SMEs represent 99% of all businesses in 
the EU, SMEs are disproportionately represented in public markets. SMEs are 
faced with administrative and financial barriers when competing for public 
contracts (European Commission, 2014). European Public Procurement 
Directives include a number of social clauses which encourage small business 
participation, such as the permissible division of large contracts into smaller lots, 
use of local conditions and setting aside of certain contracts. The research 
investigates the extent to which the inclusion of social clauses in public contracts 
facilitates SME participation.  Improving the relationship between SMEs and 
public procurement is intended to bring about increased value to the European 
economy, stimulate higher growth and increase job opportunities. 
A primary aim of the research is to address the core problems faced by public 
bodies in facilitating SME friendly policies in their tendering practices. 
Secondly, the research recognises that there is a gap in significant literature and 
aims to contribute to the level of understanding of the strategic role of European 
procurement to both academics and practitioners. A cross-national comparative 
case study approach is adopted to assess the impact of the inclusion of social 
clauses in public contracts. Four individual Irish and UK case studies which have 
included a variety of social clauses in their tendering procedures will be 
evaluated.  
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Research Methodology 
The research adopts a triangulation approach, relying on cross-national 
comparative case studies. The mixed-method triangulation approach allows for 
the research to effectively examine the legislative and practical impact of 
including social clauses in public contracts. A primarily qualitative approach is 
adopted, interviews and focus groups with key public procurers and small 
businesses will be conducted to gain a true understanding of the issues facing the 
inclusion of social clauses in public contracts. 
Each case study will examine whether the following five independent social 
clauses have a positive or negative impact on facilitating SMEs in procurement 
procedures. The following social clauses were identified during the literature 
review stage; 
 
Division of large contracts into smaller “lots” 
Use of Pre-commercial procurement - Allowing SMEs to prepare for tender 
competitions and to inform public buyers of any new innovative good or service 
Protection of Sub-contractor rights - Allowing SMEs to successfully gain a 
proportion of a large contract 
Use of Sheltered Workshops - Encouraging social enterprises to enter the public 
market 
Inclusion of Local Conditions -For example, encouraging winning contractors to 
employ long-term unemployed people  
The case study findings will allow for the research to establish a framework for 
analysing the impact of the inclusion of social clauses in public contracts on 
SME engagement. 
Research output 
The researcher recognises the vital importance of disseminating research at 
regular intervals throughout the life cycle of the project. Research will be 
disseminated through the submission of conference papers and publication of 
academic and practitioner papers. 
 
Data protection and confidentiality 
1. Data collection 
 
Your interview will be recorded on a digital audio recorder, and subsequently 
transcribed. If you do not wish to be audio recorded, you may still undertake an 
interview. In this case, the researcher will take notes for review. In both cases 
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you can request a copy of your interview transcript. After you have reviewed the 
text, it will then be anonymised.  
 
2. Data usage 
 
Only the researcher and her supervisor will see the original transcriptions. The 
anonymised data will be included in the Ph.D. thesis, academic publications, 
presentations and teaching case studies. Participants will receive draft copies of 
any publications and can request for any misleading or misinterpreted 
information to be deleted prior to publication.   
 
3. Confidentiality 
 
All data is strictly confidential, and will be stored securely on encrypted laptop 
in Room 46, Ground Floor, New House Building, South Campus. Only the 
researcher will have access to the data. The audio and text files will be securely 
stored in accordance with university protocol, and destroyed after ten years in 
accordance with the Maynooth University Research Integrity Policy. 
 
It must be recognised that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research 
data and records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the 
course of investigation by lawful authority. In such circumstances the University 
will take all reasonable steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is 
maintained to the greatest possible extent. 
 
 
4. Withdrawal from the study 
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. If you feel uncomfortable due to any part 
of the study you can withdraw your consent at any time. This includes during or 
after the interview, including after reading the transcript. 
 
If during your participation in this study you feel the information and guidelines 
that you were given have been neglected or disregarded in any way, or if you are 
unhappy about the process, please contact the Secretary of the Maynooth 
University Ethics Committee at research.ethics@nuim.ie or +353 (0)1 708 
6019. Please be assured that your concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive 
manner. 
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Consent Sheet 
 
I hereby declare that I agree that any information ticked below, which has 
evolved as part of the interview today may be included in the Ph.D. thesis and 
research dissemination publications, such as academic journal articles, 
presentations and teaching case studies.  
 
Information indicated as confidential will only be used internally in the 
research, this information will neither be cited nor will it be published, neither 
partially nor completely. 
 
 
1. I consent to mentioning my name as interview partner in 
publications 
2. I consent to stating my institution in publications relating to 
my name 
3.  I consent to mentioning my name for quotes from the 
interview 
4. I consent to sharing pictures that are taken during the course 
of the interview 
5. I have read and understood the information sheet 
6. I understand that my participation is completely voluntary 
7. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at 
any stage 
8. I understand that I am not obliged to answer any questions if 
I don’t want to 
9. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and all my 
questions have been answered. 
10. I consent to participating in this study. 
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